N. VENKATACHALA J. ( 1 ) THESE petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution, have been referred to a Division Bench. ( 2 ) IN these petitions, the petitioners have impugned the constitutional validity of several provisions of the Kar- nataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Principal act'), the Karnataka Land Rejforms (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1973 (Kar. Act 1 of 1974) (hereinafter referred to as 'the amend ment Act') and o,f subsequent Acts by which the Principal Act was further amended. ( 3 ) AT the outset, it will be convenient to trace briefly the recent history of the legislation relating to agrarian reforms in our country and in Karnataka in particular. Our country is predominantly agricultural in spite of its industrial progress in recent years, for a large majority of its people depend upon agriculture for their livelihood. Immediately after the attainment of independence by our country, the State became aware of its primary duty to bring about agrarian reforms to improve the appalling condition of the tillers of soil and to increase the production of food and other produce from the land. Under our Constitution 'land' being a State subject, legislation to bring about agrarian reforms, had to be undertaken by the States. When certain constitutional hurdles in the way of implementation of agrarian reforms were seen, the Constitution itself came to be amended so as to give protection to such legislation. ( 4 ) THE thrust of agrarian reforms consisted of reforms of the land tenure, which forms the foundation of the agrarian structure. Such land reform: were brought about in three stages. ( 5 ) THE first stage, of land reforms consisted of abolition of Zamindari, jahagirdari and Inamdari systems of land tenure and conferring of ownership of lands on their actual tillers so that they might enjoy the full fruits of their hard labour. ( 6 ) LATER, it was found that absentee landlordism was prevalent to a considerable extent even in respect of lands under the Ryotwari tenure and that a large number of land holders who had leased such lands, were collecting from actual cultivators of those lands, rents which formed substantial portions of the yield therefrom. Besides, the evils of Zamindari system were found to have permeated into the ryotwari tenure also, though not to the same extent. Besides, the evils of Zamindari system were found to have permeated into the ryotwari tenure also, though not to the same extent. This led to the second phase of the land reforms consisting of tenancy legislation- (i) to ensure to tenants security of tenure and protection from eviction from the lands held by them; and (ii ). to prevent rack-renting by fixing 'fair rent, so that tenants may retain major portions of the fruits of their labour. ( 7 ) IT was then found that the tenancy laws, aimed at security of tenure and fixation of fair-rent, were inadequate to give full protection to adtual cultivators of lands from exploitation by their, landlords. Consequently, in the third stage of the land reforms, all intermediaries between the; State and the actual cultivators were sought to be eliminated by extinguishing the rights of landlords in tenanted lands and conferring on tenants full ownership or occupancy rights in such lands. However, where such landlords intended to cultivate personally their tenanted lands, they were permitted to resume portions of such lands subject to certain ceiling limits. Concentration of holding of lands in the hands of comparatively a small number of persons was sought to be eliminated by imposing ceiling limits as to the extents of lands that could be held by individual persons and families and by taking from them surplus lands in excess of such ceiling limits for distributing them among displaced tenants and landless persons including landless agricultural labourers. ( 8 ) THE Principal Act sought to bring about land reforms envisaged in the third stage of land reforms. However, the Amendment Act went a step further and took away the landlords' right to resume for their personal cultivation even portions of their tenanted lands, which had been given to them under the Principal Act before it was amended by the Amendment act. ( 9 ) THE Principal Act came into force on 2. 10. 1965. That Act was included in the Ninth Sch. to the Constitution , by the Constitution (17th Amendment) act, 1964, with effect from 20. 6. 1964. The Constitutional validity of the principal Act, as amended by the Kar. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1965, had been challenged before the Supreme Court in N. Krishna Bhat v. State of Mysore (I ). 1965. That Act was included in the Ninth Sch. to the Constitution , by the Constitution (17th Amendment) act, 1964, with effect from 20. 6. 1964. The Constitutional validity of the principal Act, as amended by the Kar. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1965, had been challenged before the Supreme Court in N. Krishna Bhat v. State of Mysore (I ). Those writ petitions were heard by the Supreme court along with the, writ petition, golaknath vs. State of Punjab (2) and were dismissed. The Supremo Court upheld the constitutionality of the principal Act as amended by the Kar. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1965 subba Rao. C. J. , who delivered the leading judgment of the Supreme Court, upheld the constitutionality of the principal Act on the ground that it had been included in the Ninth Schedule and that hence was protected by art. 31-B of the Constitution. Hidayathulla, J. , (as he then was), in his separate but concurring judgment, upheld the Principal Act on the ground that the provisions thereof were protected by Article 31-A of the Constitution. ( 10 ) THE Amendment Act which introduced several radical provisions into the Principal Act, received the assent of the President and came into force on 1. 3. 1974. S. 2 of the Amendment Act contains a declaration that the provisions of that Act had been enacted for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 of the constitution. Such declaration was intended to give the provisions of that act protection of Article 31-C of the constitution, as it stood then. By the constitution (34th Amendment) Act, 1974, which came into force on 7. 9. 74, the Amendment Act was included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution, so as to give that Act the protection of Article 31-B of the Constitution. ( 11 ) WE shall now set out the important changes in the Principal Act brought about by the Amendment act. ( 12 ) S. 5 of the Principal Act, as it stood before it was amended by the amendment Act, interalia, prohibted creating of any leases of lands after 2. 10. 1965. ( 11 ) WE shall now set out the important changes in the Principal Act brought about by the Amendment act. ( 12 ) S. 5 of the Principal Act, as it stood before it was amended by the amendment Act, interalia, prohibted creating of any leases of lands after 2. 10. 1965. However, that section exempted the following categories of persons from creating leases of lands owned by them: -A) soliders and seamen; b) small holder; c) minor; d) widow; e) unmarried women; and f) phy sically or mentally incapacitated persons. The amendment Act substituted a new section under which creation of leases was prohibited after the date of commencement of that Act, however, exempting soliders and seamen only from such prohibition. ( 13 ) AS stated earlier, under S. 14 of the Principal Act, a landlord who bonafide required for cultivating personally or for any non-agricultural purpose, the land which he had leased to a tenant, could make an application to the Tribunal constituted under the principal Act, as it stood ther,, to deter mine the extent of such land which (the landlord) could be permitted to resume. The Tribunal could permit him to resume a portion of such tenanted land not exceeding a half portion, taking into account the total extent of land already in his possession. ( 14 ) THE Amendment Act repealed sec. 14, 16, 17 and 18 of the Principal act. As a result of such repeal, a landlord became disentitled to resume possession of even a portion of his land which he had leased to a tenant, even if he (the land lord) bonafide required such land for his personal cultivation or a, non-agricultural purpose. ( 15 ) UNAMENDED S. 44 of the Principal Act had provided that after determination of resumable portions of tenanted lands by Tribunals, the State government might, by notification, declare that with effect from such date as might be specified in such notification, all such non-resumable lands stand transferred to, and vest, in, the state Government. But, amended S. 44 has provided for vesting in the State government with effect from 1. 3,1974 entire extents of tenanted lands and not merely non-resumable, portions of tenanted lands, as was under the unamended section. The necessity for the Government issuing a notification declaring that non-resumable lands would vest in the State; has been, there fore, dispensed with. But, amended S. 44 has provided for vesting in the State government with effect from 1. 3,1974 entire extents of tenanted lands and not merely non-resumable, portions of tenanted lands, as was under the unamended section. The necessity for the Government issuing a notification declaring that non-resumable lands would vest in the State; has been, there fore, dispensed with. ( 16 ) UNAMENDE (D Sec. 45 of the principal Act had provided for granting to tenants occupancy right in respect of non-resumable portions of lands in their possession. Amended s. 45 has provided for granting occupancy right to tenants, in respect of entire extents of land held by them as tenants provided the land so granted to each tenant together with the total extent of lands already held by him as owner or mortgagee in possession, did! not exceed the ceiling limit. ( 17 ) THE next important change brought about by the Amendment Act is in regard to the compensation payable for lands which Vested in the' State government under S. 44 of the Principal Act and for surplus lands above the ceiling limit which ultimately vest in the State. Unamended S. 47 of the principal Act had provided for payment of such compensation at the rate of fifteen times the difference between the rent payable for such lands and the land revenue payable for them. Such rent could not exceed the value of one-fourth of the gross produce of lands possessing facilities of assured irrigation and one-fifth of the gross produce of lands not possessing such facilities of assured irrigation. The compensation payable for surplus lands above the celling limits, vesting in the State, was also at' the same rates. ( 18 ) IN amended S. 47 of the Principal Act, the word 'compensation' has been substituted by the words 'amount payable' for extinguishment of 'rights in lands vesting in the State Government under S. 44. Likewise, in amended S. 72 of the Principal Act, the word' compensation' has been substituted by the word' 'amount payable' in respect of surplus lands over the ceiling limit. Amended S. 72 provides for determination of such compensation on the basis of the, net annual income derivable by a landlord or land owner from his tenanted - lands ' and other lands, if any, in accordance with a scale varying between 10 and 15 times of such net annual income. Amended S. 72 provides for determination of such compensation on the basis of the, net annual income derivable by a landlord or land owner from his tenanted - lands ' and other lands, if any, in accordance with a scale varying between 10 and 15 times of such net annual income. The compensation payable under the Principal act before it was amended by the amendment Act, was 20 times the net annual income in the case of the lowest class of land or where the land was held by a small holder, minor, widow, unmarried women, physically or mentally handicapped person, soldier, or seaman. Under amended S. 47 and 72 of the Principal Act, for the purpose of determining the amount payable respect of lands vesting in the State under S. 44 and in respect of surplus lands above the ceiling limit surrendered to the State, the net annual income is taken as 10 times the land revenue (including water rate) payable for such land. ( 19 ) THERE can be no doubt that the. amount payable under amended Sec. 47 and 72 of the Principal Act for either lands vesting in the State, under S. 44 or for surplus lands above the ceium limit to be surrendered to the State, is very much less than the compensation that was payable for each category of such lands under unamended S. 4/ and 72 of the Principal Act. ( 20 ) UNDER unamended S. 63 of the principal Act, the ceiling limit for holding lands by an individual or a family, was generally 18 standard, acres'which was equal to 18 acres of first class land or 108 acres of the lowest class of lands or corresponding equivalent extents of other classes of lands. The Amendment Act has drastically reduced such ceiling limit. Under amended S. 63 of the principal. Act, such ceiling limit is only 13 acres of the first Class lanu or 54 acres of the lowest class of land or corresponding equivalent extents ot other classes of lands. ( 21 ) THUS, it is seen that the Amend nient Act reduced by about a half, the ceiling limits for holding of lands by individuals and families. ( 22 ) A cognate change brought about by the Amendment Act is in regard to the definition of the word 'family' in sub-sec (12) of S. 2 of the Principal act. ( 21 ) THUS, it is seen that the Amend nient Act reduced by about a half, the ceiling limits for holding of lands by individuals and families. ( 22 ) A cognate change brought about by the Amendment Act is in regard to the definition of the word 'family' in sub-sec (12) of S. 2 of the Principal act. Before such amendment, the word 'family' included the spouse and dependent children and grand-chij. ren of a person. The Amendment act substituted the words 'minor sons and unmarried daughters' for the words 'dependent children and dependent grandchildren'. By such amendment, sons who have attained majority, married daughters and widowed daughters, though dependent on their parents, are excluded from the ambit of 'family', so defined. ( 23 ) S. 107 of the Principal Act, as amended by the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1965 exempted the application of the provisions of the Principal Act except S. 8 (which fixes fair rent) to lands belonging to, or held on lease from, religious and charitable institutions managed! by or under the control of the State Government and lands belonging to, or held on lease from, public trusts and societies for public educational purposes created or formed before the 18th November 1961 and in existence on the date of commencement of the Karnataka Land reforms (Amendment) Act, 1965. ( 24 ) THE Amendment Act substituted a new section for S. 107 of the Principal Act. Substituted S. 107 did away with such exemption of lands belong-, ing to, or held by, religious and, charitable institutions and public trusts and societies for educational purposes. ( 25 ) THE most controversial change brought about by the Amendment Act, is in regard to the constitution of Land tribunals. ( 26 ) S. 111 of the Principal Act, as it stood before it was deleted by the amendment Act, had provided that a land Tribunal should consist of a sole; member who should be a Judicial Officer of the rank of a Munsift' and that for an area for which the Land Tribunal had not been constituted, the munsiff having jurisdiction over such area or any judicial Officer authorised in this behalf by the State Government, shall exercise all the powers and perform all the duties and functions of a land Tribunal under the Principal Act. ( 27 ) THE Amendment Act repealed S. 1ll of the Principal Act and substituted a new section for S. 48 of the principal Act. That new section provides that the State Government shall constitute for each Taluk a Land Tribunal consisting of the Assistant Commissioner who shall be the Chairman thereof and four other members nominated by the State Government, of whom one shall be a person belonging to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled tribes. Sub-sec. (3) of that section provides that the State Government may, from time to time, re-constitute such Tribunal. Sub-sec. (8) of that section provides that no legal practitioner shall be allowed to appear in any proceeding before such Tribunal. ( 28 ) S. 118 of the Principal Act, as it stood before it was amended by the amendment Act, had provided for appeals from orders of a Land Tribunal. The Amendment Act has deleted that provision for appeals. Thus, orders of tribunals are not subject to any appeal or revision and are final. ( 29 ) THE Amendment Act inserted in the Principal Act S. 48-A. which provides that the claim made by a person for grant of the occupancy right under amended S'. 45 of the Principal Act shall be enquired into by the Land Tribunal constituted under amended S. 48 of the Act. ( 30 ) A very wide range of contentions were urged by learned Counsel ,'for petitioners. We shall set out those contentions: (1) Arts. 31-A, 31-B and 31-C of the constitution damage the basic structure or basic features of the constitution and hence, those articles themselves are void and cannot give immunity to any of the impugned provisions of the Principal Act or the Amendment act from attack on the ground of viola tion of any of the fundamental rights in Part-Ill of the Constitution; (2) Notwithstanding the protective cover of Arts. 31-A, 31-B and 31-C, the court should hold that the impugned provisions of the Principal Act and the amendment Act damage the basic structure or basic features of the Constitution and hence are void; (3) After the advent of the Consti tution, if the State legislature enacts a law which contravenes any of the fundamental rights, such law is void abinitio and nonest by virtue of Art. 13 (2) of the Constitution and the assent of the President as contemplated by the first proviso to Art. 31-A, cannot cure the invalidity of such law; (4) Socio-economic justice is a basic fecture of the Constitution. The Amendment Act which substituted S. 5 of the principal Act and deleted Ss. 14 and 16 thereof, is opposed to socio-economic justice and hence is not protected by art. 31-A or unamended Art. 31-C; (5) Art. 31-A provides immunity to only those provisions of the Principal act and the Amendment Act which are basically and essentially necessary for agrarian reforms and not to those provisions which are merely subsidiary, incidental or helpful for agrarian reforms; (6) The Amendment Act which provides for taking away from the landlord his entire tenanted lands and conferring occupancy rights therein on his tenant without enabling the former to resume even a portion of his tenanted lands for his personal cultivation, is a fraud on the Constitution and does not bring about any agrarian reforms and hence is not protected by Art. 31-A of the Constitution; (7) The provisions of the Amendment Act relating to payment of compensation to the landlords and landholders for tenanted lands and surplus lands above the ceiling limit vesting in the State Government, arc not basically essential or necessary for agrarian reforms and hence are not protected by Art. 31-A, but are void as being violative o,f Arts. 14 and 31 of the Constitution; (8) Sub-sec. (2) of S. 44 of the amendment Act which nullifies a decree or order obtained by a landlord permitting him under S. 14 of the principal Act, to resume a portion of his tenanted land, is unconstitutional (9) The compensation payable to landlords for their tenanted lands which vest in the State Government and to landholders for their surplus lands above the ceiling limit which vest in the State Government, is grossly inadequate' and illusory and hence amended Ss. 47 and 72 of the Principal act are void as being violative of Art. 31 of the Constitution; (10) The compensation payable to religipus institutions whose tenanted lands vest in the State Government, is grossly inadequate and hence amended ss. 44, 45 and 47 are violative of the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 26 of the Constitution; (11) There was no justification for reducing the ceiling limit fixed under the Principal Act, as it stood before amendment by the Amending Act; (12) Reduction of the ceiling limit for holding lands, brought about by the amendment of S. 63 of the Principal act, results in acquisition of lands to the extent of the difference between the old ceiling limit and the new ceiling limit. For such acquisition of lands held by actual cultivators, compensation paid, should not be less than the market value of such lands. As amended S. 47 does not provide for payment of such compensation, that section is violative of Art. 31 of the Constitution; (13) The amendment of the definition of the word 'family' in sub sec. For such acquisition of lands held by actual cultivators, compensation paid, should not be less than the market value of such lands. As amended S. 47 does not provide for payment of such compensation, that section is violative of Art. 31 of the Constitution; (13) The amendment of the definition of the word 'family' in sub sec. (12) of S. 2 of the Principal Act, by the amendment Act, has resulted in excluding married daughters , who are widowed or deserted by husbands and depending on their parents, for the purpose of computation, of the ceiling limit of the family holding of land and such exclusion of widowed and deserted daughters depending on their parents, is arbitrary and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution; (14) The Amendment Act which saves the right of resumption oif tenanted lands by soldiers and seamen, but takes away similar right of resumption of such lands by widows, unmarried women, minors and physically or mentakly handicapped persons, is arbitrary, diseriminatory and Violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution; (15) Constituting Tribunals to the exclusion of Civil Courts to adjudicate upon civil rights and liabilities, runs counter to the directive principle of the constitution enjoining the State to take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive and to the concept of independence of the judiciary which is a basic feature of the Constitution; (16) Until Art. 323-B was an sorted in the Constitution by the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution, the State legislature had no power to enact a law providing for constituting Land tribunals and to confer on them jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes arising in the course of implementation of land reforms and hence amended S. 48 is invalid; (17) Amended S. 48, which provides for constitution of the Land Tribunal, is not a provision which is basically and essentially necessary for agrarian rer forms and hence that section is not immune from attack on the ground of violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution; (18) The Land Tribunals constituted under amended S. ' 48 of the Principal act, do not comply with the minimum requirement of the rule of law, which is a basic feature of the Constitution and hence that section is void; (19) Amended S. 48 of the Principal act confers uncontrolled and unguided power on the State Government to nominate four members for a Land; Tribunal and hence that section is void; (20) Amended S. 48 of the Principal act is void as being arbitrary on account of the absence of -- (a) provision for appeal or revision from decisions of Land Tribunals; (b) provision for transfer of a case from one Tribunal to another Tribunal where a member or members of the former Tribunal is/are disabled from hearing such case on account of interestedness or bias; (c) Provision for fixity of tenure of members of Land Tribunals; (d) provision for referring to civil court or the High Court complicated questions of law. (21) Sub-sec (8) of 48 which prohi bits legal practitioners from appearing in any proceedings before a Land Tribunal, is in conflict with S. 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, and hence is void (22) Clause (iii) of sub-see (1) of amended S. 133 which provides that all interim orders issued or made Civil Courts in any proceedings in which the question of a land being an agricultural land or the question of tenancy in such land, arose for consideration, shall stand dissolved or vacated, is void as a judicial decision of a Court is sought to be nllified without removing the basis on which such interim orders stood. ( 31 ) BEFORE dealing with the above contentions individually, it would bo useful to advert to a few basic matters ( 32 ) AS stated earlier, the constitutional validity of the Principal Act, a , amended by the Kar. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1965, was upheld by the Supreme Court in N. Krishna Bhat vs. State of Mysore (1) hence, the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Principal Act, as they stood before they were amended by the Amendment Act, is no longer res integra. However, learned counsel for the petitioners contended; that as the decision in Krishna Bhat's case, which was decided along with state of Punjab (2), was rendered prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in Keshavenanda Bharati vs. State of Kerala (3) which overruled tthe decision in Golaknathas case, this Court, notwithstanding the decision in Krishna Bhat ease, should re-examine the constitutional validit of the provisions of the Principal Act in the light of 1ho principle enunciated in the majority decision in Keshavenanda bharati's Case, namely, that the Parliament has no power to amend the constitution so as to destroy or damage its basic structure or basic features. Learned Counsel maintained that this Court should also examine whether any of the provisions of the amendment. Aet by which the Principal Act was amended, damage or destroy the basic structure or basic features of the Const tution. ( 33 ) AS stated earlier, the Amendment Act has been included in the ninth Sch. to the Constitution with a view to give that Act the projection under Art. 31-B of the Constitution. Aet by which the Principal Act was amended, damage or destroy the basic structure or basic features of the Const tution. ( 33 ) AS stated earlier, the Amendment Act has been included in the ninth Sch. to the Constitution with a view to give that Act the projection under Art. 31-B of the Constitution. The declaration contained in S, 2 of the Amendment Act, is with a view to give the Amendment Act immunity under Art. 31-C of the Constitution. But, in Waman Rao. vs. Union of India (4), Chandrachud, C. J. , speaking for the majority of the Bench, said 'bat laws included in the IX Sch. on or after 24. 4. 1973, have to be examined individually for determining whether the constitutional amendments by which they were put in the IX Sch , would in any way damage or destpry the basic structure or basic features of the Constitution ( 34 ) 'in Waman Rao's case (4) chandrachud. . C. J. , however clarified that if any law included in the IX Sch. on or after 24. 4. 1973, falls within the scope and ambit of either Art. 31-A or unamended Art. 31-C, an examinatio whether such law receives protection of art. 31 -B read with the IX Sch. to the constitution, becomes otiose. ( 35 ) WE shall now proceed to consider seriatim the contentions urged learned counsel for petitioners. ( 36 ) CONTENTION (1): (i) Learned counsel for some of the petitioners urged that Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitu- tion conferring basic rights which accord with the Universal Declaration of human Rights, constitute the basic structure or basic features off the constitution and that Art. 31-A, 31-B and 31-C which immunise certain laws from challenge on the ground of violation"of Art. 14 and 19, destory or damage such basic structure or basic features of the Constitution and that therefore the Constitutional Amend ment Acts which inserted those articles in the Constitution were themselves void and that consequently those three artcles are also void. (ii) A complete answer to the above contention is found in the decisions of the Supreme Court in Minerva mills Ltd. , vs. Union of India (5) and woman Rao vs. Union of India (4 ). (ii) A complete answer to the above contention is found in the decisions of the Supreme Court in Minerva mills Ltd. , vs. Union of India (5) and woman Rao vs. Union of India (4 ). Therein, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Art. 31-A. As regards Art. 31-B, the Supreme Court said that that article has to be read along with the IX Sch. because it is only those Acts and Regulations which are put in that schedule that can receive the protection of that article. The supreme Court held that all Acts and regulations included in, the IX Sch. prior to 24. 4. 1973 would receive the full protection of Art. 31-B, and therefore, would not be open to challenge on the ground that they are inconsis tent with or take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by any of the provisions of Part-Ill of the Constitution. As regards laws included in the ix Sch. on or after 24. 4. 1973 the Supreme Court held that they do not receive protection ipso facto and that those laws shall have to be examined individually for determining whether the constitutional amendments by. which they were put in the IX Sch. damage or destory the basic structure or basicfeatures of the Constitution in any manner. As regards Art. 31-C. the supreme' Court heldi that that article as it stood prior to its amendment by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) act, to the extent its constitutionality was upheld in Keshavananda Bharatis case, (3) did not damage any of the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure and hence was constitutionally valid. ( 37 ) CONTENTION (2): (i) It was contended by learned counsel for some of the petitioners that notwithstanding the protective cover of Art. 31-A, 31-B and 31-C of the Constitution, this Court should examine whether the provisions of the Principal Act and the Amendiment Act, damage or destory the basic structure or basic features of the Constitution. (ii) As pointed out by the Supreme court in Waman Rao's case, if a law incuded in the IX Sch on or alter 24. 4. (ii) As pointed out by the Supreme court in Waman Rao's case, if a law incuded in the IX Sch on or alter 24. 4. 