YOGESHWAR DAYAL ( 1 ) THIS is a second appeal by the lanadlord and is directed against the order of Rent Control Tribunal dated 18-11-1974 setting aside the order of ejectment dated 4-10-1973 passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, in favour of the appellant and thereby dismissing the ejectment application filed by the landlord on the ground of his bona fide personal requirement of the premises in dispute. ( 2 ) THIS appeal is an instance of how tortuous delay in the process of court can work injustice. ( 3 ) THE petition for ejectment itself was filed by the appellant as far back as 2nd August, 1972 on the ground of bona fide personal requirement of the appellant. The premises in dispute of which the ejectment was sought is a residential house No. C-27, Lajpat Nagar III, New Delhi. The application itself was filed on the simple ground that the premises are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself and for the members of his family dependent on him and on the ground that he is the owner of the premises. In column No. 19 relating to any other relevant information it was stated that the appellant is retiring from service on 30-9-1972 and after retirement wants to settle down in Delhi. ( 4 ) IN the written statement no dispute was raised by the tenant as to the purpose of letting or to the ownership of the premises. ( 5 ) THE tenant really contested the petition mainly on the ground that the real intention of the landlord is to sell the premises and not to live in its himself. ( 6 ) ANOTHER ground taken in the written statement was that the petition lacks in essential particulars in as much as it has not been mentioned by the landlord whether he has any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation or not. ( 7 ) THE averment of the appellant in paragraph 19 of the petition noted earlier was simply denied for want of knowledge. ( 8 ) THE landlord filed a replication and insisted that he had given all the particulars in accordance with law. ( 7 ) THE averment of the appellant in paragraph 19 of the petition noted earlier was simply denied for want of knowledge. ( 8 ) THE landlord filed a replication and insisted that he had given all the particulars in accordance with law. ( 9 ) REGARDING the plea of the tenant that the real intention of the landlord was to sell the premises and not to live in them was specifically denied and it was stated that the landlord has no such intention whatsoever to sell the house. It was further stated that the appellant has retired from the army and wants to settle down in Delhi. ( 10 ) BEFORE the trial Court the landlord-appellant examined himself as his own witness as AW. I and he inter alia stated in examination-in-chief that he has another house in Delhi, which is on rent and it is not vacant. When the landlord was cross-examined he further stated in the crossexamination that the other house is on rent of Rs. 1000 and he has no intention to sell it. In cross-examination the landlord appellant was confronted by the tenant-respondent with three letters dated 18-2-1971; 19-3-1971 and 1-6-1971. He admitted those letters but stated that he wanted to sell the house indispute as the tenant wanted to purchase it and at the time when he wrote the letters he was not sure whether he would get extension or not. ( 11 ) NO objection was raised on behalf of the tenant to the admissibility of evidence on the question of "other reasonably suitable residential accommodation being available to the landlord and in fact the tenant had also crossexamined the landlord in that behalf. ( 12 ) THE Additional Rent Controller in paragraphs 16, 17, 18 and 19 dealt with the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord. ( 13 ) THE Additional Rent Controller after considering the oral as well as documentary evidence on record found that the landlord had tried to sell the house in March, 1971 only as he was not sure upto that time whether he would get extension or not. The Controller also found that the landlord has retired from service and that there was nothing on the record to show that after March, 1971 he attempted to sell the house. The Controller also found that the landlord has retired from service and that there was nothing on the record to show that after March, 1971 he attempted to sell the house. The Controller also found that the existing position of the landlord was entirely different from that in March, 1971 when he was in service. The Additional Rent Controller also considered the effect of the other house in Defence Colony owned by the landlord and found that the same was occupied by the tenant and it was fetching much more rent than the premises in dispute. The Controller also felt that the retired person must have that rent for his own maintenance. The approach of the Additional Rent Controller was that the retired person has a right to choose the house which he wants to get vacated and that it was not shown that the landlord has any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Consequently the Additional Rent Controller held that the appellant bona fide need the premises in question and, therefore, made the order for eviction under clause (e) to the proviso to sub section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ) against the respendent-tenant. ( 14 ) ALTHOUGH, the tenant had pleaded in the written statement that the petition lacked in particulars inasmuch as it did not mention whether the landlord has any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation or not, yet this objection was neither pressed at the stage of evidence not at the hearing of the case before the Additional Rent Controller. ( 15 ) THE respondent-tenant appealed to the Rent Control Tribunal against the aforesaid order made by the Addl. Rent Controller, Delhi, dated 4-10-1973. Several grounds in appeal were taken. There was no ground taken regarding defect or deficiency, if any, in the pleadings. Further there was no ground that the rent from the other house in Defence Colony was a means tor maintenance of the landlord after his retirement from service. ( 16 ) BEFORE the Tribunal, the respondent-tenant contended that the need of the landlord was not bona fide as his intention was to sell the premises in question and relia nce was again placed on the aforesaid three letters dated 18-2-1971 : 19-3-1971 and 1-6-1971. ( 16 ) BEFORE the Tribunal, the respondent-tenant contended that the need of the landlord was not bona fide as his intention was to sell the premises in question and relia nce was again placed on the aforesaid three letters dated 18-2-1971 : 19-3-1971 and 1-6-1971. ( 17 ) THE Tribunal, as stated earlier, accepted the appeal as the Tribunal was not satisfied that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide and dismissed the ejectment application. ( 18 ) THIS conclusion was arrived at by the Tribunal primarily for two reasons ; (i) because the Tribunal felt that the landlord has given no explanation as to when the intention was changed from selling to living in the house and (ii) that tlie landlord has not actually shifted to Delhi till the hearing of the appeal. ( 19 ) BEFORE I deal with the submissions of learned counsel for the landlord in assailing the judgment of the tribunal, an objection raised on behalf of the respondent-tenant may be noticed. ( 20 ) THE submission was simple that the finding as to the bona fide requirement of the landlord is essentially a finding,of fact and cannot be interfered in the second appeal by this court as the second appeal lies only if it involves substantial question of law. ( 21 ) RELIANCE in this connection was placed on behalf of the respondent-tenant on the decision reported as 1966 Madhya Pardesh Law Journal page 26 : Sarvate T. B. vs. Nemichand. ( I ) It will be noticed that on peculiar facts of the case it was held that the High Court could not reappreciate the evidence and on those facts it was held that it was question of fact. ( 22 ) ON the other hand Mr. A. B. Saharya, learned counsel for the appellant, brought to my notice two other decisions of Supreme Court reported as 1970 R. C. J. page 34 : Smt. Kamla Soni v. Rup Lal Mehra (2) and 1971 R. C. J. page 749 : Madan Lal Puri vs. Sain Dass Berry (3) In the case of Smt. Kamla Soni the Bench of J. C. Shah, Ramaswami and A. N. Grover, JJ. observed that the requirement of landlord must be judged in the light of the status in life intending to occupy, his age, stage of health, the way in which he is accustomed to live, the accommodation which he occupies or otherwise has available to him and other relevant circumstances. The landlord must require the premises bona fide. It is for the court which is invested with the power to determine whether the landlord requires the premises for occupation and whether the requirement is bona fide. It is further held at page 36 of the report in paragraph 4 of the judgment "the argument for the landlord that the Judges of the High Court exceeded their jurisdiction under section 39 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, when they reversed the finding of bona fide requirement of the appellant, has no substance. "whether on the facts proved the requirement of the landlord is bona fide, within the meaning of section 14 (1) (6) is a finding on a mixed question of law and fact. An inference that the requirement of the appellant in the present case was bona fide could not be regarded as conclusive". ( 23 ) TO the similar fact in the case of Madan Lal Puri before a Bench consisting of Vaidialingam, A. N. Ray, Palekar, JJ. , the decision in the aforesaid case of Smt. "kamla Soni was again affirmed and at page 753 of the report Vaidialingam, J. speaking for the Supreme Court observed ; " that finding as to bona fide requirement is a finding of mixed question of law and fact and it will be open to the High Court when he exercise under Section 39 (2) of the Act to consider the correctness or otherwise. The findings recorded on such an issue by the subordinate Tribunals are not conclusive". ( 24 ) IT is true that Palekar, J. and Bhagwati, J. in the case of Mattu Lal vs. Radhe Lal : 1975 R. C. J. page 86 (4) expressed their doubts in paragraph 10 at page 91 about the correctness of the aforesaid decision in Smt. Kamla Soni and Madan Lal Puri cases. ( 24 ) IT is true that Palekar, J. and Bhagwati, J. in the case of Mattu Lal vs. Radhe Lal : 1975 R. C. J. page 86 (4) expressed their doubts in paragraph 10 at page 91 about the correctness of the aforesaid decision in Smt. Kamla Soni and Madan Lal Puri cases. ( 25 ) WITH all due respect to learned counsel for the respondent, it cannot be said that Mattulal s case will govern all cases of bona fide requirement of the landlord which come before the High Court in second appeal or the cases of Smt. Kamla Soni and Madan Lal Puri will govern all cases. It will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, whether the finding is a pure finding of fact or finding is such that it is a mixed question of law and fact which may call for interference by the High Court. ( 26 ) AS I noticed earlier, the finding of the Tribunal that the requirement of the landlord is not bona fide was based on the aforesaid two consideration ; (i) because the Tribunal felt that the landlord gave no explanation as to when the intention was changed from selling to living in the house, and (ii) because the landlord has not actually shifted to Delhi till the hearing of the appeal. ( 27 ) IT will be noticed that the second reason given by the learned Tribunal really vitiates the finding of the Tribunal as to the bona fide requirement of the landlord. It will be too much to expect from. a Government servant, who is due to retire to wait for retirement, come back to Delhi, hunt for a house or stay with relation or stay in a guest house and then to file petition for ejectment after showing that he has shifted to Delhi. To say the least, this approach is absurd and most unreasonable. On this short ground only because of this fallacious approach the finding of fact as to the bona fide requirement stands vitiated in law. ( 28 ) IT will be noticed that the appellant filed the petition for eviction in August, 1972 and he retired finally from the Army as a Brigadier in September, 1972. This is clear not only from his own statement but also from the order (Ext. ( 28 ) IT will be noticed that the appellant filed the petition for eviction in August, 1972 and he retired finally from the Army as a Brigadier in September, 1972. This is clear not only from his own statement but also from the order (Ext. A/2) filed on the record which shows the retirement of the appellant was on or about 28th September, 1972. The appellant thought that three months before filing the petition was sufficient for put him in possession of the house to shift to Delhi as soon as he retires. ( 29 ) NOW I would like to deal with the other finding given by the Tribunal that it is not explained by the landlord as to when his intention was changed-from selling the house to the living in house. ( 30 ) I have gone through the aforesaid three letters in this behalf dated 18-2-1971 (Ext. R-6), 19-3-1971 (Ext. R-2) and 1-6-1971 (Ext. R-3 ). Exhibit R-6 purports to have been sent to the tenant by Mrs. B. L. Bhagat. This letter reads as under : "dear Mr. Raman, My brother Brig. P. P. Singh was very keen to show house No. 27-C, Lajpat Nagar-lll to Shri Roshan Lal but when he was here last week Shri Roshan Lal did not contact us. Brig. Singh is coming again next week and will most probab ly meet you. I would appreciate, if you could kindly let Shri Roshan Lal and party see the house. Yours sincerely sd/- Mrs. B. L. Bhagat" ( 31 ) THE next letter dated 19-3-1971 (Ext. R-2) was sent by the appellant from Poona to the respondent tenant which reads as under : "dear Mr. Pattabiraman, I thank you for your letter of 11th March. We would be delighted if you takeover the house, as you have been in the house and our mother had no trouble with you. I have found out the rates in that area and we are willing to dispose the house at Rs. 75,000. 