Judgment :- SENGOTTUVELAN, J. 1. This appeal is filed by the Government of Tamil Nadu represented by the Department of Agriculture, the defendant in the suit in O.S. No. 143 of 1974 on the file of the Original Side of this Court, against the judgment and decree passed in the said suit by Padmanabhan, J., awarding a sum of Rs. 26,79,930-50 with interest at 12 per cent from the date of cancellation of lease amounting to Rs. 9,64,775 totalling Rs. 36,44,705-50 and future interest from the date of the suit till the date of decree to the respondent herein. 2. The facts of the case are briefly as follows:— In 1970 the Director of Fisheries. Madras called for sealed tenders for the lease of the right to fish, take and carry away chank shells from the Government Chank Fisheries, of (1) Palk Bay region of Ramanathapuram District; (2) The coast of Kanyakumari District; (3) the coast of Chingleput District including Madras and South Atcotand excluding the French Kuppam of Pondicherry; (4) the coast of Thanjavur District excluding the chank fishery of the French K uppam of Karaikal and also excluding the Thanjavur coast from Puthukudu to Point Calimere; and (5) The coast line of Ramanathapuram District i.e. from Sundarapandian Pattinam to Karangadu in the Palk Bay, generally known as Sivaganga Fishery. The tenders were called for by the notification dated 17th August, 1970. The respondent, a partnership firm submitted tenders along with others. The tenders submitted by the respondent being the highest was accepted by the Government of Tamil Nadu, the appellant he rein. The bid amount of the respondent in respect of several fisheries which were accepted by the appellant are as follows:— 1. PalkBayregion Rs. 81,001 2. Kanyakumari region Rs. 9,5001 3. South Arcot, Chingleput and Madras region Rs. 85,087 4. Thanjavur region Rs. 81,082 5. Sivaganga region Rs. 45,601 The respondent also executed lease deeds in respect of the above said fisheries in favour of the appellant. According to the lease deeds the respondent was permitted to collect chanks from the various regions upto the limits prescribed in the lease deeds in respect of each fishery. The particulars of the lease as evidenced by the lease deeds can conveniently be stated by means of a tabulation:— S. No. Ex. According to the lease deeds the respondent was permitted to collect chanks from the various regions upto the limits prescribed in the lease deeds in respect of each fishery. The particulars of the lease as evidenced by the lease deeds can conveniently be stated by means of a tabulation:— S. No. Ex. No. Name of the Fisheries Period of lease Lease amount Limit upto which chanks can be collected Security deposit. 1. P- Palk Bay region From 2-#1511971 to 1-- Rs. 81,000/- per annum to be paid half yearly in advance. 6,00,000 full sized chanks of size of 57.15 mm per year. Rs. 8,100 2. P- Kanyakumari region —do— Rs. 9,501/- per annum to be paid yearly in advance. 1,50,000 full sized chanks per year. Rs. 950-10 3. P- South Arcot, Chingleput and Madras region. —do— Rs. 85,087/- per annum to be paid half yearly in advance. 1,75,000 full sized chanks per year. Rs. 8,508-70 4. P- Thanjavur region —do— Rs. 81,082/- per annum to be paid half yearly in advance. 2,00,000 full sized chanks per year. Rs. 8108-20 5. P- Sivaganga region —do— Rs. 45,601/- per annum to be paid half yearly in advance. 3,00,000 full sized chanks per year Rs. 4,560-10 3. As per the terms of the abovesaid lease agreement, viz., Exs. P11 to P15, the respondent took possession of the fisheries on 2nd February, 1971. The case of the respondent is that immediately thereafter the appellant prevented the respondent from enjoying the right to fish in Palk Bay and Sivaganga regions by the non-co-operation of the appellant and its refusal to render the respondent the necessary assistance. On 7th March, 1971 the respondent sent a notice Ex. P17 through their Advocate to the Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu complaining about their being prevented from having quiet possession and peaceful enjoyment of the leasehold rights and privileges and calling upon the appellant to render all assistance in the matter of peaceful fishing of the chanks. There was no disturbance from others from 14th March, 1971 for some days. However, by means of the proceedings of the Director of Fisheries, marked as exhibits P23 to P26 the appellant unilaterally cancelled all the leases. No notice was given to the respondent to show cause why the leases should not be cancelled. There was no disturbance from others from 14th March, 1971 for some days. However, by means of the proceedings of the Director of Fisheries, marked as exhibits P23 to P26 the appellant unilaterally cancelled all the leases. No notice was given to the respondent to show cause why the leases should not be cancelled. The case of the respondent herein and the plaintiff in the suit before the learned trial judge is that he respondent was put to great loss by the unilateral cancellation of the leases. On the basis of the lease agreements the Respondent had invested more than Rs. 5,00,000 for the purpose of carrying out the fishing operation. Therefore the respondent issued a lawyers notice Ex. P27 to the appellant on 6th July, 1971 under S. 80 of the Civil Procedure Code claiming a sum of Rs. 27,65,544 as damages. The appellant did not send any reply. The appellant repaid the respondent a sum of Rs. 48,175-68 being the balance of lease amount remitted by the respondent after deducting the lease amount payable for the period during which the lease was in force, which the respondent received under protest. The appellant also refunded the security deposit of Rs. 30,227-10, The respondent herein, the plaintiff in the suit, filed the suit for recovery of damages to the extent of Rs. 27,65,544 with future interest and costs. 4. In the written statement filed in the suit the appellant herein and the defendant in the suit denied the allegation that the respondent was prevented from enjoying the featherweight in respect of Palk Bay and Sivaganga regions. The respondent enjoyed the rights granted under the different agreements till 10th June, 1971 on which date the agreements were cancelled by the appellant. Cl. 11 of Ex. P11 and Cl. 7 of Exs. P12 to P15, the agreements relating to the several leases, enable the appellant to cancel the agreement without assigning any reason therefor. The agreements did not call for any notice being given before the cancellation of the lease. The appellant cancelled the lease in the larger interest of the public. The clause relating to cancellation of the lease without assigning any reasons is binding on the respondent and the respondent having taken the lease subject to said clause and having enjoyed the fruits thereof is estopped from contending against the tenor of the agreements. The appellant cancelled the lease in the larger interest of the public. The clause relating to cancellation of the lease without assigning any reasons is binding on the respondent and the respondent having taken the lease subject to said clause and having enjoyed the fruits thereof is estopped from contending against the tenor of the agreements. The allegation that the respondent had invested about Rs. 5,00,000 in pursuance of the agreement is denied. The appellant denied the factum and the quantum of damages alleged in the plaint. It is also contended that if the number of chanks fished by the earlier lessees are taken into consideration it will be evident that the respondent could not have obtained the maximum number of chanks mentioned in the agreements. In the additional written statement filed on behalf of the appellant it is contended that what was granted under the above said five agreements Exs. P11 to P15 was only a licence to fish chanks in the different regions and that consequently the licence is revocable at the will of the lessor and the appellant is entitled to cancel the same without notice. The learned trial Judge on the basis of the above said pleadings framed the following Issues:— 1. Whether the termination of the lease agreement by the defendant is illegal and not valid? 2. Was the Plaintiff prevented from enjoying fishery right in the Palk Bay and Sivaganga regions.? 3. Is the Plaintiff entitled to any damages and if so to what amount? 4. To what relief are the parties entitled? Additional Issues: 1. Whether the agreements created a lease in favour of the plaintiff or only conferred a licence in favour of the plaintiff to collect and carry away chanks? 2. Whether the claim towards damages in respect of Kanyakumari region on the enhanced amount of Rs. 6,92,649-86 is barred by limitation? 5. In dealing-with the additional Issue No. 1 Padmanabhan, J., after referring to the cases reported in Ananda Behera v. State of Orissa 1 , and Bihar E.G.F. Co-Op. Socy. 2. Whether the claim towards damages in respect of Kanyakumari region on the enhanced amount of Rs. 6,92,649-86 is barred by limitation? 5. In dealing-with the additional Issue No. 1 Padmanabhan, J., after referring to the cases reported in Ananda Behera v. State of Orissa 1 , and Bihar E.G.F. Co-Op. Socy. v. Sipahi Singh 2 , observed that the right to collect and carry away chanks is in the nature of a profit a prendre, i.e., a profit or benefit arising out of the land, and came to the conclusion that the right to collect and carry away the chanks from the sea bed is a benefit arising out of the land as in the case of a right to catch and carry fish from a lake and as such it is an interest in immoveable property. Then, the learned trial Judge proceeded to discuss the question whether the right conferred under Exs. P11 to P15 is a lease or a licence. After referring to the definition of licence in S. 52 of the Indian Easement Act and the distinction between the lease and the licence laid down in the cases reported in Board of Revenue v. South Indian Co. Ltd. 3 , Associated Hotels of India v. R.N. Kapoor 4, M.N. Clubwala v. Fida Hussain Saheb 5, Ramamurty Subudhi v. Gopinath 6, State of W.B. v. Saradiya Thakuranin 7, Parchapakesan v. Swaminathan 8, Revenue Board v. A.M. Ansari , 9 and Ananda Behera v. State of Orissa 1, came to the conclusion that the right conferred under the agreements Exs. P11 to P15 are in the nature of a licence coupled with interest. Further, the learned Judge is of the view that the right conferred under the above said agreements which is a licence coupled with a grant or a licence with profit a prendre are not revocable under S. 60 of the Easements Act. 6. On Issue No. 1 the learned Judge held that the unilateral power of the defendant to cancel the agreements at their own will without assigning any reason therefor which is incorporated in Cl. 11 of Ex. P11 and Cl.7 of Exs. P12 to P15 is null and void. 6. On Issue No. 1 the learned Judge held that the unilateral power of the defendant to cancel the agreements at their own will without assigning any reason therefor which is incorporated in Cl. 11 of Ex. P11 and Cl.7 of Exs. P12 to P15 is null and void. After referring to the case reported in Kanwarlal v. Kamakhya Narayan 1 , holding that where a fixed term is mentioned and an option is given to the lessor to determine the lease whenever he desires, such option is void for repugnancy, the learned Judge quoted with approval the head note from, the judgment of Rajamannar, C.J., found in Maddala Thathiah v. M & S.M. Railway 2. “Where there is an enforceable concluded contract between two parties subject to a condition that it is open to one of the parties to say at any time that the contract is not enforceable, such a condition has the effect of actually or possibly destroying the contract altogether at the whim and fancy of one of the parties to the contract. Such a clause has to be rejected as unenforceable.” The learned Judge also relied on the English decision reported in Furnivali v. Coombes 3 and Forbes v. Git 4 and came to the conclusion that if in a deed an earlier clause is followed by a latter clause which destroys altogether the obligation created by the earlier clause the latter clause has to be rejected as repugnant and the earlier has to prevail. Applying the same principle to the terms of the lease in the present case the learned Judge held that since a fixed term is mentioned with an option to the lessor to determine the lease whenever he desires, the latter must be taken to be void due to repugnancy. The learned Judge also quoted with approval the following passage reported in International Oil Co. v. Indian Oil Co. Ltd. 5 :— “In all indefinite mercantile or commercial contracts, the question whether the relationship of principal and agent can be terminated by a reasonable notice or only by mutual consent is one of construction subject to the rules of law. There is no general rule of permanence. An agency may be terminated in various ways. v. Indian Oil Co. Ltd. 5 :— “In all indefinite mercantile or commercial contracts, the question whether the relationship of principal and agent can be terminated by a reasonable notice or only by mutual consent is one of construction subject to the rules of law. There is no general rule of permanence. An agency may be terminated in various ways. If the termination of agency by the principal is inequitable or works an unjust hardship on the agent, the’ law requires a reasonable notice to be given. An absolute power of cancellation of contract cannot be validly reserved in favour of one of the parties. In the instant case the Indian Oil Corporation had reserved an absolute power of cancellation of the contract of agency and has actually cancelled the agency without assigning any valid reasons. Such a clause in the contract is absolutely illegal, irregular and void. It is true the agent had knowledge of the existence in the agreement of the sword of Damocles termination clause. Even then it is unfair on the part of the Corporation to terminate the agency without due regard to the equities of an agent, without just provocation and without any notice.” Eventually the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the term occurring in Cl. 11 of Ex. P11 and Cl. 7 of Exs. P12 to P15 are illegal and void and held that the defendant is not entitled to cancel the contract unilaterally relying on the above said clauses which confer unilateral and arbitrary power on the defendant to cancel the contract at their own will without assigning any reasons therefor. The learned Judge also came to the conclusion that the above said clauses providing for cancellation of the contract are void for repugnancy to the earlier clause which prescribes a period of three years as the duration of the contract. 8. The learned Judge also did not accept the argument on behalf of the defendant, the appellant herein, that the provisions of the Governments Grants Act will apply in respect of the above said contracts. In dealing with the applicability of S. 2 of the Government Grants Act, which declares that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are not applicable to Government grants, the learned Judge referred to the following decisions of the Allahabad High Court. In dealing with the applicability of S. 2 of the Government Grants Act, which declares that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are not applicable to Government grants, the learned Judge referred to the following decisions of the Allahabad High Court. In Zahoor Ahmad v. State of U.P. 6 , the Allahabad High Court observed as follows:— “S. 2 of the Government Grants Act does not render all the provisions of the T.P. Act inapplicable to lands held under grant by the Government, but the meaning of the section is that when the Court is called upon to construe an instrument granting land by the Government, it shall construe each grant irrespective of the provisions of the T.P. Act. The ultimate portion of S. 2 of the Act, viz., ‘but every such grant and transfer shall be construed and take effect as if the said Act had not been passed’, is the key to the understanding of the section. It provides that if the grant ever comes to be construed, then the Court shall construe such grant irrespective of the provisions of the T.P. Act. For instance. S. 14 of the T.P. Act provides what is known as the rule against perpetuity. In case of a grant made by the Government, this rule will not apply”. On appeal against the judgment in the above said case, the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. Zahoor Ahmad 1 , observed as follows:— “S. 2 of the Government Grants Act does not mean that all the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are inapplicable. To illustrate, in the case of a grant under the Government Grants Act S. 14 of the Transfer of Property Act will not apply because S. 14 which provides what is known as the rule against perpetuity will not apply by reason of the provisions in the Government Grants Act. The grant shall be construed to take effect as if the Transfer of Property Act does not apply. S. 3 of the Governme nt Grants Act declares the unfettered discretion of the Government to impose such conditions and limitations as it thinks fit, no matter what the general law of the land be. The meaning of Ss. The grant shall be construed to take effect as if the Transfer of Property Act does not apply. S. 3 of the Governme nt Grants Act declares the unfettered discretion of the Government to impose such conditions and limitations as it thinks fit, no matter what the general law of the land be. The meaning of Ss. 2 and 3 of the Government Grants Act is that the scope of that Act is not limited to affecting the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act only. The Government has unfettered discretion to impose any conditions, limitations Or restrictions in its grants, and the right, privileges and obligations of the grantee would be regulated according to the terms of the grant, notwithstanding any provisions of any statutory or common law.” The learned Judge also extracted an observation of the Allahabad High Court as in the case reported in Dost Mohammed Khan v. Bank of Upper India 2 , where a Crown grant was mortgaged and it was claimed that the grant was not subject to the right of sale by the mortgagee, the Allahabad High Court repelled such a contention. The relevant passage in the judgment is as follows:— “It is difficult to interpret S. 2 of the Crown Grants Act but from a perusal of the preamble to the Act it is reasonably clear that the object of the Legislature in passing the Act was to validate any provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations which might be contained in any Crown Grant and which otherwise might be held to be obnoxious to the restrictions imposed in respect of grants generally by the Transfer of Property Act. We do not think that it was intended by the Legislature that unconditional grants made by the Crown, free from restrictions, as to alienation, should not be the subject of a sale in a suit by the mortgagee.” The learned Judge observed that in so far as this case is concerned S. 2 of the Government Grants Act has no relevancy at all and the only relevant provision that is applicable is S. 3 of the Government Grants Act. As per S. 3 of the Government Grants Act, all provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations contained in any such grant or transfer by the Government shall be valid and take effect according to their tenor, notwithstanding any rule of law, statute or enactment of the legislature. As per S. 