K. S. PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition under Art. 226 of the constitution, the petitioner has challenged Order No. BDA/aee4t/824/80-81 dt. 22. 1. 1981 of the Chairman, bangalore Development Authority, bangalore (hereinafter referred to as the BDA (Annexure-D ). ( 2 ) AMONG others, the petitioner claims to be the owner of four sites on sy. No. 13/1 of Madivala village of bangalore Taluk. She has asserted that she has purchased them on different dates from their previous owner and that she is in their lawful occupation as their owner thereof. ( 3 ) ON 2. 1. 1981 the BDA issued a provisional order under S. 321 (1) of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the Act (Annexure-B) inter alia stating that she unauthorisedly constructed buildings on site Nos. 23 and 24 of the second Block Koramangala layout, a modern lay-out formed by it. In response to the same, the petitioner filed her detailed objections before the bda on 9. 1. 1981 (Annexure-C) interalia contending that she was the owner of the sites and it had no right to demolish the buildings lawfully constructed by her. On a consideration of the said reply (Annexure-C) the BDA on 22. 1. 1981 has confirmed the provisional order and has directed the demolition of the buildings within three days from the date of receipt of its order. On 24. 3. 1981 this Count while issuing rule nisi has stayed the operation of the same. ( 4 ) RESPONDENT No. 1 which is only a formal party has not filed its return. But, respondents 2 and 3 viz. , the BDA have filed return resisting the claim of the petitioner on diverse grounds. ( 5 ) AMONG others, respondents 2 and 3 have alleged that site Nos. 23 and 24, with reference to which the provisional and final orders have been issued to the petitioners, was part of a modern lay-out' called 'koramangala lay-out' formed by it some time after the acquisition of the land of that area was complete in about 1969 and the petitioner had no manner of right, title and interest to them. At length they have alluded to the acquisition proceedings commencing from the preliminary notification dt. 28. 11. 59, the final notification dt. 7. 10. At length they have alluded to the acquisition proceedings commencing from the preliminary notification dt. 28. 11. 59, the final notification dt. 7. 10. 1965, the award made by the Land Acqusition Officer and ultimate reference made to the Civil Corut, which is still pending before the civil Court. ( 6 ) LASTLY, respondents 2 and 3 have asserted that site No. 23 has been allotted and its possession delivered on 27. 1. 1977 to one Major Asangi and that site No. 24 has been allotted to respondent no. 4 on 17. 10. 78 and that its possession has been delivered to him on 27. 10. 1979. ( 7 ) REPONDENT No. 4 has also filed his separate return supporting respondents 2 and 3. As respondent No 4 has derived his title and interest through respondents 2 and 3, it is not necessary to refer to the same in derail. ( 8 ) WHILE asserting heir absolutetile to site Nos. 23 and 24, respondents 2 to 4 have urged that notwithstanding any infirmity in the provisional and final orders made by the BDA, this is a fit case in which this Court should decline to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner. ( 9 ) SRI T. S. Ramachandra, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the final order made by the BDA without genuinely considering the cause shown by his client, is not a speaking order and is illegal. ( 10 ) SRIYUTHS A. J. Sadhashiva and h. R. Venkataramaniah, learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3, and 4 respectively, while justifying the impugned order urged that notwithstanding any infirmity in that order, this is a fit case in which this Court should decline to interfere with the same under Art. 226 of the Constitution. ( 11 ) IN response to the provisional order, the petitioner lodged her objections or representations before the BDA, in making the final order, the BDA has not even adverted to the objections filed by the petitioner, much less it has examined the cause shown by her. ( 12 ) WHENEVER a person shows cause to a provisional order, the authority is bound to examine the same and pass a considered order. ( 12 ) WHENEVER a person shows cause to a provisional order, the authority is bound to examine the same and pass a considered order. An authority like the BDA, whose order is subject to judicial review by this Court cannot make orders as if it was a mere port office, as in the present case. Sri ramachandra is right in his submission that the order made by the BDA is not a speaking order and is manifestly illegal. ( 13 ) I am distressed and surprised at the casual and callous manner in which the BDA has issued the provisional order and the final order mechanically using the cyclostyled forms as if it was performing a mere post office work. I sincerly hope that this will be the last occasion in which this Court. has to frown on such orders of the bda. ( 14 ) BUT, the question is whether this Court should interfere with the impugned order solely on this ground without examining the nature of the cause shown by the petitioner and all