S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition under Arts 226 and 227 of the Constitution for enforcement of fundamental rights under Art. 21 of the Constitution the present three petitioners who are original accused Nos. 3 to 5 respectively in criminal case No. 246 of 1982 pending investigation at Karelibag police station Baroda city pursuant to the criminal complaint filed against the present petitioners as well as other two accused on 21-7-1982 by the complainant one Mohammed Hanif Musabhai Vora alleged to be aged 15 years invoke interference of this court on the 3 ground that the said investigation by the Karelibag police station is illegal and unauthorized. ( 2 ) THE petition was admitted to final hearing by Bedarkar J. on 19 and it has reached final hearing before me today. The State of Gujarat as well as officer-in-charge of Karelibag police station and the learned Judicial Magistrate First class Baroda have been joined as parties to the present proceedings. ( 3 ) IN order to appreciate the grievance of the petitioners a few relevant facts leading to the present proceedings require to be stated at the outset. The complainant Mohammed Hanif Musabhai Vora who alleges to be 15 years. old has filed a criminal complaint at Karelibag police station against five accused out of whom present three petitioners as state: above are-accused Nos. 3 4 and 5 respectively. Accused No. 1 is one Anopkunvar Kantakunvar and accused No. 2 is one Kantakunvar Sundarkunvar. The said complaint is filed alleging7that the concerned five accused have committed offences under secs. 364 326 506 114 of the I. P. Code. The averment in the complaint against the relevant accused have vital bearing on the result of the present petition and hence it is necessary to note them in details of The complainant had given the aforesaid complaint originally before the Chhota Udepur police station and thereafter it was transferred to Karelibag police station at Baroda where it was registered on 27-7-1982 at 19. 30 hours. The complainant has stated in the complaint that he is aged 15 years and he is carrying on occupation of begging. That he is originally resident of Chhota Udepur but at the time of complaint he is said to be residing at Baroda in Baranpura and the exact place of residence is shown to be Hijda-Na-Akhada which is residential Were of eunuchs. That he is originally resident of Chhota Udepur but at the time of complaint he is said to be residing at Baroda in Baranpura and the exact place of residence is shown to be Hijda-Na-Akhada which is residential Were of eunuchs. The complainant States in his complaint that he is residing in station area with his father Musabhai Adambhai Patel since about one year. That he has four brothers and three sisters. He had gone to Baroda in search of service. He was doing manual labour in a canteen attached to Aradhna talkies at Baroda. He was doing the said manual work since about it years prior to the date of the complaint. During the time he Was doing his manual work in the said canteen one eunuch approached him. His name was Anopkunvar who is-accused No. 1 Accused No. 1 is alleged to have told the complainant that he will provide him with good service. Having given this pretext he took the complaint with him and kept him at his residence at Akota. During that time the complainant was putting on pens and bush-shirt. During the complainants stay with accused No. 1 at Akota on the must day another eunuch named Kantakunvar original accused No. 2 came to the complainant at Akota. Both accused Nos. 1 and 2 told the complainant that they will provide the complainant with service in a hotel Telling him accordingly they brought the complainant to Baranpura wearing residential locality called Akhada of Eunuchs is situated. At that place the complainant was made to put on saree blouse and skirt. The complainant allegedly resisted but as he was surrounded by large number of eunuchs his resistance was of no avail. The complainant was forcibly made to put on ladies dress and on the next day he was made to go to the surrounding villages and he was made to move therein for about a month and was made to beg. Thereafter he was brought back to Baranpura locality of Baroda city. The complainant further alleges shot he tried to run away from the said place but he could not do so. He was made to stay at Baranpura for one day more and thereafter he was taken by the aforesaid persons to Kalol (in Mehsana district ). The complainant further alleges that accused No. 2 took the complainant to Kalol. The complainant further alleges shot he tried to run away from the said place but he could not do so. He was made to stay at Baranpura for one day more and thereafter he was taken by the aforesaid persons to Kalol (in Mehsana district ). The complainant further alleges that accused No. 2 took the complainant to Kalol. That he was threatened by the eunuchs that if he informed anybody of this incident he would be killed. Under these circumstances due to the threat of beating the complainant remained in the control of these eunuchs. They took him near the water tank situated by the side of Kalol depot in Kalol town. The complainant was taken to the house of one Lulled Sited eunuch who is accused No. 3 present petitioner No. 1. The complainant further states that he stayed there for three days in ladys dress at the place of accused No. 3. On the night of 4th day accused Na. 3 brought one lady from village named Mansa. Her name was Hira who is original accused No. 4 present petitioner No. 2. The complainant was introduced to him. On that night at about 3 oclock accused No. 3 awakened the complainant and took him to the third room of her residential house. The surrounding doors were closed and the radio was put on at full tone. At that time one Shankar who is accused No. 5 and present petitioner No. 3 came there and as the complainant was shouting his mouth was gagged and was made to lie down. Accused No. 4 Hira thereafter took out the clothes of the complaint and cut off the private part of the complainant with a weapon which appeared to be a small sword. The complainant thereafter became unconscious and regained consciousness after six days. He was made to stay at Kalol for about a month and thereafter he was brought back to Baroda in Baranpura locality. The complainant further states that for the aforesaid work accused Nos. 4 and 5 had charged Rs. 2 500 accused No. 2. The complainant was thereafter staying at Baroda and by then had paid about Rs. 5 0 to accused No. 2 by collection alms. The complainant further states that for the aforesaid work accused Nos. 4 and 5 had charged Rs. 2 500 accused No. 2. The complainant was thereafter staying at Baroda and by then had paid about Rs. 5 0 to accused No. 2 by collection alms. The complainant further states that the entire incident had happened because of ignorance and minor age of the complainant and now he is made to live in this world in the form of a eunuch. That the entire incident occurred against the wish of the complainant and the accused have renamed him as Jyotikunvar Anopkunvar. ( 4 ) ON the basis of the aforesaid complaint the officer-in-charge of Karelibag police station started investigation as the alleged offences are cognizable in nature. It is at this stage that original accused Nos. 3 4 and 5 have come to this court by way of the present proceedings. ( 5 ) MR. N. K. Barot learned Advocate for the petitioners vehemently contended that Karelibag police station officer has no authority or power to initiate and continue investigation against the present three petitioners as the complaint filed against them even though taken at its face value does not disclose any offence committed by these three accused within the local limits of Karelibag police station Baroda. Consequently under sec. 156 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Karelibag police station has no authority whatsoever to investigate the alleged offences against the present petitioners. Mr. Barot submitted that if at all any alleged Senses are committed by the petitioners then are said to have been committed exclusively within the local limits of Kalol city police station. He contended that even if the complaint is taken at its face value the only allegation against the present three petitioners original accused Nos. 3 4 and 5 respectively is that the complainant was emasculated against his wish by the concerned accused in collusion with each other at Kalol at the house of accused No. 3. That consequently the offence of forcible emasculation which at the highest may constitute an offence under sec. 326 read with secs. 506 and 114 I. P. Code is alleged to have been committed by the three accused Nos. 3 4 and 5 respectively at Kalol. That consequently the offence of forcible emasculation which at the highest may constitute an offence under sec. 326 read with secs. 506 and 114 I. P. Code is alleged to have been committed by the three accused Nos. 3 4 and 5 respectively at Kalol. That the complaint nowhere alleges that any of these accused had anything to do with the initial offence of kidnaping the complainant which is said to have been committed by original accused Nos. 1 and 2 at Baroda. He therefore contended that the investigation against the present petitioners is being carried on contrary to law and consequently the petitioners are entitled to get their fundamental rights under Article 21 enforced by issuance of a proper writ of this court at this stage against the investigating agency. ( 6 ) IN order to appreciate the aforesaid contentions of Mr. Barot for the petitioners it is necessary to have a look at the relevant statutory provisions. As per sec. 156 (1) of the Code police officers powers to investigate cognizable cases have been enumerated. As the said section is relevant for the purpose of decision of this petition it is necessary to reproduce it in extenso:-"56 (1) Any officer in charge of a police station may without the order of a Magistrate investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the Ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate (3) Any Magistrate empowered under sec. 190 may order such an investigation as abovementioned"sub-SEC. (1) of sec. 156 authorises an officer-in-charge of a police station to investigate any cognizable case without an order of the Magistrate provided the offence is committed in the local area within the limits of the said police station. For that purpose local jurisdiction of the court over the concerned local area where the police station is situated has to be ascertained in the light of the provisions of Chapter XIII of the Code. Before going to chapter XIII of the Code it is necessary to note at this stage that as per sec. For that purpose local jurisdiction of the court over the concerned local area where the police station is situated has to be ascertained in the light of the provisions of Chapter XIII of the Code. Before going to chapter XIII of the Code it is necessary to note at this stage that as per sec. 156 (1) two statutory requirements are provided by the legislature before the concerned officer can investigate into a cognizable case (i) he must be the officer-in-charge of the concerned police station and (ii) he must have territorial jurisdiction to investigate into the concerned cognizable case meaning thereby that the officer-in-charge of the police station must have competence to investigate into the offence and which competence can be culled out from the nature of the jurisdiction of the court situated in to the concerned local area as can be gathered from the relevant provisions of Chapter XIII. In other words local jurisdiction of the concerned court over the area in which the alleged offence is committed would run parallel to the corresponding local jurisdiction of the concerned police station situated in that area to investigate into the said offence. Thus both the jurisdictions of the concerned police station officer to investigate in to the offence and the concerned court to take cognizance of the offence are co-terminus and they operate in the same field. As the jurisdiction of the officer-in-charge of the police station to investigate into the given offence is of the same nature as the corresponding jurisdiction of the concerned court to take cognizance of the concerned offence it is necessary to turn to Chapter XIII of the Code to find out as to whether the offences alleged against the concerned accused in the present case can be tried by the learned judicial Magistrate at Baroda because it is obvious that if the learned Magistrate at Baroda has jurisdiction to try the concerned offence against the accused ipso facto the police station officer at Karelibag police station Baroda would get similar jurisdiction to investigate into these offences and not otherwise. ( 7 ) CHAPTER XIII of the Code is having caption Jurisdiction of the Criminal courts in inquiries and trials. Sec. 177 provides for ordinary place of inquiry and trial and states that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. ( 7 ) CHAPTER XIII of the Code is having caption Jurisdiction of the Criminal courts in inquiries and trials. Sec. 177 provides for ordinary place of inquiry and trial and states that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. Taking a clue from the said section Mr. Barot contends that if the court of Judicial Magistrate first-class Baroda can have jurisdiction to inquire into or try the alleged offences against the present petitioners then only the officer-in-charge of the Karelibag police station at Baroda would get jurisdiction to investigate into the said offences against the petitioners on conjoint reading of secs. 156 (1) and 177. Mr. Barot submits that as the alleged offences under secs. 326 506 read with sec. 114 as alleged against the aforesaid accused-present petitioners are said to have been committed at Kalol withal the local limits of jurisdiction of Judicial Magistrate first-class Kalol the criminal court at Baroda would obviously have no territorial jurisdiction to inquire into or try such offences and therefore officer-in-charge at Karelibag police station Baroda would also not get any such jurisdiction. If the latter had rested only at this stage the contention of Mr. Barot would have carried lot of substance. But in Chapter XIII is also found sec. 184 which is every material for four present purpose. It reduces under:"here - (A) the offences committed by any person are such that he may be charged with and tried at one trial for each such offence by virtue of the provisions of sec. 219 sec. 220 or sec. 221 or (B) the offence or offences committed by several persons are such that they may be charged with and tried together by virtue of the provisions of sec. 219 sec. 220 or sec. 221 or (B) the offence or offences committed by several persons are such that they may be charged with and tried together by virtue of the provisions of sec. 223 the offences may be inquired into or tried by any court competent to inquire into or try any of the offences"the aforesaid provision clearly indicates that if various offences have been committed either by the Same person or by different persons at the same or different places they ail can be tried at one trial and court having local jurisdiction over any of the offences would become competent to inquire into and try all the0aforesaid offence provided the conditions laid in clause (a) or (b) are satisfied in a given case So far as the present case is concerns clause (a) of sec. 184 is out of picture for the simple reason that the concerned accused cannot be tried together under sec. 219 sec. 220 or sec. 221. Sec. 219 deals with three offences of same kind within one year which may be charged together. It is rot the case of the complainant that the accused had committed three offences of the same kind within one year. Sec. 220 is also out of picture. Sec. 220 (1) provides" (1) If in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transacttion more offences than one are committed by the same person he may be charged with and tried at one trial for every such offence". It is obvious that it is not the case of the complainant in the present complaint that original accused No. 1 or accused No. 2 had committed series of acts connected together. But on the contrary his case is that various accused had committed different offences against him at two places that is-at Baroda as well as at Kalol (Mehsana district ). In the same way sec. 221 also cannot be of any assistance to the investigating agency. But on the contrary his case is that various accused had committed different offences against him at two places that is-at Baroda as well as at Kalol (Mehsana district ). In the same way sec. 221 also cannot be of any assistance to the investigating agency. Sec. 221 (1) provides" (1) If a single_act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences and any number of such charges may be tried at once or he may be charged in the alternative with having committed some one of the said offence It is obvious that sec. 221 cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. It is therefore clear that clause (a) of sec. 184 can have no applicable to the facts for the present case. it may be stated that clause (a) of sec. 184 deal with a single accused who may have committed plurality of offences". In the present case there are more than one accused. It is in these circumstances that sub-clause (b) of sec. 184 would assume importance. As per the said provision if offence or offences committed by several persons are such that they may be charged with and tried together by virtue of the provisions of sec. 223 all these offence can be inquired into and tried by any court competent to inquire into or try any of these offences meaning there by that if different person have committed offence under the circumstances envisaged by sec. 223 all these offences can be inquired into or tried together by a court which may be competent to inquire into or try any of the offences. Competence to try any of the offences would by itself cloth the court with further competence to try all the rest of the offences even though they may have been committed beyond the local limits of the that court. It is therefore necessary to have a look at sec. 223. The said section provides for charging different accused jointly and it states"the following persons may be charged and tried together". The only relevant clause of sec. 223 is clause (d) and it reads as under:" (D) persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction". It is therefore necessary to have a look at sec. 223. The said section provides for charging different accused jointly and it states"the following persons may be charged and tried together". The only relevant clause of sec. 223 is clause (d) and it reads as under:" (D) persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction". It must therefore be found as to whether in the present case the concerned five accused who are alleged to have committed different offences against the complainant have committed them in the course of the same transaction. If the answer is yes sec. 223 (d) would clearly apply to the present case Consequently by virtue of sec. 184 (b) Baroda court willful get jurisdiction to inquire it or try all the offences against all the concerned five accused and in that eventuality as per sec. 156 (1) of the Code Karelibag police station at Baroda in its turn would also get jurisdiction to. investigate into all these offences against the concerned accused. If the answer is in the negative the result would be opposite. I have already reproduced in details the relevant averment in the complaint. A conjoint reading of the said averment leaves no room for doubt that different sets of accused are alleged to have committed distinct offences at different places. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 are alleged to have committed the offence of kidnaping the complaint at Baroda obviously within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Criminal court at Baroda. Mr. Barot for the petitioners submitted before me that the offence of kidnapping is complete moment the alleged minor is taken out of the custody of his legal guardian. There cannot be any dispute about the aforesaid legal position. So far as the offence of emasculation is concerned the complaint discloses that accused No. 2 conveyed the complainant to Kalol after allegedly threatening him and saw to it that he was emasculated at Kalol with the assistance of accused Nos. 3 4 and 5. Mr. Barot is therefore right when he contends that as per the complaint offence of emasculation was allegedly committed by accused Nos. 2 to S at Kalol within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the learned Judicial Magistrate First class Kalol Dist. Mehsana. Thus two distinct offences under sec. 3 4 and 5. Mr. Barot is therefore right when he contends that as per the complaint offence of emasculation was allegedly committed by accused Nos. 2 to S at Kalol within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the learned Judicial Magistrate First class Kalol Dist. Mehsana. Thus two distinct offences under sec. 364 on one hand and 326 I. P. C. on the other are alleged to have been committed by different sets of accused at two Disorient places in two different districts. But the matter does not rest there. A close look at the complaint shows that the entire modes operand of the concerned accused was to see that the complainant who was alleged to be a minor boy was won over to their fold and was made a eunuch. That seems to be the be all and lend all the prime motive of the concerned accused atleast accused Nos. 1 2 and 3. They do not appear to be Warily interested in kidnaping the minor boy and make him a begger on his own which he was even prior to the incident but their real object appears to be as alleged in the complaint (truth or falsity of allegations whereof is still to be ascertained at the time of trial and for which I obviously cannot and do not express any opinion one way or the other) to make the complainant a eunuch and to have one more addition to their fold with the ultimate object of having an additional professional begger of their own type. The complainant has clearly stated that he was made to stay at the house of accused No. 1 who was a eunuch for about three days and thereafter he was taken to the residential locality of eunuchs at Baranpura Baroda city where he was made to put on ladys dress and he was forced to put on this dress as he was surrounded by many eunuchs. It therefore appears clear that the real object of allegedly kidnaping the complainant was to make him a eunuch and it is with that object in view that initial offence of kidnaping was allegedly committed by accused Nos. 1 and 2. The complaint further recites that accused No. 2 and other accused who threatened the complainant forcibly took him to Kalol where with the assistance of accused Nos. 1 and 2. The complaint further recites that accused No. 2 and other accused who threatened the complainant forcibly took him to Kalol where with the assistance of accused Nos. 3 to 5 final object of emasculation was carried into effect and even thereafter he WAS brought to the headquarters of eunuchs at Baranpura locality Baroda city. Thus the entire cycle was complete moment the complainant after his emasculation was brought back to Baroda. In Baranpura locality where he was even earlier made to stay to the company of eunuchs having been forced to put on ladys dress. It therefore prima facie appears that the act of kidnaping is so closely inter-twined with the final act of emasculation that both these offences appear to be part and parcel of a common design and are components of the same transaction. Mr. Barot at this state submitted that so far as accused Nos. 3 4 and 5 are concerned they are not even alleged to have shared the original design of accused Nos. 1 and 2 at Baroda where they kidnaped the complainant the alleged minor whom they confined at Baroda with the alleged ultimate object of getting him emasculated. ( 8 ) MR. Barot further contended that so far as accused Nos. 3 4 S the