JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :–– "Airsico" is the name of the concern of the petitioner, whose office is at 9, Royd Street and the main business of the same, as stated by the petitioner is to attend to the defects including servicing and repairing of the Air Conditioner machines, not only at the premises as mentioned above but also to take such works and complete them, at the places of the customer, on their request or demand. It has been stated that such establishment as mentioned above, started its business and functioning in the year 1966 and for some time thereafter, the establishment had to be closed for reasons and circumstances beyond its control. It would appear from the statements in the petition that the concerned establishment is duly registered under the West Bengal Shops and Establishment Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the said 1963 Act) and at all material times about 60 persons were employed therein which number also included the officers and the watch and ward staff. It would also appear from the pleadings, that the said establishment was also a dealer in spare parts of Air Conditioning machines. 2. On or about 15th June, 1972, the Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation, respondent No.1, informed the petitioner that on and from 1st April, 1972 which date has been stated to be 1st April, 1971, by the answering respondents, for whom Mr. Mukherjee has appeared, and it was further informed that for such business as mentioned above, was treated as a Factory and have been brought under the purview of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the 1948 Act), and as such, the authorities concerned directed the petitioner to comply with the formalities and requirements under that Act. Against such directions, the petitioner represented that the business carried on or undertaken by him, was not for any manufacturing purposes and as such the concerned establishment could not be treated and considered as a Factory, in terms of the definition under the 1948 Act. As such, it was claimed that the provisions of that Act were not applicable. It was specifically stated that the establishment at 9, Royd Street, Calcutta 16, was just a service station and was not a Factory. As such, it was claimed that the provisions of that Act were not applicable. It was specifically stated that the establishment at 9, Royd Street, Calcutta 16, was just a service station and was not a Factory. The petitioner has also stated that since after other representations made on the subject, the respondents did not reply, he thought or took it to be granted that the matter was dropped. 3. In fact, the proceeding was not dropped and on 7th May, 1973, the respondent No.1, informed the petitioner that as 20 or more persons were employed in the establishment of the petitioner, the same would come within the purview of Factory and the said 1948 Act, as such, would be applicable. In terms of the directions as contained in that letter, the petitioner has not only meet the respondent No.1, but has also stated to have kept in record the contentions, by the letter of 4th July, 1975. It was the case of the petitioner that only 15 employees were employed by him at the establishment as mentioned herein before and the other employees as employed by him, were either in sales as dealer of Air Conditioners, who attend the customer's premises, on calls. It was also claimed that the petitioner was not a manufacturing unit or carries on any manufacturing process in the premises in question. 4. Thereafter, on or about 14th September, 1980, the respondent No.1, forwarded two applications under section 5 of the Revenue Recovery Act, 1980, to the Collector, 24-Parganas, Alipore, who is respondent No.3, for recovery of Rs, 2,698.02 as employees' contribution for the period from 1st February, 1970 to 31st December, 1971 with interest of Rs, 7,558.60 and another for Rs. 4,317.00 as employees' special contribution for the quarters ending 30th June, 1971, 30th September, 1971 and 31st December, 1971 and also for a sum of Rs. 1,262.00 as interest. Again, on or about 20th September, 1976, the petitioner received a letter of 17th February, 1976 from the respondent No. 1 informing that his establishment has been treated as Factory and as such the same would come within the provisions of the 1948 Act and by such correspondence, the petitioner was directed to keep all records ready for inspection. The petitioner has stated that the respondent No.1 also threatened him for penal consequences in default of the compliance with such directions as mentioned above. The petitioner has stated that the respondent No.1 also threatened him for penal consequences in default of the compliance with such directions as mentioned above. The petitioner has stated that on or about 28th November, 1976, he duly replied to the said letter and also clarified his position. According to the petitioner, his service station and the establishment as mentioned above, could not be termed as factory by any stretch of imagination. The petitioner has stated that then on 30th January, 1977, he received a notice under section 7 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913 (hereinafter referred to as the said 1913 Act) along with a certificate bearing No. 466 EC/76-77, issued by the Collector, 24-Parganas, Alipore, for Rs. 3,546.70 being the employees' contributions for the period from 1st April, 1971 to 30th December, 1972 with interest. Such issuance of the concerned certificate or the notice of demand and the Employees' State Insurance charges was claimed to be illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction as the said 1948 Act was not applicable to the petitioner's establishment, since the said establishment was not a factory in terms of section 2(12) of the 1948 Act which defines "Factory" as meaning any premises, including the precincts thereof whereon 10 or more persons are employed or were employed for wages on any day of the preceding 12 months, and in any pan of which, a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power or is ordinarily so carried on, but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 or a railway running shed. It was also contended that in order to be considered as a factory, there must be a manufacturing process and there must be a transformation of articles and not merely employment of labour of such articles as transformed, should be capable of being sold or transacted commercially and attending to the defects for the purpose of maintaining and servicing of Air Conditioners would not make such establishment as involved in this case, a factory. It was further claimed and contended that the application by the respondent No. 1 as mentioned above, to the Collector, 24-Parganas, respondent No.3, for the issue of certificate, was bad and illegal as the establishment of the petitioner was not conveyed under the said 1948 Act. It was further claimed and contended that the application by the respondent No. 1 as mentioned above, to the Collector, 24-Parganas, respondent No.3, for the issue of certificate, was bad and illegal as the establishment of the petitioner was not conveyed under the said 1948 Act. The petitioner further claimed that the notice under section 7 of the 1913 Act was also illegal and issued without jurisdiction, as the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890 does not provide for any such notice. The petitioner further claimed that respondent No.4, the Certificate Officer in the instant case, had no jurisdiction to issue the concerned notice under section 7 of the 1913 Act as such also, the notice should be deemed to be issued unauthorisedly. These apart, the petitioner has claimed that the certificate in the instant case, being not in form, and more particularly when, the Collector, 24-Parganas, respondent No.3 had not signed the same, could not be in forced. 