1973 falls within the scope and ambit of Art. 31-A or unamunded Art. 31-C and receives their protection, it would be unnecessary to determine whether such law also receives the protection of Art. 31-B. (iii) If the Principal Act and the amendment Act come within the protective canopy of Art. 31 A and/or unamended art. 31-C, it would be wholly rendundant to enquire whether those acts damage or destory the basic shucture or basic features of the Constitution. As article 31-A and unamended art. 31-C are held not to destroy or damage the basic structure or basic features of the Constitution, it would inevitably follow that any law which comes within the protective canopy of those two articles, can, by no stretch of imagination, be held to destory or damage the basic structure or basic features of the Constitution. (iv) Hence, we have. no hesitation in rejecting the above contention of learned Counsel. ( 38 ) CONTENTION (3) : (i) Shri g. B. Raikar, learned Counsel for some of the petitioners, put forth a very in- genious contention. He maintained that if the State Legislature passes a bill the provisions of which contravene any of the fundamental rights, such bill is void ab initio and non est by virtue of Art. 13 (2) of the Constitution and that thereafter the assent of the president to that Bill, as provided in the first proviso to Art. 31-A (1), will no. remove the invalidity of such Bill in spite of the protective cover of Art. 31-A. (ii) The simple answer to the above contention, is that a Bill passed! by The state Legislature, becomes law only after it gets the assent of the Governor or the President and until such assent it is not a, law which can attract Art. 13 (2 ). As soon as a Bill providing for acquisition of any estate or of any rights therein or extinguishment or modification of any such rights, receives the assent of the President and becomes law, such law is protected by Art 31-A against attack on the ground of violation of Art. 14, 19 and 31. Thus, we have no hesitation in rejecting the above contention of Shri raikar. Thus, we have no hesitation in rejecting the above contention of Shri raikar. ( 39 ) CONTENTION (4): (i) Shri R. B. Guttal, learned Counsel for one of the petitioners, contended that socio-economic justice is a basic feature of the Constitution and that the Amendment Act had damaged or destroyed such basic feature of the Constitution by substituting S. 5 of the Principal Act. He maintained that by substituted Sec. 5, the exemption granted to small holders, minors, widows, unmarried daughters and physically and/or mentally handicapped persons, from the prohibition against leasing qf their lands, should not have been taken away. According to him, taking away of such exemption and deletion of sections 14 to 16 of the principal Act, which enabled landlords to resume portions of their tenanted lands for their personal cultivation of non-agricultural use, offend socio-economic justice. (ii) However, Shri Guttal was not able to point out either from Keshavananda Bharathi's case (3) or from any other decision of the Supreme Court, any enunciation that socio-economic justice is a, basic structure or basic feature of the Constitution. (iii) The prohibition of creating leases after the coming into force of the Principal Act, is in furtherance of the policy of abolition of intermediaries between the State and the actual tillers of the soil. Such prohibition was already imposed by unamended S. 5 of the Principal Act. The constitutionality of that section is no longer res integra in view of the, decision of the Supreme Court in N. Krishna Bhat's (1) case upholding the constitutionality of the Principal Act. The only change brought about by the' Amendment Act in S. 5 of the Principal Act is to delete certain exemptions granted under the unamended section. (iv) Once it is held that a provision prohibiting creation or continuance of agricultural leases, is an integral part of a scheme of agrarian reforms, such provision receives the protection of Art. 31-A of the Constitution and its validity is not open to challenge on the ground of violation of Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the constitution. The mere taking "away of certain exemptions cannot, there fore render substituted S. 5 of the Principal Act any the less a valid provision enjoying the immunity under article 31-A. (v) The contention of Shri Guttal regarding deletion of Ss. 14, 19 and 31 of the constitution. The mere taking "away of certain exemptions cannot, there fore render substituted S. 5 of the Principal Act any the less a valid provision enjoying the immunity under article 31-A. (v) The contention of Shri Guttal regarding deletion of Ss. 14 to 16 of the principal Act, will be answered a little later while dealing with Contention (6) ( 40 ) CONTENTIONS (5) and (7): (i; shri B. P. Holla, learned Counsel for one of the petitioners, contended that the liability to pay compensation is not necessarily an essential and integral part of the acquisition of estates envisaged in art. 31-A and that the immunity given by that article to laws providing for acquisition of estates and rights there in and extinguishment and modification of such rights, would not, therefore, extend to the compensation part of such, acquisition, extinguishment or modification. According to him, such. acquisition, extinguishment or modification is one aspect and the liability to pay compensation therefor, is entirely a different aspect and these two aspects are not directly inter-related. (ii) Support for the above contention was sought by Shri Holla from the decision of the Supreme Court in akadasi vs. State of Orissa (6 ). There, the Orissa Kendu Leaves (Control of trade) Act, 1961, had been impugned as being viblative of the (fundamental right to carry on any trade or business guaranteed by sub-Cl (g) of C1 (1) of art. 19 of the Constitution. That 'act had created a monopoly in the State to deal in Kendu leaves to the exclusion oi private traders. That Act also contained certain other provisions enabling the State to fix the prices at which kendu leaves should be sold to it (the state) by private persons. The Supreme Court held) that only those Sections of that Act which provided for creating monopoly in the State by excluding private traders in Kendu leaves, were protected by sub-clause (ii) of clause (6) of Art. 19, but such protection did not extend to the provisions empowering the State to fix the prices at which private persons should sell kendu leaves to the State. The reasoning of the Supreme Court was stated thus at page 1054 of the report: 'a law relating to' a State monopoly cannot, in the context, include all the provisions contained in the said law whether they have direct relation with the creation of the monopoly or not. In our opinion, the said expression should be construed, to mean the law relating to the monopoly in its absolutely essential features. . If a law is passeu creating a State monopoly, (he Court should enquire what, are the provisions of the said law which are basically and essentially necessary for creating the state monopoly. It is only- those essential and basic provisions which are protected by the latter part at article 19 (6 ). If. there are other provisions maide by the Act which arc subsidiary, incidental or helpful to the operation of the monopoly, they do not fall under the said part and their validity must be judged under the first part of Art. 19 (6 ). In other words the effect of the amendmade in Art. 19 (6) is to protect the law relating to the creation of monopoly and that means that it is only the provisions of the law which art integrally and essentially connected with the creation of the monopoly that are protected. The rest of the provisions which may be incidental do not fall under the latter part of art. 19 (6) and would inevitably have' to satisfy the test of the first pan art. 19 (6 ). " the relationship between the creation of monopoly in trade a ad fixing the price for purchasing the goods by the monopoly organisation, is not, in our opinion, analogous to the relationship between acquisition, extinguishment or modification and the compersatiton therfor. To say that compensation is not directly inter-related to acquisition, is to ignore the history of art. 31-A of the Constitution, itself, (iii) Very soon after the advent of the Constitution, the Bihar Land reforms Act, 1950, was enacted mainly lor abolition of Zamindari system in Bihar. The constitutionality of that Act was impugned in Kameshwar Singh vs. State of Bihar (7 ). The Patna High court held that Act to be unconstitutional mainly on the ground that the compensation provided under that Act could not be said to be a fair equivalent in value of the property taken over by the State. The constitutionality of that Act was impugned in Kameshwar Singh vs. State of Bihar (7 ). The Patna High court held that Act to be unconstitutional mainly on the ground that the compensation provided under that Act could not be said to be a fair equivalent in value of the property taken over by the State. Reuben, J. observed thus at page 112: "the entire scheme oi the Act is that the property of the landlords and tenure-holders is to be acquired and in exchange therefor they are to gel compensation either in cash or in bonds payable in forty equal instalments. ' on my finding, the provisions relating to the determination of the amount of compensation arc void. Therefore, an essential element of the Act disappears and the remainder cannot survive. (iv) Even while the appeal irom the decision of the patna High Court was pending before the Supreme Court, the Constitution was amended by the constitution. (First Amendment) Act 1951, which inserted,, inter alia, Art. 31-A in the Constitution. The object of Art. 31-A was to give immunity to agrarian reforms legislation from challenge on grounds of violation of fundamental rights including the ground or inadequacy of compensation for acquisition of estates and modification and extinguishment of rights therein. (v) As rightly pointed out by Reuben, J. , in Kameshwar Singh's case, the payment of compensation, is necessarily an integral part of any law providin , for acquisition of estates and modification and extinguishment of rights therein. (vi) Hence, we have no hesitation in rejecting the contention of Shri holla that Art. 31-A does not immunise the provisions of the Amendment Act relating to payment to landlords amounts for their tenanted lands and to payment to landholders for their surplus lands (above the ceiling limit) which vest in the state, from any attack on the ground of violation of Arts. 14, 19 and 31 ( 41 ) CONTENTION (6); (i) Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the provisions of the Amendment act which deleted Ss. 14 to 16 of the principal Act ana thereby deprived the landlords of their right to resume from their tenants at least pormon's ox their tenanted lands for tneir (the landlords') personal cultivation, could not be regarded as those which has brought aoout any agrarian reforms and mat hence cannot have the art. 31-A of the Constitution, elaborating the above contention, learned. 31-A of the Constitution, elaborating the above contention, learned. Counsel for the petitioners strongly urged that any genuine measure of agrarian reforms abolishing intermediaries between the state and the actual cultivators and giving lull ownership of lands to the actual cultivators, should also provide for resumption by landlords of at least portions of their tenanted lands if they desire to cultivate them personally. In other words, their contention was that such portions of 'the tenanted lands which the landlords desire to cultivate personally, should not have been made to vest in the State and subsequently granted to cultivating tenants, but should have been allowed to be resumed by landlords. Learned counsel argued that many landlords depended entirely on income from their lands for their livelihood, that it is not correct to presume that every landlord is necessarily prosperous and that every tenant is necessarily poor and that many landlords were actually poorer than the tenants who may have their own lands also and derive income from both their own lauds and the lands they cultivate as tenants, it was argued that it is highly inequitable to deny the landlords the right to resume at least portions of their tenanted lands for their personal cultivation. Reliance was placed on, the following observations of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Saroj Kumari vs. State, of Haryana (8) at pages 358 and 359:"agrarian reforms does not mean that a land owner should be depriv- ed of his entire land and be not left with any part thereof. What it means is that only surplus area may be acquired from each landowner and distributed amongst the needy sections of the community, that is, landless persons, agricultural workers ana ejected tenants etc. . . . . . . If the entire land is taken away from a landowner, it will amount to making landowner landless and distribute their lands amongst others which cannot be the object of any agrarian reform or the policy of the State enshrined in clauses (b) and (c) of Art. 39 of the Constitution. Some economically viable unit has to be left with every landowner particularly because the landowners, by and large, depend on agriculture as their only means of livelihood. Some economically viable unit has to be left with every landowner particularly because the landowners, by and large, depend on agriculture as their only means of livelihood. "the above observations were made by a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana while striking down certain provisions of the Haryana ceiling on Land Holdings Act,. y/4 holding, inter alia, that that Act did not get the protection of Art. 31-A. In so doing, the Division Bench relied on a full Bench decision of that' Court in suchan Singh Bajwa vs. State of Punjab (9) wherein similar provisions of the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972, had, been struck down. The Full Bench decision in Suchan Singh's case (supra) has since been reversed by the Supreme court in CA. No. 1040 of 1976 (10) on its view that the Punjab Land Reforms act, 1972, is saved by Art. 31-A. Therefore, the foundation on which the decision in Saroj Kumari's case (supra) striking down certain provisions of haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1972, rested, has disappeared. [see: nandalal vs. State of Punjab (11)]. From this it follows that the above observations of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Saroj Kumari's case (supra) can be of ,no assistance to the petitioners. (ii) Shri S. K. Venkataranga Iyengar, Learned Counsel for some of the petitioners, however, placed some reliance on the decision: of the judicial commissioner, Goa, in Lakshmi bai vs. Union of India (12 ). There, the constitutional validity of the Goa, Daman and diu Agricultural Tenancy. (fifth amendment Act 1976 hereinafter referred to as the Goa tenancy amendment Act) had been, impugned on the ground that it violated Arts. 14 and 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution, and was not protected by Art. 31-A. Under that Act, the entire tenanted lands belonging to landlords were divested from them and tenants of such lands were made absolute owners thereof, while holding that the impugned Act was unconstitutional, Menezes,j. C observed thus at page: 26. "an Act which enables the State to take away all the land held by the landlord and vest it on the cultivator without providing that there should be no concentration of land in the hands df the cultivator is not only violative of Arts. "an Act which enables the State to take away all the land held by the landlord and vest it on the cultivator without providing that there should be no concentration of land in the hands df the cultivator is not only violative of Arts. 14 and 19 but does not come under the protective canopy of art 31 A, because it destroys the very purpose sought to be achieved namely, the distribution of land so aft best subserve the common 'good and to avoid the accumulation of wealth to detriment. . . . . . . Equitable dis- stribution of land must be made subject to a limit and) must be made not only amongst the tillers of the soil but also amongst the owners who may need it for personal cultivation The owner who desires to. cultivate his own land personally has to be placed on a common level with those' Who cultivate the land personally. (iii) The Goa Tenancy Amendment act is not in pari materia with the principal Act as amended by the amendment Act. The former act which provided for granting occupancy rights to tenants, did not impose any ceiling on the holding of agricultural lands and there was no specific provision therein requiring the lands which vested in the Government to be distributed among landless persons or insufficient holders of land. On the other hand, the Principal Act as amended by the Amendment Act, has fixed ceiling limits for holding agricultural lands as owner, or tenant or usfructuary mortgagee or otherwise. No tenant can be granted occupancy rights in lands so as to permit his total holding of lands exceed the ceiling limit. Amended S. 77 of the Principal Act provides'that lands held by tenants before 1. 3. 1974 in respect of which they are not entitled to be registered as occupants and surplus lands above ceiling limits, which vest in the Government. shall be re-granted to- (a) displaced persons having no lands; (b) landless agricultural labourers; (c) landless persons including exmilitary personnel whose gross annual income does not exceed Rs. 2,000. (d) Other persons living in the same village whose income does not exceed rs. shall be re-granted to- (a) displaced persons having no lands; (b) landless agricultural labourers; (c) landless persons including exmilitary personnel whose gross annual income does not exceed Rs. 2,000. (d) Other persons living in the same village whose income does not exceed rs. 2,000 (iv) Thus it is seen, that the pro visions of the Goa Tenancy Amendment, act are substantially different from the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by the Amendment Act hence, the ratio of the decision in lakshmi Bai's case (12) cannot apply to the present cases even, if it is assumen' for the sake of argument that that does sion lays down the law correctly. (v) Though it may appear just and reasonable to enable a landlord who desires to cultivate his tenanted lands personally to resume at least a portion thereof, experience has shown that such enabling provision contained in the Principal Act, before it was amended by the Amendment Act, was grossly misused by landlords: A large number of landlords resorted to such reusmption of portions of their tenanted lands stating falsely that they wanted such lands for personal cultivation. After resuming portions of their tenanted lands they sold such lands or leased them again clandestinely at high rents. The tenants who were dispossessed from portions of leased lands, were generally too helpless to pursue legal remedies to get restoration of such lands. Such tenants were unequal to the task of fighting their better placed landlords. It is mainly to prevent such abuse that ss. 14 to 16 of the Principal Act were deleted by the Amendment Act. (vi) A large majority of absentee landlords were in public or private employment or were engaged in trade and industry or other professions and had neither the desire nor the ability to cultivate personally their lands even if they were allowed to resume the whole or portions of such lands. Landlords who genuinely desired to cultivate their tenanted lands, were hardly a few. Even if the deletion of Ss. 14 to 16 of the Principal Act, has resulted in some hardship to landlords, that, by itself, is not, in our view, sufficient to hold that the Amendment Act is unconstitutional. Whenever big social changes are brought about, it is inevitable that some people have to suffer. As pointed out. Even if the deletion of Ss. 14 to 16 of the Principal Act, has resulted in some hardship to landlords, that, by itself, is not, in our view, sufficient to hold that the Amendment Act is unconstitutional. Whenever big social changes are brought about, it is inevitable that some people have to suffer. As pointed out. by the Supreme Court in Waman rao vs. Union of India (4) it is impossible for any Government, howsoever expertly advised, socially oriented and prudently managed, to remove every economic disparity without causing some hardship or injustice to a class of persons who are also entitled to equal protection. (vii) It is too late in the day to contend that transfer of ownership of lands from absentee landlords to cultivating tenants, does not constitute agrarian reform. As early as in the year 1962 the Supreme Court observed in Sonapur Tea Co. vs DC. (13) that the object of agrarian reform generally to abolish intermediaries between the state and the actual cultivators of lands and to make them owners of such lands, so that they may have direct relationship with the State. (viii) While considering the constitutionality of the Jammu and Kashmir agrarian Reforms Act, 1971, in Kh. Fid all vs. State of J and K (14) which is in pari materia with the Principal Act as amended by the Amendment Act, the supreme Court observed that that Act contained a clear programme of agrarian reform in taking stock of the land in the State which was not in personal cultivation and in seeing that the tillers who formed the backbone of the agrcultural economy, were provided with lands for the purpose of personal cultivation, subject to the ceiling provision even in their cases. The Supreme Court also held that that Act had been passed with the definite object of bringing about agrarian reforms and could not be successfully challenged on the ground of violation of Articles 14, 19 and 31 in view of the provisions of Article 31-A. (ix) Fallowing the above rulling, of the Supreme Court in Sonapur Tea company's case and Kh Fid Ali's case. we reject the contention that the provisions of the Amendment Act which deleted Ss. 14. to 16 of the Principal Act. and deprived the landlord of the opportunity to resume a portion of his tenanted land, is unconstitutional. we reject the contention that the provisions of the Amendment Act which deleted Ss. 14. to 16 of the Principal Act. and deprived the landlord of the opportunity to resume a portion of his tenanted land, is unconstitutional. ( 42 ) CONTENTION (8) : (i) It was contended that sub-sec (2) of S. 44. of the Amendment Act which nullifies a decree or order obtained by a landlord under S. 14 of the Principal Act permitting him to resume a portion of the tenanted land, is unconstitutional. (ii) If deletion of S. 14 of the principal Act which enabled a landlord to resume a portion of his tenanted land, is not unconstitutional, we do not see how giving retrospective effect to, such deletion and thereby nullifying decrees and orders of Court which had been made under that section, can be unconstitutional. It is well settled tha'. the legislature can give, retrospctive effect to a law affecting property rights, and that the legislature can, by appropriate legislation with retrospective effect, also nullify a judgment, decree or order of a Court by removing the legal basis on which such judgment, decree or order was founded. (ii) Hence, we reject the above contention as being devoid of merit. ( 43 ) CONTENTION (9): (i) The next serious attack on the. Amendment Act was in regard to the amounts, payable to landlords for their tenanted lands which vested in the State and to landholders for their surplus lands in excess of the ceiling limit which vest in the State. The contention ran thus: unamended Ss. 47 and 72 of the Principal Act had provided for payment of compensation to landlords whose lands vested in the State Government under S. 44 of the Act and to landholders whose surplus lands above ceiling limit should vest in the State. Such compensation was generally at 10 to 12 times the net annual income from such lands. Such net income was computed as the difference between the maximum rent fixed under the Principal Act and the land revenue payable by the landlord or the land owner to the State Government. That rent was generally the value of onefourth or one-fifth of the gross yield from the land. The Amendment Act substituted the words 'amount payable' for the word 'compensation. That rent was generally the value of onefourth or one-fifth of the gross yield from the land. The Amendment Act substituted the words 'amount payable' for the word 'compensation. Under amended s. 47 of the Principal Act, the, amount payable for a land, is 100 to 200 times the land revenue payable for such land. In the case of dry lands, the land revenue varies from 50 paise to Rs. 5 per acre. 100 or 200 times of such land revenue, would amount to only Rs. 50 to Rs. 1,000 per acre. It is a matter of common knowledge that the market value of dry lands varies from Rs. 3,000 to Rs. 15,000 per acre. Some times, the market value of dry lands may be much more than Rs. 15,000 per acre. In the case of wet lands, the land revenue including water rate, varies from Rs. 5 to Rs. 50 per acre. 100 to 200 times of such land revenue, would only be Rs. 500 to Rs. 10,000 per acre. It is a matter of common knowledge that the market value of wet lands varies from Rs. 8,000 to Rs. 50,000 peracre. Hence, the amount payable under amended S. 47 of the Principal Act for a land that vested in the State, would be only a pretence of the market value of such land. (ii) According to learned Counsel for the petitioners, the amounts payable under amended S. 47 and S. 72 of the Principal Act for the petitioners' lands which either vested or should vest in the State Government are so grossly inadequate as to be illusory and that hence amended Ss. 47 and 72 of the principal Act are violative of Art. 31 of the Constitution which had not been deleted when the Amendment Act was enacted. (iii) On the other hand, the learned Advocate General appearing for the state contended that as the Amendment Act is a measure of agrarian reform, the provisions of tha,t Act come under the protective canopy of Art 31-A of the Constitution and that hence, those provisions cannot be challenged as being violative of Art. 31 of the constitution, which provided for payment of amount for acquisition of property after the amendment of the Constitution by the Constitution (25 th amendment) Act, 1971. (iv) It was not disputed by learned counsel for petitioners that the word 'estate' occurring in article 31-A Of the Constitution, includes not only zamindari and Inam lands and other kinds of alienated lands, but also Ryotwari lands. In other words, all kinds of lands dealt with by the Principal act come within the ambit of the word 'estate' occurring in Art. 31-A of the constitution. (v) In B. Shankara Rao vs. State of 'mysore (15) the Constitutionality of the Karnataka Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1955. was challenged on several grounds. That Act provided for abolition of all intermediaries between the State and the cultivators of Inam lands and for establishing direct relationship between State and the cultivators of such inam lands. That Act also provided for vesting of Inam lands in the State, for grant of occupancy rights in them to certain categories of tenants and for grant of occupancy rights of lands, not in possession of tenants, to erstwhile inamdars themselves who would thereafter hold such lands as occupants under, the Ryotwa'ri tenure. One of the grounds on which that Act was challenged, was that the compensation paid for lands, the occupancy rights in which were not given to Inamdars, was illusory and grossly inadequate and that hence the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 of the constitution, was violated. Repelling that contention, the Supreme Court observed thus at page 458 of the report: 'the legislation was undertaken as a part of agrarian reform which the mysore State Legislature proposed to bring about in the former State of Mysore. The "impugned statute, therefore, falls under the protection of article 31-A of the Constitution and cannot be challenged on the ground that Article 31 has been violated, that no principle of compensation has been provided or that the compensation provided for is illusory or inadequate. (Underlining italics is ours) (vi) However, learned Counsel for some of the petitioners drew our attention to certain observations of Sikri, hegde and Mukherjea, JJ. , in Keshavananda Bharati's case (3) to the effect that under Art. 31 of the Constitution, the compensation for acquisition, of a property, should be reasonably related to the fair market value of such property and cannot be arbitrary or illusory. We have carefully examined those observations and they seem to relate to an acquisition not protected by art. 31-A of the Constitution. We have carefully examined those observations and they seem to relate to an acquisition not protected by art. 31-A of the Constitution. In our opinion, those observations have no application to the acquisition of an estate in furtherance of agrarian reforms which receive the protection oi art. 31-A. (vii) In State of Kerala vs. G R silk Mfg (Weaving) Co. (16) and in kh. Fida Ali vs. State of J and K (14) the supreme Court reiterated that when once a legislative area, is found to be barricaded by Art. 31-A, it cannot be breached by Art. 14, 19 or 31. (viii) Hence, the attack directed against amended Ss. 47 and 72 of the principal Act on the ground that the amount paid for lands which vest in the State, is either inadequate or illusory, cannot succeed. ( 44 ) CONTENTION (10): (i) Learned counsel for the petitioners in some of the writ petitions contended that the amendment Act which took awav exemption granted under the unamenued Principal Act, in favour of religious institutions, is violative of Art. 26 and that as Art. 31-A does not give Immunity to a law from attack on the ground of violation of Art. 26 of the constitution, the Amending Act should be held to be unconstitutional. (ii) The relevant portions of Art 26 of the Constitution, read:"26. Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right----- (a) ** ** ** (b) ** ** ** (c) to own and acquire movable or immovable property ; and. (iii) The exemption which the lands belonging to religious institutions enjoyed under the Principal Act, has bee"taken away under the Amendment Ac. as seen earlier. (iv) Shri G. V. Thirumale, learned counsel for two of the petitioners, con tended that under the provisions of the amended Principal Act, agricultural lands owned by religious institutions which had been leased to tenants and also surplus agricultural lands of those institutions above ceiling limits, either vested or should vest in the State and that those provisions are violative of the right of a religious denomination to own immovable property, which has been guaranteed by Art. 26. (v) That Art. 26 pf the Constiution does not affect the power of the slate to acquire any property belonging to a religious denomination, is well settled by a number of decisions of the supreme Court. (v) That Art. 26 pf the Constiution does not affect the power of the slate to acquire any property belonging to a religious denomination, is well settled by a number of decisions of the supreme Court. In Khajamian Wakf estates Vs. The State of Madras (17) the Supreme Court observed thus at page 165:"it was next urged, by acquiring the properties belonging to religious denominations, the legislature violated Article 26 (c) and (d) which provide that religious denominations shall have the right to own and acquire movable and immovable property and administer such property in accordance with law. These provisions do not take away the right of the State to acquire property belonging to religious denominations. Those denominations can own, acquire properties and administer. them in accordance with law. That does not mean that the property owned by them cannot be acquired. As a result of acquisition they cease to own that property. Thereafter their right to administer that property ceases because it is no longer their property. Article 26 does not interfere with the right of the Slate to acquire property", (vi) Even so, Shri Thirumale argued that by acquiring the lands of a religious institution on payment of meagre, amounts, that institution would not only be ruined financially, but its very existence would be threatened and that hence the provisions of amended principal Act, in so far as they relate to vesting of lands of religious institutions in the State, should be held to be unconstitutional. (vii) Amended S. 106 of the Principal Act which is a special provision relating- to religious institutions, provides, inter alia, that in respect of lands of religious institutions vesting in the State Government under the provisions of that Act, the amount payable to that institution, shall be an annuity to be paid annually so long as that institution exists and that 'owards such annuity, the State Government shall issue to that institution nontransferable and non negotiable annuity bonds. (viii) Thus, it is seen that, even after tenanted lands of a religious institution and its surplus lands in excess of the ceiling limit, vest in the State Government, such institution gets from the State an annual payment equal to the net annual income from those lands, as specified in amended S. 8 of the Principal act, i. e. , the aggregate of 10 times the land revenue and 10 times the water rate, if any, payable in respect of such land. (ix) No doubt the annual income computed in the above manner , is very much less than the annual rental income which a land might have been fetching before S. 8 of the, Principal Act was amended by the Amendment Act. 3ut after such amendment, no landlord including a religious institution, could have lawfully got by way of rent a higher annual income from tenanted lands. (x) Thus, the income lawfully derivable by a religious institution from its tenanted lands, is not at all reduced by the vesting of such lands in the State government and subsequent granting of occupancy rights in respect of such lands to their erstwhile tenants, in that what the religious institution receives from the State by way of annuity will be equal to the annual income which it (the religious institution.) was lawfully deriving from such lands. It is only in respect of surplus lands above the ceiling limit, which had not been leased but were got cultivated by a religious institution, there may be substantial reduction of income on account of such surplus lands vesting