JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS revision has been preferred against the order of the claims Tribunal deciding the preliminary issue that the claim petition is not liable to be dismissed for not joining the owner of the vehicle as a party in the case and consequently dismissing the claim against the insurer only as its liability is co-extensive with the owner under section 96 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and the owner not being a party to the case. ( 2. ) THE non-applicant No. 1 claimant presented the petition under section 110a of the Act, alleging that the applicant drove the scooter c. P. J. 6756 rashly and negligently on 16-6-1969 and injured the non-applicant no. 1, causing a fracture of his leg. He, therefore, claimed Rs. 20,000/-as damages against the applicant and the non-applicant No. 2 Insurance company, showing the applicant to be the owner of the vehicle. After notice, on learning that S. N. Gupta is the owner and not the applicant, the non-applicant No. 1 moved an application for joining him as a party in the case on 18-8-1980. The prayer was disallowed on 27-2-1981 as the application for joining as party was filed 14 months after the accident, when the limitation is 6 months. Then by amendment the applicant raised an objection that for non-joinder of the owner of the vehicle, who is a necessary party, the claim petition is liable to be dismissed. The objection has been overruled saying that the claim is primarily against the applicant for his rash and negligent driving and so the claim petition cannot be rejected but since the Insurance Company is only liable if there is an award against the owner, so the case against it alone has been dismissed. ( 3. ) A Division Bench of this Court in Shankar Rao v. Babulal, 1980 MPLJ 563 . has held- "in this Court it has never been doubted that in the case of fatal accidents resulting even from the use of a motor vehicle the substantive law for determination of the liability and its extent is that contained in the Fatal Accidents Act. has held- "in this Court it has never been doubted that in the case of fatal accidents resulting even from the use of a motor vehicle the substantive law for determination of the liability and its extent is that contained in the Fatal Accidents Act. 1855, the provisions contained in section 110-A to 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 being merely procedural or adjectival but not substantive in nature; these provisions introduced in the Motor Vehicles Act by the Amendment Act of 1956 are meant only to provide a cheap remedy to the claimants who were earlier required to file a Civil Suit paying ad valorem court-fees in the Courts of general jurisdiction; and therefore, any question pertaining to a substantive right has to be determined in accordance with the general law of Tort and the Fatal Accidents Act. " In New India Insuranee Co. v. Smt. Shanti Devi, AIR 1976 SC 237 , it has been held that the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act were only a change of adjectival or procedural law and not of substantive law and it was for this reason that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was held to be barred retrospectively under Section 110-F of the Act in respect of claims filed subsequent to the constitution of the Claims Tribunal and the claimant has to go to the new forum even if his cause of action, accrued prior to the change of forum as the change in law being procedural, it operated retrospectively. Sections 94 to 96 provide for compulsory insurance, the right of the third party to claim directly from the insurer, limits of the liability of the insurer and the defence open to him to avoid liability even if the insured has incurred liability. No defence is available to insurer about factum of accident or quantum of damages. Under section 96 (1) a claimant is entitled to recover from the insurer the amount of compensation which he is in law entitled to obtain from the insured subject to the statutory limits of liability of the insurer, provided the insurer has notice of the proceedings. Insurance against third party risk is compulsory, which secures payment to the claimant against the insolvency or liquidation of the insured. A Full Bench of this Court in Mangilal v. Parasram, 1970 MPLJ 1 . Insurance against third party risk is compulsory, which secures payment to the claimant against the insolvency or liquidation of the insured. A Full Bench of this Court in Mangilal v. Parasram, 1970 MPLJ 1 . has held that to a proceeding for compensation for death or bodily injury in a motor accident, the owner of the vehicle, the driver and the insurer have to be impleaded as opposite party. The insured is a necessary party and he is bound by the award and he is liable to pay the amount minus the sum which is payable by the insurer. A Division Bench of this Court in M. P. S R. T. C. v. Jahirarri, 1968 MPLJ 828 , has held that it can hardly he asserted that insurer is not a party to an action for recovery of damages, the insurer must, of necessity, be a party to such proceedings. In the aforesaid two cases passenger buses were being driven by their drivers when the accidents took place, i. e. the drivers were driving their vehicles in the course of their employment and the cases were not dismissed for not joining the insurers but the claimants were directed to join them and the cases were remanded Similar is the case of the Single Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Hindusthan Gen. Ins. Co. v. Surammo AIR 1969 A P 390 : it is not clear in that case whether the driver was made a party but the owner was directed to be made a party as he was a necessary party. ( 