JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is plaintiffs second appeal against the decree of the lower appellate Court dismissing her suit for eviction of the defendants by reversing the decree of the trial Court, which had decreed the suit. ( 2. ) THE plaintiffs case is that she is the owner and land-lady of houses Nos. 22 and 23 in Sarafa Ward, Jabalpur, in the ground floor of which the defendants were tenants on a monthly rent of Rs. 65/ -. It was a joint tenancy. The house originally belonged to her mother Kesharbai and on her death, she being the sole legal heir, inherited the same. The suit house is in a dilapidated condition and she wants to reconstruct the same. She also requires the suit accommodation for the purpose of starting a crockery shop for her son Kamal Kumar. After terminating the tenancy of the defendants the suit was filed for eviction of the defendants under section 12 (1) (f) and (h) of the Accommodation Control act on the ground of bona fide need for starting a business for her son and for reconstruction. The suit was opposed by the defendants contending that the plaintiff is not the sole owner of the houses in question; in fact Kesharbai had made a will bequeathing the houses to the plaintiff, her husband Keshri Chand and her elder son bimal Kumar; the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties; the plaintiff alone cannot bring the suit for eviction; it was denied that the house is in a dilapidated condition or that the plaintiff requires the same for reconstruction; it was also denied that the plaintiff bona fide requires the suit accommodation for starting a crockery shop for his son Kamal Kumar; the tenancy is not joint but it is separate and each of the defendant is in occupation of distinct portions. ( 3. ) THE trial Court found that the plaintiff is the sole owner of the suit house and so she is competent to file the present suit for eviction of the defendants. It was also found that the suit house is in a dilapidated condition and is required by the plaintiff for re-construction; she has prepared plans and estimates and she has got necessary funds for reconstruction. The nature of the accommodation would not be radically altered by the reconstruction. It was also found that the suit house is in a dilapidated condition and is required by the plaintiff for re-construction; she has prepared plans and estimates and she has got necessary funds for reconstruction. The nature of the accommodation would not be radically altered by the reconstruction. The plaintiff also requires the suit accommodation bona fide for starting a crockery shop for his son Kamal Kumar and she has got no other reasonably suitable accommodation for this purpose in the city. Accordingly the suit was decreed including the claim for arrears of rent. ( 4. ) IN appeal, the defendants only challenged the eviction part of the decree. There was no challenge to the decree for arrears of rent and mesne profits. In the lower appellate court, the defendants filed an application under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure for permission to file certified copies of the gift deed dated 24-12-1947 executed by Kesharbai, gifting the suit houses to the plaintiff, her husband Keshri chand and her son Bimal Kumar and the relinquishment deed dated 8-9-71 whereby bimal Kumar relinquished his interest in the suit house in favour of his parents. The application was opposed but it was allowed and additional evidence recorded by the lower appellate Court. While affirming the findings of the trial Court that the plaintiff has made out a case for eviction under section 12 (l) (f) and (h) of the Act on the grounds;: of bona fide requirement for non-residential purposes of starting a crockery shop for his son Kamal Kumar and for reconstruction of the houses, the lower appellate Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff is not the sole owner of the suit houses and she alone cannot bring the suit for eviction and besides there is non-compliance of section 12 (6) of the Act. The plaintiff and her husband Keshri Chand were joint owners and on his death on 20-9-1974 the plaintiff along with her three sons became joint owners of the suit house and sons were necessary parties to the suit. However the entire decree of the trial Court has been set aside, although the appeal was confined only to the eviction part of the decree. ( 5. However the entire decree of the trial Court has been set aside, although the appeal was confined only to the eviction part of the decree. ( 5. ) THE appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law: - (1) Whether the lower appellate Court was justified in reversing the decree of the trial Court on the facts and circumstances of the case; (2) Whether the plaintiff was entitled to file the suit for eviction and whether the defendants are estopped from challenging her title; (3) Whether the plaintiff being one of the co-owners, she could validly bring the suit for eviction without joining the other co-owners, more particularly when the other co-owners have given a declaration that they have no right, title or interest in the suit property; (4) Whether the lower appellate Court after finding that the grounds under section 12 (1) (f) and (h) have been made out, was justified in holding that there was no compliance of section 12 (6) of the M. P. Accommodation control Act, 1961; and (5) Whether the Will (Ex. A-1) should have been admitted in evidence in first appeal and whether its execution and attestation have been proved? ( 6. ) BEFORE going into the merits of the case and accepting the findings as it is, still the decree of the lower appellate Court cannot be sustained, as it erred in reversing the decree of the trial Court after finding that the grounds for eviction under section 12 (1) (f)and (h) of