00. This price is for you only. You will realise that this is not my house and I have to listen to four other members of the family, who have been already pestering me that the rent of the house is too low. I think this is a reasonable offer and if you agree, we could settle it, this year. 00. This price is for you only. You will realise that this is not my house and I have to listen to four other members of the family, who have been already pestering me that the rent of the house is too low. I think this is a reasonable offer and if you agree, we could settle it, this year. The house is well located and it is not a bad buy for the sum. The above price is valid till 30 Apr. 71. With kind regards. P. S. Prices of property at Delhi are going up day by day due to the situation, at Calcutta". ( 32 ) THE third letter is dated 1-6-1971 (Ext. R-3 ). This again was sent from Poona to Delhi and reads as under : -- "my dear Mr. Pattabi Raman, I was in Delhi, but some how could not contact you. My sister has spoken to you and I would be thankful if you let me know whether you are interested in purchasing the house at the price mentioned by my sister. This is 9. special rate for you and I would like to finalise the sale of this house by the end of this month. You may please speak to my sister and tell her the position. One outside party is very keen to purchase the house. With kind regards, Yours sincerely, sd/- Shri V. Pattabi Raman, III-C/27, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi-24" ( 33 ) IT appears to me from these three letters that at one stage the property in occupation of the tenant in dispute was owned by the family of Brig. Pritam Pal Singh, appellant and his brother and sisters. It also appears that his brother and sisters were keen to sell the property as the rent was too low and the appellant had joined his other brother and sisters in making an offer to the tenant to buy the house. The appellant was really following the common desire of other co-owners. He was himself at that time posted at and was a full Brigadier in the army. He was expecting extension of service either by way of promotion or extension and this is a common well-, known fact and particularly in a service like army where the age of retirement or time of retirement depends on the rank which an officer held. He was expecting extension of service either by way of promotion or extension and this is a common well-, known fact and particularly in a service like army where the age of retirement or time of retirement depends on the rank which an officer held. For example normally people in the army retired as Lt. Colonel and the age of retirement is nearabout 48 years. If one is promoted as a full Colonel he may retire at the age of 52 and so on. This is a well known fact in the armed forces. and I can take judicial notice of it. While in civil services where the age of superannuation or retirement is pre-determined, the age of retirement in the armed forces is not predetermined for any officer. It depends always on what rank the officer retires and the age of retirement is thus not predetermined and the officer expect promotion from one rank to the other till the last moment, and they are not sure when the retirement will take place. ( 34 ) IT is, therefore, not surprising that when the appellant was serving as Brigadier in Poona he was expecting a further extention in service and in that account he joined his other family members to dispose it off. because the return was only Rs. 2251- per month and he did not immediately need it for personal occupation. The relations between Brig. Pritam Pal Singh and the respondent-tenant was very cordial and naturally because of past relations with him and his inother he wanted to offer it to the resplendent, if he could buy the house. ( 35 ) IT will thus be noticed that instead. taken by the tenant that there was any other co-owner or co-landlord of the property in dispute and it was in these circumstances that the appellant was confronted with these three letters which he honestly admitted to have been sent to the tenant. Instead of appreciating the predicament of a retired person or a person who was facing imminent retirement the court below thought that it was mala fide on his part to claim eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement and that his intention was to sell the house It appears to me that even if there was any such intention. Instead of appreciating the predicament of a retired person or a person who was facing imminent retirement the court below thought that it was mala fide on his part to claim eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement and that his intention was to sell the house It appears to me that even if there was any such intention. there was no such necessity of pleading change of intention in the replication as observed by the Tribunal. ( 36 ) ILL the written statement as soon as this plea was taken by the tenant that the real intention of the appellant was to sell the house, the appellant infact pleaded in replication that "it is specifically denied that the petitioner has any intention whatsoever to sell the house. The petitioner has retired from the Army and wants io settle down in Delhi". ( 37 ) IN cross-examination the appellant further stated "i tried to sell the house in 1971 because the defendant wanted to purchase it. At that time I was not aware whether I will get extension or not". ( 38 ) THERE is no reason whatsoever to disbelieve the statement of the appellant. ( 39 ) I have embarked upon this inquiry of re-appreciating the evidence as to the bona fide requirement of the landlord inview of the fact that I have already held that the finding of fact as to the bona fide requirement of the landlord stood vitiated due to the palpably wrong approach of the Tribunal. ( 40 ) THE second appeal was filed in this court as far back as December, 1974 and inspite of repeated applications being filed by the appellant for expediting the appeal. this court was unable to expedite the hearing of the appeal and the appeal ultimately came up for hearing before me in view of the order of Chawla, J. dated 20-2-1980. ( 41 ) WHEN the appeal came up for hearing before me, the respondent-tenant filed an application inter alia staling that the appellant has a double storeyed house No. 386, in Defence Colony, New Delhi, and is living in the first floor accommodation thereof and has let out the ground floor to other tenant and it was submitted in this application that these subsequent events be taken into account before disposing of the appeal. ( 42 ) THESE subsequent events were recited by the respondent-tenant by way of an application (C. M. No. 5232of 1980 ). In this application apart from urging that subsequent events be taken into account, it was also urged that the ejectment petition itself was incompetent and should be dismissed as it was not mentioned in the ejectment application "that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation available to him". It was inter alia mentioned : " (i) the appellant owns a double storey house in the prestigeous Defence Colony at New Delhi No. D/386. (ii) The appellant is comfortably living in the 1st Floor accommodation of the above house. (iii) The accommodation in the house being surplus, he has let out the ground floor accommodation to another tenant. (iv) The premises in question is only a poorly built accommodation fit for accommodation of refugees, and is unfit for residence of the petitioner/appellant both position wise and location wise of the accommodations". ( 43 ) ON this application having been filed I gave notice to the appellant and he filed an affidavit in reply dated 3-1-1981 and in relation to subsequent events in paragraph 7 he deposed as under : "with reference to para 7 of the application it is submitted that the respondent has twisted and misrepresented the facts to mislead this Hon ble court. (a) At the time of the institution of the eviction petition, only the ground floor of the house at Defence Colony was built. It was already in occupation of a tenant. The landlord did not have it for his residential accommodation. There is evidence also available of this aspect on record, Even after retirement, the landlord had to stay back in Poona for want of residential accommodation in Delhi. He had to continue staying at Poona even during the pendency of the appeal before the Tribunal. These are facts undisputed and clearly discernibly on the existing record of the case. (b) Delay in final and conclusive disposal of the claim of the landlord for eviction of the respondent from the premises in question placed him in a serious and peculiar dilema. On one hand, the Tribunal drew an adverse inference against the landlord for his staying back at Poona even after his retirement and doubted his bona fides on that score. On one hand, the Tribunal drew an adverse inference against the landlord for his staying back at Poona even after his retirement and doubted his bona fides on that score. On the other hand, the landlord found it exceedingly impossible to continue to stay at Poona. After retirement from service he was staying in Poona in a village (Gorbudhruk) some 25 Kms. from the town with no one nearby. His wife was there with him. They had a grown up daughter to" wed. Stay at Poona was ileither free from trou ble nor was it convenient in view of the appellant having already retired from service and crossed 60 years of age. Under hostile and difficult circumstances, the appellant had to decide to take a plunge and so started constructing the first floor of the Defence Colony house in the later half of 1978, after waiting desparately for over three years for a decision of the present appeal which was pending since 1974. The appellant had scarce and limited savings of his life time and other resources to go by. He staked all his savings and also sought financial assistance from various sources. He was able to raise some loans from a hank and some relatives as well as from the tenant in occupation of the