Lahiri, J. - In this writ application the core question is whether the State Government has any jurisdiction to hear appeal or revision against an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner exercising his powers under the Elephants Preservation Act, 1879 or the Elephant Hunting Rules, 1930 framed by the State Govern­ment u/s. 6 of ''the Act". The Deputy Commissioner directed respondent No. 3, a "Kheddah Shikari", a licensee permitted to capture wild elephants, to return the cow-elephant to the petiti­oner. On enquiry made and having held that the cow-elephant was indeed the domesticated elephant of the petitioner which had escaped to jungle and captured by Respondent No. 3. The peti­tioner contends that the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar dated 23.6.78 directing Respondent No. 3 to return the cow-ele­phants to him was final and the State Government had no juris­diction to set aside the said order under "the Act" or "the Rules" framed there under and has questioned the decision of the State Government in this Writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The relevant facts necessary for disposal of the question posed are set forth here in after: Respondent No. 3 Giasuddin Laskar had an elephant hunting license issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, under the provisions of "the Act" and "the Rules". The license contained certain terms and conditions. The relevant conditions 11 to 16 ate quoted here in below: 11. That in the event of your capturing any elephant which shows distinct signs of domestication and other marks of its previous captivity as identified by the Forest Depot Officer as 'BONGHARASIA' which the term applicable for domesticated elephant escaping to Forest, such capture shall be kept in your custody and you cannot claim such elephant to be one of your wild elephants captured under this linense. 12. That you shall be responsible for feeding and upkeep of such capture till such time a decision is made about such a capture. 13. That Deputy Commissioner on receipt of report from Forest Depot Officer and on receipt of claim petition if any will decide the claim. 14. In the event of Deputy Commissioner admitting any claim of any owner of such 'BONGHARASIA' elephant you will be paid the cost of capture, fooding and upkeep cost as estimated by Forest Depot Officer. 15. 13. That Deputy Commissioner on receipt of report from Forest Depot Officer and on receipt of claim petition if any will decide the claim. 14. In the event of Deputy Commissioner admitting any claim of any owner of such 'BONGHARASIA' elephant you will be paid the cost of capture, fooding and upkeep cost as estimated by Forest Depot Officer. 15. On payment of such dues, you are to hand over such 'BONGHARASIA' to the claimant whose claim has been admitted. 16. That if the claim for such 'BONGHARASIA' is rejected, such elephant will be treated like any other wild elephant under this license and you can get Transit Pass from Divisional Forest Officer after payment of royalty monopoly as provided under this agreement". It will be seen that respondent No. 3 was granted the linense under "the Act" and "the Rule" to capture wild elephants. The licensee had absolute right to capture wild elephants. However, in the course of hunting if the licensee captures an elephant which bears signs of domestication and other marks of its previous captivity detected by the Forest Depot Officer, such capture was allowed to be kept in the custody of the licensee until the Deputy Commissioner decides the claim of the Forest Department. Apart from the Forest Department, it appears from clauses 13 and 14 of the license, a person claiming to be owner of such 'BONGHARASIA' elephant may present his claim. If the Deputy Commissioner decides that it is a wild elephant, the licensee was entitled to the elephant. However, if it is found by the Deputy Commis­sioner that the claim of any owner of such 'BONGHARASIA' elephant is justified he may direct return of the elephant to such owner and the licensee is entitled to the cost of capture, fooding and upkeep cost to be estimated by the Forest Depot Officer. Admittedly there is no provision of any appeal or revision against the order of the Deputy Commissioner contained in the license and/or "the Act" or "the Rules" framed there under. 3. In the instant case, respondent No. 3 had captured the cow-elephant with a calf from Elephant Mahal No. 3 on or about 27.3.78. The petitioner, on information received about the capture of the elephant claimed that he was the owner of the animal and produced a document, namely, T. P. No. 77/4385 dated 9.3.1966. 3. In the instant case, respondent No. 3 had captured the cow-elephant with a calf from Elephant Mahal No. 3 on or about 27.3.78. The petitioner, on information received about the capture of the elephant claimed that he was the owner of the animal and produced a document, namely, T. P. No. 77/4385 dated 9.3.1966. The petitioner claimed that the name of the cow-elephant was "JOYMALA". He claimed that the said elephant had escaped to jungle but captured by a licensee whereupon the petitioner lodged claim before the then Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, who by his order dated 11.8.72 allowed the claim of the petitioner and returned the same to him. After about 8 months, the elephant again fled into jungle. The petitioner claimed that the elephant captured by Respondent No. 3 was his elephant. The claim of the petitioner was thoroughly examined by the Ranger who reported that the elephant belonged to the petitioner. A thorough enquiry was made by the then Additional Deputy Commi­ssioner, Cachar as directed by the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner, on the basis of the enquiries made and on perusal of the materials available held that the petitioner was the owner of the captured cow-elephant and directed respondent No. 3 to hand her over to the claimant. The Deputy Commissioner found that all the identification marks of the captured elephant tallied with the elephant of the petitioner which had escaped to jungle. However, the Deputy Commi­ssioner, Cachar rejected the claim of the petitioner for the calf on the ground that it was born while the cow-elephant was at large in wild forest. Naturally, the petitioner could not claim ownership in respect of the baby elephant born while its mother had escaped into jungle and lived therein. The parties preferred appeals against the orders. 4. The State Government heard and rejected the appeal of the petitioner's claim for the calf but allowed the appeal of respondent No. 3 setting aside the order of the Deputy Commi­ssioner. The State Government, inter alia, held that the Deputy Commissioner had no jurisdiction to decide the claim in view of the decision of the Gauhati High Court in Civil No. 311 of 1973 decided on 25.8.75, since reported in AIR 1976 Gau. 36 , Hira Bordoloi vs. Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur. The State Government, inter alia, held that the Deputy Commissioner had no jurisdiction to decide the claim in view of the decision of the Gauhati High Court in Civil No. 311 of 1973 decided on 25.8.75, since reported in AIR 1976 Gau. 36 , Hira Bordoloi vs. Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur. It is true that it was decided on the facts and circumstances of that case that the Deputy Commissioner had no jurisdiction to decide the ownership of an elephant and it could be decided only by a Civil Court. The State Government also relied on Chytun Churn Doss & Ors. vs. The Collector of Sylhet, reported in (1874) XXI W. R. 75. The State Government exercised the appellate jurisdic­tion, accepted the appeal and set aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner. Hence, this application under Article 226 of the Constitution questioning the validity of appellate order. 5. In order to decide the extent of the powers and jurisdic­tion of the Deputy Commissioner as well as the State Govern­ment, it is necessary to recall that the Elephants Preservation Act, 1879 was extended to the district of Cachar in 1880, vide, Assam Gazette, 1880, page 340. Section 5 of "the Act" provides that the Collector or Deputy Commissioner of any district may, subject to the Rules, grant licenses to kill or capture wild ele­phants in such district. In exercise of the powers conferred under section 6 of "the Act" the State Government framed a set of Rules, vide Local Government Notification No. 4392 R dated 4th November, 1930, styled as "The Elephant Hunting Rules". The Act and the Rules authorise the Deputy Commissioner to grant license to capture or kill wild elephant within his jurisdiction. There are certain Executive Orders passed by the Government regarding "The Elephant Hunting Rules". In the instant case the license was issued under the provision of "the Act" and "the Rules" subject to certain conditions including Clauses 11 to 16 extracted above. It will appear clear that the terms of the license were binding and enforceable on the licensee as well as the Deputy Commissioner. This is a statutory license. The power of the Deputy Commissioner to decide the claim of the Forest Department and/or a third party vis-a-vis the licensee, as to the ownership of an elephant is writ large in 'the Con­ditions'. This is a statutory license. The power of the Deputy Commissioner to decide the claim of the Forest Department and/or a third party vis-a-vis the licensee, as to the ownership of an elephant is writ large in 'the Con­ditions'. In the event of any disputation as to the ownership of an elephant captured by a licensee, a person claiming to be the owner of such 'BANGHARASIA' elephant can lodge his claim to the Deputy Commissioner who is the statutory authority to hear and dispose of the claim. Under these circumstances, we hold that the Deputy Commissioner had the right and juris­diction to decide the claim of the petitioner and the appellate authority committed error apparent on the face of the records in holding that the Deputy Commissioner had no such power or jurisdiction. 6. We feel inclined to state the purport of decision in Hira Bordoloi (supra). In that case the Deputy Commissi­oner had issued a notice about capture of an elephant in the forest range. There were three claimants and the Deputy Commi­ssioner rejected the claims of all and directed that the elephant should be made over to the Forest Department. Hira Bordoloi preferred a writ petition and claimed that the elephant was not wild and as such it was not a "forest produce" as denned in Section 3(4) of the Assam Forest Regulation VII of 1891 and the Deputy Commissioner had no jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the elephant under the Assam "Forest Regulation, ln Hira Bordoloi (supra), the Deputy Commissioner did not disclose the source of his power nor could he state the law under which he had exercised the jurisdiction to pass .the order. The Respondents could not point out any provisions of law apart from the Assam Forest Regulation. Therefore, in the absence of any material as to the source of the power the High Court held that the power was purported to have been exercised under the Assam Forest Regulation. But, neither a wild elephant nor a domesticated within the forest area elephant captured was a "forest produce" as defined in sec. 2(4) of the Regulation. Accordingly, the High Court held that the Deputy Commissi­oner had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order purporting to act under the Assam Forest Regulation. But, neither a wild elephant nor a domesticated within the forest area elephant captured was a "forest produce" as defined in sec. 2(4) of the Regulation. Accordingly, the High Court held that the Deputy Commissi­oner had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order purporting to act under the Assam Forest Regulation. It will be seen that the Court invited the learned counsel for the State to show whether there was any provision in the Regulation for dealing with such a case and Counsel failed to point out any. It was never placed before the court that the power could be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner under the provisions of the Ele­phants Preservation Act, 1879 and 'the Rules' framed there under. Therefore, Him Bordoloi (supra) is the decision where the State had failed to point out the provisions of law under which the Deputy Commissioner had passed the impugned order. How­ever, in the instant case, we find that the Deputy Commissioner has had the power to decide the claims under the provisions of "the Act" and "the Rules". In Him Bordoloi (supra) the elephant