JUDGMENT - Sawant P.B. J.:-This petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution is directed against three orders passed by three different Members of the Industrial Court. The facts leading to the petition are as follows: On the 27th July 1981, respondent No. 3-Union which is not a recognised union made an application under section 13 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the said 'Act'), for cancellation of the recognition of the petitioner-Union. The petitioner-Union was recognised under section 12 of the Act in the year 1977 and continues to be a recognis-ed union of the employees of the 4th respondent-Company (hereinafter referred to as the 'Company') till date. In the application for cancellation, it is averred by the 3rd respondent-Union (hereinafter called the applicant-Union) that the majority of the employees of the Company have joined the said union with effect from January 1, 1981. It is further stated there that the majority of the members of the petitioner-Urrton including the committee members had resigned from the membership of that Union and had joined en masse the appliuant-Union. The further averment in the application is that the petitioner-Union had a membership of less than 30% of the employees of the Company for a continuous period of six months. The Said application is at present pending in the Industrial Court. Along with the application, the applicant Union on the same day presented an application for an interim injunction, pending the disposal of the main application, for restraining the petitioner-Union from negotiating, discussing or settling any dispute on behalf of the employees of the company. In support of its claim, the applicant-Union filed several documents. Among these documents, is a letter dated March 20, 1981 addressed by the applicant-Union to the petitioner-Union. In this letter, it is in terms stated, that by the said letter the majority of the workmen working in the Company were there-by tendering their resignations from the petitioner-Union as they had become the members of the applicant-Union from February 27, 1981. The letter of resignation addressed by 72*7 workmen to the petitioner-Union and forward-ed with the said letter is dated 23rd March 1981. However, Dr. The letter of resignation addressed by 72*7 workmen to the petitioner-Union and forward-ed with the said letter is dated 23rd March 1981. However, Dr. Kulkarni, appearing for the applicant -Union, states that this date might have been mentioned by mistake or may be a typographical error and the correct date should be March 20, 1981. This accompanying resignation letter states that the workmen who are signatories to the letter are thereby tendering their resignations from the membership of the petitioner-Union with immediate effect. Construed in the manner the applicant-Union desires,, the resignations of the workers from the petitioner-Union are not from a date earlier than March 20, 1981. 2. The petitioner-Union filed its preliminary written statement on 11–80981 objecting to the maintainability of the main application and the final written statement on November 5. 1981. One of the foremost objec- tions taken in both the written statements is that on the pleadings and documents of the applicant-Union itself, there is no ground for cancelling the petitioners' recognition since the application was presented on 27–7-1981 and the resignations alleged are from 20–3-1981. The petitioner-Union also opposed the grant of the interim injunction. 3. The application for interim injunction came up for hearing before Shri Samant, the then Member of the Industrial Court at Thane, and by his order dated the 16th October 1981 he granted the interim injunction against the petitioner-Union as prayed for. He held, accepting the applicant-Union's contention, that he had powers to grant the interim reliefs by virtue of the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 30 of the said Act. On the merits, he held that since the letter dated March 20, 1981 addressed by the applicant-Union to the petitioner-Union stated that majority of the workers had tendered their resignations and had become members of the applicant-Union from 27–2-1981, on the date of the interim order i.e. on 16–10–1981, the period of six calendar months referred to in section 13 of the Act was com- pleted, though not on the date of the application. The second ground he gave was that the earlier settlement between the petitioner-Union and the Company was of February 23, 1978 and the period of that settlement was to expire on October 31, 1981. The second ground he gave was that the earlier settlement between the petitioner-Union and the Company was of February 23, 1978 and the period of that settlement was to expire on October 31, 1981. The petitioner-Union continued to be a recognised union though it had lost its right to represent the workmen, since its membership had gone below 30%; hence the applicant-Union or the workmen cannot terminate the settlement in view of the provisions of sec-tion 19(7) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The agreement, however, can be terminated in advance before October 31, 1981. Unless the agree ment is terminated a new charter of demands cannot be submitted and no retrospective effect can be given from a date earlier to that of the charter of demands. Hence, if the said settlement was not terminated till the recognition of the petitioner-Union is cancelled, it will amount to complete and irreparable loss of benefits in emoluments and other demands. There-fore, reasoned the learned Member, if the interim relief is not granted as prayed for, it will result in startling and irreparable consequences for no fault of the applicant-Union or the workmen. He, therefore, granted the injunction as stated earlier. 4. Thereafter, on the 22nd December 1981 another application was made on behalf of the applicant-Union, in the same proceedings. It is necessary to reproduce that application verbatim since it has some bearing on the question that falls for determination here. The application reads as follows: “The applicant union submits that the record of the membership is produced by non-applicant -No. 1 (i.e. the petitioner-Union). It has been inspected by the applicant. It is not accepted and admitted by the applicant. In the circumstances the applicant prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct the Investigating Officer to hold enquiry by interrogation and/or secret ballot and suhmit report within a fortnight and pass any other appropriate order.” It appears that this application came up for hearing before the learned President of the Industrial Court, since in the meanwhile Shri Samant had retired. The application was opposed by the petitioner-Union. Thereafter the .Company filed an application on 25th January 1982 praying for an expeditious hearing of the main application. The President by his order dated the 25th January 1982 passed a cryptic order on the application of the applicant-Union which reads as follows :- “Heard Dr. Kulkarni for applicant-Union. Mr. The application was opposed by the petitioner-Union. Thereafter the .Company filed an application on 25th January 1982 praying for an expeditious hearing of the main application. The President by his order dated the 25th January 1982 passed a cryptic order on the application of the applicant-Union which reads as follows :- “Heard Dr. Kulkarni for applicant-Union. Mr. Shroff for non-applicant Co. Mr. E. D. Dalvi, for non-applicant-Union. Mr. Shroff files an application that the matter may be expedited as the workers are restive and the company wants to settle disputes. The I. O. to hold a secret ballot to find out which of the rival unions hasthe majority of Membership. He shall submit his report on or before 15–2-1982?. 5. Thereafter the petitioner-Union, on 30th January made an applica- tion for review of both the orders dated the 16th October 1981 and the 25th January 1982. That was heard by Shri Shinde, another Member of the Industrial Court who had in the meanwhile come in the place of Shri Samant, and Shri Shinde by his order dated the 2nd March 1982 reject- ed the said application of review. The request for review of the order of interim injunction was rejected on the ground that it suffered from laches and also that the order was not palpably erroneous. The plea for review of the order for holding secret ballot was turned down because it was not an interim order and also that it would not cause injustice to anybody. It is thus aggrieved by these three orders, as stated in the beginning, that the present petition has been filed by the recognised Union. 6. In order to appreciate the contentions advanced at the Bar, it is necessary to note the admitted facts on record and to understand the exact implications of the two orders viz. of the order of interim injunction and of the order directing the holding of secret ballot. The petitioner is a recognised Union under section 12 of the Act and will continue to be so till its recognition is cancelled under section 13 thereof. As a recognised Union, the petitioner alone is entitled, under sec- tion 20 of the Act, to represent the employees of the Company collectively and enter into a settlement with it on their behalf. No other Union nor even the employees independently of the petitioner, can be so. As a recognised Union, the petitioner alone is entitled, under sec- tion 20 of the Act, to represent the employees of the Company collectively and enter into a settlement with it on their behalf. No other Union nor even the employees independently of the petitioner, can be so. Further, by virtue of sub-section (7) of section 19 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the earlier settlement of 1978 between the petitioner-Union and the Company can be terminated only by the petitioner-Union so long as its recognition is not cancelled, and by no body else. The termination of the agreement by any body else will not be legal. This being the position in law, an interim injunction restraining the recognised Union from representing and acting on behalf of the employees will not enable any one else, including the alleged majority Union, to act on behalf of the employees. Such an injunction has the effect only of creating a stalemate in the meanwhile. The order of interim injunction dated 16–10–1981 has just this consequence. The peti- tioner-Union has not yet terminated the 1978 settlement with the Company. The applicant-Union can neither terminate it nor negotiate a settlement with the Company to-day even if the petitioner-Union terminates the said settlement. 7. What is equally important to remember is that the applicant-Union has filed the present proceedings under section 13 of the Act for cancellation of the recognition of the petitioner-Union. It is not an applica- tion for its own recognition either under section 11 (which it cannot make now that a recognised Union is already on the scene) or under section 14 of the Act. Admittedly, further, the cancellation of the petitioner-Union is sought on the ground mentioned in sub-clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of the said section 13. It is not an applica- tion for its own recognition either under section 11 (which it cannot make now that a recognised Union is already on the scene) or under section 14 of the Act. Admittedly, further, the cancellation of the petitioner-Union is sought on the ground mentioned in sub-clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of the said section 13. The relevant provisions of section 13 are as follows :- “Section 13 (1)-The Industrial Court shall cancel the recognition of a union if after giving notice to such union to show cause why its recogni-tion should not be cancelled, and after holding an inquiry, it is satisfied - (i) * * * (ii) that the membership of the union has, for a continuous period of six calendar months, fallen below the minimum required under section 11 for its recognition: Provided that, where a strike (not being an illegal strike under the Central Act) has extended to a period exceeding fourteen days in any calendar month, such month shall be excluded in computing the said period of six months: Provided further that, the recognition of a union shall not be cancelled under the provisions of this sub-clause, unless its membership for the calendar month in which show cause notice under this section was issued was less than such minimum; or (iii) * * * (iv) * * * (v) * * * (vi) * * * (vii) * * * The relevant provisions of section 11 referred to in section 13(1)(ii) are as follows: “Section 11 (1)-Any union (hereinafter referred to as the “applicant-union”) which has' for the whole of the period of six calendat months immediately preceding the calendar month in which it so applies under this section a membership of not less than thirty per cent of the total number of employees employed in any undertaking may apply in the prescribed form to the Industrial Court for being registered as a recognis- ed union for such undertaking.” The provisions of section 13(1)(ii) read with section 11(1) make it clear that before the recognition of a union is cancelled, two conditions have to be satisfied. Firstly, it must be shown that the membership of such union for the whole of the period of six calendar months immediately preceding the calendar month in which the application for cancellation is made has fallen below thirty per cent of the total number of the employees, and secondly, the recognised Union did not command such minimum member-ship even in the month in which the Court issues the show cause notice to it under section 13(1). In this connection one more provision of the Act is necessary to note and that is the definition of the “member” of a union. Sub-section (11) of section 3 of the Act defines “member” as follows :- “Section 3 (11)-Member*” means a person who is an ordinary member of a union, and has paid a subscription to the union of not less than 50 paise per calendar month : Provided that, no person shall at any time be deemed to be a member, if his subscription is in arrears for a period of more than three calendar months during the period of six months immediately preceding such time, and the expression “membership” shall be construed, accordingly. Explanation.-A subscription for a particular calendar month shall, for the purpose of this clause, be deemed to be in arrears, if such subscription is not paid within three months after theend of the calendar month in respect of which it is due.” The Explanation clarifies that a person is not deemed to be in arrears for a period of three months next even if he does not pay the subscription for a month, and read with the proviso, it means that a person does not cease to be a member unless he is in arrears for the period so counted for each of the three calendar months for which he does not pay subscription during the immediately preceding six months. What is further important to note is that a person can be a member of more unions than one. It is not, therefore, sufficient to show that a person has become a member of the Applicant-Union. What must be proved is that he has ceased to be a member of the recognised union. 8. It will now be convenient to examine the impugned orders and the reasons given for supporting the same. The first is the order of injunction dated 16–10–1981. What must be proved is that he has ceased to be a member of the recognised union. 8. It will now be convenient to examine the impugned orders and the reasons given for supporting the same. The first is the order of injunction dated 16–10–1981. By that the Petitioner-Union is prevented from negotiating, discussing or settling any dispute in whatsoever manner on behalf of the employees. The learned Member in support of the order has given curious reasons. The first reason is that on the date he passed the order, six months since the resignation of membership of the Petitioner-Union by the majority of the employees and of their membership of the Applicant-Union, were over. For this purpose, he calculated the said period from 27–2-1981 probably because that date is mentioned in the letter dated 20–3-1981 addressed by the Applicant-Union to the Petitioner-Union as the date from which the employees became members of the Applicant-Union. The second reason given is that if the earlier settlement is not terminated till the cancellation of the recognition of the Petitioner-Union, it will result in a loss of benefits to the workmen and also result in startling and irreparable consequences. The fallacies in this reasoning are too apparent. In the first place, the learned Member has already come to the conclusion that the Petitioner-Union has lost its recognition. Secondly, he has calculated the period of six months immediately preceding not from the date of the application for cancellation of recognition, but from the date of his passing the order. This has been done on the specious reasoning that unlike sections 11 and 14, the date from which such period is to be calculated is not mentioned in Section 13. A cursory glance at section 13 will show that no other date except the date of the application made for cancellation of recognition is contemplated there and no other date will be workable. In the first instance, sub-clause (ii) of section (1) of the said section makes a reference to section 11 which clearly states that the period of six months immediately preceding is to be calculated from the date of application. Secondly, the second proviso to section 13(1) lays down the condition that even in the calendar month in which the show cause notice is issued to the recognised union, its membership should be shown to have fallen below the minimum. Secondly, the second proviso to section 13(1) lays down the condition that even in the calendar month in which the show cause notice is issued to the recognised union, its membership should be shown to have fallen below the minimum. This will clearly mean that the date contemplated in section 13(1)(ii) is a date earlier to the issuance of the show cause notice and it can only be the date of the application. Thirdly, the only other date can be the date of passing the final order of cancellation and certainly not the date of passing interim orders. To calculate the said period with reference to the date of the final order will, however, render applications for cancellation of recognition infructuous in many cases and that too after a laborious enquiry into the membership. For, in the meanwhile, for a continuous period of six months prior to the date of such order, the membership of the union may well have risen to 30% or more. For all these reasons, the period of six months immediately preceding will have to be calculated only with reference to the date of the application. Fourthly, he has calculated the period from the date of the membership of the employees of the Applicant-Union and not from the date of the resignation of the employees from the membership of the Petitioner-Union which is March 20, 1981 as shown earlier. For, as stated earlier, what has to be ascertained under section 13(1) (ii) is whether the recognised union commands the minimum of membership, and not whether it has the majority of the employees as its members. The figure of membership of any other union is, therefore irrelevant for the purpose. This is particularly so be-cause an employee can be a member of more than one union at a time. Fifthly, it has escaped the learned Member that what is to be ascertained is the membership of the Petitioner-Union over a period of six continuous months prior to the date of application and not whether the Petitioner-Union is a majority or a minority union on a particular day. This can be done only by verification of the relevant record of the membership by holding an enquiry for the purpose and not on the basis of the statements made in that behalf by the Applicant-Union only. This can be done only by verification of the relevant record of the membership by holding an enquiry for the purpose and not on the basis of the statements made in that behalf by the Applicant-Union only. It will appear from the order, however, that the learned Member has taken it as an undisputed and proved fact that the Petitioner-Union has lost its recognition because in the letter addressed to it by the Applicant-Union it is stated that the majority of the workmen had tendered their resignations from the Petitioner-Union and had become members of the Applicant-Union. This is disputed by the Petitioner-Union. Lastly, the learned Member has committed a grave error in granting the injunction on the ground that the settlement needed to be terminated. In view of the legal position already pointed out, the grant of injunction was not only not calculated to help the termination of the settlement, but to stall it, since the only union which could have terminated the settlement has been prevented from doing so, as it has been prevented from acting on behalf of the employees. The reasons for granting the injunction are thus prima facie unsupportable. The learned Member Shri Shinde, erred in refusing to review the said order on the ground of laches. There is no period of limitation prescribed for making an application for review under section 30(2) of the Act. Such an application can be made at any time, provided the applicant makes out valid grounds for the same. 9. We may now examine the next order dated 25–1-1982 directing the holding of secret ballot. The order states that the ballot is directed to be held for finding out which of the rival unions has the majority of member-ship. Since the order is not a speaking one, it is difficult to know the pur-pose for which such finding was sought. The difficulty in this respect is aggravated by the fact that the review application was heard by a different Member, as in the case of the earlier order. It has, therefore, become necessary to rely solely upon the reasoning of the reviewing Court. The reason given for refusing to review the said order is that it is not an interim order. The reason is palpably wrong. It is difficult to know in what other manner it can be described. It has, therefore, become necessary to rely solely upon the reasoning of the reviewing Court. The reason given for refusing to review the said order is that it is not an interim order. The reason is palpably wrong. It is difficult to know in what other manner it can be described. While discussing the point, however, the learned Mem-ber has held that the results of the secret ballot can be of assistance while deciding the issue of membership and it would help in evaluating the evidence produced in that behalf. The ballot, it is stated, is of particular importance in this behalf because the documents produced are disputed by both sides. It is needless to comment on this reasoning. Mercifully the secret ballot is not ordered as a substitute for the procedure laid down in section 13(1)(ii). However, the statements made in the application for the direction to hold the secret ballot proceed on the assumption that it should be so. Dr. Kul-karni on behalf of the applicant-Union also argued vehemently on the footing that in the circumstances the secret ballot was the only method by which the issue of cancellation of the recognition of the petitioner-Union could be decided. He went to the length of suggesting that since section 13 merely stated that an enquiry should be held and section 5(e) gave powers to the Court to give any direction to the Investigating Officer and since further under section 9(2) the Investigating Officer was required to assist in investigating membership and he had power to convene a meeting under section 37(4), a secret ballot could be held to ascertain the issue of membership under section 13(1) (ii). He also rested his argument on the absence of prohibition in the Act against holding a ballot. It is not necessary to consider these arguments seriously. Suffice it to point out that the minimum of membership required to be found out under section 13(1)(ii) cannot be found out by a ballot secret or otherwise. The issue can be resolved only by scrutinizing the membership-record of the petitioner-Union for the specified period. The ballot can only indicate which union the employees favour on the day the ballot is taken. It cannot prove that the employees were members of a particular union over the required period. The issue can be resolved only by scrutinizing the membership-record of the petitioner-Union for the specified period. The ballot can only indicate which union the employees favour on the day the ballot is taken. It cannot prove that the employees were members of a particular union over the required period. Much less can it be taken into consideration for deciding or even for the assistance in deciding the said question. It is true that there is no particular method prescribed for holding the enquiry under section 13(1) and also that the ballot is not an anathema to the Act. However, all questions required to be adjudicated under the Act cannot be decided by counting heads. The mode and manner adopted for holding an enquiry or investigation should be relevant and suitable to the purpose for which the enquiry or the investigation is held. This obvious truism has unfortunately been ignored by the lower Court. 10. Dr. Kulkarni's reliance on two decisions of the Supreme Court-one reported in F. F. Campbell Co. v. Engineering Mazdoor Sabha1 and the other in the (M/s. Tata Engineering Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Workmen)2 to support his contention that secret ballot is permissible for ascertaining membership under the provisions of section 13of the Act is completely mis-placed. In the first case although by consent of the parties it was directed that the period of six months will be calculated with reference to a particular date, the membership was to be ascertained by scrutinizing the record of subscription etc. as per the prescription of law. This has been made clear in para 12 of the judgment. In the second case there was no dispute between a recognised and a non-recognised union. None of the two unions was recognised. One of the unions raised an industrial dispute which was pend-ing adjudication. In the meanwhile there was a settlement between the com-pany and the other union. This settlement was individually signed by 564 out of 635 workmen of the company. The company, therefore, filed an appli-cation before the Industrial Tribunal and prayed that the dispute should be marked settled. The first union challenged the settlement. The only ques-tion before the Tribunal was whether the settlement was of free choice, and just and fair. This settlement was individually signed by 564 out of 635 workmen of the company. The company, therefore, filed an appli-cation before the Industrial Tribunal and prayed that the dispute should be marked settled. The first union challenged the settlement. The only ques-tion before the Tribunal was whether the settlement was of free choice, and just and fair. The Industrial Tribunal took the view that the settlement was of free choice but workers deserved little higher emoluments and, there-fore, the settlement was not just and fair. It also held that it was n*ot proved as to how many of 564 workmen were members of the other union. The Supreme Court took the view that when the settlement was accepted by the vast majority of the workmen it was not proper for the Tribunal to set it aside on the ground that the workers deserved marginally more benefits. The Court further opined that when 564 workmen had individually signed the settlement by asserting that they were members, the assertion had to be taken at its face value. The onus to prove the falsity of the assertion was on the first union, but it made no attempt to discharge the same. Although it was true that 400 of the workmen had challenged the settlement subse-quently, it only meant that at least 329 workmen had changed their loyalty in between. But that did not mean that on the day the settlement was sign-ed, .they had not signed it. What was material in that case was to ascertain whether on the date the settlement was signed, they were members of the other union. The Court in the circumstances upheld the settlement. It is very difficult to understand as to how this authority can be pressed into service in the present case. The question that falls for consideration is not whether the workers were members of the Petitioner-Union on a particular day but whether they were so for the period specified in the section. The assertion to the contrary is further sought to be disproved by the Petitioner-Union and has not gone unchallenged. 11. It is now necessary to deal with two preliminary objections raised by Dr. Kulkarni with regard to the maintainability of this petition. His first objection was that the orders being interlocutory this Court should not interfere with them while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. 11. It is now necessary to deal with two preliminary objections raised by Dr. Kulkarni with regard to the maintainability of this petition. His first objection was that the orders being interlocutory this Court should not interfere with them while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. His second objection was that under Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of the Appellate Side Rules, 1960, of this Court, a Single Judge cannot enter-tain a challenge to the present orders since they are not passed under Chapters VI and VII of the Act. As regards the first contention, there is no doubt that the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is discretionary, and unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record resulting in injustice, this Court does not interfere with the orders passed by the lower authorities whether such orders are final or interlocutory. However, it is equally true that this Court does not refrain from exercising the said jurisdiction once it finds that such orders suffer from patent errors and erroneous exercise of jurisdiction resulting in miscarriage of justice. This they do whether the orders are final or interim. In the present case, as has been pointed out elaborately, the first order of interim injunction has been passed for reasons which are self-defeating and on assumptions which are obviously erroneous. What is more, the wide terms in which the injunction has been granted has resulted in a stalemate and has caused injustice to all concerned without doing justice to anyone. The second order serves no purpose and is an exercise in futility, and has been passed because of the erroneous view of the law taken by the lower Court. It is also stated at the Bar that situation such as this arises frequently before the Industrial Courts. It is, therefore, necessary that the correct position of law and the proper procedure to be followed in such cases is laid down for the benefit of all to avoid unnecessary litigation in future. That is yet another reason why interference with the interim orders is necessary in the present case. The second objection is equally untenable. As has been pointed out, while narrating the facts, the application for interim orders was made under sub-section (2) of section30 of the Act which is in Chapter VII thereof. That is yet another reason why interference with the interim orders is necessary in the present case. The second objection is equally untenable. As has been pointed out, while narrating the facts, the application for interim orders was made under sub-section (2) of section30 of the Act which is in Chapter VII thereof. In fact, when an objection was taken on behalf of the Petitioner-Union to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court to pass interim orders, it was argued on behalf of the Applicant-Union that the Court had such power under the said provision. The Industrial Court also upheld this contention on the ground that it had such power under the said provision. Admittedly, there- fore, the orders have been passed under the said provision. This objection is, therefore, frivolous. 12. There is no doubt that the investigation into the membership of the Petitioner-Union for the relevant pertod as required by the provisions of section 13(1), will take some time. This is particularly so when the genuineness of the documents produced by the Petitioner-Union is challeng-ed. I had, therefore, suggested to the parties that by an agreement, an arrangement can be worked out whereby the employees may get the benefit of a new settlement immediately. My suggestion was that the Petitioner-Union should forthwith terminate the settlement and serve its charter of demands on the company. The Applicant-Union has, it appears, already submitted its charter of demands. The representatives of both the Petitioner-Union and the Applicant-Union may either jointly or separately discuss their demands with the company and when a settlement is arrived at, it should be signed by the Petitioner-Union to satisfy the requirements of law and may also be counter-signed by the Applicant-Union which today allegedly commands the loyalty of the majority of the workmen. It is needless to emphasise that whatever settlement is arrived at will have to be to the satisfaction of the Applicant-Union. The settlement may further be given retrospective effect from the date the Applicant-Union served its charter of demands without mentioning that the date is selected for that reason. The workers will thereby lose nothing and gain everything that they seek to. In the meanwhile, the proceeding for the cancellation of the recognition of the Petitioner-Union will be expedited and will take their own course. This suggestion was acceptable both to the Petitioner-Union as well as to the Company. The workers will thereby lose nothing and gain everything that they seek to. In the meanwhile, the proceeding for the cancellation of the recognition of the Petitioner-Union will be expedited and will take their own course. This suggestion was acceptable both to the Petitioner-Union as well as to the Company. Surprisingly however, it was not accepted by the Applicant-Union for reasons best known to it. The only course open out of the present impasse had, therefore, to be abandoned. 13. The result, therefore, is that the order dated the 30th January 1982 passed on the review application will have to be set aside and is hereby set aside. As regards the order of interim injunction dated the 16th October 1981, in view of the wide language in which it is couched, it will have t*o be modified so that the workmen are not prevented from being represented before the employer as well as before the various authorities under this Act and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is, therefore, necessary that the order of interim injunction is set aside and instead a limited injunction is granted as I propose to do hereafter. As regards the order dated the 22nd January 1982 directing the holding of secret ballot, I am informed at the Bar that pursuant to the said order a secret ballot was held and in the said ballot the Applicant-Union has commanded a vast majority of votes. It is, therefore, not necessary now to set aside the said order. No fault could have been found if a ballot was directed to be held to find out which of the unions commanded majority today,, to enable the Court to decide whether a limited injunction of the type I propose to grant should or should not be granted. Since the ballot has been held and the results are available, they have become useful for this Court to take a decision in the matter. It is, however, made clear that the results of the said ballot will not be taken into consideration for determin-ing the issue of membership under section 13(1)(ii) since that will be an irrelevant and extraneous circumstance. 14. I therefore, pass the following order : The order dated the 16th October 1981 is hereby set aside. It is, however, made clear that the results of the said ballot will not be taken into consideration for determin-ing the issue of membership under section 13(1)(ii) since that will be an irrelevant and extraneous circumstance. 14. I therefore, pass the following order : The order dated the 16th October 1981 is hereby set aside. The Petitioner-Union though free to act as a recognised union in all other respects will not sign any settlement with the 4th Respondent-Company without the permission of the Industrial Court before which the present proceedings for cancellation of its recognition are pending. The Industrial Court when approached for the purpose will take into consideration all aspects of the matter while granting or refusing to grant the permission. For this purpose, the Court may also order ballot if necessary to ascertain the wishes of the workmen. This limited injunction alone is justified in the circumstances of the case and will be sufficient to meet the needs of the situation. 15. The Industrial Court is directed to dispose of the proceedings under section 13 as expeditiously as possible. 16. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. 17. On the application of Dr. Kulkarni, the operation of this order is stayed for a period of three weeks from today. Rule absolute. -----