ground floor of the Defence Colony House, in addition to his cooperation, to commence construction of the first floor of the house at Defence Colony in the later half of 1978, as aforesaid. (c) One of the factors, which persuaded the appellant to construct above the ground floor of the house at Defence Colony was the expectation of occupying the premises in question for his personal residence on getting them vacated from the respondent and being able to supplement his income by letting out the portion which was proposed to be constructed to meet his expenses after retirement and also to provide some security for his wife and himself to meet unforeseen and uncertain situations inherent in old age. (d) Construction of the Defence Colony house above the ground floor cost the petitioner approximately Rs. 1,70,000. 00. He met the cost by liquidating all his fixed deposits amounting to approximately Rs. 17,000 and by raising loans from various sources aggregating to a sum of Rs. (d) Construction of the Defence Colony house above the ground floor cost the petitioner approximately Rs. 1,70,000. 00. He met the cost by liquidating all his fixed deposits amounting to approximately Rs. 17,000 and by raising loans from various sources aggregating to a sum of Rs. 1,56,000 out of which the tenant on the ground floor of the building was kind enough to have advanced money to the appellant amounting to Rs. 59,500 which was to be adjusted against rent of the ground floor which was at that time at the rate of Rs. 1,700 per month. (e) Most of the construction work above the ground floor of the Defence Colony house finished by November, 1979. Water supply became available in the newly constructed portion in February 1980. Without waiting for completing fittings and finishing of the house for paucity of funds the appellant moved into the first floor of that house in July 1980. Fitting and furnishing of the first floor was carried on gradually and is still no complete. Thee phase power electric supply has yet to be fitted in the newly constructed portion. (f) However, in an anxiety to expedite the repayment of collosal debt, the appellant let out the barsati of the newly constructed portion to a tenant at Rs. 800 per month. (g) At present the appellant is in heavy debt and has yet to pay back approximately Rs. 77,000 more to his creditors which includes a sum of Rs. 9,200 still due to the tenant on the ground floor of the Defence Colony house which had to be adjusted towards rent payable in future. (h) In the aforesaid circumstances, the appellant is not getting in hand any return from the ground V. P. RAMAN floor of the Defence Colony house. His personal income, including his pension now available to him, is as follows: Pension. . Rs. 657. OOP. m. Rent of Barsati which had to be furnished in Feb. 80 to be let out toget some return from it to repay the outstanding loans. Rs. 800. 00 p. m. Rent of Lajpat Nager House. Rs. 225. 00 Dividends Rs. 40. 00 Rs. 1722. 00 (i) Out of the above resources, the appellant has yet to repay his debts as aforesaid apart from meeting the day to day expenses and necessities of life for his wife. Rs. 800. 00 p. m. Rent of Lajpat Nager House. Rs. 225. 00 Dividends Rs. 40. 00 Rs. 1722. 00 (i) Out of the above resources, the appellant has yet to repay his debts as aforesaid apart from meeting the day to day expenses and necessities of life for his wife. himself and also his son and daughter in law as the son is not in gainful employment at present, for unfortunate reasons beyond the control of the appellant. Apart from these necessities the appellant has yet to wed his grown up daughter who is of marriageable age and is presently employed at Bombay. (j) It is unavoidably necessary to let out the newly constructed first floor also of the Defence Colony House to enable the appellant-landlord to liquidate his onerous liabilities existing at present. to meet the ever growing costs of day to day living and also, if possible, to save some money and reserve it to be available as security for unforseen contingencies in the period of remaining life of the appellant and his wife, apart from the requirements of his son, daughter-in-law and the daughter. (k) Apart from the financial aspect, the appellant submits that the residential accommodation on the first floor of the Defence Colony house which he now has is not suitable due to the physical condition and age of the appellant and also of his wife due to old age. The appellant has already suffered four attacks of severe tachcardia which lasted for several hours together each time. He is also suffering from fluctuating blood pressure. As time passes, physical health of the appellant and his wife is bound to deteriorate further. In such circumstances it is most humbly and respectfully submitted that the appellant cannot be