JUDGMENT M.P. Menon,J. 1. The petitioner was appointed as Assistant Public Prosecutor (A.P.P.), Grade II in June, 1968. Respondents (3) to (5) were appointed as Assistant Public Prosecutor, Grade II only later. Going by the dates of appointment, the petitioner was se nior to them. But respondents (4) and (5) were promoted as Assistant Public Prosecutor, Grade I in December, 1975 overlooking the petitioner's seniority. 2. Under the Special Rules governing Assistant Public Prosecutors, a person appointed as Assistant Public Prosecutor. Grade II has to be on probation for two years within a continuous period of three years; and to satisfactorily complete probation, he has to pass the account test also. The petitioner did not acquire test qualification in time. He sat for the test held on 26th September 1975 and came out successful when the results were published on 6th January 1976. Satisfactory completion of probation has been declared in the petitioner's case only from 6th January 1976; and his grievance is that he should be deemed to have completed probation with effect from 27th September 1975 i.e. the day following the date on which he sat for the test. Had this been done, it is urged, respondents (4) and (5) could not have stolen a march over him. 3. The main question therefore is whether the petitioner could be regarded as having completed his probation by September, 1975. 4. This has to be primarily considered in the light of R.19 to 21 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958. Omitting details, R.19 deals with suspension, termination or extension of probation, and provides that the appointing authority can suspend probation and discharge the probationer for want of vacancy during the period of probation. If the probation is extended under R.21 and the vacancy terminates during the extended period, then also suspension and discharge is permissible. R.20 provides that at the end of the prescribed period or the extended period of probation, the appointing authority shall consider the probationer's suitability for full membership. If he is found suitable, it can be declared that he has satisfactorily completed probation. If he is found unsuitable, he can be discharged. R.21 enables the appointing authority to extend probation under certain circumstances. If he is found suitable, it can be declared that he has satisfactorily completed probation. If he is found unsuitable, he can be discharged. R.21 enables the appointing authority to extend probation under certain circumstances. Examining these rules closely, the normal principle seems to be that declaration of probation takes effect only from the date of expiry of the normal period of probation, or the extended period when an extension has been allowed. The second sentence in R.20(b) lays down that on the issue of an order declaring probation. "The probationer shall be deemed to have satisfactorily completed his probation on the date of the expiry of the prescribed or extended period of probation". 5. The only provision which recognises an exception to the above normal rule is the one contained in the proviso to R.20(b), reading as follows: - "Provided that in cases to which the proviso to sub-rule (a) applies the probationer shall be deemed to have satisfactorily completed his probation on the day following the last date of the whole examination or test in which the probationer has acquired the special qualification or has passed the prescribed tests by passing one or more subjects, if such date is earlier than the date of expiry of the extended period of probation". On terms, the exception applies only to cases governed by the proviso to R.20(a) i.e., to cases where probation has been extended under R.21. The latter part of the proviso to R.20(b) also makes it clear that the exception therein applies only when there is an "extended period of probation". Admittedly, the probation of the petitioner herein was not extended under R.21. The provisos to sub-rules (a) and (b) of R.20 cannot therefore be attracted. 6. My attention has not been drawn to any other specific provision where the rule-making authority has contemplated a departure from the normal rule i.e., where it is contemplated that the declaration should relate back to the time of the test or examination. The petitioner has thus no statutory provision on which he can directly rely for establishing the claim put forward. 7. The petitioner has thus no statutory provision on which he can directly rely for establishing the claim put forward. 7. It is then argued that since the appointing authority did not make up his mind, on the expiry of the specified period, as regards the petitioner's case either by terminating his probation or by extending it, it should be taken that the petitioner was continuing in service thereafter in some other capacity, and not as a probationer. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh (AIR 1956 SC 1210). That was a case where the Punjab rules had provided that probation could not be extended beyond a period of three years. Their Lordships noticed, in paragraph (3) of the decision, that the normal principle was that a person appointed on probation for a specific period would continue only as a probationer even after the expiry of that period. But where the rule prescribed a maximum period beyond which probation could not be extended, the implication that the employee continued as a probationer after that period, could not be pressed into service. Taking into account the language of R.6(3) of the Punjab Rules governing the case before them, their lordships held that the person concerned in that case should be deemed to have completed his probation after the expiry of the maximum period fixed. A prohibition by the statute against treating a person as probationer beyond the specified period was the basis of Dharam Singh's case (1); in the absence of such a statutory prohibition, the normal rule recognised in paragraph (3) of the judgment was to apply. Now, there is no prohibition in R.19 to 21 of our rules against continuing a person as probationer beyond any particular period. The power conferred upon the appointing authority either to terminate probation or to extend it after the specified period cannot be equated to a statutory prohibition against retaining the employee as a probationer after that period. The position is made clear by R.20A introduced in 1980, apparently by way of clarification. 8. The power conferred upon the appointing authority either to terminate probation or to extend it after the specified period cannot be equated to a statutory prohibition against retaining the employee as a probationer after that period. The position is made clear by R.20A introduced in 1980, apparently by way of clarification. 8. That apart, where the rule-making authority has addressed itself to the question as to when a departure from the prescription of R.20(b) can be recognised, and has indicated only the circumstances therefor in the proviso thereto, it will not be proper to carve out other situations for the same purpose by interpreting other provisions. What is directly done by that authority cannot be indirectly done by the court. 9. Nor am I persuaded to think that the petitioner's case can be supported by R.28(bbb) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules. The said sub-rule provides that where a pass in a test confers a right, benefit or concession, the same shall be deemed to have accrued on the day following the last day of the test; and it is added that the principle should apply to promotions also, but only against "vacancies remaining unfilled for want of test qualified hands". The general principle of recognising benefits or rights retrospectively from the time of the test can be read only subject to R.20(b) in the matter of probation, because the specific provisions therein should exclude the general provisions of R.28(bbb). And in the matter of promotion, the rule is further hedged in by the restriction that its application should be confined to vacancies remaining unfilled for want of test qualified hands. The question of promoting the petitioner as Assistant Public Prosecutor, Gr. I could have been considered only after 6th January 1976 when alone it become clear that he had satisfactorily completed probation. By that time, respondents (4) and (5) who had completed their probation in 1971 and 1972 had been promoted into Grade I. During the period between 25th September 1975 and 6th January 1976, no vacancies were remaining unfilled for want of test qualified hands. The petitioner's claim for preference in the matter of promotion cannot thus be upheld on the basis of R.28(bbb) also. The Original Petition therefore fails and is dismissed, No costs.