was captured by the Forest Department and not by a licensee bound by the conditions of the license. Therein, the State Government had failed to produce any law where under the Deputy Commissioner could exercise his power of disposal in favour of the Forest Department. Under these circumstances it was held that the impugned order of the Deputy Commissi­oner was invalid and without jurisdiction. In our opinion, the decision rendered in Hira Bordoloi (supra) was based entirely on the inability of the State to place before the Court the provisions of law where under the Deputy Commissioner had passed the order. Further, we find that the rule in Hira Bor­doloi (supra) can be applied only in respect of capture of ele­phant by the Forest Department and not by a licensee. In the instant case, power and jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner is writ large as the elephant was captured by the licensee and he exercised jurisdiction under the provisions of the Act, the Rules and the statutory license, which empowered him to decide such cases. In the result, we hold that the principles of law enunciated in Hira Bordoloi (supra) are not applicable in the instant case. In the result, we hold that the principles of law enunciated in Hira Bordoloi (supra) are not applicable in the instant case. For the foregoing reasons we hold that the appellate authority wrongly applied the principles of Hira Bordoloi (supra) and as such, the appellate order must be declared to be invalid. 7. The appellate authority committed error of law apparent on the face of the record in applying the principles of Chytun Churn Doss (supra). It is not a decision based on the Elephant Preservation Act and the Rules framed there under. The cause of action of the suit arose long before the Act and the Rules came into force. In that case, the plaintiff had filed a suit to recover a female elephant captured by the Forest Department. The High Court upheld the order of the Courts below that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the captured elephant belo­nged to him as the description of the elephant of the plaintiff substantially varied with the marks found on the captured elephant. Of course, there is a passing observation of the High Court based on Stephen's Commentaries on Blackstone, Vol. II, page 6, which we extract: "that the animal was originally 'faere nature' and such animals are no longer the property of a man while they continue in his keeping or actual possession but if at any time they regain their natural liberty, his property instantly ceases, unless they have 'animum revertendi', which is only to be known by their usual custom of returning, or unless instantly pursued by the owner, for during such pursuit his property remains." We propose not to express any opinion as to the observa­tions. However, we say this far and no further that the principles may be applicable when there are relevant factors and all of them combine to show that the claimant had abandoned his right to the animal. If a domesticated animal escapes to jungle and the claim is abandoned by the owner and after a lapse of sufficient period the animal is recaptured but it does not show its usual and natural instinct of returning back to the owner nor does it respond to the owner's call, such animal ought not to be returned to the owner to the detriment of the desire of the animal, and, it should be retained by the person to whom the animal res­ponds. This is the principle behind the rule enunciated in Step­hen's Commentaries on Blackstone. However, the custom or the principle may not be applicable in a case where there was no abandonment of the claim by the owner of the animal. The theory is based entirely on the principle of abandonment. In Chytun Churn Doss (supra), the positive conclusion reached by the court was that the elephant did not belong to the plain­tiff. The custom or the principle lost its value no sooner the Act and the Rules came into force. Under the provision of the Act, a true owner is entitled to get back his missing elephant even when he had lost all hopes and abandoned the prospect of getting back the elephant. However, in the instant case there is no question of such abandonment nor is there is any material to show that the elephant ever refused to return back to the petitioner. Under these circumstances, we hold that the appellate authority was absolutely wrong in placing reliance on Chytun Chum Doss (supra). 8. However, all these questions pale into insignificance if it is held that the State Government had no power or jurisdic­tion to entertain the appeal. We have scrutinised the provisi­ons of "the Act", "the Rules", "Executive Instructions" issued from time to time by the State Government under the Elephant Hunting Rules and all the conditions of the license, but we do not find any provision which empowers the State Government to entertain any appeal or revision against such order rendered by the Deputy Commissioner. Mr. M. A. Laskar, learned coun­sel for Respondent No. 3 and Mr. P. Prasad, learned Govern­ment Advocate have failed to place before us any law under which the State Government could entertain an appeal or revi­sion against the order of the Deputy Commissioner. The right of appeal can be created by a statute and an authority can enter­tain and dispose of an appeal or revision if such power is con­ferred by or under any law and not otherwise. Under these circums­tances, we are constrained to hold that Respondent No. 3 had no right to prefer any appeal to the State Government. We also hold that the State Government had no power or jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of any appeal and/or revision against an order rendered by the Deputy Commissioner under the provisi­ons of "the Act" and "the Rules" framed there under. We also hold that the State Government had no power or jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of any appeal and/or revision against an order rendered by the Deputy Commissioner under the provisi­ons of "the Act" and "the Rules" framed there under. 9. In the result, we declare that the impugned order dated 19.11.1978 passed by the State Government is without jurisdiction and is liable to be quashed, which we hereby do. In the result, the petition is allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs.