Lahiri, J.- In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner claims that his precious "land" measuring, 36 acres situated at Thangal Bazar, Sheet No. 16, with building and structure standing thereon were acquired by the Government of Manipur under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, "the Act" for short. On the land the petitioner had constructed building and other structures. Due notification under section 4 of "the Act" was duly made and published. On perusal of the notification under section 4(1) of "the Act" we find that the land was classified as 'Shop Site-G-1". It has been stated by the petitioner that Thangal Bazar is in the heart of imphal, capital of Manipur and the said Bazar is the main trade and commercial nerve-centre of Manipur. The petitioner has categorically asserted that the Government took over possession of the land, performed acts of possession and allowed the Imphal Municipa­lity to use and occupy the same and the latter let out the land to others, vide para 11 of the affidavit-in-reply. Thereafter, the Collector, as required under "the Act", assessed compensation of Rs. 10,35,000/- for the acquired land in his Award dated 22nd December, 1978, under sections 10 & 11 of "the Act". However, he did not assess any compensation of the building and struc­tures as he waited the valuation report from the Executive Engineer (Building Division), Imphal (vide Annexure 14, Page 30). There after, by a supplementary award dated 31-8-79, the Collector awarded a further compensation of Rs. 2,28,258.00 for the building on the acquired land. 2. The petitioner contends that the Government has failed to pay the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector in 1978 and 1979, notwithstanding several notices issued by him which the Government was bound to pay under "the Act". The Respondents were bound to pay the amount under section 31 of "the Act". After demanding justice from the Respondents the petitioner filed the writ application on 11.9.79 praying for a Writ of mandamus or a direction of the like nature commanding the Respondents to pay the compensation as required under section 31 of "the Act". This court issued a Rule on 17-9-79 why the Respondents should not be directed to pay the petitioner the amounts awarded by the Collector. This court issued a Rule on 17-9-79 why the Respondents should not be directed to pay the petitioner the amounts awarded by the Collector. The Respondents appeared and contended that the petitioner was not entitled to compensa­tion awarded on the ground that the Government of Manipur had withdrawn the acquisition proceeding in exercise of its powers under section 48 (1) of "the Act", by a notification dated 30.1.82 3. Therfore, the question that fall for determination is whether the Government could withdraw the acquisition proceedings in exercise of their power under section 48 (1) of ''the Act" and whether it was bona-fide exercise of the power. The power of withdra­wal was exercised long after compensation had been awarded by the Collector. The first award was made on the 22nd December, 1978 and the supplementary award was made in 1979 and only on 30.1.82 the Government thought it convenient to "withdraw from acquisition" after the petitioner had obtained the Rule on 17-9-79 in the Civil Rule why they should not be directed to pay the compensation awarded by the Collector. There is absolutely no reason for this inordinate delay in keeping the entire procee­dings under suspension. A substantial property was acquired, possession taken, all formalities, including ascertainment of the valuation of the property made and long after the compensation was awarded the Govt. thought it fit to withdraw from the acquisi­tion proceedings. But, what was the reason for withdrawal ? The land was acquired for a public purpose. Apart from whims, caprices or pleasure we do not find any plausible reason to exercise the power of withdrawal under section 48 (1) of "the Act". Was it just, fair and reasonable ? Was it a bona-fide act ? There is no material placed before us to show that the action was just, fair, reasonable or bonafide. However, let us try to adjudicate whether the Government had acted bona-fide in exercising the powers under section 48 (1) of "the Act". It appears that when the Government found that they were to pay compensation to the tune of Rs. 12,63,258/-they made endea­vour to wriggle out from the difficult situation and, thereby put a citizen in jeopardy. The Government was prompt in acquiring the land for public purpose, namely, for construction of Govern­ment quarters and later, notwithstanding the existence of such purpose, the Government withdrew from the acquisition. 12,63,258/-they made endea­vour to wriggle out from the difficult situation and, thereby put a citizen in jeopardy. The Government was prompt in acquiring the land for public purpose, namely, for construction of Govern­ment quarters and later, notwithstanding the existence of such purpose, the Government withdrew from the acquisition. The provision of section 48 (1) of "the Act" confers administrative powers to the administration. Functions of the administration may be ministerial or discretionary. It is well known that a ministerial function is one where the law prescribes that the duty will be performed in certain and specific terms and leaves not­hing to the discretion or judgment of the authority, that is, the function of the authority does not involve any investigation into any disputed fact or making of choices, the authority acts in strict obedience to the rules of law which impose, on it the specified and definite duties in respect of which he has BO choice. However, the range of judicial reviewability of the ministerial functions has been recognised the world over. At some stage question arose as to whether certiorari or mandamus would be proper relief. However, in the present day dispensation of justice, the distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts, which was the bane of the petitioner seeking mandamus has been displaced in modern administrative law. The availability and scope of review are the same. Sharif Ahmed vs. K T. A. AIR 1978 S. C. 209 is but one of the decisions of the Supreme Court on the point. Murray vs. Vaughan 300 F. Supp. 688 (D. R. I. 1969) is also one among many decision of the American court which have adopted a broader mandamus approach. The nature of the powers conferred under section 48 (1) of "the Act" is discreti­onary. It is true that when an administrative action is taken, in exercise of discretionary power, the scope of interference by this court in a writ application is very much limited, but this court can in appropriate case interfere with the exercise of such power. The discretionary power is never "uncontrollable discretionary power" nor is there any absolute and unfattered discre­tion, as the authority must "act" accordingly to law. "Ordi­narily, the principles of judicial review of discretionary powers fall into two major classes. First, abuse of power by the autho­rity and, secondly, non-exercise of the power. The discretionary power is never "uncontrollable discretionary power" nor is there any absolute and unfattered discre­tion, as the authority must "act" accordingly to law. "Ordi­narily, the principles of judicial review of discretionary powers fall into two major classes. First, abuse of power by the autho­rity and, secondly, non-exercise of the power. In the first group fall categories like (I) malafide exercise or power, or exercise of power in bad faith or for an improper purpose, or consideration of extraneous matters or irrelevant matter, or leaving out relevant consideration. If the discretion- is unreasonable or is used in a colourable manner, it may also be abuse of power. Under the second categories fall actions under dictation or exercising the power mechanically or fettering the discretion. These are illustra­tive cases. There is a sterling observation of Lord Denning M.R. in Instrumatic Ltd. vs. Supabrase Ltd. (C. A.) :- "There are many tribunals from which an appeal lies only on a "point of law" : and we always interpret the provision widely and liberally. In most of the cases the tribunal finds the the primary facts (which cannot be chall­enged on appeal); and the question at issue is what is the proper inference from those facts. In such cases, if a tribunal draws an inference which connote reasonably be drawn, it errs in point of law, and its decision can be reviewed by the courts. That was settled, once and for all, in Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) vs. Bairstow (1956) A. C. 14. In other cases the question is whether, given the primary facts, the tribunal rightly exercised its discre­tion. In such cases if the tribunal exercises its discretion in a way which is plainly wrong, it errs in point of law, and its decision can be reviewed by the courts. The courts can review the discretion of a tribunal, just as it can review the discretion of a judge in chambers, and on like grounds. The principles stated in Ward vs. James (1966) I Q. B. 293, apply as much to the discretion of a tribunal as to the discretion of a Judge". ( Emphasis added) It resolves the problem as to whether the exercise of discre­tion, which is palpably or plainly wrong, amount to an error in point of law. The principles stated in Ward vs. James (1966) I Q. B. 293, apply as much to the discretion of a tribunal as to the discretion of a Judge". ( Emphasis added) It resolves the problem as to whether the exercise of discre­tion, which is palpably or plainly wrong, amount to an error in point of law. It is true that when an authority draws an inference from the primary facts, which cannot ordinary be chall­enged as it is an inference drawn from the primary facts. It is also not challengeable, whether it is "proper" inference drawn from those facts. If two views are plausible or the view expre­ssed by the authority is also acceptable, reasonable and/or just, it cannot be interferred with. However, if on the basis of the primary facts the authority exercises discretion and if it turns out that the exercise of discretion is "plainly wrong" or "palpably wrong", the decision of the authority can be interfered with as it amounts to "an error in point of law". Similarly, if the discretion exercised by an authority is unfair or unjust and the orders prejudicially affects a party, the same cannot be sustained. Therefore, if the discretion to withdraw from the acquisition of the land was "palpably wrong" or unjust, unfair or malafide the discretionary power under section 48 (1) is liable to be quashed. 4. In the instant case the power was exercised under section 48. (1) of "the Act". We extract the relevant provision :- '48. Completion of acquisition not compulsory, but com­pensation to be awarded when not completed- (I) Except in the case provided for in Section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken"'. It will be seen that the discertionary power cannot be exerci­sed if the possession has been taken". Respondents claim that the Government had the power to withdraw from the acquisi­tion of the land as it did not take over possession of the acquired land. In support thereof the Respondents have filed an affidavit sworn by the Under Secretary to the Govt. of Manipur (at pages 54-55). The deponent stated in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the affidavit that possession of the land had never been taken by the Government. In support thereof the Respondents have filed an affidavit sworn by the Under Secretary to the Govt. of Manipur (at pages 54-55). The deponent stated in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the affidavit that possession of the land had never been taken by the Government. However, the petitioner asserted that posse­ssion had been taken, and, stated by making a sworn testimony the averments as incorrect and untrue. Now, we find from the affidavit of the Under Secretary that the basis of the assertion was "information derived from records", which were believed to be true by the deponent. Therefore, the assertion of the Under Secretary was based on records. Where are the relevant records ? They have not been produced before us, no reason at all has been assigned for non-production of the records. This court granted time as asked for by the Respondents to produce the records and allowed them ample opportunities for produc­tion of the records. Notwithstanding the opportunities the records have not been produced nor have they given any explanation for the non-production. It follows, therefore, that there is no record to show that the possession of the land was not taken over by the Govt. under Section 16 of "the Act". Therefore, the records which are admittedly at the disposal of the Respon­dents have not been produced. From the non-production of the documents, a reasonable inference can be drawn that if produced, the records would have clearly shown that the possession of the land had been taken over by the Govt.. It is difficult of us to bold that even after about 5 years from the date of making the notification under section 4 of "the Act" the Govt. did not take over possession of the land. The petitioner has cate­gorically stated that the possession was taken over by the Govern­ment. In the result, we hold that possession of the land bad been taken over by the Government before issuance of the notification under section 48 of "the Act". The land vested absolutely in the Government free from encumbrances. Under these circumstances the order of withdrawal from acquisition must be declared to be invalid. We are constrained to hold that the Government cannot withdraw from the acquisition under section 48 (1) of "the Act", having taken over possession of the land under section 16. The land vested absolutely in the Government free from encumbrances. Under these circumstances the order of withdrawal from acquisition must be declared to be invalid. We are constrained to hold that the Government cannot withdraw from the acquisition under section 48 (1) of "the Act", having taken over possession of the land under section 16. We are also surprised to find that the Govern­ment exercised the power of withdrawal after the petitioner had filed the writ petition in this court and obtained Rule. The timing is very much significant. 6. In Shrimati Shanti Neogi vs. Land Acquisition Collector, AIR 1975 Calcutta 415, the Calcutta High Court has held that the Govern­ment should take prompt decision to withdraw acquisition procee­dings. In the instant case the Government withdrew from the acquisition purporting to act under section 48 (1) of "the Act", about 5 years after issuance of the notification. The extra-ordinary power of withdrawal was exercised after the Rule had been issued in favour of the petitioner asking the Respondents why they should not be directed to pay the amount awarded by the Collector. In the instant case there is another added feature, namely, that the Government had taken over possession under section 16 of "the Act". When the possession of the land was taken over under section 16 of "the Act", it vests in the Government free from all encumbrances and the owner or person interested acquires a statutory right to get the compensation. Even the compensation proceedings were completed by the Collector. Under these circum­stances we are constrained to hold that the Respondents are bound to pay the amount awarded by the Collector. 7. In the instant case the petitioner has been deprived of the right of enjoyment or possession of his land for about 5 years. He is wronged by the Government. Under the shield of law the Respondents unsuccessfully endeavoured to deprive the petitioner of his rightful claim to compensation. 8. Under these circumstances we hold that the notification issued under section 48(1) is invalid. We also hold that the Gov­ernment is bound to pay the compensation of the land under section 31 of "the Act". We direct the Respondents to pay the awarded amount within a period of 3 months from to-day. 9. Mr. N. N. Saikia, learned Government Advocate, Manipur, has submitted that he would instruct the Govt. We also hold that the Gov­ernment is bound to pay the compensation of the land under section 31 of "the Act". We direct the Respondents to pay the awarded amount within a period of 3 months from to-day. 9. Mr. N. N. Saikia, learned Government Advocate, Manipur, has submitted that he would instruct the Govt. to hand over vacant possession of the land to the petitioner within 3 months along with necessary compensation for the use and occupation of the land acceptable to the petitioner. If the State Government hand over vacant possession of the land without any encumbra­nces as stated by Mr. Saikia and also pay a reasonable compensation acceptable to the petitioner, the latter shall not be entitled to the awarded amount. Mr. A. Sarma, counsel for the petitioner agrees to the said proposal. We make it clear that if the State Government fails to hand over the land and pay compensation in the manner set-forth above, the latter shall be entitled to the awarded amount with interest immediately on the expiry of 3 months from to-day. 10. In the result the petition is allowed. The Rule is made absolute. However we make no order as to cost.