5. The first affidavit-in-opposition was filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 5 through Shri Kali Prosad Bhatta, who at the relevant time was the Insurance Inspector in the office of the respondent No. 1. The said affidavit was dated 19th August, 1977. In the said affidavit, the deponent has stated that the registration of the petitioner's business under the 1963 Act, cannot prevent the respondents concerned, from treating the establishment of the petitioner as a factory and for the necessary coverage under the 1948 Act. It was also claimed by the deponent that the petitioner's establishment would be a "Factory" under the 2(12) of the 1948 Act and as mentioned hereinbefore and such coverage was with effect from 1st April, 1971. The deponent has further stated that such coverage was duly intimated to the petitioner by office letter dated 1st May, 1973. The deponent has further stated that the petitioner's factory has been treated as covered with effect from the date and under the provisions of the 1948 Act as mentioned hereinbefore. The deponent has further stated that such coverage was duly intimated to the petitioner by office letter dated 1st May, 1973. The deponent has further stated that the petitioner's factory has been treated as covered with effect from the date and under the provisions of the 1948 Act as mentioned hereinbefore. The deponent has also stated that it was reported by the Insurance Inspector concerned, in its survey report dated 27th January, 1972 that the workshop/establishment of the petitioner as mentioned hereinbefore, was definitely covered as a factory under section 2(12) of the 1948 Act read with section 2(K) of the Factories Act, 1948, as servicing and repairing of Air Conditioners, including gas changing, winding, welding, testing and pumping etc. "was carried on in such establishment/workshop, with the aid of power and by employing more than 20 persons." Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948 has defined "manufacturing process" meaning any process for (i) making altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing, or otherwise treating or adapting any articles or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal, or (ii) pumping oil, water or sewage or (iii) generating transforming or transmitting power; or (iv) printing by letterpress, lithography, photogravure or other similar work of bookbinding, which is carried on by way of trade or for purposes of gain, or incidentally to another business so carried on; or (v) constructing, reconstructing, repairing, refitting, finishing or breaking up ships or vessels. The deponent has further stated that the stand as taken by the petitioner viz., his establishment was not covered by the provisions as mentioned hereinbefore, were not correct and in fact, his factory/establishment was covered within the meaning of the 1948 Act and the regulations framed thereunder. The deponent has further stated that the petitioner was properly intimated by his office, on the basis of the report of the Insurance Inspector as mentioned hereinbefore, that the said factory/establishment was duly covered under section 2(12) of the 1948 Act with effect from 1st April, 1971. It was also the case of the deponent that considering the number of persons employed in the establishment/factory of the petitioner, the same was duly brought under the provisions of the 1948 Act. It was also the case of the deponent that considering the number of persons employed in the establishment/factory of the petitioner, the same was duly brought under the provisions of the 1948 Act. The deponent has further stated that due to the petitioner's default in payment of the lawful contribution under the 1948 Act, the authorities were compelled to send requisition for the recovery of arrear as land revenue, through the certificate proceedings. It was categorically claimed by the deponent that in view of the determinations of this Court, in the case of (1) Indian Jute Company Limited v. The Regional Director, West Bengal Region, Employees' State Insurance Corporation & Anr., reported in 1977 CHN 131, the contentions as sought to be raised or purported to be put forward by the petitioner, were without any substance. It has also been stated by the deponent, that since the petitioner has not exhausted other remedies under the statute or as provided for the redress of injury, if any, no interference at this stage should or need be made and the application was premature. It was also the case of the deponent that to materialize the beneficial provisions of the 1948 Act, for the causes of the poor employees, the respondents, in the instant case, took the steps as impeached, duly and bona fide. In fact, the deponent has also claimed that the present petition to be mala fide, misleading, misconceived and bad for suppression of material facts apart from the fact that such claims as made in this proceeding were belated. To the above affidavit-in-opposition, a affidavit-in-reply dated 10th September, 1977, has been filed by the petitioner, wherein, he has denied the material allegations and has stated that his establishment/factory has been duly registered under the 1963 Act and the provisions of the same as amended thereafter. It was also specifically claimed that the factory/establishment of the petitioner, in view of the number of persons employed and as there was no involvement of any manufacturing process, excepting repairing and servicing of Air Conditioners, the factory/establishment cannot be brought under the provisions of the statute as mentioned above. It was also specifically claimed that the factory/establishment of the petitioner, in view of the number of persons employed and as there was no involvement of any manufacturing process, excepting repairing and servicing of Air Conditioners, the factory/establishment cannot be brought under the provisions of the statute as mentioned above. In the facts and circumstances of this case, deponent has also claimed that the establishment/factory as mentioned above, could not in any event be covered under the provisions of 1948 Act with effect from 1st April, 1971, and that too, on the report of the Insurance Inspector. The deponent has further denied the validity and bona fide of such report. It was the further case of the petitioner that such report nowhere disclosed the reasons for treating the establishment/factory of the petitioner to be covered by the provisions of 1948 Act. The allegations of mala fide illegality and irregularity, as made against the petitioner, in the matter of moving the application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India have been categorically denied. The petitioner has also stated that since his establishment was not a factory, there was no obligation to make any contribution to the E. S. I. fund and the 1948 Act has no application to the establishment/factory which is nothing but a servicing station. 