the Accommodation Control Act has been duly made out by the plaintiff and yet plaintiff and yet dismissed the suit on the sole ground that the plaintiff being one of the co-owners cannot bring the suit for eviction. The defendants have admitted that the plaintiff is one of co-owners and landlady of the suit accommodation. The defendants have been paying rents to her, though the receipts were issued jointly in the names of the plaintiff and her husband Keshri Chand. The defendants have also admitted that they had remitted arrears of rents by money-order to the plaintiff after service of quit notice and that the first floor of the suit accommodation was vacated by them and possession handed over to the plaintiff. She, therefore, reduced the rent from Rs. 95/- to Rs. 65/ -. The defendants have also admitted that they had remitted arrears of rents by money-order to the plaintiff after service of quit notice and that the first floor of the suit accommodation was vacated by them and possession handed over to the plaintiff. She, therefore, reduced the rent from Rs. 95/- to Rs. 65/ -. Therefore, there is clear attornment of tenancy in favour of the plaintiff and there is clear recognition that she was one of the owners and landlady of the suit accommodation. The Supreme Court in Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal (A. I. R. 1979 S. C. 1745) has held that in order to get a decree or order for eviction against a tenant under M. P. Accommodation Control Act it is not necessary to give notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and that the only legal requirement was that the suit should be grounded on one or more of the clauses of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the M. P. Act which means that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are not fully applicable in a suit for eviction under the Accommodation Control Act. It is true that under the general law all the co-owners should join in a suit for eviction and it is not open to some of the co-owners to bring a suit for eviction of the tenant unless the remaining co-owners authorise the former to bring the suit for eviction. But the supreme Court in Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath (A. I. R. 1976 S. C. 2335) has held that: "jurisprudentially it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property. The position will change only when partition takes place. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission that the plaintiff who is admittedly the landlord and co-owner of the premises is not the owner of the premises, within the meaning of section 13 (1) (f ). The position will change only when partition takes place. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission that the plaintiff who is admittedly the landlord and co-owner of the premises is not the owner of the premises, within the meaning of section 13 (1) (f ). It is not necessary to establish that the plaintiff is the only owner of the property for the purpose of section 13 (1) (f) as long as he is a co-owner of the property being at the same time the acknowledged, landlord of the defendants. " In that case the Supreme Court was required to consider a case for eviction under section 13 (1) (f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, namely, whether the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for his own occupation "if he is the owner". The provision is akin to section 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control act, 1961. This view was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Kanta Goel v. B. P. Pathak (A. I. R. 1977 S. C. 1599) by saying that one of the co-heirs of deceased landlord can sue for eviction in absence of other co-heirs who have no objection. It is true that in this case section 14a of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was under consideration which provides that a landlord has a right to recover immediate possession of the premises in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child when the Government requires the residential premises let out to him and he has been asked to vacate the same. Here the Supreme Court was not considering the case of an owner. The Supreme court has however affirmed the earlier decision in Sri Ram Pasrichas case (supra ). ( 7. ) IN the present case, the plaintiff did examine two of her sons Kamal Kumar (P. W. 1) and Basant Kumar (P. W. 5), who have stated on oath that they have no right or interest in the suit houses. The Supreme court has however affirmed the earlier decision in Sri Ram Pasrichas case (supra ). ( 7. ) IN the present case, the plaintiff did examine two of her sons Kamal Kumar (P. W. 1) and Basant Kumar (P. W. 5), who have stated on oath that they have no right or interest in the suit houses. In the lower appellate Court also a joint application was filed by the three sons of the plaintiff, i. e. Vimal Kumar, Kamal Kumar and Basant Kumar, under section 151 of the Code saying that they have no claim, right or title over the suit houses and they did not wish to be joined as parties to the suit, their mother being the sole owner and landlady of the suit houses. Therefore, even if the plaintiff is one of the co-owners, still she could bring the suit for eviction without joining the other co-owners and particularly when the defendants have attorned their tenancy in her favour, paid rents to her and recognized her to be landlady. The defendants are estopped from challenging her title. The co-owners, i. e. her sons, have unequivocally given a declaration that they did not want to be joined as parties to the suit, their mother being the sole owner and landlady. The decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Charan v. Ved Prakash AIR 1980 All. 27 ) and Kallan v. District Judge, Allahabad ( AIR 1981 all. 168 ) are of no help to the defendants because it has been clearly held in these cases that one co-owner can bring a suit for eviction if he is also the lessor. There is no question of the landlord complying with section 12 (6) of the Accommodation Control act before filing the suit. This has to be complied with as per direction in the decree. ( 8. ) NOW the question remains whether the lower appellate Court was justified in allowing the application under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code and by taking on record1 the certified copies of the gift deed and relinquishment deed (Exs. A-1 and A-2) and whether the execution, attestation and acceptance of the gift deed has been proved, so also the execution and attestation of the relinquishment deed. A-1 and A-2) and whether the execution, attestation and acceptance of the gift deed has been proved, so also the execution and attestation of the relinquishment deed. The Supreme Court in arian Singh v. Kartar Singh (A. I. R. 1951 S. C. 193) has held : - "the legitimate occasion for the application of O. 41, R. 27 is when, on-examining the evidence as it stands, some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent, not where a discovery is made, outside the Court, of fresh evidence and the application is made to import it. The true test, therefore, is whether the appellate Court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. " Here in the present case the application under Order 41, Rule 27 was considered by the lower appellate Court without examining the evidence on record and without hearing the appeal on merits. The learned appellate Judge distinguished the Supreme Court case in Sri Ram Pasrichas case (supra) by saying that here the defendants had raised an objection of non-joinder of necessary parties in the trial Court* and in that case the plaintiff was recognised as both as co-owner and landlord but here also the plaintiff has been recognised as co-owner and landlady by the defendants. A Division Bench of this court in Madanmohan v. Munnibai (1956 NLJ 610 =a. I. R. 1957 Nag. 15) has held that fresh evidence not capable of being discovered with due diligence may be received by the appellate Court provided such evidence must be of a decisive and collusive character on a vital issue in the case and must be free from suspicion. Assuming that the original owner Kesharbai made a gift of the suit houses to the plaintiff, her husband and son Vimal Kumar, still, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court cited above, the plaintiff could as a co-owner and landlady bring the suit for eviction and the documents filed by the defendants are of no help for deciding the suit. This apart, the execution, attestation and acceptance of the gift deed (Ex. A-1) as also the relinquishment deed (Ex. A-2) having not been duly proved, the plaintiff Sunderbai was further examined in the lower appellate Court and she categorically denied execution of Ex. A-1 by her mother and Ex. This apart, the execution, attestation and acceptance of the gift deed (Ex. A-1) as also the relinquishment deed (Ex. A-2) having not been duly proved, the plaintiff Sunderbai was further examined in the lower appellate Court and she categorically denied execution of Ex. A-1 by her mother and Ex. A-2 by her son Vimal Kumar, but in spite of such denial, the lower appellate Court held that she had admitted the execution of these documents. This finding is perverse. The defendants made no efforts to get the originals of these documents produced by serving notice on the plaintiff and no case has been made out for adducing secondary evidence. The plaintiff has only examined a clerk from the Sub registrars office, Chetan Das, to prove that these two documents (Exs. A-1 and A-2) are certified copies of the documents duly registered in his office. The only presumption available under section 60 of the Registration Act is regarding registration of the documents and nothing more. The defendants are still obliged to prove the execution of the gift deed by Kesharbai, its attestation and its acceptance by the donees. No such evidence has been adduced nor any attesting witness has been examined. Similar is the case with regard to the relinquishment deed. Therefore, these documents having not been proved and there is nothing on record to show that the plaintiff was a co-owner and not a full owner of the suit houses, these documents being not proved, are of no avail to the defendants. The plaintiff has produced the lease deed (Ex. CP-9) to show that the nazul lease of the land on which the suit houses stand has been executed in her name and valid upto to the year 1999. Besides, she has also produced the Municipal tax receipts and the property Tax receipts showing her to be the owner of the suit houses. Simply because some of the rent receipts were issued jointly in the names of the plaintiff and her husband would not make her husband an owner of the suit houses. Under the circumstances, there was no justification for the lower appellate Court to reverse the decree of the trial Court. ( 9. ) ACCORDINGLY the appeal is allowed with costs by reversing the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court and restoring that of the trial Court. Under the circumstances, there was no justification for the lower appellate Court to reverse the decree of the trial Court. ( 9. ) ACCORDINGLY the appeal is allowed with costs by reversing the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court and restoring that of the trial Court. It is further directed that the plaintiff is entitled to obtain possession after two months from the date of this decree and she is further directed to pay compensation to the defendants equal to double the amount of animal rent, i. e. Rs. 1560/ -. Counsels fee as per schedule, if certified. Appeal allowed