Judgment :- 1. This Original Petition is the outcome of an election held on September 16,1980, from Ward No. I of Edathua Panchayat reserved for women. The petitioner and respondents 1 and 2 were candidates. The counting of votes took place in the office of the Edathua Panchayat on the next day. The petitioner and the first respondent having polled equal number of votes, the second respondent claimed a re-counting and that was allowed. Even after recounting, the result remained the same. It is alleged by the petitioner that the first respondent then pointed out that a re-election will be the means to find a solution of the deadlock; while the petitioner pointed out that R.64 of the Kerala Panchayats (Decision of Election. Disputes) Rules, 1963, should be resorted to. The Returning Officer then said that he would consider the matter within a few minutes and the candidates and their agents were asked to remain outside the office. Accordingly, the petitioner and her agents came out of the office and remained outside. Within a few minutes, the first respondent and her agents got into the Returning Officer's room and came out with the announcement that she has been declared elected by drawing of lots. The protest made by the petitioner to the Returning Officer had no effect, and finally the first respondent was declared elected. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner filed O. P. (Election) No. 62/80 under S.22 of the Kerala Panchayats Act, 1960 read with R.5 of the Kerala Panchayats (Decision of Election Disputes) Rules, 1963, hereinafter called respectively the Act and the Rules, before the Principal Munsiff, Alleppey, the third respondent herein. Several grounds were taken in the petition and one of the main grounds was that there was non-compliance of R.64 of the Rules and that has materially affected the result of the election. Evidence, both oral and documentary; was adduced on either side. On the conclusion of the trial, the third respondent dismissed the petition. Ext. P1 is the true copy of the order. 2. At the time when the Original Petition came up for hearing the main ground taken by Sri. Evidence, both oral and documentary; was adduced on either side. On the conclusion of the trial, the third respondent dismissed the petition. Ext. P1 is the true copy of the order. 2. At the time when the Original Petition came up for hearing the main ground taken by Sri. Kuriakose, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, is that the learned Munsiff seriously erred by laying down a wrong law relating to the manner and service of notice contemplated under R.64; and that the very approach made by him to the material question involved was wrong. This, according to the counsel, constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record and the order impugned is therefore liable to be interfered with. 3. R.64 of the Rules reads: "64. Drawing of lots in case of equality of votes: - If there is an equality of votes between any two or more candidates, the Returning Officer shall, after notice to the candidates or their authorised agents if present, decide by drawing lots in such manner as he may deem fit which of the candidate or candidates he shall declare to have been elected." 4. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that considering the importance of the subject and also the object of the Act and the Rules, the provisions contained in R.64 are mandatory in nature and it is clear by reading the relevant rule read with S.113 (1) of the Kerala Panchayats Act and S.19 of the Kerala Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125, (as amended by Act 3/1957) that the notice contemplated under R.64 should be in writing. Admittedly no notice in writing under R.64 was given either to the petitioner or to respondents 1 and 2 or their agents by the Returning Officer. The stand taken by the Returning Officer as could be seen from the order of the third respondent was that R.64 did not contemplate a written notice; and that the requirements under that rule were satisfied by giving oral notice to the candidates or their agents. A decision on the point in dispute depends upon a proper and correct construction of R.64 of the Rules. 5. The counsel appearing for the petitioner invited my attention to Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn. and also the decisions of the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (AIR 1978 SC. A decision on the point in dispute depends upon a proper and correct construction of R.64 of the Rules. 5. The counsel appearing for the petitioner invited my attention to Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn. and also the decisions of the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (AIR 1978 SC. 597) and In re. Presidential Election (AIR 1974 SC. 1682). In re Presidential Election 1974, (AIR 1974 SC. 1682) it was held that in determining the question whether a provision is mandatory or directory, the subject-matter, the importance of the provision, and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act will decide whether the provision is directory or mandatory and it is the duty of the Courts to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully adverting to the whole scope of the provision to be construed. There are several provisions in the Act and the Rules in order to keep the election process pure and above manipulations Several safeguards also have been given in the Act and the rules in this respect. It need not be repeated that it was to avoid manipulations and malpractices that all these possible safe-guards have been incorporated in the Act and the Rules. In the instant case, the petitioner and the first respondent polled equally and there was a tie and that was to be resolved by resorting to R.64 of the Rules. Therefore, the decision to be taken by the Returning Officer by drawing lots is an important process which clinches the issue and resolves the deadlock. There can be no doubt that the object of giving notice under R.64 is to secure the presence of the candidates or their agents or to enable them to be present at the time of drawing lots. No doubt, the manner in which this has to be done is left to the discretion of the Returning Officer. This discretion has to be exercised by him not in any arbitrary manner. This rule is intended for safeguarding the interest of the contesting candidates and to ensure that the process of drawing lots by the Returning Officer is done in a fair and impartial way. without giving room for any sort of complaint. This discretion has to be exercised by him not in any arbitrary manner. This rule is intended for safeguarding the interest of the contesting candidates and to ensure that the process of drawing lots by the Returning Officer is done in a fair and impartial way. without giving room for any sort of complaint. While construing an important provision as in R.64, it is only proper and legitimate to adopt a liberal construction that would make the relevant provision meaningful and effective. A construction which defeats the very purpose and object of the provisions of the Act and the rules should also be avoided. The object of the enactment and the intention of legislature also are relevant for a proper construction of the relevant provision in a statute. In Kadir Mohammed v. Augusthy Varghese, (1969 KLT 739) Krishna Iyer J., (as he then was), has observed as follows, while laying down canons and guidelines on interpretation of statutes: "It is well settled that, while a rewriting of the section is not part of the judicial power, if one construction will lead to an absurdity while another will give effect to what commonsense would show as obviously intended, the construction which would defeat the ends of the Act must be rejected, even if the same words in the same section and even in the same sentence have to be construed differently. It has been held that in order to give meaning to the intention of the legislature, some words may, in suitable cases, be read into the provision to avoid reducing them to an absurdity. The Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union India (AIR 1978 SC. 597) while dealing with the arbitrary power conferred on a Passport Officer under S.10(3) of the Passports Act, 1967, observed: "In fact equality and arbitrariness are swon enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic, while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. 597) while dealing with the arbitrary power conferred on a Passport Officer under S.10(3) of the Passports Act, 1967, observed: "In fact equality and arbitrariness are swon enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic, while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Art.14." Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn, at page 146 states: "The modern tendency seems to be against construing statutes so as to leave the person or body upon whom a power is conferred absolutely untrammelled in the exercise of it." Lord Wrenbury observed in Roberts v. Hopwood, (1925) A. C. 578 at p. 613: "A discretion does not empower a man to do what he likes merely because he is minded to do so - he must in the exercise of his discretion do not what he likes but what he ought." 6. Let us now make an endeavour to construe R.64 in its proper perspective, bearing in mind the above principles, the object and purpose of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Under S.113 of the Kerala Panchayats Act, "all notices and permissions given, issued or granted, as the case may be. under the provisions of this Act shall be in writing". S.19 of Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125, states "where by any Act, a power to issue any notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law is conferred, then expressions used in the notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law, shall, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, have the same respective meanings as in the Act conferring the power". It is clear from the above, if this section is read along with S.113 of the Kerala Panchayats Act, that notices given under R.64 of the Rules also shall be in writing. As there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context, it is necessary, that the notice contemplated under R.64 should be in writing so that it may not in any way enable the officer to exercise arbitrary power in the process of drawing lots. As there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context, it is necessary, that the notice contemplated under R.64 should be in writing so that it may not in any way enable the officer to exercise arbitrary power in the process of drawing lots. It is only therefore fair and correct, to avoid a construction of R.64 conferring arbitrary power on the Returning Officer which is liable to be abused, particularly in matters relating to the process of election. It was under S.22 of the Kerala Panchayats Act that the petitioner filed the election petition before the Munsiff. Under S.22(1)(d) (iv), non-compliance with the provisions of the Act or of any rules made thereunder is a ground on which a Munsiff may, subject to the provisions in S.21, declare the election in question to be invalid. As stated earlier, no written notice as contemplated under R.64 of the Rules has been given to the parties involved in the election. It has already been found that the notice contemplated under R.64 should be in writing. There is therefore non-compliance of R.64 in the instant case. But the question is whether that alone is sufficient to grant the prayer for setting aside the election. The learned advocate appearing for the first respondent rightly pointed out that it is not enough if the petitioner satisfies that there was non-compliance of any provision of the Act or the Rules; he must further satisfy the court that the result of the election in so far as it con-ceraed with the returned candidate has been materially affected. The submission made by the counsel in this respect is valid in view of the provisions of S.22(1)(d) of the Act. The question whether election has been materially affected or not is purely a question of fact. It is not at all proper for this Court in exercise of its power under Art.226 of the Constitution, to appraise or reappraise the evidence, oral and documentary given before the Munsiff. In the case on hand, there is no finding given by the Munsiff on this point. The learned Munsiff appears to have not considered or even adverted to these important aspects in the case. In these circumstances the case has to go back. In the case on hand, there is no finding given by the Munsiff on this point. The learned Munsiff appears to have not considered or even adverted to these important aspects in the case. In these circumstances the case has to go back. In the result, this Original Petition is allowed, Ext.P1 is set aside and the case is sent back to the Principal Munsiff, Alleppey, for disposal afresh according to law on the materials already on record and in the light of this judgment. In view of the fact that the Principal Munsiff who tried the case has already taken a view it is only fair that this case is made over by him to the Additional Munsiff, unless he (Principal Munsiff) has been transferred in the meantime, to dispose of the case according to law and in the light of this judgment, within two months from the date of receipt of records by that Court. No costs, in the circumstances.