6. There was another affidavit-in-opposition filed for and on behalf of the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 through Shri Chittaranjan Sen Mazumder, Certificate Officer, 24-Parganas, Alipore. The contents of this affidavit were not looked into or considered, as the learned Advocate for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 could not establish that the copy of the said affidavit-in-opposition, was supplied to the learned Advocate for the petitioner. This affidavit-in-opposition was dated 27th July, 1978. 7. Mr. Banerjee, appearing in support of the Rule and on the materials as available, submitted that since the establishment/factory was continuing with any manufacturing process therein, the acts and activities of the petitioner was continued or performed and further more as the number of employees as engaged, was less than the number as required under the Factories Act, so the petitioner's establishment/factory, could not be brought under the provisions of the 1948 Act. Such submissions were also sought to be supplemented by Mr. Banerjee on a reference to section 2(12) of the 1948 Act and section 2(k) of the Factories Act, particulars whereof have been mentioned hereinbefore. Such submissions were also sought to be supplemented by Mr. Banerjee on a reference to section 2(12) of the 1948 Act and section 2(k) of the Factories Act, particulars whereof have been mentioned hereinbefore. In any event, it was claimed by Mr. Banerjee that since no manufacturing process was carried on or performed by the petitioner, at his establishment/factory, so the steps as taken or threatened by the relevant respondents were irregular, improper and without jurisdiction. It was also claimed that the placing of reliance on the ex parte report of the Insurance Inspector, was improper, as the same was unilateral and was obtained without opportunities to the petitioner. Section 75 of the 1948 Act, postulates the matters to be decided by Employees' Insurance Court and section 77 of that Act, lays down the relevant circumstances, when the proceedings before an Employees' Insurance Court, could be commenced. The provisions of the sections as mentioned hereinbefore are quoted hereunder :–– Section 75 : (1) If any question or dispute arises as to–– (a) whether any person is an employee within the meaning of this Act or whether he is liable to pay the employees' contribution, or (b) the rate of wages or average daily wages of an employee for the purposes of this Act, or (c) The rate of contribution payable by a principal employer in respect of any employee; or (d) the person who is or was the principal employer in respect of any employer, or (e) the right of any person to any benefit and as to the amount and duration thereof, or (ee) any direction issued by the Corporation under section 55A on a review of any payment of dependants benefits, or (f) repealed, (g) any other matter which is dispute between a principal employer and the Corporation, or between a principal employee and an immediate employer, or between a person and the Corporation or between an employee and a principal or immediate employer, in respect of any contribution or benefit or other dues payable or recoverable under this Act, or any other matter required to be or which may be decided by the Employees' Insurance Court under this Act subject to the provision of sub-section (2A) shall be decided by the Employees' Insurance Court in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2A) the following claims shall be decided by the Employees' Insurance Court, namely :–– (a) claim for the recovery of contributions from the principal employer, (b) claim by a principal employer to recover contribution from any immediate employer, (c) repealed; (d) claim against a principal employer under section 68; (e) claim under section 70 for the recovery of the value or a amount of the benefits received by a person when he is not lawfully entitled thereto, and (f) any claim for the recovery of any benefit admissible under this Act. (2A) If any proceedings before the Employees' Insurance Court a disablement question arises and the decision of a medical board or medical appeal tribunal has not been obtained on the same and the decision of such question is necessary for the determination of the claim or question before the Employees' Insurance Court, that Court shall direct the Corporation to have the question decided by this Act and shall thereafter proceed with the determination of the claim or question before it in accordance with the decision of the medical board or the medical appeal tribunal as the case may be, except where an appeal has been filed before the Employees' Insurance Court under sub-section (2) of section 54A in which case the Employees' Insurance Court may itself determine all the issues arising before it. (3) No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question or dispute as aforesaid or to adjudicate on any liability which by or under this Act is to be decided by (a medical board, or by a medical appeal tribunal or by the Employees' Insurance Court). Section 77 : (1) The proceedings before an Employees' Insurance Court shall be commenced by application. (1A) Every such application shall be made within a period of three years from the date on which the cause of action arise. Section 77 : (1) The proceedings before an Employees' Insurance Court shall be commenced by application. (1A) Every such application shall be made within a period of three years from the date on which the cause of action arise. Explanation.