3 of the Government Grants Act, all provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations contained in any such grant or transfer by the Government shall be valid and take effect according to their tenor, notwithstanding any rule of law, statute or enactment of the legislature. But the learned Judge did not apply the provisions of S. 3 of the Government Grants Act since there is no plea in the written statement that what has been conferred upon the plaintiff, the respondent herein, under Exs. P11 to P15 are Government grants, coming within the meaning of the Government Grants Act. Eventually the learned Judge, after referring to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in Maddala Thathiah v. M. & S.M. Railway 3 where Rajamannar, Chief Justice, held that where there is an enforceable concluded contract between two parties subject to a condition that it is open to one of the parties to say at any time that the contract is not enforceable, such a condition has the effect of actually or possibly destroying the contract altogether at the whim and fancy of one of the parties to the contract and such a clause has to be rejected as unenforceable, came to the conclusion that the cancellation of the agreements Exs. P11 to P15 was illegal and invalid. 9. On Issue No. 2, regarding the question whether the plaintiff was prevented from enjoying the fishery right in the Palk Bay and Sivaganga regions, the learned Judge accepting the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 that one Mangalaswami, an office-bearer of the Fishermen Association and other fishermen had obstructed the exercise of the rights by the plaintiff as lessee of the above said chank fisheries and also accepting the version of P.Ws. that the Fisheries Department did not take effective steps to prevent the obstruction caused by Mangalaswami and his associates against the exercise of the rights by the Plaintiff, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was prevented from enjoying the fishery rights in Palk Bay and Sivaganga regions. 10. On Additional Issue No. 2, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the enhanced claim put forward by the plaintiff by way of an amendment to the plaint in respect of damages relating to Kanyakumari region is not barred by limitation. 11. 10. On Additional Issue No. 2, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the enhanced claim put forward by the plaintiff by way of an amendment to the plaint in respect of damages relating to Kanyakumari region is not barred by limitation. 11. On Issue No. 3 relating to the question whether the plaintiff is entitled to any damage, and if so, to what amount, the learned Judge referred to S. 73 of the Contract Act which states that when a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties know, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it and the observation in the wellknown decision in Hadley v. Baxendale 1 , which is as follows:— ‘Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the t me they made the contract as the probable result of the breach of it. Now, if the special circumstances under which the contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these special circumstances so known and communicated.” The learned Judge also referred to the decision reported in Venkatarama Sastrulu v. Nama Venkanna 2 , where the principle in arriving at the damages for breach of contract is stated as:— “The loss or damages must arise naturally in the usual course of things from the breach or it must be such as the parties know to be likely to result from the breach.” The learned Judge also referred to Illustration (a) to S. 73 of the Contract Act which states that the measure of damages upon a breach by a buyer is the difference between the contrast price and the market price on the date of the breach and observed that the present case is more or less similar to a case covered by Illustration (a) to S. 73 of the Contract Act. Though the learned Judge observed that Exs. P11 to P15 cannot be characterised to be the agreements to sell goods, the same relate to a similar transaction since the plaintiff has been permitted by the above said agreements to catch and carry away a particular quantity of chanks from different regions. The learned Judge also accepted the evidence of P.W. 3 that there is a great demand for these chanks particularly in West Bengal. On the question of measure of damages the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to the difference between the cost price of the chanks that would have been incurred by the plaintiff in case the lease agreements, Exs. P11 to P15 had been acted upon and the market price prevalent after the cancellation of the lease. The learned Judge also observed that on account of cancellation of the lease the plaintiff had been obliged to buy at the market rate. P11 to P15 had