Jogighopa Fishery Co-Operative Society Ltd. & Anr. v. Assam Board of Revenue, Gauhati and Others
1982-12-16
K.LAHIRI, T.N.SINGH
body1982
DigiLaw.ai
Lahiri J.- This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for an order or a Writ of Certiorari to remove into this Court Case No. 23 F(G) 1982 disposed by the Assam Board of Revenue, the highest appellate authority constituted under the Rules for the Settlement of Fisheries, for short "the Rules", for the purpose of quashing the impugned order dated 21.9.82. 2. No. 1/77 Digdhar Brahmaputra Fishery is the bone of contention. Since 1976, the petitioner society was enjoying 'the fishery' on payment of a very nominal annual revenue of Rs. 39,660/-. Of course it undertook to improve and/or develop the fishery. Thus it enjoyed it for years. However, the Government decided to put up the fishery for sale, instead of direct settlement with the petitioner, and, accordingly, issued sale notice dated May 24, 1982 inviting tenders, vide Annexure 'C'. The petitioner as well as Respondent No. 2 vied for the settlement. The petitioner offered Rs. 40,101/- per annum whereas Respondent No. 2 offered Rs. 86,711. 75 per annum-the difference per year comes to over Rs. 46,000.00. The psriod of lease is for 3 years. Thus the offer of Respondent No. 2 was Rs. 1,38,000/- over the offer of the petitioner. Thus, if Respondent No. 2's offer was accepted the Government would have gained revenue over Rs. 1,38,000/- for the fishery. Situated thus the settling authority, namely, the S.D.C., Goalpara, in consultation with the Advisory Board preferred Respondent No. 2 and that too very rightly. By its order dated 25.6.82, Respondent No. 2 was given the first preference provided it could produce Income-Tax Clearance Certificate in the name of "the Society" by 2.30 P.M. on 28.6.82 and also directed Respondent No. 2 to produce proof of "financial stability of landed property and/or bank account transacted till 25.6.82 worth 50% of the offered amount in the tender". However, the tender was submitted by Shri Maniram Das, for and on behalf of his registered Co-operative fishery, namely Baladmari Gobindapur Machmara Aru Jalbowa Samabay Samity Ltd. It is a Co-operative Society registered under the Assam Cooperative Societies Act and composed of 100% fishermen. The fishery has had fishing implements worth Rs. 25,000/-apart from cash money and landed properties.
However, the tender was submitted by Shri Maniram Das, for and on behalf of his registered Co-operative fishery, namely Baladmari Gobindapur Machmara Aru Jalbowa Samabay Samity Ltd. It is a Co-operative Society registered under the Assam Cooperative Societies Act and composed of 100% fishermen. The fishery has had fishing implements worth Rs. 25,000/-apart from cash money and landed properties. It may be noted here that Respondent No. 2 had applied for obtaining Income-tax Clearance Certificate which wjs clearly set out in Column No. 12 of the Tender and the acknowledgment of the receipt of the application was also appended along with an affidavit. He produced the Sales-tax certificate. As such, on the date of the submission of the tender, respondent No. 2 had applied for obtaining Income-Tax Certificate of his Co-operative Society but could not obtain the same. However, the S.D.O., by his order dated 25.6.82 asked him to produce the said certificate and also to produce materials to bear up the financial stability of "the co-operative society". It was also stated in the order that on failure of Respondent No. 2 to produce the documents the tender of the petitioner's Co-operative Society would be given the first preference provided the latter could produce "proof of financial stability of landed property and/or bank account transacted upto 25.6.82 in the name or on behalf of the Society worth 50% of the offered amount in the tender". It appears that Respondent No.2 had failed to produce the Income-tax Clearance Certificate and documents called for by the Sub-Divisional Officer and on that count alone' the S.D.O., settled the fishery with the petitioner. The sole reason for settling the fishery with the petitioner was that Respondent 2 had failed to produce the documents required by the S.D.O.. It also appears that apart from obtaining the settlement of the fishery the petitioner obtained settlement of another fishery, being No. 20/118 Valley Manas Fishery at Rs. 6101.00 per year. Therefore, two fisheries were settled with the petitioner. We reiterate that the sole reason for not settling the fishery with Respondent 2 was non-production of some documents. However, in respect of the Income-Tax Clearance Certificate, Respondent 2 had applied for the same from the Department and filed an acknowledgment of the receipt. The security papers demanded, however, were not produced by Respondent No. 2.
We reiterate that the sole reason for not settling the fishery with Respondent 2 was non-production of some documents. However, in respect of the Income-Tax Clearance Certificate, Respondent 2 had applied for the same from the Department and filed an acknowledgment of the receipt. The security papers demanded, however, were not produced by Respondent No. 2. It appears that on 28.6.82, Respondent 2 filed an application, vide Annsxure 'A' to the Affidavit-in-opposition. We have seen the original. It was stated that the Secretary of Respondent 2 went to Dhubri to obtain the certificate from the Income-tax Officer but as it was a holiday for 'Ambubashi' (a Hindu festival), the officer did not attend his office and Respondent 2 could learn that the certificate would be given on 28.6.82. Admittedly, Respondent 2 could not obtain the certificate and he filed an affidavit stating the reasons for failure to file the certificate and prayed for time till 29.6.82. However, it will appear that the order of settlement was made without considering this application. On the next day, i.e., on June 29, 1982 Respondent 2 filed a copy of the Income-tax Clearance Certificate. The S.D.O. wrote on the body of the petition as under: "Settlement cannot be kept pending as it is to be settled from 1.7.82. He may file appeal. Sd/- Illegible 29.6.82" Against the order of settlement dated 28.6.82 Respondent 2 preferred an appeal to the Assam Board of Revenue. The learned Board by a reasoned judgment allowed the appeal. 3. The following are the uncontroverted areas and Sri S.N. Bhuyan, learned counsel for the petitioner has candidly conceded them: (a) that the Assam Board of Revenue is the appellate authority having co-extensive power with the 'settling authority, that is to say, it can, on appreciation of the materials before it, dismiss the appeal or accept the appeal and may itself order settlement with any valid tenderers, like the primary authority, on good, just and sufficient grounds; (b) that apart from the present fishery the petitioner has been settled with another fishery, although small, styled as No. 20/118 Valley Manas Fishery at an annual revenue of Rs.
6101.00 per annum, for 3 years; (c) that Respondent 2, a registered co-operative fishery society composed of 100% fishermen, drew a blank, after hoping to win the fishery; (d) that the annual revenue offered by Respondent 2 was more than double the amount offered by the petitioner. If there be no legal impediment in settling the fishery with Respondent 2, the Government would be gainer by Rs. 1,40,000/-; (e) that in a writ of certiorari this court can not exercise the appellate power nor can this court interfere with the findings of facts reached by the Board of Revenue unless the findings are based on no evidence or purely on surmises or conjectures or it is manifestly against the basic principles of natural justice. However, if the error of law is apparent on the face of the records and the party is prejudicially affected thereby this court is competent to exercise jurisdiction. Similarly, if the order is such, that in law the grounds are not such as to warrant the decision or if the authority has failed to proceed in accordance with the essential requirements of law which it was meant to administer or when there is a patent error or based on a clear disregard of the law or based on obvious wrong interpretation of a statutory provision upon which the decisions lay, resulting in injustice or if the material provision of law is overlooked by the appellate authority, which amounts to a patent error of law, or if the impugned order is not a "real decision" but a "purported decision", this court shall undoubtedly exercise the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. It will appear that the learned Board of Revenue has exercised over the matter, taken into consideration all the relevant factors and reached a decision. But Mr.
4. It will appear that the learned Board of Revenue has exercised over the matter, taken into consideration all the relevant factors and reached a decision. But Mr. Bhuyan, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the following errors are apparent on the face of the record: First, the finding of the Assam Board of Revenue that the submission of Income-tax Clearance Certificate was not necessary, -was 'based on mistaken belief of non-existence of an existing law and as such the impugned order is vitiated'; Secondly, the findings of the learned Board that the tenderers were not required to furnish proof of financial stability was based on erroneous interpretation of Clause 5 (2) (b) of the Sale Notice as well as Rule 46 of the Fishery Rules; and, Thirdly, the findings of the Board that there was no material to hold that the offer of Respondent 2 was reckless, excessive and speculative were perverse and caused by sheer non-consideration of the relevant materials and misreading of the relevant documents. 5. Let us consider the first point. It is correct that the Board of Revenue assumed that the provisions regarding submission of the Income-tax Clearance Certificate under Clause 12 (b) of the Sale Notice was obliterated by way of amendment. Factually it is not correct. The provisions of Clause 12 (c) of the Sale Notice was not given effect only for the year 1971-72. As such, let us assume that furnishing of the certified copy of the Income-tax Clearance Certificate was one of the conditions in the tender form. It will be seen that Respondent 2 had applied for the Income-tax Clearance Certificate but could not append the same because the authority did not provide it with the certified copies. Respondent 2 appended the acknowledgement receipt of the application made to the appropriate authority to obtain the certified copy. Therefore, non-submission of the certified copy was not due to any default of Respondent 2 but .because the authority could not furnish the certificate. In fact, the certitfied copy was filed on the 29th of June, 1982 before the settling Authority but after the settlement had been made with the petitioner. Now, the appellate authority who has had co-extensive power with the settling authority found that in fact on the date of settlement respondent 2 had no arrear and had before it the certified copy of the Income-tax Clearance Certificate.
Now, the appellate authority who has had co-extensive power with the settling authority found that in fact on the date of settlement respondent 2 had no arrear and had before it the certified copy of the Income-tax Clearance Certificate. Therefore, when the matter came up before the Board it found that there was a valid Income-tax Clearance Certificate. The Board was justified in holding that failure of Respondent 2 was not due ot its laches or negligence for which it should not have been deprived of the settlement. Therefore, the main question is that if a party fails to produce the certificate, not due to his own laches or negligence but because of the act of the authority, should the party be penalised therefore ? The learned Board of Revenue found that there was a valid Income-tax Clearance Certificate and as such, held that Respondent 2 should have been settled and he settled the fishery with Respondent 2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Board could have settled provided furnishing of the certified copy of the Certificate before the primary authority was merely obligatory or directory. Counsel submits that Clause 12(b) of the Sale Notice is mandatory. So, let us turn to the question. 6. Therefore, let us turn to the question whether it is mandatory or directory. If we turn to Form No. 101, that is, the statutory "Notice of Sale of fisheries", we find in clause 2 that there is a provision that if any tenderer 'fails to furnish the required security as laid down in the Rules' the fishery must be resold 'at his/its risk forthwith' and he or it is bound to make good the difference between his tender and the amount realised at the subsequent sale, calculated on the whole period of settlement. It shows that on failure to furnish the required security under the Rules there is a penal provision, namely, resale of the fishery and the defaulter is to make good the difference between his tender amount and 'the amount realised by the subsequent sale'. This is a mandatory provision for the reason that the penal consequences for the default have been clearly set forth.
This is a mandatory provision for the reason that the penal consequences for the default have been clearly set forth. Similarly, if we turn to Clause (3) of the Sale Notice we find that if a tenderer fails to execute the counterpart within a month from the date of the sale, the fishery should be resold at bis risk and he shall be bound to make good the difference between his tender and the amount realised by the subsequent sale calculated on the whole period of settlement. Under this Clause a tenderer is 'required' to execute the counterpart within one month from the date of the sale and if he defaults the penalty is provided. This is also a mandatory provision. We also find similar consequences for not doing certain 'acts' by the tenderer. We find similar mandatory provision in Clause 12(c) of the Sale Notice, which provided as under:- "(c) Any settlement will be liable to be cancelled if it is proved to the satisfaction of the settling authority that the tender contains any wrong statement specially as to the caste." ( Emphasis added ) Therefore, a tender is liable to be cancelled, vide Clause 12(c) of the Sale Notice, if it is proved to the satisfaction of the settling authority that the tender contains any wrong statement specially as to the caste and on no other ground. Now, we extract the provisions of Clause 12 (a) and (b) of the Sale Notice : "(a) Each tender should be for one Fishery or a group of fisheries proposed to be sold in a lot and must accompany a treasury challan showing deposit of Rs. 10 as tender fee without which no tender will be considered. In no case the aforesaid fee will be refunded. (b) Each tender should be accompanied with certified copies of Income-Tax Clearance Certificate, Sales Tax Clearance Certificate and Caste Certificate." We do not find either in Clause 12 (b) or in any other Clauses that non-furnishing of the certified copy or for the delayed submission, a tender is liable to be cancelled or may be left out of consideration.
(b) Each tender should be accompanied with certified copies of Income-Tax Clearance Certificate, Sales Tax Clearance Certificate and Caste Certificate." We do not find either in Clause 12 (b) or in any other Clauses that non-furnishing of the certified copy or for the delayed submission, a tender is liable to be cancelled or may be left out of consideration. On perusal of Clause 12 (b) it is apparent that it is directory for the following reasons : (a) Clause 12 (b) provides the form and manner in which something is to be done, but no legal consequences, of failure to observe the prescription has been set forth. (b) There is nothing in Clause 12 (b) to show that substantial compliance will invalidate the tender. A tender can be invalidated only on the ground set forth in Clause 12(c). It is true that some what compulsive word like "should" is there. However, this compulsive word must take its meaning in accordance with the legislative intent. There was no legislative intent that non-furnishing of the certified copies referred in Clause 12 (b) will entail cancellation of a tender. Considering the subject matter, its importance in relation to the general object intended to be secured, namely, to ascertain as to whether a tenderer is defaulter in payment of income tax as well as its function, we are constrained to hold that the settling authority may ask for this certificate on a subsequent stage and in fact the settling authority did so realising that it was directory. In our opinion the requirements set forth in Clause 12 (b) occupy a field which may be characterised as minor or non-essential. One of the touch-stone to determine whether a requirement is essential or not is to consider the consequence of the failure to follow the provision and if the requirements are minor and not urgent in nature or character, the interpretation must be that the provision is directory. In the instant case, admittedly, Respondent No. 2 was not a defaulter in payment of income-tax and a certificate was duly filed before this settling authority before the commencement of the period of settlement (1.7.82). In various decisions similar provisions of law were held to be 'directory' and not mandatory for the reasons alluded.
In the instant case, admittedly, Respondent No. 2 was not a defaulter in payment of income-tax and a certificate was duly filed before this settling authority before the commencement of the period of settlement (1.7.82). In various decisions similar provisions of law were held to be 'directory' and not mandatory for the reasons alluded. We rely on Mufosin All Barbhuyan vs. State of Assam, AIR 1971 A & N 171 (DB) and Khoi Signar vs. State of Assam, Civil Rule 499 of 1979 decided on 20.11.80. 1. At this stage we would refer a sterling decision of the Supreme Court in Ramanna vs. The Indian Airport Authority, AIR 1979 SC 1627= (1979) 3 SCC 489 , which marks a watershed in the realm of Administrative law wherein it has been stated that even in the matter of settlement or Govt. contracts, employment, largess, licences the authorities cannot violate the norms or practice set forth in the tender notice. It is bound by the norms and procedure laid down in the notices. Therefore, when Clause 12 (b) was merely directory could the settling authority take the provision as mandatory and deprive the tenderer his statutory right to obtain the settlement. Even in matters of such settlements, the Govt. cannot act arbitrarily and treat a directory provision as mandatory and throw out a tenderer out of the fray. On the authority of Ramanna (supra) we say that the tender could not have been left out of consideration for non-submission of the certified copy of the income-tax certificate. However, the Board of Revenue has rightly rectified the mistake committed by the primary authority. We hold that the Board of Revenue is also competent to consider all materials and to grant settlement which it has done, in exercise of the appellate power. It is true that the ground on which the Board of Revenue has granted the relief, may not be correct, but the fact remaios that the finding can be supported by some other reason. In the instant case we find sufficient reason to support the findings of the Board. 8. The second contention of Mr. Bhuyan is that the tenderer was required to furnish proof of financial stability which Respondent 2 failed to furnish on the 28th June, 1982. Now let us turn to the provisions of the law regarding furnishing of the security.
In the instant case we find sufficient reason to support the findings of the Board. 8. The second contention of Mr. Bhuyan is that the tenderer was required to furnish proof of financial stability which Respondent 2 failed to furnish on the 28th June, 1982. Now let us turn to the provisions of the law regarding furnishing of the security. Was it necessary or mandatory for Respondent 2 to-furnish the security on the 28th June, 1982 and whether for non-furnishing of the security the authority could reject the tender, which it did in the instant case? Rule 5 (2) (b) of 'the Rules" deals with the point of time when the security is to be deposited. It reads: "5. (2) (a) * * * (b) Provided that Fisheries Co-operative Societies with 100 per cent share-holder from members of actual fishermen belonging to Scheduled Castes of the State or Maimai Community of the district of Cachar and registered under the Assam Co-operatives Act, 1949, shall, immediately on acceptance of their tenders, be entitled to deposit a sum as such security equal to ten per cent of the revenue of the fisheries settled with them for the first year of the full term of settlement. If any tenderer or tenderers referred to in sub-rules (a) and (b) above, fails/fail to furnish the security as laid down above the fisheries shall be resold at his or their risk forthwith and he or they be bound to make good the difference between his or their tenders and the amount realised at the subsequent sale, calculated on the whole period of settlement." (Emphasis added) 9. It will be seen from Clause 5 (2) (b) that security money is required to be given "on acceptance of the tender'', that is, after the settlement is made in favour of a party and not before that point. In Rule 46 of the Fishery Rules, relied by learned counsel for the petitioner, we do not find anything in support of the contention that the primary authority could demand security papers or documents before making the settlement in favour of the party. We quote Rule 46: "46.
In Rule 46 of the Fishery Rules, relied by learned counsel for the petitioner, we do not find anything in support of the contention that the primary authority could demand security papers or documents before making the settlement in favour of the party. We quote Rule 46: "46. Fisheries shall be settled to the best advantage and subject to this condition, the agency of the middleman as lessee shall be done away with as far as possible." Now, if we turn to the clauses of the Sale Notice, we find that the settling authority could not have legally called upon Respondent 2 to produce bank account or proof of 'finansial stability of landed property' at any time before the settlement was made in its favour. Clause 17 of the Sale Notice is in point, which reads as under: "17. The successful tenderer shall have to produce valid patta or certified copy of the Jamabandi in respect of land owned by him or any other acceptable proof of his financial stability. The tenderer must be also required to produce a certificate as proof of his not being a defaulter with regard to any Govt. dues." (Emphasis added) It is clear that only when a settlement is made, the succesful tenderer before executing the deed of settlement may be asked to produce valid Patta, Jamabandi or other documents referred in Rule 17. In the instant case, the cart was put before the horse. Respondent 2 was called upon to produce the documents before any settlement was made in his favour which was violative of rule 5 (2) (b) as well as Clause 17 of the Sale Notice. Oa failure to produce the required security and/or document the penalty is prescribed in Clauses (2), (3) and (4) of the Tender Notice and in proviso to Rule 5 (b) of the Fishery Rules. The consequences are entirely his. Under these circumstances, the Board of Revenue was absolutely justified in holding that there was no necessity of production of the documents before the settlement had been made. The finding is in consonance with the provisions of the Rules and the terms of the sale notice and, therefore, we cannot accept the second contention. 10. Further, Respondent 2 is a registered Co-operative Society composed of 100% actual fishermen.
The finding is in consonance with the provisions of the Rules and the terms of the sale notice and, therefore, we cannot accept the second contention. 10. Further, Respondent 2 is a registered Co-operative Society composed of 100% actual fishermen. In Columns 10 and 11 of its tender, Respondent 2, the Co-operative Society, clearly gave out details of unencumbered moveable as well as immove-able properties which would be secured for getting the settlement. As such, full particulars of the properties were set forth in the tender of Respondent 2 itself. At any rate, the security was to the accepted after the settlement had been made and-'Respondent 2 had 1 month's time after the settlement to execute the counterpart of the lease dead. Therefore, within the said period it could have produced the necessary documents. If it failed to produce the security, its tender would have been cancelled and it would have been liable for the penalties prescribed in the Rules and the Tender Notice. Under the circumstances, we do not find any force in the contention. 11. In so far as the third contention is concerned, we do not consider it to be relevant and/or important. There is no material to show that the offer made by Respondent 2 was reckless, excessive or speculative. The price of everything is going up and in that context the offer made by Respondent 2 was fully in accord with the upward rise. We have perused Annexure 'A'. It does not say that the bid was reckless. This letter refers to matter relating to 1972-75. At that relevant time fishery was reduced by a mile. We are constrained to hold that the Board of Revenue never misread the letter in question. We do not find that the letter of the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Goalpara dated 6.3.76 (Annexure 'D') for remission of revenue for a previous period due to circumstances which were prevailing at that time, can be of any assistance to hold that the offer was excessive. The instruction of the State Govt. to extend the terms of the fishery on obtaining small amount that is 10 percent over the existing revenue was made as it was a short term extension for only one year and that too the offer was made to a sitting lessee.
The instruction of the State Govt. to extend the terms of the fishery on obtaining small amount that is 10 percent over the existing revenue was made as it was a short term extension for only one year and that too the offer was made to a sitting lessee. In fact, there is no material worth the name to hold that the offer of Respondent 2 was excessive, reckless or speculative. The settling authority will take adequate security from Respondent 2. In the event he fails to pay the kist money in accordance with law, the amount shall be recovered from the security and Respondent 2 will be liable to pay the prescribed penalty. We are constrained to hold that the Board of Revenue either misread any document or left out of consideration any relevant document. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has completely failed to convince us that the offer of Respondent 2 was excessive. No other point was urged by learned Counsel for the petitioner. 12. For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in the contention and the petition is disminsed. We were about to saddle the petitioner with cost of Rs. 300/-. But learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Respondent 2 is a rich co-operative society and as such, no such costs should be awarded in its favour. Mr. B. M. Goswami, learned counsel for Respondent 2 admits the position. Under these circumstances, we do not make any order as to costs. In the result, the petition is dismissed but we make no order as to costs.