other relevant circumstances that havebeen set out by respondents 3 to 4 in great detail. In my view, it is proper for this Court to examine the cause shown by the petitioner and the justification pleaded by the repondents 2 to 4 to sustain the impugned order and decide the matter finally ( 15 ) IN the cause shown by her to the provisional order the petitioner is asserting her title to the two sites that are the subject matter of the provisional and final orders made by the bda. Undoubtedly, if the petitioner had a resemblance of title or legal interest in the property, in the normal circumstances, it would be proper for me to quash the impugned order and relegate the parties to work out their remedies either before the BDA or before an appropriate civil Court. But, that is not the position in this case. ( 16 ) AN examination of all the records produced by the BDA in justification of its plea clearly establish that these two sites are part and parcel of a modern lay-out formed by the BDA called 'koramangala Lay-out as early as in 1969. But, that is not the position in this case. ( 16 ) AN examination of all the records produced by the BDA in justification of its plea clearly establish that these two sites are part and parcel of a modern lay-out formed by the BDA called 'koramangala Lay-out as early as in 1969. Secondly, the records also conclusively establish that the lands on which sites have been formed by the BDA, which earlier belonged to various individuals including the petitioner and her husband, have been acquired, necessary awards have been made and possession has been taken as early as on 17. 4. 1969. ( 17 ) WITH the passing of the awards and taking possession from the previous land owners all title and interest in the lands of the previous land owners completely stood extinguished and their title stood vested in the BDA. ( 18 ) IN this case or in any other proceeding the petitioner has not challenged the acquisition proceedings that have become final. ( 19 ) WITH the vesting of the title in the BDA, the petitioner or her prede cessor in interest or any other person that had any title or interest in the pro perty, can only claim compensation and cannot claim any other interest in these lands. In these circumstances, the action taken by the BDA though somewhat inaptly taken without really exercising its mind, does not really call for interference by this Court. Any interference by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under art. 226 of the Constitution on the ground that the order is not a speaking order would only permit illegal occupation of the petitioner to which she is not entitled to in law, justice and equity. In these circumstances, notwithstanding the infirmity in the impugned order made by the BDA, this is fit case in which this court should declme to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner and dismiss this wrt petition on that ground. ( 20 ) BUT, at this stage Sri Ramachandra submits that the petitioner has constructed a building on portions of site Nos. 23 and 24 and that she is actually residing in that building and therefore, it is absolutely necessary for this Court to grant a reasonable time to demolish, the said building and deliver vacant possession to the BDA or to the allottee as the case may be. 23 and 24 and that she is actually residing in that building and therefore, it is absolutely necessary for this Court to grant a reasonable time to demolish, the said building and deliver vacant possession to the BDA or to the allottee as the case may be. Sri ramachandra also filed a memo stating that the petitioner would demolish, quit and deliver vacant possession Of the sites on or before 22. 10. 1982. The memo filed by the petitioner read thus :"the petitioner undertakes to demolish the existing building and quit and deliver vacant possession of house situated in site Nos. 23 and 24, II Block of Koramangala Layout, Bangalore on or before 22. 10. 1982". ( 21 ) WHATEVER is the illegality or the action of the petitioner, it now transpires that she has constructed a building and is in actual occupation of the same. In the impugned order, the bda had given 3 days time to the petitioner to demolish the building. But, bv virtue of the interim order made by this Court on 24. 3. 1981, which has been in force ever since then, the petitioner is in occupation of the building even as on this day. ( 22 ) AN immediate demolition of the building will undoubtedly cause considerable injury and hardship to the petitioner. In my opinion, having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the ease, the time sought by the petitioner is reasonable and it is just and proper to grant the same. ( 23 ) IN the light of my above discussion, I hold that this writ petition is liable to the dismissed, I therefore dismiss this writ petition and discharge the rule issued in the case. But, I grant time to the petitioner till 22. 10. 1982 to demolish the existing building, quit and deliver vacant possession of site no. 24 to respondent No. 4 and site No. 23 to its allottee. ( 24 ) RULE issued is discharged. But, in the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .