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1982 DIGILAW 170 (KAR)

GURAPPA v. SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY EMPLOYEES CONSUMERS CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD.

1982-08-06

K.S.PUTTASWAMY

body1982
PATTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition under Art, 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has challenged Bye-law No. 14 (f) ef the Bye-laws of the South central Railway Employees Consumers Co-operative Society Ltd. Hubli (hereinafter referred to as the Society) established and functioning under the provisions of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Act and the consequent orders made by the Senior Divisional personnel Officer, Hubli on 6-1-82 (Annexure-A) and the Honorary Secretary of the Society dated 7-1-82 (Annexure-C), ( 2 ) WHEN the petitioner was in service of the South Central Railway, he was enrolled as a member of the Society. In the elections held to the committee of Management of the Society, the petitioner was elected as a member to the committee of management and was thereafter elected as its president. ( 3 ) ON 31-10-81 the petitioner attained superannuation and has retired from service from that day. In conformity with Bye-law No. 14 (f) of the bye-laws of the Society, the Senior Divisional Personnel Officer and the honorary Secretary have declared that the petitioner cannot continue as a member and the President of the Society from 1-11-81. Hence the challenge of the petitioner to Bye-law No. 14 (f) of the Bye-laws and the consequent orders made thereto. ( 4 ) BYE-LAW No. 14 (f) of the Bye-laws of the Society that is impugned leads thus :" (F) ceasing to be employed on this Railway for reasons whatsoever". If this Bye-law is invalid, the consequent orders made thereto will also be invalid, ( 5 ) THE petitioner has urged that Bye-law No. 14 (f) of the Bye-laws providing for automatic cessation of membership of a member oa his retirement from service Is violative of Sections 16, 17 and 24 of the Act and is, therefore, liable to be struck down. ( 6 ) RESPONDENT No. 1 which is the society and two other members of that Society viz. respondents 5 and 6 have filed their return justifying the bye-law and the action taken thereto. Respondents 2 and 3 have also filed their separate return supporting respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 4 who has been duly served has remained absent and is unrepresented. respondents 5 and 6 have filed their return justifying the bye-law and the action taken thereto. Respondents 2 and 3 have also filed their separate return supporting respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 4 who has been duly served has remained absent and is unrepresented. ( 7 ) SRI B. S. Raikote, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that bye-law No. 14 (f) of the Bye-laws providing for automatic cessation of membership of a member of the society that has retired from service is violative of Sections 16, 17 and 24 of the Act and is liable to be struck down and the consequent orders made thereto are liable to be quashed. In support of his contention Sri Raikote strongly relies on the rulings of this Court in N. Y. Somareddi v. Assistant Commissioner Gadag, [ (1967) 1 Mys. LJ 459 ] ; B. B. Bannad v. Betageri Urban Co-operative Bank, Ltd. , [ (1972) 2 Mys. LJ 397] and an unreported decision of this Court in K. M. Puttanashetty v. Registrar of co-opertive Societies, [w. P. 3607/73 dated 4-11-74 : (1975) 1 Kar. LJ ( h. N. ). 211], a summary of which is only reported in 1975 (1) Karnataka Law journal (Short Notes of Cases) Item No. 211. ( 8 ) SRI H. F. M. Reddy, learned counsel for respondents 1, 5 and 6 and Sri G. Dayanand, learned counsel for respondent 2 and 3 in justifying the impugned bye-law and the orders, contend that a bye-law framed by a society is not a law and is only a term of contract between the members and a society and the same cannot be struck down by this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In support of their contention learned counsel for the respondents strongly rely on the ruling of the Supreme Court in Co-operative centrol Bank v. Addl. Industrial Tribunal, [ air 1970 SC 245 ] ( 9 ) SRI Raivote is right in his submission that this Court in the rulings relied on by him has examined the validity of one or the other bye-law of a co-operative Society and bad also invalidated them. Industrial Tribunal, [ air 1970 SC 245 ] ( 9 ) SRI Raivote is right in his submission that this Court in the rulings relied on by him has examined the validity of one or the other bye-law of a co-operative Society and bad also invalidated them. ( 10 ) BUT, in Co operative Central Bank Limiteds case (supra) an unanimous bench of three learned Judges of the Supreme Court speaking through Shelat, j. examining the true scope and ambit of a bye-law of a Co-operative Society made under the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act of 1964 corresponding to the Act observed thus :"we are unable to accept the submission that the bye-laws of a co-operative society framed in pursuance of the