been acted upon and the market price prevalent after the cancellation of the lease. The learned Judge also observed that on account of cancellation of the lease the plaintiff had been obliged to buy at the market rate. The learned Judge eventually, after setting out the principle in Murlidhar v. Harishchandrc 3 that the first principle on which damages in cases of breach of contract are calculated is that, as far as possible, he who has proved a breach of a bargain to supply what he contracts to get is to be placed, as far as money can do it, in as good a situation as if the contract can be performed, calculated the cost of the chanks as per Ex. P11 in respect of Palk Bay region after taking into consideration the cost of the price paid by the plaintiff as evidenced by Exs. P62, P72 and arrived at Rs. 11,25,000 as the damages sustained by the pontiff in respect of Palk Bay region. 12. In so far as South Arcot, Chingleput and Madras regions are concerned the learned Judge after calculating the cost of the chanks as per Ex. P13 and after taking into consideration the cost of the chanks purchased after cancellation as evidenced by Exs. P74 and P80, arrived at the difference between the contract price and the market price Rs. 3,61,294 as the quantum of damages in the above said region. 13. With reference to Thanjavur region the learned Judge calculated the cost price of the chanks as per Ex. P14 and the price paid by the plaintiff as per Exs. P74 and P75 and came to the conclusion that the difference in price, viz., Rs. 2,61,794 will be the quantum of damage in Thanjavur region. As far as Sivaganga region is concerned the learned Judge calculated the cost price of the chanks as per Ex. P15 and the price paid by the plaintiff as per Ex. P72 and came to the conclusion that the difference in price, viz., Rs. 2,25,000 will be the quantum of damage in respect of Sivaganga Region. As far as Kanyakumari region is concerned the learned Judge calculated the cost price of the chanks as per Ex. P12 and the price paid by the plaintiff as evidenced by Ex. P95 and came to the conclusion that the difference in price, viz., Rs. 2,25,000 will be the quantum of damage in respect of Sivaganga Region. As far as Kanyakumari region is concerned the learned Judge calculated the cost price of the chanks as per Ex. P12 and the price paid by the plaintiff as evidenced by Ex. P95 and came to the conclusion that the difference in price, viz., Rs. 7,48,326 will be the quantum of damage in Kanyakumari region. 14. For taking into consideration the chanks that could have been fished by the plaintiff the learned Judge assumed that the maximum quantity prescribed in the agreements, Exs. P11 to P15 would have been fished by the plaintiff and proceeded to assess the damages on that basis. The learned Judge also observed that the fact that during 1967-1970 the very same plaintiff and the other lessee T.S. Abdul Kader and Company were not able to reach the ceiling limit will not in any way affect the claim of the plaintiff for damages on the basis that he would have got the maximum number of chanks mentioned in Exs. P11 to P15. The learned Judge also rejected the documents, Exs. P115, 124, 125 and 126 wherein the plaintiff himself had given the price of the chanks in Ramanathapuram before the declaration of free chank fishery and the price prevailing after the declaration of free chank fishery and preferred to rely upon the bills produced by the plaintiff in the matter of calculation of damages and spoken to by P.Ws. and calculated the damages on the difference between the price alleged to have been paid by the plaintiff after the cancellation of the lease and the cost which would have been incurred by the plaintiff if he had operated the chank fisheries as per Exs. P11 to P15. The learned Judge thus arrived at the quantum of damages at Rs. 27,21,404 for all the above said chank fisheries. The learned Judge also came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to six per cent interest on the above said sum from the date of the suit till the date of payment. 15. P11 to P15. The learned Judge thus arrived at the quantum of damages at Rs. 27,21,404 for all the above said chank fisheries. The learned Judge also came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to six per cent interest on the above said sum from the date of the suit till the date of payment. 