––For the purpose of this sub-section,–– (a) the cause of action in respect of a claim for benefit shall not be deemed to arise unless the insured person or in the case of dependents benefit, the dependents of the insured person claim or that benefit in accordance with the regulations made in that behalf within a period of twelve months, after the claim become due or within such further period as the Employees' Insurance Court may allow on grounds which appear to it to be reasonable; (b) the cause of action in respect of a claim by the Corporation for recovering contributions from the principal employer or a claim by the principal employer for recovering contributions from an immediate employer shall not be deemed to arise till the date by which the evidence of contributions having been paid is due to be received by the Corporation under the regulations. (2A) Every such application shall be in such form and shall contain such particulars and shall be accompanied by such fee. If any, as may be prescribed by rules made by the State Government in consultation with the Corporation. On a reference to these provisions and also to the provision of section 45(A) and (B) of the 1948 Act, which are quoted hereunder :–– 45A. (1) Where in respect of a factory or establishment no returns, particulars, registers or records are submitted, furnished or maintained in accordance with the provisions of section 44 or any Inspector or other official of the Corporation referred to in subsection (2) of section 45 is obstructed by the principal or immediate employer or any other person in exercising his functions or discharging his duties under section 45, the Corporation may, on the basis of information available to it, by order, determine the amount of contributions payable in respect of the employees of that factory or establishment. (2) An order made by the Corporation under sub-section (1) shall be sufficient proof of the claim of the Corporation under section 75 or for recovery of the amount determined by such order as an arrear of land revenue under section 45B. 45B. (2) An order made by the Corporation under sub-section (1) shall be sufficient proof of the claim of the Corporation under section 75 or for recovery of the amount determined by such order as an arrear of land revenue under section 45B. 45B. Any contribution payable under this Act may be recovered as an arrear of land revenue. Mr. Banerjee claimed that the steps as taken, were barred by time. Such submission was made by him, on a specific reference to the provisions of section 77 of the 1948 Act. He further claimed as there was no determination in terms of section 45A, so the recovery of contributions under section 45B could not be initiated or given effect to. Mr. Banerjee, on a further reference to the provisions as indicated hereinbefore, claimed that as the E. S. I. Corporation have not exercised the power of execution under the provision of section 75 of the 1948 Act which they could have done, the taking of initiating of the certificate proceedings was improper and unauthorised. In support of his submissions that the petitioner was not involved in manufacture or in a manufacturing process, Mr. Banerjee referred to the determinations of the Madras High Court in the case of (2) In re : A. M. Chinniah etc., AIR 1957 Madras 755, wherein the Court has considered the meaning of "manufacture" and "manufacturing process" and has observed that it depends upon the circumstance of each case whether a particular business carried on comes within the definition of "manufacturing process". To constitute a manufacture there must be a transformation. Mere labour bestowed on an article even if the labour is applied through machinery, will not make it a manufacture, unless it has progressed so far that transformation ensues, and the article becomes commercially known as another and different article from that as which it begins its existence. Case law referred apart from observing that the workers as defined in section 2(1) fall under three groups viz., persons employed directly or through any agency, whether for wages or not (a) in any manufacturing process, or (b) in cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for manufacturing process of, (c) in any other kind of work incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process or the subject of such process. When the question was whether certain persons could be included as workers for the purpose of deciding whether a particular soap works was a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2. 8. It was submitted by Mr. Banerjee that the authorities concerned, if they had so intended or wished and wanted, should have, subject to the other limitations in the Act, proceeded under section 75 of the 1948 Act, which as indicated hereinbefore, deals with matters to be decided by the Employees' Insurance Court, and such steps not having been taken, the proceedings or initiated and concluded, must be deemed to be or considered as improper, void and without jurisdiction. The definition of "Factory" under the said 1948 Act and under the Factories Act, differ from each other in certain respects. A factory under the 1948 Act means, any premises including precincts thereof whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on but does not include a Mine subject to the operation of the Indian Mines Act, 1952, or a Railway running shed, whereas under the 1948 Act, factory means where 20 or more workers are working, or were working in any day of the preceding 12 months and in any part of which a manufacturing process, or is ordinarily so carried on, but does not include a Mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, or a Railway running shed. On the basis of such definition of "Factory", Mr. Banerjee contended that the establishment/factory, belonging to the petitioner, was improperly brought under the said 1948 Act and furthermore, when in such establishment/factory, no manufacturing process was being continued or carried on and when the initiation of the concerned certificate proceeding was bad, void, irregular and without jurisdiction under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890. 9. Mr. Mukherjee, on a reference to the preamble of the 1948 Act, which is to provide for certain benefits and employment in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury and to make provisions for certain other matters in relation thereto and also to the scheme and contents of the Act, claimed the same, to be a self contained Code. 9. Mr. Mukherjee, on a reference to the preamble of the 1948 Act, which is to provide for certain benefits and employment in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury and to make provisions for certain other matters in relation thereto and also to the scheme and contents of the Act, claimed the same, to be a self contained Code. It was contended by him that for the provisions in or under Chapter IV of the 1948 Act, subject to the provisions as contained therein, all employees in factories or establishments to which the Act would apply, must be insured in the manner as provided for. As such, it was claimed by him that since in the establishment/factory of the petitioner, the required number of employees were employed or engaged in a manufacturing process, so the provisions of the 1948 Act have been duly applied and such establishment/factory has been duly brought under the purview of the 1948 Act. It was also contended by Mr. Mukherjee that "manufacturing process" as defined in the Factories Act, was wide enough to bring in the said establishment/factory of the petitioner under the provisions of the 1948 Act or for covering the same. It was claimed by Mr. Mukherjee that the contribution payable under the Act in respect of an employee shall comprise