Mungeshwar Sahoo, J. – The plaintiff appellant appellant has filed this second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 4.12.1995 passed by the learned Second Additional District Judge, Gopalganj in Title Appeal No. 68 of 1993 whereby the lower appellate court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court dated 22.4.1993 passed by the learned 3rd Additional Munsif, Gopalganj in Title Suit No. 249 of 1986. 2. The plaintiff appellant filed the aforesaid title suit for declaration of title and confirmation of possession and in the alternative for recovery of possession and also for declaration that the order passed by the defendant 2nd set i.e. State authorities is illegal. 3. The plaintiff claimed the aforesaid relief alleging that he is in service in Air Force and posted at Amritsar and he is of backward class (Annexure-1). He applied for settlement of the suit land through his commandant officer. The Collector made over the file to the DCLR for inquiry and report. After due inquiry the suit land was settled with the plaintiff on 17.6.1983 by the S.D.O., Gopalganj. The defendant 1st set i.e. the school authority started interference, therefore, a proceeding under Section 144 Cr.P.C. was initiated. According to the plaintiff after settlement plaintiff constructed his house in the suit land and planted some trees. The defendant 2nd set i.e. the Collector has no authority to cancel the settlement already made in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, the order canceling the settlement is illegal and not binding on the plaintiff. The defendant first set on false statement that the suit land is playground in collusion with the defendant 2nd set always tried to dispossess the plaintiff. The suit land is away from the school at a distance of 50 bigha. 4. According to the defendants 1st set i.e. the school authorities the plaintiff is not a landless person rather he has got 6-7 bigha of land. The settlement was made on the basis of collusive report and there was no enquiry on the spot. S.D.O., Gopalganj has no jurisdiction to settle the suit land with the plaintiff and by virtue of that illegal settlement no right title or interest accrued to the plaintiff. The other allegations regarding construction of house and Nad Khuta and planting of trees were denied. S.D.O., Gopalganj has no jurisdiction to settle the suit land with the plaintiff and by virtue of that illegal settlement no right title or interest accrued to the plaintiff. The other allegations regarding construction of house and Nad Khuta and planting of trees were denied. According to these defence the Collector would only make settlement in favour of plaintiff but there is no settlement by the Collector. The school was established in the year 1940 and since then the disputed plot is being used as playground by the students of the school. It is at a distance of 100 yards from the school and when the school came to know about the illegal settlement an application was filed and after inspection a report was called from DCLR who recommended for cancellation of the settlement because the plaintiff is a military personnel and the disputed land is being used as playground of the school which is a land of public utility and on being satisfied the Collector cancelled the settlement made in favour of the plaintiff. 5. It appears that the trial court recorded the finding that the S.D.O. has no jurisdiction to settle the land, it was the Collector who was competent to settle the land in favour of the appellant who is military personnel. On these findings, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s suit. On appeal, the lower appellate court also considered the circular of the State Government and then recorded the finding that the Collector had only the jurisdiction to settle the land in favour of plaintiff who is military personnel and also recorded the finding that the plaintiff is not landless person. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. 6. On 18.3.1997 this appeal was admitted and the following substantial questions of law were formulated : – “(i) Whether the circular of the Government regarding mode of settlement not being statutory, the Collector had no jurisdiction to cancel the settlement, particularly in view of the principles laid down by this Hon’ble Court? (ii) Whether the court below has misconstrued and misinterpreted Ext.II which clearly specific that the settlement was being made to him by virtue of his being a man of backward class (Annexure-1) as well as a military personnel and Sub Divisional Officer was fully competent to make the settlement? (iii) Any other point which may be raised at the time of final hearing” 7. (iii) Any other point which may be raised at the time of final hearing” 7. The learned senior counsel Mr. S.S. Dwivedi at the time of hearing of this second appeal submitted that other two substantial questions of law may be formulated which are also involved for decision in the present case. According to the learned counsel the judgment of the lower appellate court is vitiated due to absolute non-consideration of plaintiff’s evidence and the courts below misread and misconstrued the documents of the plaintiff and the defendants especially Ext.-C, D, Ext.2, 4, 4-A, 5 and 6 as well as other documents. According to the learned counsel Ext.-C is the sheet anchor of the plaintiff’s case. After due enquiry the land was settled in favour of the plaintiff by the S.D.O. According to the learned counsel when the application of the plaintiff was received a report was called for. It was reported that the land is Parti Kadim recorded in the possession of the Malik and it is also not a public place. There is no house of Harijan near about the suit land and it is Parti land. On being satisfied with this report, by terms of order dated 1.6.1983 the land was settled with the plaintiffs. Ext-C provides that the land can be settled by the S.D.O. to schedule tribes, schedule caste and backward class (Annexure-1) whereas the lands can be settled by Collector only in favour of the military personnel. In the present case, the plaintiff filed the application for settlement wherein he clearly stated that presently he is working as military personnel in Air Force but he is a member of backward class (Annexure-1). On the basis of this fact that he is a member of backward class (Annexure-1) the land was settled by the S.D.O., therefore, the findings of both the courts below that S.D.O. has no jurisdiction to settle the land in favour of the plaintiff is wrong. According to the learned counsel Ext.-2 was Pleader Commissioner report. The Pleader Commissioner found that the house has been constructed and cultivation has been made by the plaintiff at the spot and some trees has also been planted but the appellate court did not consider this Ext.-2. According to the learned counsel Ext.-2 was Pleader Commissioner report. The Pleader Commissioner found that the house has been constructed and cultivation has been made by the plaintiff at the spot and some trees has also been planted but the appellate court did not consider this Ext.-2. Likewise the plaintiff produced Ext.6 which is the plaint of Title Suit No. 310 of 1948 to prove that the school had earlier filed the suit for declaration that plot No. 98 is the playground of the school. Now, therefore, he cannot be allowed to say that the suit land is also used as playground of the school. So far Pleader Commissioners report is concerned no objection was filed by the defendant and moreover according to the decision of this court in 1990 PLJR 833 all instructions contained in an administrative circular cannot be mandatory in nature so as to vitiate the settlement when there is a case where some deviation which is not unreasonable or irrational or mala fide is alleged. 8. The learned counsel further submitted that by birth the appellant was the member of backward class (Annexure-1) therefore, according to the circular Ext.-C he was entitled for settlement of the land and he had only 20 decimal of land therefore, considering him to be the landless 1.64 acres land was settled by the S.D.O. as in view of Ext-C, 2 acres land can be settled only. On the basis of these grounds the learned counsel submitted that the impugned judgment and decree are vitiated as both the courts below misconstrued and misunderstood and misinterpreted Ext.-C the government circular. So far landless person is concerned, the learned counsel relied upon a decision of this court report in 2005 (2) PLJR 24 and submitted that since the petitioner possessed less than 1 acre land he comes within the definition of landless person under the provision of sub-section 4 of Section 27 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. The learned counsel further submitted that prior to cancellation of the settlement no notice was given to the present plaintiff. 9. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent school authorities submitted that so far non-service of notice prior to cancellation is concerned this was never pleaded by the plaintiff nor any evidence was adduced by the plaintiff on that account. 9. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent school authorities submitted that so far non-service of notice prior to cancellation is concerned this was never pleaded by the plaintiff nor any evidence was adduced by the plaintiff on that account. Had this ground been raised in the pleading or in evidence the defendant could have pleaded or adduced evidence counter to the pleading to the evidence. This is a question of fact therefore, it cannot be allowed at the second appellate stage. The learned counsel further submitted that when two views are possible and both the courts below have taken another view the High Court in second appellate jurisdiction cannot interfere with the finding because another view is possible. The learned counsel further submitted that Ext.C clearly provides that land will be settled to Bhumiheen person who are either schedule tribes, schedule caste or backward caste (Annexure 1) or military personnel but the plaintiff was found to be possessed of 20 decimal of land therefore, he cannot be termed as landless person (Bhoomihin Kisan) and, therefore, the lands could not have been settled. Moreover the plaintiff is in Air Force as such technically he cannot be termed as landless persons. The concept of settlement is for settling the land in favour of Bhoomiheen Kisan. Here the courts below recorded the finding that the land was used as playground by the students of the school. The trial court considered each and every evidences. So far the Pleader Commissioner report is concerned he found recent construction and cultivation. Moreover, if the settlement itself is illegal that will not create title in favour of the plaintiff. So far non-consideration of oral and documentary evidences are concerned the courts below have considered the relevant evidences and for non-consideration of some of the evidences the judgment cannot be said to be vitiated. The plaintiffs’ case is based on Ext.-C, therefore, the question to be decided is regarding construction of Ext.-C. The subsequent course of conduct of the parties is not decisive factor for construction of Ext.-C therefore, the evidences produced by the plaintiff that the land is far away from the school or the school has another playground are not relevant and therefore, even if the evidence to that effect has not been considered it will not vitiate the judgment. 10. 10. In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, the submission of the parties and the substantial question of law formulated and sought to be formulated it appears that the main point which requires for consideration is as to the effect of Ext.-C. Ext.-C is a circular of the State Government wherein guidelines have been given for settlement of lands in the village for the purpose of house and cultivation. It provides that while making settlement the preference should be given to, (Ka) Schedule Tribes, (kha) Schedule Caste, (Ga) Backward Class (Annexure-1), (Gha) Employed military personnel and the family members of late military personnel, (Anga) The refugee from east Pakistan and Burma after 1.1.1964. Power has been given to the S.D.O. for settlement of the land in favour of the entry No. Ka to Ga and so far entry No. Gha and Anga is concerned power has been given to Collector. In the said circular at paragraph 4 it clearly mentioned that earlier persons in entries who are suitable and Bhoomihin were entitled for settlement of 5 acres which has been now decreased to 2 acres. The District Magistrate can settle 2 acres cultivable land in favour of suitable military personnel and 12.5 decimal of housing purpose. 11. In view of these circular for the settlement of the government land in the village the members of the aforesaid entries must be first landless person (Bhumiheen Kisan). So far landless (Bhumiheen) is concerned it has not been defined in the circular. From the decision relied upon by the appellant 2005 (2) PLJR Bhart Prasad vs. State of Bihar it appears that in that case preamption application was filed under the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. Considering the definition of that Act as provided under sub section 4 of Section 27 this Court held that the petitioners before the High Court possessed of less than 1 acres land therefore, they are landless person. 12. Considering the definition of that Act as provided under sub section 4 of Section 27 this Court held that the petitioners before the High Court possessed of less than 1 acres land therefore, they are landless person. 12. So far this matter is concerned the Apex Court in the case of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti, U.P. vs. Braj Kishore and others AIR 1988 SC 2239 held that Bhoodan Yagna which was started by the late 'Acharya Vinoba Bhave and followed by Shri Jaya Prakash Narain, it could not be said that persons who admittedly have no land in the village in which the land to be allotted is situated would be covered by the expression "landless persons", in spite of the fact that they may be traders and paying income-tax and may have properties in the cities. It is now well settled that in order to interpret a law one must understand the background and the purpose for which the law was enacted. The Bhoodan Yagna movement used generally a term 'Bhoomihin Kisan' and it is this term which gained momentum and virtually was understood to mean those agricultural labourers whose main source of livelihood is agriculture but who have no lands of their own or who have no lands (agricultural) recorded in their names in the revenue record and it is this problem of 'Bhoomihin Kisan' that this movement went on to settle and the Act was enacted to remedy that problem. In view of the above position of law laid down by the Apex court the word ‘Bhoomihin’ should be given its plain ordinary dictionary meaning. Therefore, a person who is member of entry No. Ka to Anga in Ext.-C must be first Bhoomihin and then he will be entitled for settlement. Admittedly, in the present case the plaintiff admitted the fact that he is a military personal employed in Air Force and posted at Amritsar. It is not his case that he is landless backward class (Annexure-1). Therefore, the land should be settled. Had the plaintiff claimed this status then in view of the Apex Court he has to give particulars as to whether he is income tax payee or not or whether he has acquired any property in the town at Amritsar or not. It is not his case that he is landless backward class (Annexure-1). Therefore, the land should be settled. Had the plaintiff claimed this status then in view of the Apex Court he has to give particulars as to whether he is income tax payee or not or whether he has acquired any property in the town at Amritsar or not. From perusal of the judgment of both the courts below it appears that admittedly 20 decimal land is recorded in his name in the village therefore, technically he cannot be termed as Bhoomihin. This circular Ext.-C has not been issued pursuant to the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. This circular only mentions that in the village how the Gairmazurva Aam and Khas land should be settled wherein the word ‘Bhoomihin’ has been used. Now therefore, for interpreting the word ‘Bhoomihin’ used in this circular the Court cannot borrow the definition from the other Act. The literal meaning of word ‘Bhoomihin’ should be given effect to. It is well settled principles of law while construing a document the words in their ordinary, natural sense has to be taken into account if there is no ambiguity in the word. 13. So far the submission of the learned counsel that the settlement was made to the plaintiff by virtue of is being a man of backward class (Annexure-1) it would be evident from the certificate is concerned it may be mentioned here that in the application filed by the plaintiff he described himself as backward class (Annexure-1) and claimed himself to be the military person therefore, his application for settlement was forwarded through proper channel. He never applied that he is ‘Bhoomihin’ backward class (Annexure-1) therefore, the land be settled to him. The appellate court has clearly recorded the finding that he is not a Bhoominin therefore, the settlement has been made in favour of a military personal by the S.D.O. in Ext.-C the settlement in favour of military personal can be made by District Magistrate only. Considering all these aspects of the matter both the courts below held that the orders settling by the S.D.O. has rightly been cancelled by the District Magistrate. Considering all these aspects of the matter both the courts below held that the orders settling by the S.D.O. has rightly been cancelled by the District Magistrate. So far the submission of the learned counsel that the District Magistrate has no jurisdiction to cancel is concerned it may be mentioned here that when the order made by the S.D.O. is contrary to Ext.-C that is against the circular of the State Government it cannot be allowed to stand and the Collector being authority representing the State cannot be said that he has no authority to correct or set aside the order passed by the inferior authority who has no jurisdiction to pass the order. 14. So far the submission that there is some deviation only and Ext.-C being circular is not mandatory is concerned no doubt it is not mandatory but then on these grounds the authorities of the State cannot act contrary to the guideline or the circular of the State Government. If the submission is accepted then it will create confusion and anomaly. If S.D.O. had no jurisdiction to settle the land in favour of military personnel then on this ground that there is some deviation the illegal order cannot be validated. Even the circular is not mandatory then also either it may be followed strictly or it should not be followed at all. 15. So far non-service of notice is concerned it may be mentioned here that no such ground was taken by the plaintiff in the plaint nor any evidence was adduced nor any issue was framed. It is a question of fact, therefore at the final hearing of this second appeal the said question cannot be allowed to be raised. 16. So far the non consideration of evidences are concerned since only the question i.e. relevant for decision in this appeal relates to the interpretation of Ext.-C no other evidences is material for construing the terms and conditions of Ext.-C and moreover the trial court has considered the evidences and the appellate court confirmed the same. In other words after considering the evidences available on record the appellate court also recorded the same finding. In other words after considering the evidences available on record the appellate court also recorded the same finding. In my opinion, therefore, adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence in support of the finding recorded by the lower appellate court cannot be said to be a substantial question of law as has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Madamanchi Ramappa and another vs. Muthaluru Bojjappa AIR 1963 SC 1633 . 17. So far Pleader Commissioner’s report is concerned, it shows only possession but if the order of S.D.O. itself is against circular the subsequent act of plaintiff will not create title on him. 18. So far the misconstruction of Ext.-C is concerned it may be mentioned here that after considering the evidences both the courts below inferred that the settlement has been made to the plaintiff as he is military personnel. The lower appellate court recorded that the plaintiff is not Bhoomihin. The question will be whether while exercise jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C. i.e. Court can take the other possible view. In the case of Vishwanath Agrawal vs. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal (2012) 7 SCC 288 (Pr. 37) the Apex Court has held as follows : – “37. In Vidhyadhar vs. Manikrao (1999) 3 SCC 573 , it has been ruled that the High Court in a second appellate should not disturb the concurrent findings of fact unless it is shown that the findings recorded by the courts below are perverse being based on no evidence or that on the evidence on record no reasonable person could not come to that conclusion. We may note here that solely because another view is possible on the basis of the evidence, the High Court would not be entitled to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This view of ours has been fortified by the decision of this Court in Abdul Raheem vs. Karnataka Electricity Board (2007) 14 SCC 138 : AIR 2008 SC 956 .” 19. So far the decision relied upon by the learned counsel i.e. 1990 PLJR 833 is concerned it appears that the said decision relates to settlement of Jalkar therefore, it is not applicable in the present case. 20. So far the decision relied upon by the learned counsel i.e. 1990 PLJR 833 is concerned it appears that the said decision relates to settlement of Jalkar therefore, it is not applicable in the present case. 20. In view of the above discussion and proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court, both the substantial question of law formulated at the time of admission and the substantial question of law sought to be formulated are not at all the substantial question of law involved for decision in this second appeal. I therefore, find no merit in this second appeal. Accordingly, this second appeal is dismissed.