15. Though in the grounds of appeal the appellant/the State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Secretary to Government, Department of Agriculture, challenged all the findings of the learned trial Judge, during the course of the argument the correctness of the judgment of the learned trial Judge was challenged mainly on the following two grounds:— (1) The provisions of the Government Grants Act, 1895 apply to this case and as such all the terms of the lease are enforceable in spite of the provisions of the Contract Act and the Transfer of Property Act. Hence the finding of the learned trial Judge that Cl. 11 of Ex. P11 and Cl. 7 of Exs. P12 to P15 empowering the Government to cancel the lease without assigning any reason at any time is void and unenforceable cannot be sustained. (2) In any event the basis adopted for calculating the quantum of damage is not correct Hence the points for determination that arise in the appeal are as follows— 1. Whether the finding of the learned trial Judge that the clauses in the agreements of lease, viz., Exs. P11 to P15, empowering the Government to cancel the lease at any time without assigning any reason is void and unenforceable, is sustainable in view of the provisions of the Government Grants Act? 2. Whether the basis on which the quantum of damage arrived at by the learned trial Judge is sustainable? Before entering into a discussion on the first point we will have to ascertain the nature of right conveyed under the agreements, Exs. P11 to P15. The transaction in question related to the fishing and carrying away the chanks found in the regions of Palk Bay, Kanyakumari, South Arcot, Chingleputand Madras, Thanjavur and Sivaganga. In these areas in certain parts of the Sea, certain types of worms grow on the sea-bed and such sea-bed is called “Poochi Manal”. The chanks grow on these worms and mature into several types depending upon the region. There are two types of chanks, viz., Jadhi chanks and Patti Chanks. In these areas in certain parts of the Sea, certain types of worms grow on the sea-bed and such sea-bed is called “Poochi Manal”. The chanks grow on these worms and mature into several types depending upon the region. There are two types of chanks, viz., Jadhi chanks and Patti Chanks. The Jadhi chanks are more valuable than the patti chanks. Valampuri chanks, a rare variety of chanks, is of great value. The ancient rulers of Tamil Naduhadbeen exploiting the chank fisheries in the east-coast of Tamil Nadu from time immemorial. That right had devolved on the subsequent rulers, viz., Nawabs of Arcot, the British and afterwards the Union of India. The right vested with the sovereign was enjoyed by leasing out the right to fish and take away the chanks by diving or netting and the proceeds of the lease were appropriated by the sovereign from time immemorial. In the year 1962, the fishermen residing in Sivaganga coast of Ramanathapuram District made an attempt to challenge the rights of the Government by filing writ petitions in W.P. Nos. 915 and 916 of 1962 reported in P.S.A. Susai and another v. The Director of Fisheries Mount Road, Madras and another 1 , on the ground they have been fishing and carrying away the chanks in the chank fisheries from time immemorial and that the Government is not entitled to lease out either under the provisions of the Indian Fisheries Act, 1897 or any other enactment and that the right to fish the chanks in the Sivaganga coast is a fundamental right available to the fishermen under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. In that case Veeraswami, J., as he then was, dealt with in extenso the origin and development of the chank fisheries on the East-coast of Tamil Nadu from ancient times upto the present day and came to the conclusion that the sovereign had the right to exploit the chank fisheries from time immemorial and as such the fishermen cannot question the right of the Fisheries Department to lease out the chank fisheries. 16. The question that arises in this case is whether the right conveyed by the Government of Tamil Nadu to the lessee of a chank fishery is a right in immovable property. The plea of the plaintiff, the respondent herein, is that such a lease is a lease of immovable property. 16. The question that arises in this case is whether the right conveyed by the Government of Tamil Nadu to the lessee of a chank fishery is a right in immovable property. The plea of the plaintiff, the respondent herein, is that such a lease is a lease of immovable property. In support of the case of the respondent, reliance is placed upon the case reported in The Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh and others 2, where the Supreme Court observed as follows:— “The right to catch and carry away the fish being a ‘Profit a prendre’ i.e., a profit or benefit arising out of the land, it has to be regarded as immovable property within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act read in the light of S. 3(26) of the General Clauses Act.” In the case reported in K.T.M.T.M. Abdul Kayoom and another v. The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras 3, a Full Bench of this Court in dealing with the nature of the rights acquired by a lessee of a chank fishery observed that the amount of lease paid by the lessee is a capital expenditure. In the course of the judgment the Full Bench quoted with approval the following passage from the case reported in Kauri Timber Company Limited v. Commissioner of Taxes 4 : “The principle of these decisions appears to be this: that wherever at the time of the contract it is contemplated that the purchasers should derive a benefit from the further growth of the thing sold from further vegetation and from the nutriment afforded by the land, the contract is to be considered as for the interest in land; but where the process of vegetation is over, or the parties agree that the thing sold shall be immediately withdrawn from the land, the land is to be considered as a mere warehouse of the things sold and the contract is for goods.” On appeal against the decision of the Full Bench in the above case, viz., in K.T.M.T.M. Abdul Kayoom and another v. The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras 3, the Supreme Court held in K.T.M.T.M. Abdul Kayoom and another v. The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras 5, that the lease amount paid by the lessee of a chank fishery is a capital expenditure spent for acquiring right to fish the chanks. In the case reported in Ananda Behera and another v. State of Orissa and another 1, the Supreme Court laid down that the sale of a right to catch and carry away fish in specific portions of the lake over a specified future period amounts to a licence to enter on the land coupled with a grant to catch and carry away the fish, that is to say, it is a profit a prendre, which is regarded in India as a benefit that arises out of the land and as such is an immoveable property. In the case reported in The Srirangam Municipality v. Nataraja Pillai 2, Rarnanujam, J., while construing the right of a lessee to cut the grass for a period of three years in the sewage farm maintained by the Srirangam Municipality, observed as follows:— “The grantee is entitled not only to the grass which has grown at the time of execution of the deed but also to the subsequent growth for the period mentioned in the deed. As such he acquires a right in the land under that deed and is a lessee. The owner reserving a right to terminate the arrangement after notice or on grantee contravening its terms will not make it a licence.” The learned trial Judge after considering the material on record and the decisions cited above came to the conclusion that the right that is conferred on the plaintiff under Exs. P11 to P15 is a licence coupled with interest in immovable property. In fact the finding of the learned trial Judge that what was granted is a right in immovable property is not seriously challenged by the appellant before us in spite of the fact a plea was taken in the additional written statement to the effect that what was given to the plaintiff is a mere licence which is liable to be revoked by the grantor at any time. 17. The main argument on behalf of the appellant is that the right conferred under Exs. P11 to P15 being a right in respect of an immoveable property the right conveyed to the lessee amounts to a Government grant to which the provisions of the Government Grants Act apply. 17. The main argument on behalf of the appellant is that the right conferred under Exs. P11 to P15 being a right in respect of an immoveable property the right conveyed to the lessee amounts to a Government grant to which the provisions of the Government Grants Act apply. The meaning and the implication of the word “grant” is explained in the case reported in Mohan Ali and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 3 where the following observation is found:— “In the widest sense, ‘grant’ may comprehend everything that is granted or passed from one to another by deed. But commonly the term is applied to rights created or transferred by the Crown, e.g. grants of pensions, patents, charters, franchise, etc.” 18. The right granted under Exs. P11 to P15 being a right in immoveable property granted by the Government the transaction is well within the definition of the term—a grant. The case of the appellant is that in view of the provisions of the Government Grants Act, Cl. 11 of the agreement Ex. P11 and Cl. 7 of the agreements Exs. P12 to P15 enabling the Government to cancel the lease without assigning any reason cannot be said to be void and inoperative as contended by the respondent. As per S. 2 of the Government Grants Act the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 shall not apply to any grant by the Government and every such grant and transfer will have to be construed as if the Transfer of Property Act had not been passed. S. 3 of the Government Grants Acts is as follows:— “All provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations contained in any such grant or transfer as aforesaid shall be valid and take effect according to their tenor, any rule of law, statute or enactment of the Legislature to the contrary notwithstanding.”