Lahiri, J.:- The Commissioner of Wealth-Tax, for short "the Commissioner" in exercise of his powers under section 18(2A) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, by a common order dated 26.8.74 restricted the penalties imposed GO the petitioner assessee to 25% for the assessment years 1966-67 to 1969-1970. The Assessee-petitioner has filed four writ application questioning the validity of the order. As all the cases raise common questions of law and are based on similar facts we propose to dispose them by a common order. 2. The petitioner contends that (a) the impugned order has no backing of reasons and suffers from infirmity of non appli­cation of the mind by the authority to the requirements of the provisions of Section 18(2A) of "the Act" (b) the impugned order is violative of the principles of natural justice and (c) his claim for waiver was turned down mechanically without due application of mind. 3. For late submissions of the returns the W.T.O. imposed the penalties on the assessee under section 18(1) of the Act for the assessment years. The assessee filed four separate applica­tions under section 18(2A) of "the Act" before the Commissi­oner. The Commissioner, held that the disclosures of the wealth had been made by the assessee voluntarily before issue of any notice under section 14(2), the disclosures were full and complete, the assessee had extended all co-operation in the matter of completion of the assessment and further held that "... the applications under section 18(2A).........are well founded. The assessee family is, therefore, entitled to claim relief as provided under the said provisions of law". Having held so, the learned Commissioner proceeded to cogitate about causes for late submissions of the returns and held that the explanations offered were bona fide, thou on they might not constitute conclu­sive defence and reasonable cause under section 18(1)(a) for non-levy of any penalty but thereafter concluded thus : "On considering all the pleas of the assessee and parti­cularly the fact that the assessee had voluntarily submi­tted the return and extended all co-operation to the W.T.O. which ware substantially accepted by the W.T.O. and there was no concealment whatever noticed and that the asse­ssee family has paid all the tax demands, I am of the view that the penalties imposed actually by the W.T.O. under section 18(1)(a) be now restricted to 25-/.(twenty five percent) thereof which will meet the ends of justice in this case". 4. 4. The learned Commissioner not only held that all the conditions of Section 18 (2A) were present in the cases but went so far as to hold that the explanations for late submiss­ion of the returns were bonafide yet he did not waive the penalt­ies because the explanations did not constitute conclusive defence and reasonable causes contemplated under section 18 (1) (a). It is apparent that the learned Commissioner overlooked the respec­tive scope, ambit and contours of Sec. 18(1) (a) and Sec. 18 (2A). The question of reasonable cause crops up for consideration under section 18 (1) (a) and if the authority concerned is satisfied that there is reasonable cause for the delay then there cannot be any occasion to levy penalty and the question for invoking Section 18 (2A) never arises. Such order may be corrected by the Commissioner In exercise of powers of revision under "the Act". When there if reasonable cause for the delay no occasion arises to levy penalty, the assessee is entitled to be exonerated. Section 18 (1) (a) operates in the field where the question of levy of any penalty arises whereas Sec. 18 (2A) empowers the Commissioner' to "reduce or waive the amount of minimum penalty imposable". The power to "waive" penalty under section 18 (2A) is date distinct and different from the power to "impose penalty" contemplated under section 18 (1) of the Act. Section 18 (2A) can come into play only when penalty has been imposed under section 18(1). I he power to reduce or waive is directly connected with "the amount of minimum penalty" the order of imposition of penalty remains in fact but the order merely reduces the quantum of penalty or the revenue waives the right to collect the amount of penalty imposed. 5, The word "waive" means to "abandon, throw away, renounce, repudiate, or surrender a claim, privilege or wrong. To give up right or claim voluntarily" as defined in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (FIFTH EDITION). The learned Commissi­oner has omitted to note the distinction between the respective scope of section 18 (1) and 18 (2A). Section 18 (2A) clearly indicates that a party may obtain relief of waiver or reduction even when the penalty imposable under section 18 (1) is justified. The learned Commissi­oner has omitted to note the distinction between the respective scope of section 18 (1) and 18 (2A). Section 18 (2A) clearly indicates that a party may obtain relief of waiver or reduction even when the penalty imposable under section 18 (1) is justified. While considering an application under section 18 (2A) some of the relevant factors which need be considered are as to (a) the gravity of default; (b) whether the assessee had defaulted to make any wrongful gain for himself or to cause wrongful loss to the revenue: (c) the nature of the conduct and behaviour of the assessee throughout the proceedings and there before. The Commissi­oner is to consider all such relevant factors to find out whether the assessee should be asked to pay the penalty for the wrong committed by him, the quality of the wrong or default is un­doubtedly a relevant factor. However, the factors indicated above are only illustrative and not exhaustive. However, one thing is for sure that though the assessee is penalized for his default the Commissioner may waive the penalty imposable. In the instant case, none of the relevant factors required to be considered by the learned Commissioner was taken note but he considered the factor not german to the decision, namely, whether the bonafide explanations of the assessee constituted a defeace and a reasonable cause contemplated under section 18 (1) (a) for non-levy of any penalty. As such the impugned order cannot be sustained. 6. If we try to ferret out the reason why the learned Commissioner restricted the penalties to 25% we find no reason as to why the penalty was not waived. There is also no reason why the penalties were restricted to 25% only. The power conferred under section 18 (2A) is undoubtedly a discretionary power but it has been conferred on a quasi-judicial authority whose orders must have some backing of reasons. True it is that the provisions of the statutes do not provide any guide lines when and how the power to waive or reduce the penalty should be exercised; there is no mechanism or methodology for waiving or reducing the penalty in Section 18 (2A) yet the Commissioner is duty-bound to give reasons for not waiving or not reducing the penalty or reducing it to a certain point. The conferment of the power is undoubtedly coupled with duty. The conferment of the power is undoubtedly coupled with duty. We have noted that Section 18 (2A) incorporates the expressions "the Commissioner may in his discretion reduce or waive" the penalty but the discretion cannot be arbitrary ; it must be exercised on consideration of relevant or material facts and circumstances. Giving of reasons is now a part of natural justice. It is, accor­dingly, necessary for the quasi-judicial bodies to give reasons. There is a general obligation on adjudicatory bodies to give reasons for the decisions even when statutes do not impose such a condition. This obligation to give reasons form a part of natural justice and springs from the consti­tutional provisions contained in Articles 32,226,136 and 227 of the Constitution. We rely on Mahabir Prasad vs. U.P., AIR 1970 SC 1302 ; Gujarat vs. Krishna Cinema, AIR 1971 SC1650; Chowgule & Co. vs. India, AIR 1971 SC 2021 ; Punjab vs. Bakhtawar Singh. AIR 1972 SC 2083 ; Narayan Das vs. Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1972 SC 2086 ; Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. vs. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785 . An adjudicatory authority cannot disarm the Court by taking refuge in silence. The peti­tioners have pointed out that there is no reason ascribed why the penalties were not waived. We find nothing but silence. Giving of reasons by the Commissioner while exercising power under section 18 (2A) is necessary for the following reasons : (a) The applications under section 18 (2A) contain the grounds for reduction or waiver; the authority is bound to give reasons If it rejects the contentions otherwise it would be natural to conclude that the authority could not meet the challenges or had no reasons. (b) The Provision does not empower the authority to with-hold reasons. Therefore, there is a general duty to give reasons by the authority. Reasons, howsoever brief, dispel all doubts about arbitrariness of the authority. (c) The duty to give reasons is a safety valve against arbitrary exercise of discretionary power. If such quasi-judicial authorities are permitted to render order without reason, apart from arbitrariness there might be potent danger of non consi­deration of the application and would encourage mechanical exercise of the power. (d) Observance of the principles of natural justice is implicit In the rule of law. The rule of law itself commands for reasoned decision. If such quasi-judicial authorities are permitted to render order without reason, apart from arbitrariness there might be potent danger of non consi­deration of the application and would encourage mechanical exercise of the power. (d) Observance of the principles of natural justice is implicit In the rule of law. The rule of law itself commands for reasoned decision. The minimum requirement of the rule of law is that one ought not to be deprived of his rights without the authority of law. It has been held in Mahabir Prasad vs. State of U.P, AIR 1970 SC 1302 (1304) that the duty to give reason is the minimum requirements of the