4. ) HOWEVER, a Division Bench of this Court in State of M. P. v. Premabai 1979 MPLJ 214 . has held that - "the driver is primarily liable for the death of Ramavatar and Shivprasad due to his rash and negligent driving. Since at the relevant time he was driving the vehicle in discharge of his official duties, the State Government is vicariously liable for the acts of its employee. The Supreme Court in sitaram v. Santanuprasad AIR 1966 SC 1697 . has held that a master is vicariously liable for the acts of his servant acting in the course of his employment. For the masters liability to arise, the act must be a wrongful act authorised by the master or a wrongful and unauthorised mode of doing some act authorised by the master. has held that a master is vicariously liable for the acts of his servant acting in the course of his employment. For the masters liability to arise, the act must be a wrongful act authorised by the master or a wrongful and unauthorised mode of doing some act authorised by the master. The driver of a car taking the car on the masters business makes him vicariously liable if he commits an accident. Reiterating this principle in a recent case of Pushpabai v. Ran jit G. and P. Co. , AIR 1977 S C 1735, the Supreme Court has further held that: for the masters liability to arise the test is whether the act was done on the owners business or that it was proved to have been impliedly authorised by the owner. The law is settled that master is vicariously liable for the acts of his servants acting in the course of his employment. Unless the act is done in the course of employment the servants act does not make the employer liable. The recent trend in law is to make the master liable for acts which do not strictly fall within the term in the course of the employment as ordinarily understood. The owner is not only liable for the negligence of the driver if that driver is his servant acting in the course of his employment but also when the driver is, with the owners consent, driving the car on the owners business or for the owners purposes. therefore, the State of Madhya Pradesh is liable for payment of compensation for the acts of its driver, even if the State Government is not the owner of the jeep in question." Similarly an insurer is made vicariously liable under section 96 (1) of the act when compensation is awarded against the insured, provided it had notice of the proceedings and to the extent enumerated in section 95. Therefore, the owner is not only liable for the negligence of the driver if that driver is his servant acting in the course of his employment but also when the driver is, with the owners consent, driving the car on the owners business or for the owners purposes. Therefore, the owner is not only liable for the negligence of the driver if that driver is his servant acting in the course of his employment but also when the driver is, with the owners consent, driving the car on the owners business or for the owners purposes. If the driver is neither the employee nor the agent of the owner nor driving the vehicle for owners business, the owner is not vicariously liable and is not a necessary party to such a case, consequently the insurer is also not liable and cannot be made a party. In the present case it is nobodys case that the applicant at the relevant time was driving the scooter as driver or agent of the owner S. N. Gupta and for his business. ( 5. ) UNDER section HOC, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit but the Tribunal shall have all the powers of Civil Court for the purposes of taking evidence, enforcing attendance of witnesses, of compelling discovery of documents and for such other purposes as may be prescribed. Section 111 A empowers the State Government to make rules, in exercise of which the Madhya Pradesh Motor Accidents of Claims Tribunal Rules, 1959 has been framed. Rule 3 prescribes that an application for compensation arising out of a motor accident shall be made in Form a requiring the owner, driver and insurer as opposite parties. Rule 5 empowers the Claims tribunal to summarily reject an application if (i) it is not made by a person competent to do, (ii) not made within the time prescribed, (iii) not properly stamped, and (iv) not duly signed and verified. But summary rejection will not bar presentation of a fresh application. So an application is not liable to be summarily rejected if either the owner or the insurer is not made parties. This is because in all cases the owner or the insurer need not be made parties as in the present case. But summary rejection will not bar presentation of a fresh application. So an application is not liable to be summarily rejected if either the owner or the insurer is not made parties. This is because in all cases the owner or the insurer need not be made parties as in the present case. Rule 14 expressly provides that the following provisions of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall apply i. e. Order V, Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30 of Order XVI, rules 8 to 21 of Order XVII and Rules 1 to 3 of Order XXIII, provided the Claims Tribunal may construe them with such alterations as may be proper or necessary. So only certain provisions of the Code are applicable and that too can be applied in a modified form. Order I is not made applicable, so Order 1, Rule 9 of the Code cannot be invoked to reject an application for not joining a necessary party, even assuming that the owner and the insurer are necessary parties to this case. ( 6. ) ACCORDINGLY, the revision fails and it is dismissed with costs. Counsels fee Rs. 100, if certified, to be shared half and half by the non-applicants 1 and 2. Revision dismissed.