in the State. But as the religious institution is permitted to retain such lands (not tenanted) upto the ceiling limit, it would be difficult to hold that the provisions of the amended Principal Act would seriously affect the financial position of such a religious institution so as to threaten its very existence. . (xi) A contention similar to the one urged by Sri Thirumale came up for consideration before the Supreme court in Narendra Prasadji vs. State of Gujarat (18) There, the constitutional validity of the Gujrat Devasthan inams Abolition Act, 1969, had been challenged. That Act provided for abolition of Inams held by religious and charitable institutions. . (xi) A contention similar to the one urged by Sri Thirumale came up for consideration before the Supreme court in Narendra Prasadji vs. State of Gujarat (18) There, the constitutional validity of the Gujrat Devasthan inams Abolition Act, 1969, had been challenged. That Act provided for abolition of Inams held by religious and charitable institutions. The learn- fed Counsel for the appellant therein contended that the compulsory acquisition of property of a religious institution limited the substance of the right of ownership guaranteed by Art. 26 (c) of the Constitution. Repelling that contention, this is what the Supreme Court said at pages 2104 and 2105 of the report:"what we look at the object of the act and of the various provisions enacted in furtherance of agravia reform, the Act is squarely protected under the saving provision of Art. 31-A. But it is then submitted that art. 31-A does not provide against the vice of contravention of Art. 26 while Arts. 14, 19 and 31 are expressly mentioned in Art. 31-A. The question, therefore, arises whether the right under Art. 26 (c) is an absolute and unqualified right to the extent that no agrarian reform can touch upon the landis owned by the religious denominations. No rights in an organised society can be absolute enjoyment of one's rights must be consistent with the enjoyment of rights also by others Where in a free play of social forces it is not possible to bring about a voluntary harmony, the State has to step in to set right the imbalance between competing interests and the Directive principles of State Policy , although not enforceable in Courts, have a definite and positive role introducing an obligation upon the State under art. 37 in making laws to regulate the conduct of men and their affairs. In doing so a distinction will have to be made between those, laws which directly infringe the freedom of religion and others, although indirectly, affecting some secular activities of religious institutions or bodies. 37 in making laws to regulate the conduct of men and their affairs. In doing so a distinction will have to be made between those, laws which directly infringe the freedom of religion and others, although indirectly, affecting some secular activities of religious institutions or bodies. For example if a, religious 'institution owns large areas of land far exceeding the ceiling under relepvant laws and indulges in Activities detrimental to the interests of the agricultural tenants, who are at their mercy, freedom of religion or freedom to manage religious affairs cannot be pleaded as a shield against regulatory remedial measures adopted by the State to put a stop to exploitation and unrest in other quarters in the interest of general social welfare. The core of religion is no interfered with in providing for amenties for sufferers of any kind. We take the view that the Act and its provisions do no violence 'to the rights guaranteed under Art. 26 (c ). In the view we have taken it is also not necessary to mention Art. 26 in art. 31-A and its omission therein is not at all of any consequence. " (xii) In the light of the aforesaid pronouncement of the Supreme, Court, we are unable to accede to the contention of Sri Thirumale that the amended principal Act, in so far as it provides for vesting in the State of the tenanted lands and surplus lands (in excess o the ceiling limit), owned by religious institutions, is violative of Article 26 of the Constitution. ( 45 ) CONTENTION (11) : (i) It was contended by Sri S. K. Venkataranga lyengar, learned Counsel for some of the petitioners, that (he ceiling limits for holding lands which had already been reduced under unamended S. 63 of the Principal Act, were themselves low and that there was no justification for reducing the ceiling limits by the amending Act. (ii) ,shri Venkataranga lyengar did not challenge, and we think rightly too, the competence of the State legislature to impose the ceiling limits for holding lands. Imposition of ceiling limits for holding lands, has been held by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions as being a measure which brings about equitable distribution of lands and hence constitutes agrarian reform which gets the protection of art. Imposition of ceiling limits for holding lands, has been held by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions as being a measure which brings about equitable distribution of lands and hence constitutes agrarian reform which gets the protection of art. 31-A of the, Constitution [see: (1) ranjit Singh vs. State of Punjab (AJR 1965 SC 632) (2) Inder Sing vs. State of Punjab (AIR 1967 SC 1976) what should be the ceiling limits, is a matter of legislative judgment and its reasonableness is not a mater Courts. to decide especially when such enquiry is barricaded by art. 31-A of the Constitution. (iii) Moreover, it is a matter of common knowledge that compared to the size of population of this State, which is depending upon agriculture for its livelihood, the total extent of lands in the State fit for cultivation, is very inadequate. There is great land-hunger in this State. There are a vast number of landless agricultural labourers and a large number of landholders whose holdings are very small and much below the ceiling limits. In such a situation, the reduction or the ceiling limits for holding Lands, cannot be said to be unreasonable. (v) Hence, we reject the above contention of Shri Venkataranga lyengar. ( 46 ) CONTENTION (12) ; (i) The reduction of coiling limits for holding lands brought about by the Amendment Act, has resulted in vesting in the State government of lands to the extent of the difference between the old ceiling limits under unamended Ss. 63 of the principal Act and the reduced ceiling limits under amended Sec. 63 of the principal Act. Learned Counsel for some of the petitioners contended that the State has no power to acquire any portion of the land held by a person under his personal cultivation in the estate which is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under a law unless the law empowering the acquisition provides for compensation at a rate not less than the market value of such land. It was further contended that as amended Sec. 67 of the Principal act does not provide for such compensation, that section should be held to be violative of the second proviso to clause (1) of Art. 31-A of the Constitution. It was further contended that as amended Sec. 67 of the Principal act does not provide for such compensation, that section should be held to be violative of the second proviso to clause (1) of Art. 31-A of the Constitution. That proviso reads:"provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estatt and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his pernal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within tne ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing here on or appurtenant thereto unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof. " (ii) A similar contention was considered by the Supreme Court in Kunjukutiy vs. State oy Kerala (19) while dealing with the constitutionality of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1966, as amended by Kerala Act 30 of 1969. Repelling that contention, this is whas' the Supreme Court. said at page 2i05 of the report:"it was not disputed that the ceiling limit fixed by the amended Act was within the competence of the legislature to fix; nor was it contended that the ceiling fixed by the original unamended Act by itself debarred; the legislature from further reducing the ceding limit so fixed. Prior to the amendment undoubtedly no land within the personal cultivation of the holder under the unamended Act within the ceiling limit fixed there by could be acquired without payment of compensation according to the market value, but once ceiling limit was changed by the amended act the second proviso to Art. 31-A (i) must be held to refer only to the new ceiling limit fixed by the amended Act. The ceiling limit originally fixed ceased to exist for future, the moment it was replaces by the amended Act. The prohibition contained in the second proviso operates only within the ceiling limit fixed under the existing law at the given time. It is true that the new ceiling limit was fixed contemporaneously with the acquisition of the land in excess of that ceiling limit. The prohibition contained in the second proviso operates only within the ceiling limit fixed under the existing law at the given time. It is true that the new ceiling limit was fixed contemporaneously with the acquisition of the land in excess of that ceiling limit. But it was not contended thai a law so fixing the ceiling limit and acquiring the land in excess would offend any provision of the Constitution. " (iii) In the light of the above ruling of the Supreme Court, the aforesaid contention of learned Counsel for petitioners should fail. ( 47 ) CONTENTION (13) : (i) It was next contended that the amendmen. of the definition of the word 'family' in sub-sec. (12) of S. 2 of the Principal Act, by the Amendment Act, so as to include unmarried daughters in the definition of family, whether or not they are dependant on their parents, was arbitrary because a separate ceiling limit should have been provided tor each unmarried daughter if she was not dependant on her parents, in which case the lands held by her would not be included in the ceiling limit for the family. (ii) A similar contention had been urged in Nanda Lal vs. State of Hariyana (20 ). While repelling that contention the Supreme Court referred to the report of the Planning Commission and the conclusion of the Chief Minister's conference and observed that adopting the family as the unit as again. it an individual, was considered- necessary, as that would reduce the scope for evasion of law by effecting mala fide partitions and transfers of lands in favour of family members. The Supreme court added that in the rural agricultural set up of our country the family is the operative unit and that all the lands of a family constitute a single Operational holding and that therefore, ceiling should be related to the capacity of a lamily to cultivate the lands personally. The Supreme Court noticed the contention on behalf of the State that the case of an unmarried daughter or daughters living with the family would be rare because in the normal course daughters would get married and would become members of their husbands' units and that is why no separate provision was made for giving additional land for every unmarried major daughter living with the family. The Supreme Court said at page 2104:"it is, there fore, not possible to strike down an enactment particularly the enactment dealing with agrarian reform which has been put on the statute Book with the avowed purpose of bringing about equality or rather reducing the inequality between the haves and the have-nots, as being violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution simply because it has failed to make a provision for what was regarded as an exceptional case or a rare contingency. " (iii) In the said decision, the Supreme Court was content with expressing a wish that the State would consider sympathetically the case of unmarried major daughters living with the family and even the case of divorced daughters who have come back to the family, by providing for addition ct some more land to the permissible area of the primary unit of the family for each such unmanned daughter or such divorced daughter, subject to some maximum limit. W-3 also express similar hope in regard to the necessity to amend the Land reforms law of Karnataka. (iv) However, in the light of the aforesaid pronouncement of the Supreme Court, we reject the contention that the amended definition of family as arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and hence void. ( 48 ) CONTENTION (14): (i) Amendment of S. 15 of the Principal Act by the amendment Act, by which the right of resumption of tenanted lands by soldiers and seamen was saved, but similar right 01 widows, unmarried daughters minors and physically and mentally handicapped persons,, was taken away was assailed as being arbitrary, descriminatory and hence void as being violatiye of Art. 14 of the Constitution. (ii) Perhaps the reasons for not permitting unmarried daughters, widows, minors and physically and mentally handicapped persons, to resume their tenanted lands, is that those categories of landlords are generally not likely to be, able to cultivate their lands personally. However, the Act provides for paying a higher rate of compensation to widows, unmarried women, minors and physically or mentally handicapped persons whose tenanted lands vest in the State. Even otherwise, attack on the ground of violation of art. 14 is immunised by Art. . 31-A be , cause granting full ownership of tentanted lands to the respective tenants, is a measure of agrarian reform. Even otherwise, attack on the ground of violation of art. 14 is immunised by Art. . 31-A be , cause granting full ownership of tentanted lands to the respective tenants, is a measure of agrarian reform. ( 49 ) CONTENTION (15): (i) Learned counsel for a few of the petitioners contended that the Amendment Act which excludes the jurisdiction of Civil courts and constitutes Land Tribunals with jurisdiction to adjudicate the question whether a land is an agricultural land, the question whether the tenancy is of an agricultural land and other questions involving civil rights, runs counter to the directive principle embodied in Art. 50 of the Constitution, namely, separation of the judiciary from the executive. (ii) Separation of the judiciary from the executive, does not mean that tribunals cannot exist under the Constitution. The Constitution itself envisages tribunals. Art. 186 provides for appeal to the Supreme Court from decision of Courts as well as tribunals. Even the High Court's power of superintendence under Art: 227, extends to courts and Tribunals, alike. The Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act has inserted a new Chapter, Chap. XIV"a, under the heading 'tribunate". Art. 323-B therein relates to Tribunals for certain matters. One of the matters for the adjudication of which Tribunals can be constituted under that articles, is 'land reform Thus, the constitution of land Reforms Tribunals under amended S. 48 of the Prinicipal Act, is sanctioned by Art. 323-B, the relevant portions of which read:"323-B. (1) The appropriate Legislature may,, by law, provide for ,the adjudication or trial by tribunals of any disputes, complaints, or offences with respect to any of the matters specified in clause (2) with respect to which such legislature has power to make laws. (2) The matters, referred to in cl. (1) are the following, namely:- (a) ** ** ** ** (d) land reforms by way of acquisition by the State of any estate as defined in Article 31a or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights or bv way of ceiling on agricultural land or in any other way. " (iii) However, one of learned Counsel questioned the validity of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act in so far as it inserted Chapter XIV-A in the Constitution. " (iii) However, one of learned Counsel questioned the validity of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act in so far as it inserted Chapter XIV-A in the Constitution. That constiruting of tribunals and conferring jurisdiction on them, are not per se, unconstitional is evident from the following observations of the Supreme Court ir associated Cement Companies Ltd. vs. P. N. Sharma (21) tribunals which fall within the purview of Art. 136 (1) occupy a special position of their own under the scheme of our Constitution. Special matters and questions are entrusted to them for their decision and in that sense, they share with the courts one common characteristic; both the Courts and the tribunals are constituted by the State and are invested with judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions. . They are both adjudicating bodies and they deal with and finally determine disputes between parties which are entrusted to their jurisdiction. ,. The approach adopted by both the courts and the tribunals is subsant'ially the same, and there is no essential difference between the functions that they discharge. As in the case of courts, so in the case of tribunals. it is the State's inherent judicial power which has been transferred and by virtue of the said, power, it is the State's inherent judicial function which they discharge. Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign State, and on considerations of policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the Courts established by the Constitution; but that does no' affect the competence of the State, by appropriate measures, to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating special matters and disputes between parties. . . . . . . The basic and the fundamental feature which is common to both the Courts and the tribunals is that they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vesting sovereign State. " (iv) Hence, we reject the contention that the Amendment Act constuting land Tribunals and conferring jurisdiction on them to adjudicate disputes in regard to land reforms, is unconstitutional. ( 50 ) CONTENTION (16) : (i) One of the learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the power to constitute land Tribunals was conferred on the state legislature for the first time by art. ( 50 ) CONTENTION (16) : (i) One of the learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the power to constitute land Tribunals was conferred on the state legislature for the first time by art. 323-B which was inserted in the constitution by the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution and that as the amendment Act which amended S. 48 of the principal Act, was enacted prior to the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution, it must be held that amended section 48 is void on account of want of legislative competence. (vi) The relevant part of Entry 18 in List II of the VII Sch. to the Constitution, reads :''land that is to say, right in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant and collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land (iii) It is a well settled rule of construction of entries in the legisa tive lists of the Centre and the States in a federal constitution that the language of' these entries should be given the widest meaning of which they are fairlv capable of. So interpreted, the words of Entry 18 arc wide enough to comprehend the power o,f State legislature to constitute tribunals to deal with matters relating to lane tenure legislation or transfer of rights in lands. Long, before Part XIV-A was inserted in the Constitution by the 42 nd Amendment of the Constitution, spedal tribunals to deal with disputes arising out. of abolition of Zamindari art) Inam (enures, had been' constituted by State legislative enactments. The Madras' Estates (Abolition and conversion in Ryotwari) Act, 1947. provided for setting up Tribunals hear appeals from decisions of Statement state, 'a. P ('22) the question that arose for decision was whether the jurisdiction of Civil Courts was barred from questioning the correctness of decisions of such Tribunals. The Supreme court held that the jurisdiction of civil Courts was barred. Though the question whether the Madras Provincial legislature had the competence to constitute such Tribunals did not expressly come up for consideration, the decision of the Supreme Court proceeded on the basis that the State Legislature had such competence. The Supreme court held that the jurisdiction of civil Courts was barred. Though the question whether the Madras Provincial legislature had the competence to constitute such Tribunals did not expressly come up for consideration, the decision of the Supreme Court proceeded on the basis that the State Legislature had such competence. (iv) Hence, we hold that de hors the provisions of Art. 323-B of the constitution, the State Legislature had competence to enact S. 36 of the amendment Act which substituted a new section for Sec. 48 of the Principal act, providing for constitution of Land tribunals. ( 51 ) CONTENTION (17) :. (i) Shri b. P. Holla and Shri K. Shivashankar bhat, learned counsel for petitioners in some of the petitions, contended that amended S. 48 which provides for constituting Land Tribunals, is not a provision which is basically and essentially a necessary part of agrarian reforms and that hence that section is not immunised from attack on the ground of violation of Arts. 14 and 19 of the constitution. (ii) Elaborating this contention, learned Counsel submitted] that an adjudicatory machinery provided under amended S. 48, for adjudicating disputes that arise'in the course of carrying out the measure of land reforms, envisaged in the Principal Act, as amended by the Amendment Act, need not be regarded as one which is basically and essentially necessary, in that, it would be possible to carry out such measure of land reforms without any special adjudicatory machinery, in which case the ordinary civil Courts would deal with such disputes, and that even if a special adjudicatory machinery is considered necessary for the purpose, it is possible to have a different adjudicatory machinery rather than the one provided by amended) S. 48 of the Principal Act. Relying on the ruling of the Supreme Court in Akadasi vs. State of Orissa (6), it was urged that the protection of Art. 31-A would be available to only such provisions of the impugned Amendment Act which form a basically and essentially necessary part of an agrarian reform measure and not to those provisions which could be merely subsidiary, incidental or helpful in carrying out such measure of agrarian reforms. (iii) We shall now examine whether the protective cloak of Art. 31-A; is available to the machinery provisions of a law relating to agrarian reforms. (iii) We shall now examine whether the protective cloak of Art. 31-A; is available to the machinery provisions of a law relating to agrarian reforms. (iv) In Kh Fida Ali vs. State of j and K (14) the constitutional validity of" the Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian reforms Act, 1972, had been impugned. The Supreme Court held that the Act contained a clear programme of agrarian reforms and! hence could not be challenged on the score of violation of articles 14, 19 and 31 in view of the protection given by Art. 31-A. During the course of that judgment, the Supreme Court noticed certain procedural provisions of that Aci and ' observed thus at page 1526:"section 49 provides for a summary procedure for all proceedings and enquiries under the Act or the rules. . . . . . By S. 52 all applications, suits and proceedings pending before any Revenue Officer, Civil. or Revenue Court etc. , shall abate subject to the proviso appended to the Section. "the entire Act including the procedural provisions, was held to be constitutionally valid having received the protection of Art. 31-A. (v) In Minerva Mills Ltd. , vs. Union of India (5) Bhagwati, J. , in his separate judgment considered the constitutional validity of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holding) Act, 1961, as amended maharashtra Acts Nos. 21 and 47 of 1975. While upholding the constitutional!! of that Act, His Lordship observed thus at page 1812 of the report: "the impugned legislation also contained provisions prescribing the machinery for implementation of its substantive provisions. Now plainly and unquestionaly this was a piece of legislation relating to agrarian reform and; was immunised against challenge under Art. 14, 19 and 31 by the protective cloak of Art. 31-A. . . " (vi) In Kamakshya vs. Collector and DC (23) the constitutionality of vs. 4 (h) of the Bihar Land Reform act, 1950, had been impugned. That section empowered the Collector to enquire into any transfer of interest of any kind in any building used primarily as office or Cutchery for the collection of rent of such estate, if such transfer had been made at any time after 1. 1. That section empowered the Collector to enquire into any transfer of interest of any kind in any building used primarily as office or Cutchery for the collection of rent of such estate, if such transfer had been made at any time after 1. 1. 1946 and if on such enquiry the Collector was satisfied that such transfer was made with the object of defeating the provisions of that Act or causing loss to the State or obtaining higher compensation, then the Collector might, after giving notice to the parties concerned and them and with the previous sanction of the State Government annul such transfer and dispossess the person claiming under it. No appeal or review was provided in the Act from such order of the Collector. The supreme Court, while upholding the constitutionality of that Section, said thus at page 66 of the report:"assuming, however, that the Collector has very wide powers, it is to be remembered that S. 4 (h) is a part of the law of acquisition of estates as enacted by the Act and is an integral part of the machinery by which acquisition of an estate takes place. The Act is a valid law of aquisition and its whole purpose may be defeated unless there was some such provision as contained-in S. 4 (h ). The act being a law for acquisition of estates the question of it imposing any unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights of the petitioners does not arise. In any event the Act including S. 4 (h) is protected by article 31-A of the Constitntion. " (vii) In Raghubir Singh, vs. State of Ajmir (24) Secs. 8 and 38 of Ajmer abolition of intermedaries and Land reforms Act, 1955 were under challenge. S. 8 empowered the Collector to cancel certain leases of lands if they had not been made in the normal course of management, but in anticipation of legislation for abolition of intermediaries. The argument was that there could be no retrospective cancellation of leases granted at a time when the land owner had a right to dispose of his property as of right under Art. 19 (1) (f) and there was no restriction on that right. In upholding the validity of the provision as being protected under art. The argument was that there could be no retrospective cancellation of leases granted at a time when the land owner had a right to dispose of his property as of right under Art. 19 (1) (f) and there was no restriction on that right. In upholding the validity of the provision as being protected under art. 31-A (1) (a), the Supreme Court said thus at page 478:"such cancellation would suoserve the purposes of the Act, and the provision for it would therefore be an integral part of the Act, though ancil lary to its main object, and would thus be protected under Art. 31-A (1) (a) of the Constitution. " (viii) S. 38 of that Act which provided for fixing the maximum rent at 50 per cent above the land revenue, was assailed as imposing an unreasonable restriction on the right of the land owner to let his holding. While upholding the validity of that section, the supreme Court said at page 478. "s. 38 is another ancillary section, like S. 8 and is meant to subserve 'the purposes of the Act, namely, the abolition of intermediaries and encouragement of selfcultivation oi tne land. We are, therefore, of opines that. S. 38 is also protected under art. 31-A (1) (a) of the Constitution as an ancillary provision necessary for the purpose of carrying out the objects of the Act. ," (Underlining italics is ours) (IX) In State of Bihar Vs. Umesh (25) the attack was on S. 4 (h) of the bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, which empowered the Collector, inter alia, to make enquiries in respect of any transfer oi any land comprised in an estate and to cancel the same if he was satisfied that such transfer was made some time after January 1, 1946, with the object of defeating any provisions of that act or causing loss to the State or obtaining compensation thereunder. Repelling the contention that that Section was not protected by Art. 31-A of the constitution, this is what the Supreme court said at page 51:"it is said that the section ex proped vigore does not provide for acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or for the extinguishment or modification of any such rights and, therefore, is nut hit by Art. 31-A of the Constitution. This argument in eifect disannexes s. 4 (h) of the Act from the settinging which it appears and seeks to test its validity independently of its interaction on the other provisions of the act. Section 4 (h) is an integral part of the Act and taken out of the act, it can only operate in vacuum indeed, the object of the section is to offset the anticipatory attempts made by landlords to defeat the provisions of the Act. Suppose the Collector cancels a transfer of land by uu. owner of an estate under the said section; the said land automatically vests in the State, with the result that the rights oi the transferor and the transteree therein are extinguished. The said result accrues on the basis that the said land continued to be a part of the estate at the time the Act, came into force. That apart, the section is a part of the Act, designed to extinguish or modify the rights in an estate, ana the power conferred on a Collector to cancel a transfer of any land in an estate is only to prevent fraud and to achieve effectively the object oi the Act. " (x) The Andhra Pradesh (Andhra area) instates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1943, inter alia, conferred on every tenant in an estate the right to aolain a Ryotwari patta in respect of Ryoti lands and on the landholder the light to obtain Ryoiwari Patta in respect of lands which beloged to him before the notified aate as his private lands. 8. 