rule of law. (e) Section 18 (2 A) confers a statutory tight on the assessee. The authority empowered must consider the claims of an assessee. It is required to pass an order on consideration of the assertions of the assesses and the exercise call's for a recanted order. (f) It is a general duty of the quasi-judicial authority to act fairly. Fairness founded on reasons is the essence of the guarantee epitomized in Article 14. We extract what their Lord­ships observed in Manager, Government Branch Press vs. D. B. Bettiappa, AIR 1979 SC 429 . "The giving of reasons, as Lord Denning put it in Breen vs. Amalgamated Engineer Union (1971) 1 ALL. E.R. 1148 is one of the fundamentals of good administration and to recall the words of this court in Khudi Ram vs. State of West Bengal (1975) 2 SCR 832 at p. 845 : ( AIR 1975 SC 550 at P. 558) in a Government of laws there is nothing like unfettered discretion Immune from judicial reviewability. The executive, no less than the judiciary, is under a general duty to act fairly. Indeed, fairness founded on reason is the essence of the guarantee epitomized in Arts. 14 and 16(1)." (g) The duty to give reasons is the elementary requirements for a quasi-judicial process as rules by the Supreme Court in Govindrao vs. State of M. P. AIR 1965 SC 1222 (1226) A Commissioner of Income-Tax vs. Walchand AIR 1967 SC 1435 (1431). (h) A party to the proceeding is entitled to know the reasons for the decision that deprives him of his statutory right. It is a branch of the principles of natural justice; (i) Absence of reasons by the authority multiply writ procee­dings in courts. (h) A party to the proceeding is entitled to know the reasons for the decision that deprives him of his statutory right. It is a branch of the principles of natural justice; (i) Absence of reasons by the authority multiply writ procee­dings in courts. Constitutional provisions for judicial review under Articles 226, 227 and 136 of the constitution being open, such orders require reasons to be stated for the decisions rendered : (j) Even discretionary power coupled with duty calls for reasons to be stated, as the authority is under an obligation to decide an application under section 18 (2A) one way of the other. There is no unfettered discretion in public law. The notion of absolute unfettered discretion now stands rejected. Statutory power conferred for public purposes is conferred as it were upon trust, not absolutely that is to say, it can validly be used only in the right and appropriate way witch the statute when conferring is presumed to have intended. We extract an intrinsic observation of Lord Denning M. R. in Breen vs. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971) 2 Q B. 175 (190). "The discretion of a statutory body is never unfettered. It is a discretion which is to be exercised according to law. That means at least this : the statutory body must be guided by relevant considerations and not by irrelevant. If its decision is influenced by extraneous considerations which it ought not to have taken into account, then the decision cannot stand. No matter that the statutory body may have acted in good faith; nevertheless the decision will be set aside. That is established by Padfield vs. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1968) AC 997 which is a landmark in modern administrative law". (k) When the concept of "error of law" includes giving of inconsistent, unintelligible or inadequate reasons, it must take within its fold "giving of no reasons" as well. A fortiori when application of wrong legal test to the facts found, taking irre­levant consideration or failure to take relevant consideration can be "error of law" it stands to reasons that "giving BO reasons must come within the concept of "error of law". (l) When there is a duty to decide the application under Section 18(2A) according to law on The basis of relevant consi­derations, it is imperative for the authority to state reasons fop its decision. The authority must act fairly. (l) When there is a duty to decide the application under Section 18(2A) according to law on The basis of relevant consi­derations, it is imperative for the authority to state reasons fop its decision. The authority must act fairly. It is a fundamental rule that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly seen to be done. The rule is appli­cable in a proceeding under Section 18(2A). 7. These are some of the reason why giving of reasons is a must in a proceeding under section 18(2A)of "the Act'. We hold that the impugned order suffers from absence of any reason for the decision and as such the impugned order must be quashed which we hereby do. 8. In the result, therefore the petitions are allowed and the matters are remitted to the learned Commissioner for due disposal of the applications according to law. There is no order as to cost. 9. Before parting we would observe that we have derived considerable assistance from the judgment of Hansaria J., in Kartar Singh vs. Commissioner of Wealth-Tax : 1981(1) Gauhati Law Reports 97.