present petitioners are concerned only accused No. 3- petitioner No. 1 is a eunuch while so far as petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 original accused Nos. 4 and 5 are concerned one of them is a female viz. accused No. 4 and accused No. 5 is a male. In my view at this stage where the court is only concerned with the question whether investigating agency at Baroda has jurisdiction to investigate into the concerned offences alleged in the complaint the question whether any offence can be brought home to the concerned accused on evidence does not at all arise for consideration. As it is a well settled position of law for deciding the question about territorial jurisdiction or authority or power of the investigating agency or of the criminal court the averment in the complaint are required to be presumed to be true and on demurrer such question of jurisdiction and power has to be resolved. The complaint Alleged that accused Nos. 1 and 2. who acted at Baroda and accuse No. 3 who acted at Kalol in Mehsana district are eunuchs. Mr. The complaint Alleged that accused Nos. 1 and 2. who acted at Baroda and accuse No. 3 who acted at Kalol in Mehsana district are eunuchs. Mr. Barot for the petitioner has no quarrel with this factual position. But what he contends is that so far as accused Nos. 4 and 5 are concerned they are not eunuchs and whatever act is alleged to have been committed by them was entirely at Kalol beyond the local jurisdiction of the Baroda police or for that purpose the criminal court at Baroda. As I have already indicated above the conjoint reading of all the relevant averment in the complaint leaves no room for doubt that accused Nos. 1 and 2 at Baroda are alleged to have kidnaped the complainant with a view to ultimately getting him emasculated and to bring him into their fold of professional beggers. They seem to have indulged in the offence of kidnaping and accused No. 2 in his turn with the assistance of accused Nos. 3 4 and 5 is alleged to have fulfilled the ultimate object of getting the complainant emasculated at Kalol after requisitioning the expect services of accused No. 4 who according to Mr. Barot appears to be acting like an experienced mid-wife in such adventures. Accused No. 5 is alleged to have contributed his mite in making the adventure a complete success. Thus the role played by accused Nos. 4 and 5 represents the role of persons who have allegedly acted as limbs of other accused who were admittedly eunuchs. It must therefore be held prima facie at this stage that the offence of emasculation alleged to have been committed at Kalol in Mehsana district was part and parcel of the comprehensive transaction of kidnaping and castrating the concerned victim with a view to making him an eunuch who could be a useful addition to their class of professional beggers. ( 9 ) AT this stage it is necessary to have a look at a few decisions to which my attention was invited by Mr. Barot for the petitioners. He invited my attention to the Supreme court judgment in State of A. P. v. Cheemalapati Ganeshwara Rao and Another 1968 S. C. 1850. In the aforesaid case the Supreme court was concerned with the interpretation of the provisions of sec. Barot for the petitioners. He invited my attention to the Supreme court judgment in State of A. P. v. Cheemalapati Ganeshwara Rao and Another 1968 S. C. 1850. In the aforesaid case the Supreme court was concerned with the interpretation of the provisions of sec. 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 The said section is practically pari materia with sec. 223 of the present Code. Sec. 239 (d) of the old Code is couched in the same language in which sec. 223 (d) of the present Code is couched. Certain offences of criminal conspiracy in connection with misappropriation and falsification of accounts were alleged to have been committed by the concerned accused. The question before the Supreme Court was whether there was any misjoinder of parties in that case. The Supreme Court had therefore to decide whether for the applicability of sec. 239 (d) it was necessary to ascertain anything more than this that the different offences were committed in the course of the same transaction or whether it must further be ascertained whether the acts are intrinsically connected with one another. Under these circumstances the question about the true connotation of the words same transaction squarely arose for decision of the Supreme court. Mudholkar J. speaking for the Supreme court made the following pertinent observation;" What is meant by same transaction is not defined anywhere in the Code. Indeed it would always be difficult to define precisely what the expression means. Whether a transaction can be regarded as the same solve necessarily depend upon the particular facts of each case and it section as to us to be a difficult task to undertake a definition of that which the Legislature has deliberately left undefined. We have not come across a single decision of any court which has embarked upon the difficult task of defining the expression. But it is generally thought that where there is proximity of time or place or unity of purpose and design or continuity of action in respect of a action of acts it may be possible to infer that they form part of the same transaction. It is however must necessary that every one of these elements should co-exist for a transaction to be regarded as the same. It is however must necessary that every one of these elements should co-exist for a transaction to be regarded as the same. But if several acts committed by a personal show a unity of purpose or design that would be a strong circumstance to indicate that those acts form part of the same transaction. The connection between a series of acts seems to us to be an essential ingredient for those acts to constitute the same transaction and therefore the mere absence of the words so connected together as to form in clauses (a) (c) (sic) and (d) of sec. 239 would make little difference. Now a transaction may consist of an isolated act or may consist of a series of acts. The series of acts which constitute a transaction must of necessity be connected with one another and if some of them stand out independentely they would not for part of the same transaction hut would constitute a different transition or transactions. Therefore even if the expression same transaction alone had been used in sec. 235 (1) it would have meant a transaction consisting either of a single act or of a series of connected acts. The same transaction occurring in clauses (a) (c) (sic) and (d) of sec. 239 as well as that occurring in see. 235 (1) ought to be given the same meaning according to the normal rule of construction of statutes. (emphasis supplied)"the Supreme court held that various clauses of sec. 239 (1) are cumulative in nature and they are not mutually exclusive. In the light of the aforesaid settled legal position it will have to be seen whether various acts alleged against different sets of accused in the present case show unity of purpose and design. If they show unity of purpose or design several acts would form part of the same transaction. As I have already stated above for that purpose the averment in the complaint have to be taken at their face value. In my view various average in the complaint clearly indicate a common thread which runs through the entire transaction viz. minor boy was sought to be kidnaped with ultimate object of emasculation and to bring him within the fold of begging eunuchs. this common thread runs throughout the length and breadth of various allegations in the complaint. It must therefore be held that thorough accused Nos. minor boy was sought to be kidnaped with ultimate object of emasculation and to bring him within the fold of begging eunuchs. this common thread runs throughout the length and breadth of various allegations in the complaint. It must therefore be held that thorough accused Nos. 3 4 and 5 may have come on the scene later on at a different place altogether accused No. 2 who seemed to have matter