56 (1) of that Act made express provision tor determination of the claims made by landholders for grant of Ryotwari Patta in respee, of the alleged private lands. explain ning the scope oi that section, the Supreme Court observed thus m m. Chayanna vs. K. Narayana (26) at page 1320 of the report:"if there is a provision for delcrmination of claims of a landholder for grant of Ryotwari patta in respect of his private lands, surely in an act aimed at abolition of intermeadiaries and introduction of ryotwari settlement, there must be a provision for determination of the claims of ryots for the grant of ryotwari patta section 56 (1) is clearly such a provision. '" (xi) From the aforesctid decisions of the Supreme Court, it can reasonably be gathered that an Art providing for acquisition by the State of any estate or any rights therein, or extin- guishment or modification of such rights, takes within its ambit not merely the provisions therein which ex proprio vigore provide for such acquisition, modification or extinguishment, but also provisions therein relating to the constitution of special tribunals conferring upon them jurisdiction for determining rights and liabilities which such latter provisions cannot but be regarded as necessarily an integral and essential part of such Act and not as something which is merely ancillary or incidental to the main object of such Act. It, therefore, follows that the protective canopy of art. 31-A is available also to those provisions of such Act which rejate to the constitution of special tribunals and conferring upon them adjudicatory jurisdiction. ( 52 ) CONTENTIONS (18), (19) and (20) : (i) These contentions can conveniently be considered together. As stated earlier, amended S. 48 of the principal Act is the most controversial provision. Practically all learned counsel for petitioners assailed that section. In fact, some of them assaiiedi only that section and no other provision of the Principal Act or the Amendment Act. (ii) Amended S. 48 deals with the constitution of land Tribunals. As seen earlier, each such Tribunal consists of an Assistant Commissioner who is its Chairman and four other members nominated by the State Government, at least one of whom should be a person belonging to the Scheduled castes or the Scheduled Tribes. The state Government may constitute additional Tribunals for any Taluk. The state Government may re-constitute the Tribunal at any time. (iii) The striking features of the land Tribunals, are these: (i) Amended S. 48 of the Principal act contains no guidance as to how the power of the State Government to nominate members other than the chairman, should be exercised; (ii) That section does not prescribe any educational or other qualifications for being nominated as members other than its Chairman of the Tribunals; (iii) No tenure is fixed for such members. They can be ( removed from membership at the will and pleasure of the State Government; (iv) The decision of the Land Tribunal is made final and there is no provision for any appeal or revision from such decision or for making a reference to the High Court or any other Court of any question of law, however complicated it may be; and (v) There is no specific provision for transfer of a case from one Tribunal to another where any member of a tribunal has any personal interest in that case or where there is a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of any of those members. We shall consider separately the feature relating to prohibition against legal practitioners appearing in proceedings before the Land Tribunals. (vi) It was contended by learned counsel that on account of the above features, the Land Tribunal is abhorrent to the concept of a Tribunal and that the section relating to the constitution of the Tribunal does not fulfil even the minimum requirement of the rule of law which is a basic structure of the Constitution and that hence amended S. 48 is unconstitutional. (vii) For the proposition that the rule of law is a basic structure of the constitution, reliance was placed on the following observations of Mathew, J. , in Indira Gandhi vs. Raj Narain (27):"in the opinion of some of the judges constituting the majority in bharati's case ( AIR 1973 SC 1461 ) rule of Law is a basic structure of the constitution apart from democracy. " (viii) What is the content of the concept of the rule of law? In jai Singhani vs. Union of India (28) the Supreme Court observed that the rule of law from one point of view means that the decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules, that, in general, such decisions should be predictable and that the citizen should know where he is. (ix) In Indira Gandhi's case, mathew, J. , observed thus at page 2385 of the report :"the provisions of the Constitution were enacted with a view to ensure the rule of law. Even if I assume that the rule of law is a basic structure, it seems to me that the meaning and the constituent elements of the concept must be gathered from the enacting provisions of the Constitution. Even if I assume that the rule of law is a basic structure, it seems to me that the meaning and the constituent elements of the concept must be gathered from the enacting provisions of the Constitution. The equality aspect of the rule of law and of democratic republicanism is provided in Article 14. . . If according to the majority in Bharathi's case ( AIR 1973 SC 1461 ) Art. 14 does not pertain to the basic structure of 'the constitution, which is the other principle of equality incorporated in the constitution which can be the basic structure of the Constitution or the essential feature of democracy or rule of law?" (x) Though it is dfficult to :,tate the precise contents of the concept of the rule of law, we shall proceed to examine whether amended S. 48 of the principal Act fulfils the requirement that decisions should be made, by the application of known principles and rules, that in general, decisions should be predictable and that the citizen should know where he is. (xi) It is plain that the Land Tribunal has to decide the causes coming up for decision before it, in accordance with the provisions of the amended principal Act following the procedure prescribed by S. 48-A of that Act and the procedural rules contained in the karnataka Land Reforms Rules, 1974 rule 17 of those Rules provides, inter alia, that the Tribunal shall, in respect of applications. made to it, follow toe same procedure as specified for a summary enquiry under S. 34 of the karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. (xii) Thus, there is nothing in amended S. 48 of the Principal Act that militates against the principle that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and that decisions should be predictable. (xiii) Learnexl Counsel for some of the petitioners submitted that in the absence of guidelines, the Government may pack the Tribunals with members belonging to its own political party, that with the change of the political party in power the members of the Tribunal may also be changed and that members so chosen could not be expected to function impartially or objectively, but were likely to be amenable to extraneous influence. It was highlighted by learned counsel that there were serious allegations of large scale corruption against several members of Tribunals and that several writ petitions impugning the decisions of Tribunals on the ground of corruption or bias, have been admitted by this Court. (xiv) It is true that amended S. 48 of the Principal Act does not contain any guidelines for the exercise pf the power of the Government to nominate the members of the Tribunal other than its Chairman and that that Section does not also prescribe any qualifications for being nominated as the members of the Tribunal. We entirely agree with learned Counsel for petitioners that it would have been more satisfactory if that section contained such guidelines and had prescribed qualifications for being nominated as members of the Tribunal. But, the question is whether the absence of such guidelines and such qualifications, renders that section unconstitutional on the ground of conferring unguided and uncontrolled power on the Government. (xv) It is significant to note that the power to nominate members of the tribunal, is conferred not on any minor functionary,but on the highest executive authrity in the State, i. e. , the state Government. It is well settled that the guidance for exercise of The power conferred by a status need not necessarily be express and that the policy and the scheme of the Act may themselves afford such guidance. In the present case, the purpose for which land Tribunals are to be constituted, may itself afford guidance as to how such power to nominate should be exercised. (xvi)) The mere possibility of abusu of power, is not sufficient to hold that the provision conferring such power, is invalid: In any particular case, if it is shown that the person or persons nominated as members of the tribunal, are not proper persons the nomination of such members would be struck down by the Court. What would be struck down would be the exercise of power to nominate in a particular case and not the Section itself conferring such power. Likewise, if any member is shown to have acted corruptly or with bias, then the decision to which he is a party, will be vitiated. But, the power to nominate" members. by itself cannot be regarded as bad on that score. Likewise, if any member is shown to have acted corruptly or with bias, then the decision to which he is a party, will be vitiated. But, the power to nominate" members. by itself cannot be regarded as bad on that score. (xvii) Thus, we are unable to hold that amended S. 48 of the Principal act is unconstitutional on the ground of conferring unguided and uncontrolled power. (xviii) Learned Counsel for petitioners contended that as valuable rights to property come up for adjudication by the Tribunals, the members of the Tribunals should consist of persons who are well versed in law, as very often complicated questions of law arise for determination by the Tribunals. It was argued that in the absence of prescription of qualifications for membership of Tribunals, the Government can under S. 48 appoint as member any lay person with hardly any education or capacity to understand questions of fact and/or law that arise for adjudication and to sift the evidence. It was pointed out that most of the enactments like the Income tax Act, the Sales Tax Act, the Industrial Disputes Act and the Co-operative societies Act, which provide lor constituting Tribunals, have prescribed either judicial experienc or eligibility for being appointed as a Judge as a qualification for the membership of such tribunals. (xix) On the other hand, the learned Advocate General, who appeared for the State, pointed out that the chairman of the Land Tribunal would be an Assistant Commissioner who would have judicial experience as exofficio Executive Magistarat and also as the appellate authority in Land Revenue matters hearing appeals from order of Tahsildars. The, learned Advocate General also submitted that the chairman of the Land Tribunal would guide the other members thereof in dealing with questions qf law that arise for determination and in assessing evidence. The learned Advocate General said that the questions which generally arise for determination before land Tribunals would be comparatively simple ones, like the questions whether the applicant for grant of occupancy right in respect of a land, was a tenant thereof and whether he was personally cultivating it immediately before 1. 3. 1974. The learned Advocate General said that the questions which generally arise for determination before land Tribunals would be comparatively simple ones, like the questions whether the applicant for grant of occupancy right in respect of a land, was a tenant thereof and whether he was personally cultivating it immediately before 1. 3. 1974. The learned Advocate General added that it is not absolutely necessary that adjudication of disputes should be done only by a Judge or a person well versed in law, that such adjudication can be done by lay persons also and that it would not be correct to start with a presumption that sud. persons would not discharge their adjudicatory functions honestly, fairly and objectively. (xx) There can be no doubt that it would have been more satisfactory if the Tribunals were manned by person having knowledge of law and preferably haying judicial expedience also. But, the question is whether the constitution of the Land Tribunal can be held to be invalid on the ground that its members other than the Chairman, have no judicial experience or even knowledge of law. (xxi) This very question was on sidered in Khatija Bi vs. State of Karnataka (29) by Venkataramaiah, J. who observed, thus at page 166: -"many of these Tribunals do consist of persons who are not trained in law. It is well known that under the provisions of the Arbitration Act laymen are often appointed as Arbitrators. I know of no case where a decision of an Arbitrator is set aside on the sole ground that he is not a lawyer or he does not possess a degree in law. Association of laymen with administration of justice is not foreign to British Jurisprudence. The Jury consisting of laymen are the judges of the fact in many countries. Till very recently we had under the Criminal Procedure Code the system of trial with the aid of the jury where in certain case's, the verdict of the Jury was binding on the court. Hence, merely because lavmen are associated) with the decision making process of the Tribunal, it cannot be said that the very foundation of the Constitution is shaken by the State Legislature. "we are in respectful agreement with the above observations of Venkataramaiah. Hence, merely because lavmen are associated) with the decision making process of the Tribunal, it cannot be said that the very foundation of the Constitution is shaken by the State Legislature. "we are in respectful agreement with the above observations of Venkataramaiah. J. (xxii) It was next contended that the absence of fixity of tenure of a member of the Tribunal affects his sense of security of office and judicial independence, and that the prospect of being removed from office if he incurs the displeasure of the people in authority, makes him amenable to extraneous pressure in deciding cases. (xxiii) As stated earlier, amended s. 48 of the Principal Act does not fix any term for the members of the Tribunal. Under sub-section (3) of that section, the State Government may reconstitute the Tribunal at any time. It is well known that if a person who performs judicial duties, should function without fear of favour, he should have a sense of security as to his tenure. In the Reference under Art. 143 of the Constitution regarding the special Courts Bill, 1978' (30) the; question that arose for consideration was whether the provision in that Bill enabling the Government to appoint retired Judges of High Courts to preside over the Special Courts, suffered from any infirmity. While answering that question , Chandrachud. C. J. ,. in his leading opinion, observed thus at page 517 of the report:-"a sitting Judge of the High court enjoys security of tenure until he attains a particular age, the retired Judge will hold his office during the pleasure of the Government. The pleasure doctrne is subversive of judicial independence. A retired Judge presiding over a special Court, who displays strength and indepndence may be frowned upon by the Government and there is nothing to prevent it from term nating his appointment as and when it likes. " (xxiv) Absence of security of tenure of members of the Tribunal other than its Chairman, is a serious infirmity in amended S. 48 of the Principal Act. (xxv) As stated earlier, there is no provision for appeal or revision from decisions of Land Tribunals nor is there any provision for reference to a Civil court or the High Court on questions of law. (xxv) As stated earlier, there is no provision for appeal or revision from decisions of Land Tribunals nor is there any provision for reference to a Civil court or the High Court on questions of law. (xxvi) It was argued by learned counsel for petitioners that at least one appeal or revision from a decision of the Tribunal, is absolutely necessary and that the absence of any provision for such appeal or revision, renders amended Section 48 of the Principal act invalid. (xxvii) On the other hand, the learned Advocate General contended that even if no appeal or revision from the decisions of the Land Tribunals is povided, the constitutional remedy under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution, is still available to a party' aggrieved by the decision of such tribunal. He maintained that under those articles the High Court can interfere not only when the decision of a tribunal suffers from a manifest error of law, but also when such decision is perverse even on a question of fact. (xxviii) Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that a petition under Art. 226 and/or Art. 227 cannot be a substitute for an appeal or a revision as the scope of a petition under either or both those articles, is very limited and that in exercise of such jurisdiction the High Court cannot go into errors of fact or even errors of law which are not manifest errors. (xxix) Learned Counsel for petitioners strongly relied on the following observations of the Delhi High Court in wire Netting Stores vs. Reg. Provident commr. (31 ). "the order may be passed by the duly competent and qualified person. but is not subject to any review or revison judicially or quasi-judicially. The determination of the amount payable by the employer affects civil rights if not fundamental rights. A provision should have been made for an appeal to a Tribunal, judicial or quasi judicial. The availability of constitutional remedy cannot supply this lacuna,. but is not subject to any review or revison judicially or quasi-judicially. The determination of the amount payable by the employer affects civil rights if not fundamental rights. A provision should have been made for an appeal to a Tribunal, judicial or quasi judicial. The availability of constitutional remedy cannot supply this lacuna,. "dealing with this question, Venkataramaiah, J. , observed