provisions of the Act can be held to be law or to have the force of law. It has no doubt been held that, if a statute gives power to a Government or other authority to make rules, the rules so framed have the force of statute and are to be deemed to be incorporated as a part of the statute. That principle however does not apply to bye-laws of the nature that a co-operative society is empowered by the Act to make. The bye-laws that are contemplated by the Act can be merely those which govern the internal management, business or administration of a society They may be binding between the persons affected by them but they do not have the force of a statute. In respect of bye-laws laying down conditions of service of the employees of a society the bye-laws would be binding between the society and the employees just in the same manner as conditions of service laid down by contract between the parties. In fact, after such bye-laws laying down the conditions of service are made and any person enters the employment of a society those conditions of service will have to be treated as conditions accepted by the employee when entering the service and will thus bind him like conditions of service specifically forming part of the contract of service. The bye-laws that can be framed by a society under the Act are similar in nature to the Articles of Association of a company incorporated under the Companies Act and such articles of Association have never been held to have the force of law". The bye-laws that can be framed by a society under the Act are similar in nature to the Articles of Association of a company incorporated under the Companies Act and such articles of Association have never been held to have the force of law". As I apprehend, two principle emerge from this ruling and they are, (i) that a bye-law of a society is not a law within the meaning of law occurring in art. 13 of the Constitution and (ii) that a bye-law of a society comparable to articles of Association of a Company or a Friendly Society is only a term of contract between a member and a society. But the enunciation made by this court in all the cases relied by Sri Raikote based on the assumption that a bye-law can be invalidated is opposed to the above enunciation made by the supreme Court. ( 11 ) THE enunciation in N. Y. Somareddi's case (supra) decided earlier to the enunciation made by the Supreme Court and, therefore, that enunciation which is no longer good law cannot be followed by this Court. In the other cases, with respect, it has to be observed that the binding ruling of the Supreme court in Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. case (supra) has not been noticed and this Court has proceeded to examine the matter as if it was not res Integra by a ruling of the Supreme Court. ( 12 ) UNDER Art. 141 of the Constitution the law declared by the Supreme court is binding on me. Without aay doubt, if the later rulings of this Court in Bannada's (supra) and Pattanashetty's case (supra) bad referred to the ruling of the Supreme Court, in Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. , case, then also those rulings would be binding on me. But, as those rulings have not even referred to a binding ruling of the Supreme Court, it has to be held that those rulings rendered per in curiam cannot be followed by me. In this view my dissenting with any of them or referring this case to a larger bench also does not arise. But, as those rulings have not even referred to a binding ruling of the Supreme Court, it has to be held that those rulings rendered per in curiam cannot be followed by me. In this view my dissenting with any of them or referring this case to a larger bench also does not arise. ( 13 ) ON the application of the principles enunciated by the Supreme court in Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. case (supra) it has to be held that bye-Law No. 14 (f) of the Bye-laws is not a law and is only a term of contract and this petition challenging its validity under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable. ( 14 ) EVEN otherwise a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the term of a contract of a Co-operative Society, which is not a state within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution, is not also maintainable. (videkhoday Brewing Distilling Industries (P.) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [ (1981) 2 Kar. LJ 533 on app. W. A. 1109/81 dated 5-8-81] affirmed in W. A. No. 1109 of 1981 dated 5-8-81. In this view also, this petition is not maintainable. ( 15 ) AS I have reached the conclusion that this petition is not maintainable, the puestion of this Court examining the validity of the impugned bye-law or the consequent orders made thereto do not arise for my determination, i, therefore, refrain to examine them and express my opinion. ( 16 ) IN the light of my above discussion, I hold that this writ petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. I, therefore, dismiss this writ petition and discharge the rule issued in the case. But, in the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed. --- *** --- .