of contributions payable by the employee, which is known as employees' contribution and contributions payable by the employees viz., employees' contribution and they are to be paid or deposited with the Corporation, which means the Employees' State Insurance Corporation, as set up under the 1948 Act, keeping in view the preamble and objects of the Act. According to Mr. Mukherjee, such rates of contributions have also been fixed duly and at the rates as specified in the First Schedule of the Act, subject to the other stipulations or exclusions. Such contributions as mentioned above, were claimed by Mr. Mukherjee, to be paid by the principal employer, who is also protected in the matter of recovery from the employees their share of contributions. Mr. Mukherjee categorically claimed that in terms of provisions of the 1948 Act and Regulations viz., the Employees' State Insurance (General) Regulations, 1950, as framed thereunder, steps in the matter of issuing the coverage, were due, legal, bona fide and appropriate. Mr. Mukherjee categorically claimed that in terms of provisions of the 1948 Act and Regulations viz., the Employees' State Insurance (General) Regulations, 1950, as framed thereunder, steps in the matter of issuing the coverage, were due, legal, bona fide and appropriate. It should be noted that the Regulations as mentioned hereinbefore were framed, under or in terms of the power as contained in section 97 of the 1948 Act. 10. Mr. Mukherjee, on a reference to the terms and wordings of section 45 of the 1948 Act, also contended that there was no limitation for the action to be taken or initiated under the same and since under section 73D of the Act, the Employees' special contribution payable under Chapter V-A, which deals with transitory provisions, may be recovered, as if the same was an arrear of land revenue, the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890 and so also the provisions of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, were applicable and were appropriately applied in this case. It was further contended that be it under the provisions of the Act of 1890 or the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, the petitioner had and perhaps still has the right to file objections, which should be deemed to be or treated as other remedy, available in the statute and such other remedies, which were equally efficacious and more effective, not having been availed of, this Court should not interfere at this stage. Such submissions were made by Mr. Mukherjee, on a specific reference to section 37 of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, which creates a general bar to the jurisdiction of Civil Courts, save where fraud is alleged. 11. It was further claimed by Mr. Mukjerjee that the terms "manufacturing process", as defined in the Indian Factories Act, being very wide and all inclusive the petitioner, because of his dealings, would certainly come within such definition and has thus been correctly brought under the coverage of the 1948 Act and the fact that the petitioner at all material times employed and still employees more than the required number of employees, has been and in consistency of the 1948 Act, been duly covered and brought under that Act and the fact that those employees are employed in different units of the establishment, would not matter much. It was claimed that even though the employees are employed in the different units of the establishment, would not make them employees of different units and considering the incidents of the 1948 Act, the establishment/factory of the petitioner, should be considered as one unit. In support of his submissions as above, Mr. Mukherjee referred to the determinations in the case of (3) P. C. Chanda & Co. Ltd. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation & Ors., 1980 (1) CHN 208 . In that case, the petitioner company carried on business of manufacturing and sale of paints, pigments, varnishes. Apart from its head office, Budge Budge, the Company has its factory and Sales Branch offices at different places but the same are, according to the petitioner, independent units having separate administration and accounts without being in any way connected with the administration of the factory. The employees engaged in the factory are covered by the Employees' State Insurance Scheme. Section 1(4) of the Act provides that at the first instance, the Act will apply to all factories but section 1(5) empowers the appropriate Government to extend the provisions of the Act by notification to any other establishment. The case of the petitioner was that no such notification under section 1(5) of the Act was issued. The petitioner has challenged the several notices, directions the Company to submit returns and deposit the contributions as required by the Act in respect of the employees at the Head Office and Sales Branch offices and also threatening legal actions against the petitioner. The petitioner has challenged the several notices, directions the Company to submit returns and deposit the contributions as required by the Act in respect of the employees at the Head Office and Sales Branch offices and also threatening legal actions against the petitioner. The contentions of the petitioner, inter alia, were that the provisions of the Act could not be extended to the employees engaged in the Head Office and other offices of the petitioner without first issuance of a notice under section 1(5) of the Act inspite of the fact that the term "employee" was amended by the Amending Act of 1966 and it was held that where the Head Office and the factory are situate at different places, the employees in the Head Office who are engaged in any type of work specified in section 2(9) of the Act of 1948, as it now stands are "employees within the meaning of the Act and on a reliance to the determinations in the case of (4) M/s. Union Carbide of India Ltd. v. Employee's Insurance Court, reported in AIR 1978 SC 456, it has been observed further that the provisions of the 1948 Act, would apply to the establishment as a whole. It should be noted, whether a notification under section 1(5) of the 1948 Act, was necessary or not, was in issue before the Full Bench of this Court in the case of The Indian Jute Co. Ltd. v. The Regional Director, West Bengal Region etc. & Ors. (supra) and that point was neither answered directly nor indirectly. 12. On his arguments, that the 1948 Act is a complete Code and the applicability of the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act, reference was made by Mr. Mukherjee to the determinations in the case of (5) M/s. Modern India Construction Co. Ltd. v. The Employees' State Insurance Corporation & Ors., 1979 (2) CHN 14 . In that case the Corporation sent a letter of request to the Collector under section 5 of the Revenue Recovery Act for recovery of a sum of money alleged to be due on account of employers and contribution from the appellant. The said letter of request was forwarded by the Collector's Office to the Certificate Officer who thereupon drew up a certificate and caused the same to be filed in his office under sections 4 and 6 of the Bengal Act. The said letter of request was forwarded by the Collector's Office to the Certificate Officer who thereupon drew up a certificate and caused the same to be filed in his office under sections 4 and 6 of the Bengal Act. The certificate-debtor on receiving a notice under section 7 filed an objection under section 37 of the said Act contending that the Certificate Officer not being the Collector could not have himself filed the certificate under section 4 of the Bengal Act. The Certificate Officer as well as the Additional District Magistrate who heard the matter in revision overruled the objection of the certificate-debtor. On a further revision, the Divisional Commissioner reversed the decision and upheld the objection. The Board of Revenue on being moved by the Corporation affirmed the decision of the Commissioner. Thereafter, the Corporation challenged the orders passed by the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue by a writ petition. The learned trial Judge set aside the said orders and overruled the objection of the certificate-debtor. The appeal was preferred from the said order of the learned trial Judge, and it has been observed that under section 73B of the Employees' State Insurance Act the sum payable to the Corporation as employers' special contribution may be recovered 'as if it were an arrear of land revenue'. Section 5 of the Central Act again provides that as and when a request is sent to the Collector of a District for recovery of such sum, the same is to be recovered as 'an arrear of land revenue which had accrued in his own District". Section 5 of the Central Act again provides that as and when a request is sent to the Collector of a District for recovery of such sum, the same is to be recovered as 'an arrear of land revenue which had accrued in his own District". When there can be no dispute about the fact that an arrear of land revenue which accrues within a district is payable to the Collector of the District, it goes without saying that the combined effect of sections 73D and 5 makes the sum for which a request has been made under section 5, payable to the Collector and on a request being made under section 5 of the Central Act the sum requested to be recovered becomes a public demand payable to the Collector to the request is made for which the Certificate Officer could validly issue a certificate under section 4 of the Bengal Act, apart from holding that when the Certificate Officer issues a certificate for recovery of a sum on a request made under section 5 of the Central Act to the Collector and recovers the said amount, it cannot be said it is not recovered by the Collector as envisaged by section 5. It still remains a recovery by the Collector of a public demand which is in legal fiction payable to him through the process or the machinery prescribed by law and section 3A of the Central Act would have its application only in a case where a certificate is received under this Act, by the Collector of District obviously meaning thereby it is so received on transfer in terms of section 3 thereof. In the instant case, the recovery was being made in terms of the first part of section 5 of the Central Act and there being no transfer by the Collector to the Collector of some other District, section 3A can have no manner of application. 13. As indicated hereinbefore, it was Mr. Mukherjee's contentions that the dispute in this case, was covered by the provisions in subsections (c) and (g) of section 75 of the 1948 Act and the rule of limitations as mentioned and prescribed in section 77 are not applicable. 13. As indicated hereinbefore, it was Mr. Mukherjee's contentions that the dispute in this case, was covered by the provisions in subsections (c) and (g) of section 75 of the 1948 Act and the rule of limitations as mentioned and prescribed in section 77 are not applicable. He definitely contended the establishment of the petitioner to be a factory and the demand as raised, was a public demand and as such, the rule of limitation was not applicable and the proceedings were duly and authorisedly taken and initiated. 14. Mr. Shyamal Sen, appearing for the other appearing respondents, after adopting the arguments as advanced by Mr. Mukherjee, on a reference to the provisions of section 45A of the 1948 Act and so also to the provisions of sections 3(6), 4, 5 and 34 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, contended that since objections under section 9 of that Act were not filed, this proceeding cannot be allowed to be continued or decided in favour of the petitioner. Section 3(6), as mentioned above, defines "Public demand" as any arrear or money mentioned or referred to in Schedule 1, and includes any interest which may, by law, be chargeable thereon up to the date on which a certificate is signed under Part II. Under section 4 as mentioned above, when the Certificate Officer is satisfied that any public demand, payable to the Collector is due, he may sign a Certificate, in the prescribed form, stating that the demand is due, and shall cause the Certificate to be filed in his office and section 5 deals with requisition of certificate in other cases, viz., when any public demand payable to any person other than the Collector is due, such person may send to the Certificate Officer, a written requisition in the prescribed form, subject to the provisions that no action shall be under the Act on a requisition made by a Land Mortgage Bank registered or deemed to be registered under the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940 or an assignee of such Bank, unless the requisition is counter-signed by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, West Bengal. It is also the requirements of the statute that every such requisition, must be signed and verified in the prescribed manner, and except in such cases as may be prescribed, shall be chargeable with fee of the amount, which would be payable under the Court Fees Act, 1870, in respect of a plaint for the recovery of a sum of money equal to that stated in the requisition as being done. On the basis of the requirements as mentioned above and since they were duly complied with. Mr. Sen further contended that so far the Certificate Officer was concerned, there was no way out but to issue the Certificate as disclosed with the petition. It was also claimed by him that there are provisions in section 34 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, when a certificate is cancelled and modified and asked for any consequential relief then the time and manner as specified, the petitioner should not be allowed to challenge the certificate in question in this proceeding. Mr. Sen also claimed that there was no limitation for filing a certificate. 15. While replying to the arguments of the respondents, Mr. Banerjee referred to various decisions, which he should have cited at the time of his initial argument. The necessary leave to cite the cases as mentioned hereinafter, was given to Mr. Banerjee, for ends of justice and as it was felt that otherwise, the petitioner would have some grievance that he has been denied justice. Since Mr. Banerjee was allowed to cite the cases in the circumstances as indicated hereinbefore, corresponding chance and opportunity was given to the learned Advocates for the respondents to reply or to submit on the cases as cited. 16. The first of such cases, on which Mr. Banerjee placed reliance, was that of (6) Hindusthan Lever Ltd. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, New Delhi & Ors., 1973 (1) LLJ 259. The definition of "Employee" as in the section 2(9) of the 1948 Act, was construed in that case and it was held amongst others, that under section 75(1)(a) of the 1948 Act, disputes between the parties as to whether a person is an employee within the meaning of the Act, must be decided by the Employees' State Insurance Court and the prima facie decision of the Corporation, would be of very little effect. In the case of (7) M/s. Hindusthan Lever Ltd. v. E. S. I. & Ors, 1973 Lab IC 706, it has also been observed that because of identity of the employer of the Factory and the Office, persons employed at the Delhi Office are also employees of the Factory at Ghaziabad. Act therefore applies to employees at Delhi Office even though the factory is not situated thereat, in view of the amendment of section 2(9) in 1968 and inspite of the fact that the Act does not extend to commercial establishments as such the benefit of the Act would therefore have to be given only to those persons in the establishment at Delhi who would be covered by the definition on the ground that they carryon a job which is connected with the factory in the manner provided by the definition in section 2(9) and the question whether any person is an employee, within the meaning of the Act or whether he is liable to pay employees' contribution, has to be decided by the Employees' Insurance Court. Reliance was then placed in the case of (8) The Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Bhopal v. The Central Press & Anr., AIR 1977 SC 1951, where it has been observed that the Scheme of the Act after its amendment by Act 44 of 1966 is that the Corporation itself should in a case where there is omission on the part of the employer to maintain records in accordance with section 44 of the Act determine the amount of contributions on the strength of such information as it may collect and can then make the demand under section 45A. If the employer refuses to comply with the demand so made, the matter can come up before the Employees' Insurance Court under section 75 of the Act. The Court should give the Corporation a direction to perform its duty where it considers that this should be performed by the Corporation. It cannot decline to perform its own duty because the Corporation has failed to discharge its function and thereafter to the case of Sham Lal etc. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1978 SC 1484 , where the employer disputed their liability to pay the contribution, but was ultimately found to be liable. It cannot decline to perform its own duty because the Corporation has failed to discharge its function and thereafter to the case of Sham Lal etc. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1978 SC 1484 , where the employer disputed their liability to pay the contribution, but was ultimately found to be liable. Under section 45A of the 1948 Act, the Supreme Court has observed that the Tribunal concerned was under the obligation to give an opportunity of hearing to the employer. Mr. Banerjee also referred to the case of (9) T. I. Diamond Chain Ltd. v. E. S. I. Corpn., Madras, 43 FJR 297, and on the determinations in the case of (10) M/s. Universal Refrigeration Corporation (Private) Ltd. & Ors. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, 74 CWN 674. In that case the applicant did not produce the necessary records. The respondent Corporation also does not appear to have led any evidence on the point to enable the tribunal below to make necessary assessment. It simply relied on the ad hoc assessment, which appears to have been made by it under the Central Government Notification under section 73(H) of the Employees' State Insurance Act and on such, it has been held that notification clearly applies, on its own terms, to special contributions under the Act and the instant case is not one of special contribution. It is a case of ordinary contribution under section 39 of the Act, Accordingly the very basis of the respondent's assessment is defective and unsupportable in law and lastly to the case of (11) M/s. Sri Krishna Mills Co. v. The Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation & Ors., 1973 Lab IC 408, wherein it has been observed that when an employer disputes its liability to pay contribution in respect of certain contract labour, the Regional Director of the Employees' State Insurance Corporation is in competent to decide the dispute. He cannot straightway commence recovery proceeding without referring the dispute to be decided by the Employees' Insurance Court in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 17. The above decisions were cited by Mr. Banerjee, for supplementing his arguments that without moving the Employees' State Insurance Court and that too within the time as stipulated, the Corporation could not have taken or initiated the recovery proceedings and in fact without the necessary determinations by the Tribunal, the petitioner could not be proceeded against. 17. The above decisions were cited by Mr. Banerjee, for supplementing his arguments that without moving the Employees' State Insurance Court and that too within the time as stipulated, the Corporation could not have taken or initiated the recovery proceedings and in fact without the necessary determinations by the Tribunal, the petitioner could not be proceeded against. It was claimed by Mr. Banerjee that the cause of action under section 77(i)(b) of the 1948 Act, in respect of the claim for recovering contributions from the principal employer, shall not be deemed to arise till the date by which the evidence of contributions having been paid, in due to be received by the Corporation under the Regulations and cause of action, if any, can be said to be arisen in the happening as above and not otherwise, or more particularly within three years after the date due. It was also claimed that in this case, there was no due determination under section 75(g). In his further reply, Mr. Mukherjee claimed that no ground having been taken under or in respect of section 45A of the 1948 Act, points touching the same or arising therefrom, must not be allowed to be agitated, and the cases as cited by Mr. Banerjee, have no manner of application in the facts of this case. Mr. Mukherjee, on a reference to section 44 of the 1948 Act, stated that it was the primary liability and obligation of the employer, viz., the petitioner in this case, to file with the Corporation or to such officer as directed, the necessary return in the form as prescribed, giving the relevant particulars of the employees as employed by him and the Corporation may on the failure of the compliance as above, require the Person-in-Charge of the factory/establishment, to furnish such or necessary particulars for enabling them to decide and find out whether such establishment/factory is a factory or not and it was also contended by Mr. Mukherjee, that in case of obstructions by the principal or immediate employer or any other person, in the matter of exercising the necessary functions in discharge of duties under section 45, the Corporation may, on the basis of informations available, by order, determine the amount of contributions payable in respect of the employees of that factory or establishment, and if by such act or determination, anybody is dissatisfied he may refer the matter to the Insurance Court, in terms of the determinations in the case of (12) Regional Director, E. S. I. Corporation etc. v. M/s. Manikkar Engineers Ltd. etc., 1982 Lab IC 140. In that case it has been observed that merely for the reason that the establishment has objected to the correctness of the order, no duty is cast upon the E. S. I. Corporation to make a reference to the Insurance Court, to obtain its seal of approval, before taking steps for the realization of the amount by invoking the provisions of sections 45A(2) and 45B of the Act. There cannot be any doubt that on the basis of the observations as above, it is the party aggrieved, who should approach the Insurance Court, as section 15 clearly postulates that opportunity to have the lis adjudicated, should be given to the aggrieved party. Mr. Mukherjee claimed that as there is no obstruction, the steps as taken in the matter, without going to the Insurance Court, cannot be deemed or considered to be improved or contrary to or in excess of or in improper excise of jurisdiction, as claimed. 18. On the basis of the definition of "manufacturing process" as in the Indian Factories Act, Mr. Banerjee could not contend that the establishment of the petitioner at No.9, Royd Street, Calcutta, was not a factory. 18. On the basis of the definition of "manufacturing process" as in the Indian Factories Act, Mr. Banerjee could not contend that the establishment of the petitioner at No.9, Royd Street, Calcutta, was not a factory. That apart, on the admitted position of the petitioner engaging more than the required number of the employees as defined in the 1948 Act and to the following effect :–– Section 2 (9) : "employee" means any person employed for wages in or in connection with the work of a factory or establishment to which this Act applies, and–– (i) who is directly employed by the principal employer or any work or, or incidental or preliminary to or connected with the work of the factory or establishment, whether such work is done by the employee in the factory or establishment or elsewhere; or (ii) who is employed by or through an immediate employer on the premises of the factory or establishment or under the supervision of the principal employer or his agent on work which is ordinarily part of the work of the factory or establishment or which is preliminary to the work carried on in or incidental to the purpose of the factory or establishment; or (iii) whose services are temporarily lent or let on hire to the principal employer by the person with whom the person whose services are so let on hire has entered into a contract of service; but does not include–– (a) any member of the Indian Naval, Military or Air forces, or (b) any person employed on a remuneration which in the aggregate exceeds four hundred rupees a month, it cannot be but or should be held that the petitioner should not only be governed or come under the provisions of the 1948 Act, but he would also be covered by the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948. The petitioner's establishment, even though he has shown different works for different employees, should thus be considered as a Factory and such fact has been duly determined by the authorities concerned. The petitioner's establishment, even though he has shown different works for different employees, should thus be considered as a Factory and such fact has been duly determined by the authorities concerned. Even though the petitioner is a dealer in spare parts of the Air Conditioners and undertakes servicing and maintenance of them for the customers, on orders being duly placed, either at the customer's place or at the service station, because of the nature and character of the jobs undertaken, the acts of the petitioner as mentioned hereinbefore, would safely come under the definition of manufacturing process or their establishment factory, where works are undertaken and completed, would come within such definition, which is very wide, elastic and all comprehensive. Such and above being the position, the establishment/factory of the petitioner, I repeat, was properly brought under the purview of the 1948 Act. 19. There cannot be any doubt or dispute that the 1948 Act is a complete Code and even though the same has not become very popular amongst the employees for various reasons, the same has such intention or background, which would be beneficial, if duly applied and acted upon. I further find that in view of the terms of the 1948 Act on interpretation of them, the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890 and so also those of Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, would be applicable, to recover the arrears as land revenue and as such also, steps as taken and are impeached, were not improper or without jurisdiction and under both the statutes as mentioned hereinbefore, the petitioner had due remedies, which were equally efficacious or effective. As mentioned earlier, even though the employees of the petitioner are employed in different units, considering the incidents and effect of the statute viz. Act, the establishment/factory of the petitioner should be deemed to be one unit and the provisions of the 1948 Act should apply to the establishment as a whole, and such findings of mine are supported from the determinations as cited at the Bar. I further find that since the establishment of the petitioner is a factory, the demand as raised, was public demand and so the rule of limitation, as urged, was not applicable and that the dispute in this case, would be covered by the provisions of section 75 (e) and (g) of the 1948 Act. I further find that since the establishment of the petitioner is a factory, the demand as raised, was public demand and so the rule of limitation, as urged, was not applicable and that the dispute in this case, would be covered by the provisions of section 75 (e) and (g) of the 1948 Act. On consideration of the cases as cited by Mr. Banerjee, subsequent to his initial arguments, I find that these determinations are not appropriately applicable in the facts of this case and they are distinguishable. As such, this Rule fails and the same is discharged. There will be no orders as to costs.