thus in Khatija bi's case (28):"any decision given by the Tribunal is open to correction at the hands of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and by the Supreme Court under the power vested in it by the Constitution, (xxx) It is unnecessary to examine the numerous decisions of the Supreme court and High Courts cited by learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Advocate, General as to the ambit of the jurisdiction of this Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (xxxi) While it is undoubtedly very desirable to provide at least one appea or revision from the decision of any trinal, the mere absence of such appeal or revision can, at the worst only be regarded as a lacuna which is not sufficient to render invalid the provision which renders the decision of the Land. Tribunal final. It is noteworthy that certain enactments which , provide for adjudication by Tribunals, do not also provide for any appeal, revision or reference to a civil Court or the High court. The Industrial Disputes Act. 1947, does not provide for any appeal from decisions of the Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Court; Likewise, the Air Corporation Act, 1953 and the life Insurance Corporation 1956, do not contain any provision for appeals from the awards of the respective Tribunals constituted under those Acts for deter mination of compensation for acquisition by the State of the, Undertakings of companies. (xxxii) The absence of a specii'ic provision for transfer of a case from one land Tribunal to another on the ground of interestedness or bias on the part of any member of the former, is a very serious omission in the amended Principal Act. (xxxii) The absence of a specii'ic provision for transfer of a case from one land Tribunal to another on the ground of interestedness or bias on the part of any member of the former, is a very serious omission in the amended Principal Act. In the Reference relating to the special Courts Bill, 1978 (32) the supreme Court, while considering the absence of any provision in the Special courts Bill, 1978, for transfer of cases from one Special Court to another, observed thus at page 517 of the report :- "the manner in which a Judge conducts himself may disclose a bias, in which case the interest of justice would require that the trial of the case ought to be withdrawn from mm. There are other cases in which a Judge may not in fact be biased and yet the accused may entertain a reasonable apprehension on account of attendant circumstances that he will not get a fair trial. It is of the utmost importance that justice must not only be done but must be seem to be done. To compel an accused to submit to the jurisdiction of a Court which, in fact, is biased or is reasonably apprehended to be biased is a violation of the fundamental principles of natural justice and a denial of fair play. Tnere are yet other cases in which expediency or convenience may require the transfer of a case, even if no bias is involved. The absence of provision for transfer of trials in appropriate cases may undermine the very confidence of the people in the special Courts as an institution up for dispensing justice. (xxxiii) The above observations are equally applicable to Land Tribunals. However, this serious defect is not without a remedy. The party who apprehends bias or interestedness on the part of any member of a Tribunal, can request that member not to participate in proceedings of the Tribunal. Under rule 16 of the Karnalaka Land forms Rules, 1974, the quorum for a meeting of the Tribunal is only three members. Even if two members of the tribunal are disabled from participating in the proceedings of the Tribunal, the remaining three members will be sufficient to constitute the quorum. Under rule 16 of the Karnalaka Land forms Rules, 1974, the quorum for a meeting of the Tribunal is only three members. Even if two members of the tribunal are disabled from participating in the proceedings of the Tribunal, the remaining three members will be sufficient to constitute the quorum. If in spite of such request the member in respect of whom there is apprehension of bias or interestedness, insists on participating in the proceeding, the aggrieved party can approach this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution to prevent such member from so participating. If the Chairman and/or more than two members suffer from bias or interestedness, a party can move the government to constitute an additional tribunal and if such additional Tribunal is constituted, he can move the Deputy Commissioner of the District to transfer the case to such additional tribunal. If the. Government or the deputy Commissioner does not accede to such request, such party may approach this Court for a mandamus directing the Government to constitute an additional Tribunal and directing the deputy Commissioner to transfer the case to such additional Tribunal. (xxxiv) In spite of the infirmity of not providing for security of tenure of members of the Tribunal and the absence of any provision for appeal, revision or reference from orders of Tribunals and for the transfer of cases from one Tribunal to the other, the constitutionality of amended S. 48 of the Principal Act cannot be challenged, as that section which provides for an adjudicatory machinery, also enjoys the protective cloak of Art. 31-A of the Constitution. ( 53 ) CONTENTION (21) : (i) Learned counsel for petitioners next contended that sub-sec. (8) of amended S. 48 of the principal Act which prohibits legal practitioners from appearing in the proceedings before Land Tribunals, is in conflict with S. 30 of the Advocates act, 1961 which is a Central enactment and that even otherwise that subsection was constitutionally invalid. (ii) Support for the above contention was sought to be derived from the decision of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Jaswant Kaul vs. State of Haryana (33 ). S. 20-A of the Haryana ceiling of Land Holdings Act, 1972, barred the appearance of any legal practitioner before any officer or authority under that Act other than the financial Commissioner. S. 20-A of the Haryana ceiling of Land Holdings Act, 1972, barred the appearance of any legal practitioner before any officer or authority under that Act other than the financial Commissioner. It was argued that that Section was repugnant to s. 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, which declares that every Advocate whose name is entered in the common roll can as of right practise, inter alia, before any Tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence. Chinnappa reddy, J. , who spoke for the Full bench, observed thus at pages 233 and 234 of the report :-"the right of an Advocate whose name appears on the common roll to practise before any Tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence, cannot be taken away by a state law. To the extent that Section 20-A bars the appearance of Advocates before any officer or authority, it must be held to be repugnant to Section 30 of the Advocates Act and therefore invalid. " (iii) However, before the opinion of the Full Bench was pronounced, His lordship noticed that S. 30 of the Advocates Act had not yet come into force. He said that that would not make any difference to his conclusion regarding the validity of S. 20-A of the Haryana act, because until S. 30 of the Advocates Act comes into'force, S. 14 of the indian Bar Council Act shall continue to be in force. But, His Lordship thought that S. 14 of the Indian Bar council Act was in pari materia with s. 30 of the Advocates Act. (iv) With great respect to Chinnappa reddy, J. , he was not right as pointed out by the learned Advocate General, in thinking that S. 14 (1) of the Bar council Act is in pari materia with S. 30 of the Advocates Act. The relevant parts of sub-sec. (1) of S. 14 of the bar Council Act read: -"14. Right of Advocates to practise: (1) An Advocate shall be entitled as of right to practise----- (a) xx xx xx xx (b) save as otherwise provided by sub-section (2) or by or under any other law for the time being in force in any other Court or before any other Tribunal or person legally au- thorised to take evidence, and. . . . . Underlining italics is ours. . . . . Underlining italics is ours. (v) Thus it is seen that the right of an Advocate to practise before any Tribunal, can be taken away or restricted by any law. The view we have taken receives support from the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Mulchand vs. Mukund (34 ). Rule 36 of the rules framed undep: the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, provided that in proceedings under Rules 32 to 35 no party shall be represented by a legal practitioner. The validity of that Rule was impugned in "the High court of Bombay. It was contended that that Rule violated the fundamental right guranteed to an Advocate under art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution to practise his profession. Repelling that contention, Chagla, C. J. who spoke for the Bench said thus at page 298 of the report:- "the right of a lawyer to practise is not an absolute right. The very charter which gives him the right to practise controls, limits and circumscribes his right. . . . . . . The statutory right given to an Advocate who has been enrolled as such by this court is under S. 14 (1) of the Bar council Act, and that right is to practise subject to the provisions of subsec. (4) of S. 9 in the High Court of which he is an advocate,, and save as otherwise provided by sub-sec. (2) or by or under any other law for the time, being in force in any other Court in the province and before any other Tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence, and before any other authority or person before whom such advocate is by or under the law for the time being in force entitled to practise. Therefore, his right to practise is controlled by this important provision, that any other law for the time being in force may restrict or take away his right. Therefore, if the Co-operative Societies Act were to provide that an advocate of the High Court of Bombay shall not practise before the arbitral tribunal set up under that Act, then the right of the advocate will be, cirsumscribed by the provisions of that law. Therefore, if the Co-operative Societies Act were to provide that an advocate of the High Court of Bombay shall not practise before the arbitral tribunal set up under that Act, then the right of the advocate will be, cirsumscribed by the provisions of that law. It should be remembered that it is not the fact that a man has passed a law examination or has acquired a law degree that entitles him to practise in Courts of law; his right to practise depends upon his being enrolled as an Advocate and he is enrolled as an advocate on terms and conditions laid down in the Bar council Act. Therefore, as I said before, his very charter which entitles him to practise lays down conditions and limitations in that he can: only practise before such tribunals as the law permits him and he may not practise before such tribunals, as the laws lays down as being prohibited to lawyers. (vi) In T. S. Agarwal vs. Jt. Regr. of Co-operative Societies (35) the, contutional validity of sub-sec. (2) of S. 69 of the M. P. Co-operative Societies act, 1960, had been under attack. That sub-section provides, inter alia, that no party shall be represented at the hearing of the dispute except with the permission of the Registrar or his inominee. Repelling that attack this is what the Madhya Pradesh High Court said at page 88 of the report: - "the right to be represented by a legal practitioner, except when a person is charged of a, criminal offence, is not a fundamental right. . . . . . . The procedure of administrative tribunals being informal, a party can feel at ease and properly present his case even without a lawyer, this is one of the reasons which is given for the growth of the tribunals; (Justice in the Welfare State, Harry Street, page 10 (Hamlyn Lectures, 1963 ). Many believe that at least in simple and ordinary matters representation by a lawyer unnecessarily adds to the expense of the parties and has a tendency to complicate and prolong the proceedings. Experience shows that simple disputes can be satisfactorily decided even without the assistance of counsel. " (vii) Similar was the view taken by Subba Rao, J. , (as he then was), in Rangaswamy vs. Industrial Tribunal (36 ). (viii) In the light of the aforesaid rulings, sub-sec. Experience shows that simple disputes can be satisfactorily decided even without the assistance of counsel. " (vii) Similar was the view taken by Subba Rao, J. , (as he then was), in Rangaswamy vs. Industrial Tribunal (36 ). (viii) In the light of the aforesaid rulings, sub-sec. (8) of amended S. 48 of the Principal Act, which prohibited legal practitioners from appearing in any proceedings before the; Tribunal, cannot be held to be void. ( 54 ) CONTENTION (22): (i) Sub-sec. (1) of amended) S. 133 of the Principal Act povides, inter alia, that notwithstanding anything in any law for the time being in force, all interim orders issued or made by any Civil or Criminal Court, officer or authority, whether in the nature of temporary injunction or appointment of a Receiver or otherwise concerning the land, shall stand dissolved or vacated as the case may be (ii) It was contended by one o! learned Counsel for petitioners that it is not competent for the legislature to nullify judgments, decreep or orders of competent Courts. (iii) The law on this point is well settled by several decisions of the supreme Court. The legislature cannot directly overrule or nullify a judicial decision. But the legislature is competent to render ineffective the decision of a competent Court by changing the basis of law upon which that decision had been founded. (iv) S. 132 of the Principal Act, inter alia, bars the jurisdiction of a civil Court to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under that Act required to be decided by the tribunal. Amended S. 133 of Principal act provides, inter alia, that no Civil or Criminal Court shall decide in any suit or civil proceeding concerning a land, the question whether the land is or is not an agricultural land and whether the person claiming to be in possession, is or is 'not a tenant of the said land immediately prior to 1. 3. 1974. . . Haying so excluded the jurisdiction of Civil and Criminal courts in certain matters it was competent for the legislature to take away such jurisdiction restrospectively also and to render ineffective orders already made by such Courts. 3. 1974. . . Haying so excluded the jurisdiction of Civil and Criminal courts in certain matters it was competent for the legislature to take away such jurisdiction restrospectively also and to render ineffective orders already made by such Courts. Hence, it cannot be said that the legislature had no competence to provide that all interim orders issued or made by such courts including orders of temporary injunction and orders appointing Receivers shall stand dissolved or vacated. ( 55 ) WE, therefore, uphold the consttutional validity of all the impugned provisions of the Principal Act and of the Amendment Act and of subsequent acts by which the Principal Act was amended. ( 56 ) IN the result, (i) W. P. Nos. 1470/74 etc, in which only the constitutional validity of the principal Act and/or the Amendment act, has been challenged, are dismissed, but without costs. (ii) W. P. Nos. 1985/75 etc. in which, besides the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Principal act and/or the Amendment Act, the notices issued by the Land Tribunals in proceedings before them have been challenged, are also dismissed, but without costs. The Land Tribunals may continue the proceedings before them from the stage of such notices; and (iii) W. P. Nos. 2551/75 etc. in whicn not only the constitutional validity of the Principal Act and/or the Amendment Act but also the orders of the land Tribunals have been impugned are directed to be posted for further hearing to consider contentions other than these relating to the constitutional validity of the Principal Act and/or the amendment Act and of subsequent acts by which the Principal Act was amended. --- *** --- .