minded the entire operation castration against the complaint is alleged to have acted all throughout from beginning to end and hence it can prima facial be held that there was unity of purpose or destination or cognoscenti of action in respect of various acts committed by the accused at different places. Consequently even applying the ratio of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision in my view present accused-petitioners can squarely be covered by the provision of sec. 223 (d) which is analogous to the provisions of sec. 239 (d) of the old Code with which the Supreme Court was concerned. ( 10 ) MR. Barot then invited my attention to two decisions of the Punjab and Hariyana high Court and Travancore-Kochin High Court viz A. I. R. 1965 Pun. 449 and A. I. R. 1965 The. 26. So far as the aforesaid decision are concerned they go on the same lines as the Supreme Court and therefore it is not necessary to burden this judgment by repeating what other High Courts have stated on the aspect of the same transactions. Before parting with the first contention of Mr. Barot I must note one submission of Mr. Barot. He submitted that looking to the averment in the complaint no offence of kidnaping is disclosed even against accused Nos. 1 and 2 eunuch less against accused Nos. 3 4 and 5. As I have stated earlier so far as accused Nos. 3 4 and 5 are concerned it is not the complainants case that they had kidnaped him. But the reading of the complaint shows that accused Nos. 1 and 2 had kidnaped the complaint at Baroda and kept him in their company against his wish and it is accused No. 2 who brought the complainant to Kalol where with the assistance of accused Nos. 3 4 and 5 he was got emasculated. Under these circumstances once a view is taken that the entire transaction was one viz. 1 and 2 had kidnaped the complaint at Baroda and kept him in their company against his wish and it is accused No. 2 who brought the complainant to Kalol where with the assistance of accused Nos. 3 4 and 5 he was got emasculated. Under these circumstances once a view is taken that the entire transaction was one viz. kidnaping wrongful confinement and emasculation and in fact emasculation was the main object of the modes operand adopted by the concerned accused applicability of sec. 223 (d) is clearly made out on the averment made in the Complaint and in light of the aforesaid Supreme court decision. I must make it clear that on the question whether the complaint discloses any offence of kidnaping and abatement against accused Nos. 1 and 2. I am not required to make any observation whatever at this stage as they are not before me. The only grievance made before me is on behalf of accused Nos. 3 4 and 5 against starting of investigation against them by the Baroda police on the ground that the complaint discloses no offence alleged to have been committed by these accused within Baroda limits. As observed by me above the relevant averment in the complaint which have got to be taken as true at this stage clearly indicate that various offences are alleged to have been committed by different concerned accused as part and parcel of a comprehensive one and the same transaction. It must therefore be held that on a combined reading of secs. 156 (1) 184 (b) and sec. 223 (d) the criminal court at Baroda has ample jurisdiction to try the offences alleged against the concerned accused. Automatically the police at Baroda would get parallel jurisdiction to investigate into these offences. The only contention raised by Mr. Barot in support of the petition is therefore repelled. ( 11 ) ONCE the aforesaid conclusion is reached the present criminal proceedings must come to an end against the petitioners. But in order to complete this judgment it is necessary to note an alternative legal position which squarely emerges on the record of the case at this stage. Even assuming that the offences alleged to have been committed by accused Nos. But in order to complete this judgment it is necessary to note an alternative legal position which squarely emerges on the record of the case at this stage. Even assuming that the offences alleged to have been committed by accused Nos. 3 4 and 5 at Kalol in Mehsana district are independent offences which do not form part and parcel of the same transaction and even assuming that Mr. Barot is right in his contention even then there is an insurmountable difficulty in his way in getting any relief from this court in the present proceedings. His contention is that accused Nos. 3 4 and 5 are alleged to have committed offence of emasculation against the complainant beyond the local limits of the jurisdiction of the criminal court at Baroda as the said offence had allegedly taken place at Kalol in Mehsana district and therefore under sec. 156 (1) Baroda police would have no power to investigate into the said offence committed Kalol. Even if Mr. Barot is right. So far the Legislature has provided a safety valve by enacting sec. 156 (2) which has already been extracted by me earlier. To recapitulate at this stage the said provision in terms states that no proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate meaning thereby that any irregularity in the process of investigation regarding an offence which the concerned police officer was not empowered under sec. 156 to investigate into cannot be called in question during the continuation of such investigation. It is necessary to recall at this stage that sec. 156 (1) of the Code empowers a police officer in charge of a police station to investigate any cognizable case which the court having jurisdiction over the Local area can inquire into and/or try. Mr. Barots contention is that sub-sec. (2) of sec. 156 carves out a limited exception to sec. 156 viz. 156 (1) of the Code empowers a police officer in charge of a police station to investigate any cognizable case which the court having jurisdiction over the Local area can inquire into and/or try. Mr. Barots contention is that sub-sec. (2) of sec. 156 carves out a limited exception to sec. 156 viz. that if in a given case it is found that a police officer other than the officer-in-charge of the police station is investigating a cognizable case which otherwise falls within the territorial limits of that station then in such an eventuality such an irregularity in conducting of investigation by an unauthorized police officer is sought to be insulated against by sec. 156 (2 ). But if the police officer in charge of the police station has no territorial jurisdiction to investigate into any cognizable case that absence of power is not shielded by sec. 156 (2 ). It is not possible to agree with the aforesaid contention of Mr. Barot. It is true that under sec. 156 (1) the officer-in-charge of the police station is the designated police officer who has to investigate into the cognizable offence which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the local area of the concerned court wherein the police station is situated. Thus under sec. 156 (1) the legislature has pinpointed the concerned officer in charge of the police station who has to investigate the cognizable offence and the area of his operation is also ear--marked by laying down that he can investigate into the cognizable case which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned court in the local area in which the police station is situated. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 156 in terms lays down that no proceedings of police officer in any such case can be called in question on the ground that such officer was not empowered under this sub-section to investigate. Now it is obvious that the term police officer is the genus while the officer-in-charge of the police station is its species as defined by sec. 156 in terms lays down that no proceedings of police officer in any such case can be called in question on the ground that such officer was not empowered under this sub-section to investigate. Now it is obvious that the term police officer is the genus while the officer-in-charge of the police station is its species as defined by sec. 2 of the Code which states:"officer in charge of a police station includes when the officer in charge of the police station is absent from the station house or unable from illness or other cause to perform his duties the police officer present at the station house who is next in rank to such officer and is above the rank of constable or when the State Government so directs any other police officer so present-". It is therefore obvious that the officer-in-charge of the police station is also a police officer but he is designated police officer by express words of sec. 156 (1 ). But when we come to sub-sec. (2) advisedly the legislature has used wider word police officer meaning thereby that immunity is sought to be given to the investigation proceedings initiated by any police officer which in its turn would include even an officer in charge of the police station and this immunity against any attack on the investigation procedure is comprehensive immunity which states that such investigation shall not be called if question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. Consequently if any police officer was not empowered to investigate the offence even then his investigation cannot be called in question at any stage of investigation. Empowerment of the officer to investigate may be by his designation or quo the territorial jurisdiction within which he functions. Both these aspects are \ aspects of empowerment under sec. 156 (1 ). But the attempt of Mr. Barot was to show that sub-sec. (2) of sec. 56 may be so read as to provide only for immunity against procedural irregularity regarding investigation by the designated police officer and that this immunity may not be extended to cover cases of absence of territorial jurisdiction. On the express language of sec. 156 (2) it is not possible to agree with the aforesaid contention of Mr. Barot. 56 may be so read as to provide only for immunity against procedural irregularity regarding investigation by the designated police officer and that this immunity may not be extended to cover cases of absence of territorial jurisdiction. On the express language of sec. 156 (2) it is not possible to agree with the aforesaid contention of Mr. Barot. It must be held that any sort of irregularity or illegality in the conducting of investigation by any police officer with respect to any type of empowerment under sec. 156 (1) including territorial jurisdiction are all taken care of by the provisions of sec. 156 (2 ). The Get result therefore is that even assuming that a police officer in charge of a police station seeks to investigate into an offence which is beyond his territorial jurisdiction or alternatively an officer other than the officer in charge of the police station seeks to investigate into an offence which otherwise falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the said police station in either case sec. 156 (2) immunizes this investigation against any possible attack on the ground of absence of power with the concerned investigation officer. Mr. Barots submission that immunity can be confined to the latter type of case and not to the former does not stand scrutiny in the face of the express statutory language of sec. 156 (2 ). In this connection it would be profitable to have a look at a few relevant decisions on the point. In H. N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi A. I. R. 1955 S. C. 196 the Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether cognizance taken by a Magistrate on a police report which was vitiated by breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation can be found fault with at any later stage. The illegality in the investigation alleged in the case before the Supreme Court was that the investigating officer who had conducted the investigation was not empowered to investigate into the alleged office as per the requirement of sec. 5 (4) and proviso to sec. 3 of the prevention of Corruption Act as it stood prior to its amendments by Act 59 of 1952 and the corresponding sec. 5-A as inserted by Amending Act 59 of 1952. The Supreme Court held that the said provision were mandatory and the investigation conducted in violation thereof would bear the stamp of illegality. 3 of the prevention of Corruption Act as it stood prior to its amendments by Act 59 of 1952 and the corresponding sec. 5-A as inserted by Amending Act 59 of 1952. The Supreme Court held that the said provision were mandatory and the investigation conducted in violation thereof would bear the stamp of illegality. It is in this connection that the Supreme Court had to consider the corresponding provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure-sec. 156 onwards and the further question whether once cognizance is taken by a criminal court under clause (a) or (b) of sec. 190 (1) of the Code the alleged illegality of the police report can be made a ground to vitiate the cognizance. In this connection it is necessary to notice a few relevant observations made by Jagannadhadas J. in the aforesaid decision on the interpretation of secs. 155 and 156 of the Code. In connection with the provisions of sec. 156 (2) of the Code 1898 which are pari materia with the provisions of sec. 156 (2) of the new Code the following pertinent observations are made :"what sub-see. (2) of sec. 156 Criminal Procedure Code cures is investigation by to officer not empowered under that sec. i. e. with reference to sub-secs. (1) and (3) thereof. Sub-sec. (1) of sec. 156 is a provision empowering an officer in charge of a police station to investigate a cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate and delimiting his power to the investigation of such cases within certain local jurisdiction. It is the violation of this provision that is cured under sub-sec. (2 ). Obviously sub-sec. (2) of see. 156 cannot cure the violation of any other specie statutory provision prohibiting investigation by an officer of a lower rank then a Deputy Superintendent of Police unless specifically authorised. (Emphasis supplied) "mr. Barot is right when he contends that the Supreme Court was concerned with a case in which power of the concerned designated police officer to take cognizance was on the anvil. Still however the Supreme Court interpreted the provisions of sec. 156 (2) to mean that they gave complete immunity to investigation of cognizable cases by a police officer with respect to his power to investigate such case within any local jurisdiction and any violation of the provisions of sec. 156 (1) was held to be cured by sub-sec. (2) of sec. 156. 156 (2) to mean that they gave complete immunity to investigation of cognizable cases by a police officer with respect to his power to investigate such case within any local jurisdiction and any violation of the provisions of sec. 156 (1) was held to be cured by sub-sec. (2) of sec. 156. It must therefore be held as a settled legal position that any alleged infection of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 156 by any police officer is taken care of by the insulating provisions of sec. 156 (2 ). In the aforesaid Supreme Court decision it has been further held that:"a defect or illegality in investigation however serious has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. No doubt a police report which results from an investigation is provided in sec J9c Criminal P C. as the material on which cognizance is take if But it cannot be maintained that a valid and legal police report is the foundation if the Jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance. See. 19 Cr. P. C is one out of a group of sections under the heading Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings. the language of is section is in marked contrast with that of the other sections of the group under the same heading i. e. sec. 133 and 195 to 199. These latter sections regulate the competence of the court and bar its jurisdiction in certain cases excepting in compliance therewith. But sec. 190 does not While no doubt in one sense clauses (a) (b) and (c) of sec. 190 (1) are conditions requisite for taking of cognizance it is not possible to say that cognizance on an invalid police report is prohibited and is therefore a nullity. Such an invalid report may still fall either under clause (a) or (b) of sec. 190 (1) and in any case cognizance so taken is only in the nature of error in a proceeding antecedent to the trial. To such a situation sec. 537 Criminal P. C. is attracted". Such an invalid report may still fall either under clause (a) or (b) of sec. 190 (1) and in any case cognizance so taken is only in the nature of error in a proceeding antecedent to the trial. To such a situation sec. 537 Criminal P. C. is attracted". The Supreme Court placing reliance on two Privy Council decisions in Prabhu v. Emperor A. I. R. 1944 P. C. 73 and Lumbhardar Zutshi v. The king A. I. R. 1950 PC has further observed:"if therefore cognizance is in fact taken on a police report vitiated by the breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation there can be no doubt that the result of the trial which follows it cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a miscarriage of justice. That an illegality committed in the course of investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the court for trial is well settled". Mr. Barot fairly stated that it is true that if he does not challenge the investigation at this stage and if police report ultimately results and if the Baroda court takes cognizance on the basis of the police report which in his view would be an invalid police report cognizance taken by the Baroda court cannot be challenged save and except on the ground of prejudice as laid down by sec. 462 of the present Code. He therefore submitted that he has awaken in time and has therefore rushed to this court at this stage as for him it is now or never. It is true that the legal situation which may emerge after taking cognizance strictly does not arise at the stage but the legislative intention also has to be kept in view while considering the grievance of Mr. Barot at this stage where police report has not resulted and investigation is in progress The combined reading of sec. 156 (2) and sec 462 of the Code leaves no room for doubt that errors in conducting of investigation or in conducting of inquiries or trials which have nexus with territorial jurisdiction are not treated by the legislature to be fatal errors but mere irregularities which can be cured and can have clinching effect only when failure of justice and material prejudice are demonstrated by the concerned accused. If the legislature in its wisdom has insulated inquiries and trials before the criminal courts against the attacks on the ground of absence of territorial jurisdiction save and except in a given contingency where failure of justice and material prejudice are demonstrated it would be too much to hold that at prior stage of investigation a police officer who is investigating into the offence which does not fall within his territorial jurisdiction would he required to be totally prohibited from proceeding with investigation on the ground of that some of the offences into which he is investigating fall outside the ambit of his local jurisdiction. Even otherwise sec. 156 (2) which is a corresponding provision to sec. 462 which takes care of inquiries and trials can certainly be held to be a reflection of legislative intention that even pending investigation in such cases would not be thwarted on the ground of absence of power of the concerned officer. It is not necessary for me to dilate further on the question as there are series of judgments of the Supreme Court as well as this court taking the view that once cognizance is taken by a criminal court may be on illegal or invalid police report cognizance is not affected on merits and the only right open to the accused is to demonstrate failure of justice and material prejudice to challenge the result of the trial. I may only note a few of these decisions which were noticed by me during the course of arguments in the present cases1 A. I. R. 1962 Guj. 6052 A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 59. 3 A. I. R. 1959 S. C. 831. 4 A. I. R. 1962 Bom. 208. 5 A. I. R. 1963 Raj. 48. The last decision is required to be noted in a bit details as the question that arose before the learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High court directly touched the question of territorial jurisdiction of the investigating police officer. In the aforesaid Rajasthan decision the facts were that an offence of gambling was committed within the jurisdiction of Railway police. The investigation was however made by the District Police and the charge sheet was submitted not to the railway magistrate but to the judicial Magistrate. In the aforesaid Rajasthan decision the facts were that an offence of gambling was committed within the jurisdiction of Railway police. The investigation was however made by the District Police and the charge sheet was submitted not to the railway magistrate but to the judicial Magistrate. The Magistrate not only registered the case and called upon the party to bring evidence but he took further proceedings in that he supplied copies of the investigation papers to the accused and adjourned the case for hearing arguments with regard to the framing of charges and also bound them down for appearing in his court. An argument was raised before the Rajasthan High court to the effect that the report submitted by the railway police was an illegal report as it suffered from absence of territorial jurisdiction and consequently the proceedings before the learned Magistrate were bad in law. The Learned Single Judge relying upon the Supreme Court decision in H. N. Rishbuds case (supra) turned down the said contention. While doing so C. B. Bhargava J. noticed provisions of sec. 156 (1) and sec. 156 (2) of the Code Placing reliance on sec. 156 (2) of the Code Bhargava J. stated:"in view of the provisions of sec. 156 (2) Cr. P. C it was not open to the accused to question the investigation proceedings on the ground that the District police officer was not empowered to make investigation into an offence which was committed outside the local area of his police station. The Learned Magistrate was not right in entertaining this objection and discharging the accused on this ground. The purpose of investigation is to ascertain facts and to collect evidence. No question of prejudice to the accused arises when investigation has been made by an officer in charge of the police station even in contravention of provisions of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 156 Cr. P. C. It is for this reason that under sub-sec. (2) such proceedings cannot be called in question". It is therefore obvious that provisions of sec. 156 (2) of the Code were so interpreted as to furnish a cloak of immunity to investigation by a police officer for offences beyond his territorial jurisdiction. I concur with the aforesaid reasoning adopted by Bhargava J. of Rajasthan High Court. As I have already stated above there is no reason to cut down the wide scope and ambit of sec. I concur with the aforesaid reasoning adopted by Bhargava J. of Rajasthan High Court. As I have already stated above there is no reason to cut down the wide scope and ambit of sec. 156 (2) and to narrow it down to procedural irregularities pertaining to concerned designated police officer who may not be officer in charge of the police station as tried to be submitted by Mr. Barot. ( 12 ) MR. Barot then invited my attention to sec. 461 (L) of the Code which states. "if any Magistrate not being empowered by law in this behalf does any of the following things namely. x x x x (1) tries an offender;x x x x his proceedings shall be void one of the irregularities catelogued in sec. 461 pertains to trying an offender by a Magistrate not empowered by law in this behalf. Mr. Barot submitted that as per the aforesaid provisions if the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction to try an offender his trial would be void. With respect this would amount to arguing in a circle. If the Magistrate is not permitted by law to try any accused it would obviously be an irregularity which would vitiate the proceedings. But so far as sec. 462 is concerned it has in terms pointed out that any infringement of procedure about trial of offences falling within a given territorial jurisdiction has not been treated by the legislature on the same footing as an irregularity vitiating the trial by itself as envisaged by sec. 461 (L ). Therefore sec. 461 (L) will be confined to those cases in which the Magistrate may be inherently lacking power in himself to try an offender and which lack of power must be such lack of power which has no nexus with absence of territorial jurisdiction. Even otherwise the alleged illegal investigation in a case which results into an illegal police report is finally held by the Supreme court as not resulting in any illegality in taking cognizance by the concerned Magistrate of the offence disclosed thereby. Consequently sec. 461 (L) can obviously have no play so far as such cases are concerned. Even otherwise the alleged illegal investigation in a case which results into an illegal police report is finally held by the Supreme court as not resulting in any illegality in taking cognizance by the concerned Magistrate of the offence disclosed thereby. Consequently sec. 461 (L) can obviously have no play so far as such cases are concerned. The present case is alleged to be involving an irregularity in investigation procedure which has a nexus with territorial jurisdiction of the police authority and which is likely to have effect on the ultimate police report which might result at the end of investigation. To such a case provisions of sec. 461 (L) can never apply. It must also be observed that notwithstanding the provisions of sec. 461 (L) or its equivalent provisions in the old Code being sec. 530 (p) the Supreme Court in a series of judgments has taken the view that cognizance taken on an illegal police report does not by itself vitiate the trial. It is not open to Mr. Barot to contend before me that the ratio of various Supreme Court judgments would have no binding effect in view of the non-consideration of sec. 461 (L) or its corresponding provisions by the Supreme Court. Even otherwise as I have shown above provisions of sec. 461 (L) have no relevance to the present question in controversy between the parties. ( 13 ) BEFORE parting with the present case I must note one more argument raised by Mr. Barot. He invited my attention to two Supreme Court judgments reported in 1982 Criminal Law Journal 819 paras 10 20 21 22 and 40 as well as 1982 Criminal Law Journal 867 para 12 in support of his contention that the accused have a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India to be proceeded against in accordance with law before any agency may be investigating agency or court and that if such right is violated or infringed action of the concerned officer would be a nullity. There cannot be any dispute so far as this proposition of law is concerned. Article 21 of the Constitution enjoins that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. There cannot be any dispute so far as this proposition of law is concerned. Article 21 of the Constitution enjoins that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. It may be stated that at this stage when a police officer investigates into alleged offences against the accused no question of deprivation of life arises. But the question of deprivation of personal liberty can squarely arise if such police officer arrests any accused without warrant in a cognizable case. But even then the Article itself provides that such type of attack on personal liberty may become permissible if the procedure established by law is followed by the concerned authority. It cannot be disputed and in fact it was not disputed by Mr. Barot that the Code of Criminal Procedure does establish a procedure according to law. But his grievance was that the said Code did not empower the investigating authority at Baroda to investigate into the offences in question against accused Nos. 3 4 and 5 who are the petitioners before me. Consequently mere reliance on Article 21 can be of no assistance to Mr. Barot. He therefore rightly concentrated his attack on the applicability of various provisions of the Code including sec. 156 (2 ). As discussed there appears no room for doubt that both on merits as well as on the ground of immunity under sec. 156 (2) the impugned investigation at Baroda cannot be faulted in the present proceedings at this stage and consequently the alleged violation of Article 21 pales into total insignificance. ( 14 ) BEFORE parting I may usefully refer to the latest judgment of the Supreme Court laying down the limited scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High court under Article 226 while it seeks to interfere with pending investigation proceedings. In State of Bihar v. J. A. C. Saldanna A. I. R. 1980 S. C. 326. D. A. Desai J. in this connection observed as under:"investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the police department the Superintendence over which vests in the State Government. The power of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence is ordinarily not to be interfered with by the judiciary. D. A. Desai J. in this connection observed as under:"investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the police department the Superintendence over which vests in the State Government. The power of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence is ordinarily not to be interfered with by the judiciary. THE High court in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction commits a grave error by making observations on seriously disputed questions of facts taking its clue from affidavits which in such a situation would hardly provide any reliable material. The High court is clearly in error in giving the direction virtually amounting to a mandamus to close the case before the investigation is complete. "it is therefore obvious that only in exceptional cases the High court in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can interpose at the stage of investigation. As discussed above the present is not one of those cases. On the contrary it is a case in which no need for interference with pending investigation is made out both on merits as well as on the ground of statutory immunity granted to this investigation by sec. 156 (2) of the Code. ( 15 ) IN the result the present proceedings fail as indicated above. Rule issued therein shall stand discharged. Mr. Barot at this stage made an oral application before me to certify this case to be fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. The oral application is made almost immediately on the completion of the dictation of this oral judgment. But as per rules of this court question of grant of certificate on such request will have to be resolved by a Division Bench. I accordingly direct that consideration of the oral request of Mr. Barot may be entrusted to a Division Bench at the earliest. The papers therefore may be placed before the learned Chief Justice for passing suitable orders in this behalf. Mr. Barot made it clear that while he makes this oral request he reserves his right to prefer a Letters Patent Appeal if permissible according to law. Mr. Barot also requested me to grant some time to him to enable him to approach the proper court for obtaining suitable interim relief. The request is reasonable. Mr. Barot made it clear that while he makes this oral request he reserves his right to prefer a Letters Patent Appeal if permissible according to law. Mr. Barot also requested me to grant some time to him to enable him to approach the proper court for obtaining suitable interim relief. The request is reasonable. I therefore direct that the police may not submit any charge-sheet against the present petitioners for a period of four weeks from today during which time the petitioners may do the needful. Petition dismissed: rule discharged. .