( 1 ) THESE two writ petitions filed by Sain Ditta Mal and his son Harivansh Lal raise the same issues and can be disposed of by a common judgment. It is common ground that the facts are identical in both cases and do not need to be separately dealt with. ( 2 ) THE petitioners are citizens of India. Each of them is a certified goldsmith within the meaning of the Gold Control Rules in Part XII-A of the Defence of India Rules 1962. The residential premises of the petitioners viz. , 4-B/32, Old Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi was searched by Officers of the Customs Department on 6-7-1966. Gold ornaments weighing 502 gms. and 120 round pieces of gold were taken into custody. Eventually the gold ornaments have been released and I am not concerned with them here. However, the 120 round pieces of gold have been confiscated and a personal penalty has been imposed on each of the petitioners and it is the validity of this confiscation and these penalties that are under challenge 10 these writ petitions. ( 3 ) ON 6-7-1966, immediately after the search and seizure, a statement was recorded from each of the petitioners. According to the petitioners these statements had been obtained from them by threats and coercion and they had stated so in their telegram and letters of the 7th and llth July, 1966. This aspect of the matter is, however, not of much relevance now. Under the Customs Act, 1962 the authority had to initiate action to confiscate the seized articles within a period of six months of the seizure (which could be extended by another period of six months) failing which they were bound to return the goods to the petitioners, vide S. 110 (2) of the Act. In the present case, the first six months period expired on 5-1-1967 but the authorities exercised their right of extension. They had, therefore, to take a decision regarding confiscation by the 5th July, 1967 but they failed to pass any order of confiscation by this date. ( 4 ) ON 7-7-1967, the petitioners wrote to the authorities seeking the release of the goods as they had not received any notice regarding confiscation. The goods were not released. They had, therefore, to take a decision regarding confiscation by the 5th July, 1967 but they failed to pass any order of confiscation by this date. ( 4 ) ON 7-7-1967, the petitioners wrote to the authorities seeking the release of the goods as they had not received any notice regarding confiscation. The goods were not released. Instead, on 5-8-1967, a notice was issued from the Collector of Central Excise (respondent No. 3) calling upon the petitioners to show cause why the pieces of gold should not be confiscated under R. 126-M for the contravention of Rr. 126-B, 126-C, 126-E, 126-H and 126-1 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 and why a personal penalty should not be imposed on the petitioners under Rule 126-L (16) of the said Rules. The petitioners gave a written reply on 14-9-1967 and were also personally heard in proceedings which concluded on 18-7-1968. On 13-9-1968, the third respondent passed an order confiscating the gold pieces and ornaments under Rule 126-M and imposing a penalty of Rs. 10,000. 00 on each of the petitioners. The petitioners preferred appeals to the Gold Control Administrator (respondent No. 2) on 18-10-1968 and added certain further grounds of appeal on 3-9-1969. The appeal was decided by the second respondent on 8-2-197-1. He released the ornaments but confirmed the confiscation of the gold pieces. The penalty on each of the petitioners was reduced from Rs. 10,000. 00 to Rs. 4,000. 00. The petitioners, aggrieved by the orders dated 13-9-1963 and 8-2-1971, have filed these writ petitions and pray for the issue of writs of certiorari quashing the above two orders and for directions to the respondents "to return, the gold pieces to the petitioners. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners, Sri Kapil Sibal, did not, rightly it seems to me, seek to canvass before me the merits of the findings of the respondents. He confined himself purely to certain legal propositions on the basis of which he tried to persuade me that the orders of confiscation and penalty are illegal and without jurisdiction. It is necessary, in order to appreciate these arguments to briefly outline some of the relevant provisions of the Customs Act, the Defence of India Rules and the Gold Control Act, 1968 which was enacted during the pendency of the impugned proceedings. A. Customs Act: The Customs Act, 1962. It is necessary, in order to appreciate these arguments to briefly outline some of the relevant provisions of the Customs Act, the Defence of India Rules and the Gold Control Act, 1968 which was enacted during the pendency of the impugned proceedings. A. Customs Act: The Customs Act, 1962. makes provisions, inter alia, for the seizure of "smuggled" goods, i. e. improperly imported goods which are liable to confiscation under Sections 111 to 113 of the Act. It is unnecessary for our purpose to set out the details of these provisions elaborately except to mention that the Act confers extensive powers of search and seizure on customs officers in order to lay their hands on such smuggled goods. In particular S. 105 (1) provides: "if the Assistant Collector of Customs. . . . . . . . has reason to believe that any goods liable to confiscation or any documents or things which in his opinion will be useful for or relevant to any proceeding under this Act, are secreted in any place he may authorise any officer of Customs to search or may himself search for such goods, documents or things. "sub-section (2) makes the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code applicable in respect of such searches. Section 108 gives the officers powers to examine persons, record statements and conduct enquiries and investigations. Section 110 enables the proper officer to seize goods where he has reason to believe that such goods are liable to confiscation under the Act. In the present case, there is no dispute that the premises of the petitioners were searched in pursuance of a "search warrant issued by the Assistant Collector (Hqrs.) Central Excise Collectorate, New Delhi" and the gold pieces in question seized. B. The Defence of India Rules: ON 26-10-1962 the President of India issued a Proclamation of Emergency under Article 252 (1) of the Constitution and on the same day he also promulgated the Defence of India Ordinance (No. IV) of 1962. In pursuance of the Ordinance were framed the Defence of India Rules, 1962. The Ordinance was replaced by the Defence of India Act (No. 51) of 1962 which came into force on 12-12-1962. The rules framed earlier were continued under the Act. ON 10-1-1963 the rules were amended to include Part XII-A relating to Gold Control. They were amended subsequently in Nov. The Ordinance was replaced by the Defence of India Act (No. 51) of 1962 which came into force on 12-12-1962. The rules framed earlier were continued under the Act. ON 10-1-1963 the rules were amended to include Part XII-A relating to Gold Control. They were amended subsequently in Nov. , 1966 but these amendments are not material here. For purposes of convenience I shall call these rules the "d. I. R. " to avoid confusion with the Gold Control Act and Regulations that were introduced subsequently and to which I shall refer a little later. This part consisted of six chapters and comprised of Rr. 126-A to 126-Z. It is necessary to refer to some of the rules here. Rule 126-A gives relevant definitions. "administrator" means the Administrator appointed under Rule 126-J who can be referred to as the "g. C. A. ". "certified goldsmith" is defined by Clause (bb) to mean "a dealer who holds a valid certificate granted under Rule 126-HH recognising him as a goldsmith". Clause (c) defines a "dealer" as a "person who carries on directly or otherwise, the business of (I) making, manufacturing, buying, selling, supplying, distributing, melting, processing or converting ornaments, (ii) buying, selling, supplying, distributing, melting, processing or converting gold for "the purpose of making or manufacturing ornaments,for cash, deferred payment, remuneration or other valuable consideration, and includes certain categories of persons the details of which are unnecessary for my present purpose. "ornament" as defined in Cl. (f) as "any article in a finished form, meant for personal adornment or for adornment of any idol, deity or any other object of religious worship, made of, or manufactured from gold whether or not set with stones or gems, real or artificial or with pearls real, cultured orimitation or with all or any of them and includes parts, pendants or broken pieces of ornaments"; and "primary gold" is defined by Clause (g) to mean "gold in any unfinished or semi-finished form" and to include "all ingots, bars, blocks, slabs, billets, shots, pellets, rods and wires". "refiner" and "refinery" are defined in CIs. (h) and (i) but it is unnecessary to set them out here. Under Rule 126-B, a licensed dealer or a certified goldsmith, in the absence of special authority, "shall not make or manufacture or otherwise work on ornaments and articles; a refiner may make standard gold bars but cannot make, manufacture etc. "refiner" and "refinery" are defined in CIs. (h) and (i) but it is unnecessary to set them out here. Under Rule 126-B, a licensed dealer or a certified goldsmith, in the absence of special authority, "shall not make or manufacture or otherwise work on ornaments and articles; a refiner may make standard gold bars but cannot make, manufacture etc. articles or ornaments; and other persons can do neither. Chapter III deals with the licensing of dealers and refiners. Rule 126-P, in Chapter IV, requires the making of returns by dealers and refiners as to the particulars of gold in their possession or under their control in prescribed forms within prescribed periods. Rule 126-H lays restrictions on possession and sale of gold after the commencement of the Act. Sub-section (1-A) (sic) prohibits all persons, other than a licensed dealer or refiner from owning or having in his control, custody or possession any primary gold beyond a prescribed date but this provision came into effect only in 1967. Chapter IV-A deals with certified goldsmiths and artisans. Rule 126-HH being the provision relating to the former, R. 126-1 provides for declarations by all persons, other than dealers and refiners, as to the details of articles and ornaments of gold owned by them. Rule 126-11, previously Section 126-1 (11), raises a presumption that any person, who is in possession, custody or control of any article, ornament or primary gold, is the owner thereof, until the contrary is proved. Chapter VI contains miscellaneous provisions but these are very important. Rule 126-11, previously Section 126-1 (11), raises a presumption that any person, who is in possession, custody or control of any article, ornament or primary gold, is the owner thereof, until the contrary is proved. Chapter VI contains miscellaneous provisions but these are very important. Rule 126-L reads as follows, in so far as it is relevant for the present purposes: "126-L. Power of entry, search and seizure, to obtain information and to take samples Any person authorised by the Administrator by writing in this behalf may (a) enter and search any refinery of which the refiner or the establishment of a dealer who is licensed under this Part; (b) seize any gold in respect of which he suspects that any provision of this Part has been, or is being, or is about to be, contravened, along with the package, covering or receptacle, if any, in which such gold is found and thereafter take all measures necessary for their safe custody; (c) seize any books of account, return or any other document relating to any gold in respect of which he suspects, that any provision of this Part has been or is being or is about to be, contravened and thereafter take all measures necessary for their safe custody. (2) Any person authorised by the Central Government by writing in this behalf may (a) enter and search any premises, not being a refinery or establishment referred to in sub-rule (1), vaults, lockers or any other place whether above or below ground. (b) seize any gold in respect of which he suspects that any provision of this part has been, or is being or is about to be contravened, along with the package, covering or receptacle, if any, in which such gold is found and thereafter take all measures necessary for their safe custody. (3) Any officer authorised by the Administrator by writing in this behalf may search any person if that officer has reason to believe that such person has secreted about his person (a) any gold in respect of which such officer suspects that any provision of this part has been, or is being, or is about to be contravened. (b) any document relating to such gold. (4) to (11 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) any document relating to such gold. (4) to (11 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (12) The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898) relating to search and seizure shall, so far as they are applicable, apply in relation to search and seizure made under this rule. (13) Any gazetted officer authorised by the Administrator in this behalf may hold an inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining whether any contravention of any of the provisions of this part has been, is being, or is about to be committed, and shall for the purposes of such inquiry have power to summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary either to give evidence or to produce any document or other thing. (14) The Administrator may call for information from any person for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not there has been any contravention of any of the provisions of this part. (15)and (16 ). . Explanation. . . -. . . . . . . . . Rule 126-M is important. It declares: "any gold seized under Rule 126-L, together with the package, covering or receptacle, if any, in which such gold is found shall be liable to confiscation. "the rule proceeds to set out the details of U1 te persons empowered to confiscate, their powers and provisions for appeal and revision and other details not relevant for our present purposes. Rule 126-X is also relevant. It provides : "the Central Government may perform all or any of the functions of the Administrator and may, by notification, exercise all or any of the powers conferred by this Part on the Administrator if that Government is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do. "c. Gold Control Act and Regulation : The third phase with which I am concerned starts with the withdrawal of the proclamation of emergency on 10-1-1968. This led to the lapse on 10-7-1968 vide S. 1 (3) of the Defence of India Act and the Defence of India Rules. The President promulgated the Gold Control Ordinance, 1968 on 29-6-1968 which replaced, by its provisions, the provisions of Part XII-A of the D. I. R. Section 117 of the Ordinance, however, needs to be set out. This led to the lapse on 10-7-1968 vide S. 1 (3) of the Defence of India Act and the Defence of India Rules. The President promulgated the Gold Control Ordinance, 1968 on 29-6-1968 which replaced, by its provisions, the provisions of Part XII-A of the D. I. R. Section 117 of the Ordinance, however, needs to be set out. It ran : "117 (1) As from the commencement of this Ordinance, the provisions of Part XII-A of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 shallstand repealed and upon such repeal, S. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall apply as if the said part were a Central Act. (2) Notwithstanding the repeal made by sub-section (1) but without prejudice to the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 any notification, order, direction, appointment or declaration made or any notice, licence or certificate issued or permission, authorisation or exemption granted or any confiscation adjudged or penalty or fine imposed or any forfeiture ordered or any other thing done or any other action taken under or in pursuance of the provisions of Part XII-A of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance be deemed to have been made, issued, granted, adjudged, imposed, ordered, done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Ordinance. "the Ordinance was replaced By the Gold Control Act of 1968 which passed on 24-8-1968 which came into force on 1-9-1968. Section 116 (2) of the Act again contained a saving provision in the following terms : "notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken including any notification, order or appointment made, direction given, notice, licence or certificate issued, permission, authorisation or exemption granted, confiscation adjudged, penalty or fine imposed, or forfeiture ordered whether under the Gold (Control) Ordinance 1968 or Part XII-A of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, shall in so far as it is not inconsistent With the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done, taken, made, given, issued, granted, adjudged, imposed or ordered as the case may be, under the corresponding provision of this Act, as if this Act had commenced on the 29th day of June, 1968. " ( 6 ) IN the light of these provisions, the first contention raised by counsel for the petitioner is that there has been no valid confiscation of the goods under Rule 126-M of the D. I. R. The argument runs thus: Rule 126-M authorises the confiscation only of gold seized under Rule 126-L. Rule 126-L (2), which applies in this case, empowers a search and seizures by a person "authorised by the Central Government by writing in this behalf. " The search and seizure in this case was admittedly in pursuance of a search warrant issued by an Assistant Collector of Central Excise under the Customs Act, 1962. The seizure consequent on this search, became, to say the least, ineffective on 5-7-1967 on the expiry of the one-year period specified in Section 110 (2 ). That being so, there is no valid seizure at alt under the D. I. R. , much less one under R. 126 L. It follows, therefore, that the confiscation is illegal and unjustified. ( 7 ) PRIMA facie, these contentions appeared to carry some weight, particularly because the respondents, admit that action was taken under the Customs Act for the search and seizure and that an extension of time for action under Section 124 of the Customs Act was made on 5-1-1967 as already stated. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that tee arguments on behalf of the petitioners proceed on a basically wrong premise both of law and fact. He urges that the seizure was based hi fact on a prima facie satisfaction not only regarding violations of Customs Act but also of violations of the D. I. R. The contentions lack substance in law because he says the premise that a search and seizure under the D. I. R. needed separate search warrant is without foundation. After hearing both counsel I am of opinion that the plea on behalf of the respondents should be upheld. ( 8 ) FIRST, as to (he factual situation, the position is this. The petitioners have filed, as Annexure A to the writ petition, the "panchanama" recording what transpired at the search and seizure effected on 6-7-1966. This is signed by the Inspector of Customs, the two petitioners and the panch witnesses. The first sentence of the second para of this document reads: "the gold ornaments wighing 502 gms. The petitioners have filed, as Annexure A to the writ petition, the "panchanama" recording what transpired at the search and seizure effected on 6-7-1966. This is signed by the Inspector of Customs, the two petitioners and the panch witnesses. The first sentence of the second para of this document reads: "the gold ornaments wighing 502 gms. in gross are reasonably believed by the Customs Officers to have been manufactured in contravention of the Gold Control Rules. "it proceeds to say : "the 120 gold pieces are reasonably believed by them to have been made of smuggled gold and manufactured in contravention of Gold Control Rules. "it is true that the memo in all probability may have been prepared by the officers and signed by the petitioners but it clearly shows that the articles were seized both under the Customs Act and the D. I. R. Learned counsel for the respondent placed before me a seizure report also prepared on the same date. It no doubt refers to certain other matters about which the petitioners say they have their own explanation. I am referring to the memo, however, not in respect of those other particulars but for a very limited purpose. It refers to an interrogation of Harivansh Lal at which one ofthe questions put to him was whether he had declared the seized gold pieces under the Gold Control Rules. It also refers to the petitioners having been arrested "under S. 104 of the Customs Act, 1962 and Rule 126-L of the Gold Control Rules. " It is true that both these documents relied upon by the respondents are not antecedent to the actual search. It is also true that the appropriate authority must entertain satisfaction about a violation of the Customs Act and the D. I. R. prior to the seizure, search and seizure and not afterwards. But the two above documents, were contemporaneously drawn up and they can be taken into account to show that the gold was seized under both the enactments and because a competent authority entertained the necessary satisfaction in this regard. It was a search and seizure under both the enactments rolled into one. But the two above documents, were contemporaneously drawn up and they can be taken into account to show that the gold was seized under both the enactments and because a competent authority entertained the necessary satisfaction in this regard. It was a search and seizure under both the enactments rolled into one. ( 9 ) BUT, says learned counsel for the petitioners, while the entertainment of prior satisfaction is demonstrable for purposes of the Customs Act by the existence of a search warrant, it is negatived by the absence of such a warrant under the D. I. R. This argument must succeed if, as under the Customs Act, there is, also under the D. I. R. a necessity for the issue of a search warrant in favour of a particular officer expressing satisfaction of the officer issuing the warrant that search is necessary on account of apprehended violation of the D. I. R. But an examination of the D. I. R. shows that the scheme thereof is somewhat different. It will be seen from the provisions of R. 126-L already extracted that a search and seizure can be effected by "any person authorised by the Administrator by writing in this behalf" under Rule 126-L (1) and "by the Central Govt. by writing in this behalf" under Rule 126-L (2 ). There was some controversy before me whether the present case is governed by sub-rule (2) or sub-rule (1) also. It is, however, unnecessary to go into this controversy as R. 126-X empowers the Central Government to exercise all the functions of the Administrator and, whether it is sub- rule (1) or (2), an authorisation by the Central Government "by writing in this behalf" is a pre-requisite for any search or seizure under Rule 126-L. The question is whether such authorisation exists in the present case. ( 10 ) THE respondents seek an answer to the above question in the affirmative and in support of this prayer, they rely upon Notification S 0 130 (No. F. 7 (26)/63-S B dated 9-1-1963) issued by the Ministry of Finance in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 126-X read with notification of 5-11-1963. Both the notifications are fully extracted in Jayanti Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1970 Guj 108 and it is, therefore, not necessary to set out the notification here. Both the notifications are fully extracted in Jayanti Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1970 Guj 108 and it is, therefore, not necessary to set out the notification here. It authorises officers of the Central Government department not inferior in rank to officers specified in Col. 2 of the table appended below as the persons who shall exercise any or all the powers of the Gold Board in relation to matters specified in the corresponding entries in Column 3 and Column 4 of the said table. It contains in the second column the names of certain officers of Customs and Central Excise Department who are authorised to exercise powers and functions under the D. I. R. specified in column No. 3 and the nature of the powers and functions as designated in column No. 4. Serial No. 5 authorises any officer not inferior in rank to a Sub-Inspector of Central Excise to exercise powers of entry, search and seizure under Rule 126-L (1) and serial No. 6 authorises any officer not below the rank of a "sub-Inspector with the written permission of the Superintendent" to exercise similar powers under Rule 126-L (2 ). Serial No. 6 was modified by the second notification of 5-11-1963. This substituted, in column No. 1, for "sub-Inspector with the written permission of the Superintendent" the following (at p. 115); "sub-INSPECTOR of the Central Excise Department with the written permission of the Superintendent, Preventive Officer of the Customs Department for the time being employed for the prevention of smuggling, with the written permission of a gazetted officer of the Collectorate of Customs, any officer of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence It is clear that under the powers conferred by those Notifications, the designated officers can enter and search the premises described and seize gold etc. , in the event of suspected contravention of the Rules. This notification read with Rule 126-L indicates that there is no necessity of the issue of a search warrant prior to entry or search and that it is enough if the necessary satisfaction is entertained before the actual search and seizure is made. It is not disputed that the officers who made the search and seizure in this case were officers not below the ranks designated above. It is not disputed that the officers who made the search and seizure in this case were officers not below the ranks designated above. ( 11 ) THE further question, however, is whether Rule 126-L (1) and (2) envisage a specific writing authorising a particular officer to enter and search certain premises or whether a general authorisation by means of the notification above cited will suffice for the purpose. Learned Counsel for the petitioners says that the notification only contains a general authorisation for persona not below a particular rank to act and exercise certain powers and functions and that before an actual search or seizure can be effected in a particular case there should be an authority in this behalf in favour of a particular officer in writing. Learned counsel submits that it is an elementary principle of criminal procedure and the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code are made applicable under R. 126-L (2) that there can be no search without a search warrant and that this cardinal requirement will not be otherwise fulfilled. ( 12 ) THE contentions of the learned counsel are to a large extent, answered by a judgment of the Gujarat High Court (Jayanti Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1970 Guj 108 ) earlier referred to. In that case, the premises of the petitioner were searched bycertain Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors of Central Excise and some undeclared hidden gold was seized. One of the contentions of the petitioner who sought to have a notice of confiscation issued to him quashed was that R. M. Shelat who seized the declared gold was not duly authorised by the Central Government under Rule 126-L (2) and that therefore there being no valid seizure, the notice for confiscation was invalid. Bhagwati C. J. (as his Lordship then was) repelled this argument. The various aspects of his finding on this argument are as follows : (A) It is not correct to say that a valid seizure under Rule 126-L is not a prerequisite for a confiscation under R. 126-M and that once there is a seizure whatever its nature a confiscation would be valid. (b) The reference in the notifications to Gold Board was mistaken and inappropriate but this should be construed as empowering the officers to exercise the powers in question. (b) The reference in the notifications to Gold Board was mistaken and inappropriate but this should be construed as empowering the officers to exercise the powers in question. (c) The authority conferred on these persons was not ineffective because it was conferred by designation and not by name. (d) There was nothing wrong in the indirect authorisation i. e. , of certain officers conditional to permission by another and it is not necessary that it should be unconditional or directly in favour of the person concerned. This decision answers the contention of the petitioner that the seizure could not have been effected without a specific search warrant and that the authority of the notification is not good enough to enable an officer to enter, search and seize provided he falls within the terms of column No. 2 of the above notifications. ( 13 ) THERE is, however, one aspect of the present case that is not directly covered by the Gujarat decision. It will be seen that, in that case, the officers who conducted the search and effected the seizure were sub- Inspectors and Inspectors of Central Excise and under the notification of Nov. , 1963 they needed the written permission of the Superintendent of Central Excise before they could conduct a search or effect a seizure. It is seen that the written permission of the Superintendent had been obtained on 17-11-1964. one day before the search for the search and seizure. No such written permission before the search and seizure in the present case has been placed on record by the respondents. I do not, however, think that the search and seizure are vitiated for this reason. It is unfortunate that the search warrant has not been placed before me by the respondents but it is quite clear, in my opinion that the warrant issued by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise (HQ), New Delhi also fulfills the requirements of permission contemplated by the notifications extracted above. If it is taken that the search was effected by the Preventive Staff of the Customs Department in pursuance of a search warrant issued under the Customs Act by the Assistant Collector of Customs (as appears from the seizure memo and the petitioners representation before the Collector of Central Excise and his memo of appeal to the Gold Administrator) the case falls under serial No. 6 above. Again, if it is taken that the officers who conducted the search were Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors of Central Excise, they had the written permission of the Assistant Collector, an officer superior to the Superintendent and the proceedings were, therefore, in order. In either view of the matter, therefore, I think the search and seizure were with due authority. The notifications only contemplate written permission of the superior officer mentioned and so long as it is there, I do not think that the proceedings will be vitiated even if the search warrant did not specifically spell out the provisions of the D. I. R. It would be a needless superfluity to insist that two separate search warrants should have been made under the two enactments. The fact that an extension was taken under Section 110 (2) does not necessarily imply an admission that the search and seizure had been effected only under that Act. That extension had to be taken if it had not yet been decided till that further proceedings under the Customs Act should be dropped as it was necessary to keep the matter alive under that statute. There being no similar requirement or restriction under the D. I. R. , no notice under those rules was issued. This cannot mean that the proceedings had not, even earlier, been initiated under the D. I. R. as well. In the very nature of things, in most searches initiated because existence of smuggled gold is suspected, a reason to believe that there has been violation of D. I. R. is also implicit. However, as I have pointed out, this is a case where factually as well as in law both types of reasons to believe existed and it was an integrated search and seizure under both the enactments. It is difficult to accept the contention that it was a case where the search and seizure were only under the Customs Act and that. because a case thereunder could not be made out, the authorities much later decided to convert it into one under the D. I. R. ( 14 ) I now pass on to the second contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The D. I. R. did not, as mentioned earlier, prescribe any time limit for confiscation or penalty action in pursuance of a seizure. The D. I. R. did not, as mentioned earlier, prescribe any time limit for confiscation or penalty action in pursuance of a seizure. However, the Ordinance promulgated on 29-6-1968 as well as the Gold Control Act effective from 1-9-1968 provided a period of limitation. Section 77 of the Act (corresponding to S. 80 of the Ordinance) provided that no order of adjudication of confiscation or penalty could be made unless the owner of the gold, conveyance of animal or other person concerned is given a notice in writing of the grounds of the proposed confiscation and an opportunity of being heard against the proposal. A proviso to the section added: "provided further that where no such notice is given within a period of six months from the date of seizure of the gold, conveyance or animal or such further period as the Collector of Central Excise or Customs may allow, such gold, conveyance or animal shall be returned after the expiry of that period to the person from whose possession it was seized. "the point made is that, in this case the notice under the D. I. R. had been given on 5-8-1967 and though that may have been alright under the rules as they then stood, the position had changed with effect from 1-9-1968. The adjudication order in this case having been ordered on 13-9-1968, after the coming into force of the Act, the contention is that the order cannot stand in view of the fact that no notice of confiscation/penalty had been issued within six months of the seizure and there had been no extension of the period by the competent authority under the second proviso above quoted. ( 15 ) IN support of the above contention, learned counsel for the petitioner relied on two decisions. The first of these is the decision of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Romesh Chander v. Supdt. of Customs, 1975 Cri LJ 739, a decision of Fazi Ali C. J. and Jaswant Singh, J. (as their Lordships then were ). In that case, certain gold had been seized from the appellants on 6-5-1966 in the belief that it was smuggled gold and after a notice under Section 111 (k) of the Customs Act, 1962 dated 11-5-1966, the seized gold had been confiscated and personal penalties also levied on the two appellants on 17-3-1969. In that case, certain gold had been seized from the appellants on 6-5-1966 in the belief that it was smuggled gold and after a notice under Section 111 (k) of the Customs Act, 1962 dated 11-5-1966, the seized gold had been confiscated and personal penalties also levied on the two appellants on 17-3-1969. Subsequently on 7-5-1969, notices were issued to the appellants calling upon them to show cause why the gold should not be confiscated under the then operative Rule 126-M of the D. I. R. (now Section 71 of the Gold Control Act) and why penal action should not be taken against them under the then operative Rule 126-L (16) of the D. I. R. (now S. 74 of the Gold Control Act ). These proceedings were objected to inter alia, on the ground that the notice was time barred and to the seizure having taken place long before the enforcement of the Gold Control Act they could not be proceeded against under an enactment which was non-existent at the time of the commission of the alleged offence. This contention was accepted by the Court. After setting out Sections 116 and 117 respectively of the Gold Control Act and Ordinance it was pointed out that Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act could have application only to the repeal of an Act or Regulation and not to the repeal of Rule. It was, therefore, held that action under Rules 126-M and 126-L (16) could not be taken against the appellant after the repeal of the D. I. R. So also, it was held that action could not be taken against the appellants under Section 71 or 74 of the Gold Control Act which had not been in force at the time of the alleged commission of the offence particularly because S. 116 (2) of the Gold Control Act did not incorporate the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. The Court added (at p. 744): "the impugned notice also appears to be time barred. There is nothing on the record to indicate the time during which the notice could be issued as extended under Section 79 of the Gold Control Act or that any notice was served on the appellant before the expiry of the initial period of six months calling upon him to show cause why extension in the period be not granted. There is nothing on the record to indicate the time during which the notice could be issued as extended under Section 79 of the Gold Control Act or that any notice was served on the appellant before the expiry of the initial period of six months calling upon him to show cause why extension in the period be not granted. The notice cannot, therefore, be treated as valid. We are fortified in this view by a decision of the Supreme Court in Asst. Collector of Customs v. Charan Das Malhotra, (1971) SCC 697 : ( AIR 1972 SC 689 ) where it was held that a civil right which accrues to a person on the expiry of the initial period of six months cannot be defeated by an ex parte order of extension of time by the Collector". ( 16 ) THE second decision relied upon by Sri Sibal is that of the Calcutta High Court. In Karmarkar v. Union of India, (1976-77) 81 Cal WN 159 : (1977 Cri LJ (NOC) 149) (Cal), certain gold and gold ornaments were seized from the shop of the petitioner on 6-5-1968 and proceedings under R. 126-L were initiated on 13-5-1968. On 13-12-1968 a notice was issued to the petitioner to show cause against confiscation and penalty under Sections 71 and 74 respectively read with Section 116 of the Gold Control Act. Reference was also made in the notice to the corresponding provisions of the D. I. R. A confiscation order was also passed on 22-10-1969. The petitioner, in the writ petition, contended that the D. I. R. having been repealed on 10-7-1968, no proceedings were pending against him after that date and so the Collector of Customs had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order dated 22-10-1969. The Court rejected this contention relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Jayanti Lal Amrat Lal v. Union of India, ( AIR 1971 SC 1193 ). The Court rejected this contention relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Jayanti Lal Amrat Lal v. Union of India, ( AIR 1971 SC 1193 ). The learned Judge held that the show cause notice, issued prior to 29-6-1968, was a notice regarding an offence under the D. I. R. , that there was no inconsistency between the provisions of the Ordinance and the Act, that the Act did not manifest any intention to destroy the liabilities incurred under the D. I. R. and that, therefore, the Collector of Central Excise had the jurisdiction to issue the show cause notice under Sec. 79 of the Act read withSection 116 (1) of the Gold Control Act and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act for contraventions and offences under the D. I. R. since repealed. The learned Judge, however, proceeded to hold that the confiscation was invalid since the notice therefor under Sec. 79 had been given beyond the period of six months from the date of the seizure of the gold. It was pointed out that S. 79 was identical in terms with the provisions of Ss. 110 and 124 of the Customs Act, 1962 (which, as I shall mention a little later, is not quite correct ). Referring to Assistant Collector of Customs v. Charan Das Malhotra ( AIR 1972 SC 689 ), it was pointed out that Sec. 79 does not impose a period of limitation for the issue of notice but vests a civil right in the person concerned to get the goods back if notice as specified therein was not given. The learned Judge concluded: "the provision in the second proviso to Section 79 of the Gold Control Act is mandatory. If within six months from the date of seizure the notice is not given in that case, the gold "shall" be returned to the person from whose possession it was seized. In the instant case the gold was seized on the 6th of May, 1968 and the notice was issued on the 9th Dec. , 1968. So, the period of six months expired on 6th Nov. , 1968. No material was placed before me by the respondents to show that any order extending the period was passed by the Collector of Central Excise. Where under the statute the seized gold shall have to be returned to the petitioner on or before 6th Nov. , 1968. So, the period of six months expired on 6th Nov. , 1968. No material was placed before me by the respondents to show that any order extending the period was passed by the Collector of Central Excise. Where under the statute the seized gold shall have to be returned to the petitioner on or before 6th Nov. , 1968, an order of confiscation of the seized gold could not be made by the Collector of Central Excise on the 22nd Oct. , 1969. So that part of the order by which the Collector of Central Excise confiscated the seized gold in lieu of penalty must be quashed. " ( 17 ) IT will be seen at once that the facts of the two cases relied upon by Sri Sibal are different in certain material respects from those of the present case. In the Jammu and Kashmir case, the gold was seized on 6th May, 1966 but no proceedings were initiated under the D. I. R. or the Gold Control Act till 7-5-1969. In other words, there was no action taken or pending against the appellants under the D. I. R. as on the date of the Ordinance viz. 29-6-1968. In the Calcutta case, the seizure was on 6th May, 1968 and though the enquiry for purposes of R. 126-L was initiated on 13th May, 1968 the notice for confiscation and penalty was issued only on 9th Dec. , 1968. The Gold Control Ordinance came into force on 29-6-1968 and the Act on 1-9-1968. It was, therefore, a case in which it was possible for the authorities to have issued a notice within the period limited in Ss. 79/80 of the Act or Ordinance respectively but they failed to issue any notice till 9-12-1968. In the present case, on the other hand, the seizure was on 6-7-1966 and the notice issued on 5-8-1967 under the D. I. R. was quite valid and proper as at that time there was no limitation prescribed for initiating action for confiscation. The question is, whether this difference in facts saves the situation in the present case for the respondents. The question is, whether this difference in facts saves the situation in the present case for the respondents. ( 18 ) I shall take it, in favour of the respondents, that the provisions of the Gold Control Ordinance and the Gold Control Act contain nothing mutually inconsistent with each other or with the D. I. R. Indeed no other view is possible in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in Jayanti Lal Amrat Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 1193 , and this is also the view taken in the Calcutta ease. In this case, the seizure took place on 6-7-1966 and, as permitted by the D. I. R. and before the Ordinance came into force, the notice of confiscation and penalty under R. 126-L was issued on 5-8-1967. The action taken, it is clear, was therefore, saved by the provision container in S. 117 (2) of the Ordinance. In a event, it is also saved by S. 116 (2) of the Act. Here again, the position being governed by the specific provisions of Sec. 116 (2) it is unnecessary to discuss the extent of applicability of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act to such cases. The effect of these two provisions in the Ordinance and Act is that the seizure made as well as the notice issued under the D. I. R. is deemed to have beed made and issued under the corresponding provision of the Act itself. In other words by a statutory fiction, the notice issued on 5-8-1967 is deemed to be a notice issued under Section 79 of the Gold Control Act. If that be so, the petitioner is clearly justified in saying that the notice being after six months from the seizure, the goods have to be returned to the petitioner. ( 19 ) BUT a contention that may be urged against this conclusion is that this would lead to an absurd result. The seizure was in 1966 and no notice need at all have been issued within six months under the D. I. R. This being so, will it be permissible to so interpret the statute as to require, retrospectively as it were, that the confiscation should be invalid for the failure of the respondents to issue a notice which they were not bound to issue under the statutory provisions then in force ? There are three answers to this argument. One is that when a statutory fiction is enacted, it must be given its full effect and one must not allow one s mind to boggle on the ground that some apparent anomaly may arise from the assumptions stipulated. The second is that the statute itself has an inbuilt provision to safeguard the interest of the revenue. The proviso enables the Collector of Customs to extend the period of six months if found necessary. Their on being made even after the expiry of the period of six months. It is also interesting to notice that, unlike the corresponding provision in Sec. 110 (2) of the Customs Act, the extension under Section 79 is not limited to a single extension for a period of six months. There is no provision restricting theperiod for which the extension can be allowed. The only limitation is that it is a quasi-judicial power that has to be exercised after notice to the party concerned. The Customs Act also contains another limitation that the extension can be allowed only on sufficient cause being shown. Even that limitation is absent under Sec. 79. But, even if such a limitation is read in to save the rule from unreasonableness and unconstitutionality I see no grounds on which, if the Collector had allowed an extension on 1-9-1968 or soon thereafter, on the ground that no action was initiated earlier in view of the absence of a period of limitation in the D. I. R. , such extension could have been challenged. The respondents, it seems to me, would well have been within their rights if they had extended the period of six months. The failure to do so is only due to their own lapse and this cannot found a claim of hardship caused by the above interpretation of the effect of Ss. 79 and 116. The third aspect of the matter is that the declaration of the confiscation made on 13-9-1968 invalid will not irrevocably affect the respondents right of recourse against the gold in question. As pointed out by Sri Sibal there seems to be nothing to preclude the respondents from taking fresh proceedings for seizure of the gold for contravention of the Gold Control Act in accordance with the said Act immediately on the goods being returned to the petitioners. As pointed out by Sri Sibal there seems to be nothing to preclude the respondents from taking fresh proceedings for seizure of the gold for contravention of the Gold Control Act in accordance with the said Act immediately on the goods being returned to the petitioners. For while there is a limitation for a confiscation after a seizure, there is no period of time within which the respondents should seize goods suspected to involve contravention of the Act. While, naturally, I cannot express a final opinion about the validity and legality of such a seizure, if made, it does not seem, prima facie, that the declaration of the confiscation presently in issue would enable the petitioners to "get away" with impunity from the consequences of their impugned activities. For these reasons, I would hold, agreeing with the Calcutta High Court, that the confiscation of the gold pieces in question was invalid and that the petitioners are entitled to the return thereof in view of the proviso to Section 79 of the Gold Control Act. ( 20 ) THE last contention of Sri Sibal was that the respondents had erred in holding that the gold seized was gold in its primary form and not ornaments or parts of ornaments as contended for by the petitioners. Rule 126a of the D. I. R. contains the following definitions which have also been extracted earlier: " (C) "gold" means gold, including its alloy, whether virgin, melted, remelted, wrought or unwrought, in any shape or form, of a purity of not less than nine carats and includes any gold coin (whether legal tender or not), any ornament and any other article of gold;" " (E) "ornaments" means any article in a finished form, meant for personal adornment or for the adornment of idol, deity or any other object of religious worship, made of, or manufactured from gold, whether or not set with stones or gems, real or artificial, or with pearls, real, cultured or imitation or with all or any of them and includes parts, pendants or broken pieces of ornaments;" " (F) "primary gold" means gold in any unfinished form and includes all ingots, bars, blocks, slabs, billets, shots, pellets, rods and wires. "i am unable to agree that the gold pieces seized from the petitioners were "ornaments" within the meaning of the definition. "i am unable to agree that the gold pieces seized from the petitioners were "ornaments" within the meaning of the definition. The articles seized from the petitioners were circular gold pieces in a crude form. According to the respondents the petitioners were engaged in properly cutting and polishing them, stamping them with a die containing the picture of a Goddess, putting an "ear" on them and then disposing them off as coins which could form part of a necklace cr other ornament. But in the form in which they were seized they were not ornaments but primary gold. This is also clear from certain samples produced at the time of hearing. I, therefore, see no substance in this contention. ( 21 ) THE result of the above discussion is that the confiscation of the gold pieces is set aside and the respondents directed to return them to the petitioners. So far as the penalties are concerned, however, I see no reason to quash them in view of my findings regarding the validity of the continuation of the proceedings under the D. I. R. even after the Gold Control Act came into force. No other legal infirmity that would vitiate the levy of penalty has been pointed out. I, therefore, allow the writ petition in part and direct the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the orders dated 13-9-1968 and 8-2-1971 to the extent indicated above and a mandamus to the respondents to restore to the petitioners the 120 pieces of gold referred to in the said orders. I make no order as to costs.