reasonably expected to continue to reside in the first floor of the house at Defence Colony and to deny him the benefit of residence in the premises in dispute, which alone could be of avail, help and assistance to the appellant at the present stage of his old age and to enable him reasonably to meet his necessary obligations in life. (1) The respondent has attempted to mislead this Hon ble court by suggesting in sub para (iv) of para 7 of the application that the premises in question are unfit for residence of the appellant both positionwise and locationwise of the accommodation. (1) The respondent has attempted to mislead this Hon ble court by suggesting in sub para (iv) of para 7 of the application that the premises in question are unfit for residence of the appellant both positionwise and locationwise of the accommodation. The suggestion is misconceived and appears to have been made in total ignorance of and disregard to the present condition and circumstances of the appellant. (m) In the aforesaid circumstances, the appellant still bona fide requires the premises in question for residence for himself and members of his family dependent on him. " ( 44 ) THIS immediately raised the question whether now the appellant has acquired other reasonably suitable residential accommodation and, therefore, the cause of action which may have been there when the application for ejectment was filed has now disappeared. Since it raised a disputed question of fact I permitted the parties to lead evidence. ( 45 ) I had called upon the appellant to examine his witnesses first and he inter alia examined Dr. V. K. Chopra, Registrar, Intensive Cornorary Care Unit, Sir Ganga Ram Hospital, Delhi as AWI and Dr. Jitendra Bajaj a specialist in Orthopaedic branch of Surgery as AW2. Brig. Pritam Pal Singh examined himself as AW3. Sri Sudhir Datta Sharma, clerk of Vijya Bank, Defence Colony, New Delhi, appeared as AW4. The appellant also examined Shri Ganga Dhar Chahal, a clerk of Bank of Maharashtra South Extension, New Delhi, as AW5, Shri B. P. Singh brother of the appellant as AW6 ; Mrs. Pushpa Bhatia and Mrs. Prerr-alya Nirmaijit Singh, sisters of the appellant, as AW7 and AW8; and Mrs. Bimla Singh wife of the appellant as AW9. ( 46 ) ON the other hand respondent Shri V. P. Raman examined himself as his own witness. ( 47 ) DR. V. K. Chopra stated that he examined Brig. Pritam Pal Singh on 10-3-1981 and had stated that the appellant had given him a history suggesting paroxysmal Atrial Tachcardia for a number of years and there was a documented episode recorded from Poona on 9-4-1973. He also mentioned that during these attacks he used to giddiness and marked fatigue. Attime lie used to get a feeling of Syncope i. e. near unconsciousness, and he advised him to take tablet Isopten and to avoid strains, physical exertion like running, climbing up-stairs, lifting weight. He also mentioned that during these attacks he used to giddiness and marked fatigue. Attime lie used to get a feeling of Syncope i. e. near unconsciousness, and he advised him to take tablet Isopten and to avoid strains, physical exertion like running, climbing up-stairs, lifting weight. The witness further deposed that on 3rd April, 1981 he saw the appellant at 10. 15 P. M. when he had an actual attack. Previously the appellant was able to control these attacks by certain manoeuvers which is usual with such patients but this time he was unable to do so. The blood pressure of the appellant during the attack was 90-70 mm of mercury. He further deposed that after the witness prevented the attack the blood pressure goes to 115180 mm of mercury. He produced in Court the E. C. Gs. of 9-4-1973 and 3-3-1981 as Exts. APWIU and APW 112. The witness also deposed that since the appellant s episodes of tachcardia are becoming more frequent and usually come on exertion I had advised him not to undertake heavy physical exertion or climbing upstairs. ( 48 ) IN reply to Court question the witness deposed that the blood pressure of the appellant in normal state would be 110170 to 145195 mm of mercury. The blood pressure of the appellant was very low during the attack. According to ECG which the witness had filed, the heart rate was practically about 160 beats per minute whereas it should normally have been less than 100 beats per minute so far as the appellant is concerned. Increasing heart beat in medical treatment is called tachcardia. The tachcardia from which Brig. Pritam Pal Singh is suffering is "intermittent Tachcardia". ( 49 ) THE only suggestion given to this witness on behalf of the tenant was that he had only given certificate to Brig. Pritam Pal Singh but he asserted that he in fact treated the appellant first on 10-3-1981 and thereafter on 3-4-1981. ( 50 ) THIS evidence has been led by the appellant to show his physical state of health.