JUDGMENT : B.K. Behera, J. - The Petitioner was the tenant-opposite party and the opposite party was the landlord-Petitioner in House Rent Control Case No. 26 of 1977 in the Court of the Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate-cum-House Rent Controller, Berhampur (for short, the 'Controller'). The opposite party had sought eviction of the Petitioner in respect of the tenanted house under the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1967 (for short, the 'Act') on the grounds that the Petitioner was a wilful defaulter and that die house was required by the opposite party for his bona fide use and occupation. These were legal and valid grounds for eviction as provided in Section 7 of the Act. The Petitioner had objected to the eviction sought by the opposite party, had denied the allegation that he was a wilful defaulter and had refuted the assertion made by the opposite party that the house was required for his bona fide use and occupation. On February 15, 1978, both the parties effected a compromise and filed a petition of compromise signed by both of them and their Advocates stating: Compromise petition filed by both parties most respectfully showeth: 1. Thrt at the intervention of Bhadraloks of the locality that both parties have compromise themselves. 2. That the Respondent has to vacate the house before 28-2-1978 positively and have to deliver the possession of the house to the Petitioner. Prayer That both parties therefore pray that the Honourable court be pleased to record the compromise and pass a decree in the interests of justice, and the parties have to bear their own costs. The Controller passed by the following order: Both parties are present. They filed compromise petition. Eviction petition allowed in terms of compromise petition. O.P. shall vacate the house before 28-2-1978 positively and have to deliver the possession of the house to the Petitioner. Case closed. 2. The opposite party sought the eviction of the Petitioner in Execution Proceeding No. 51 of 1980 in the Court of the Munsif, Berhampur, as the Petitioner did not vacate possession of the house as agreed upon. Objection was raised by the Petitioner u/s 47 of the CPC as to the executability of the decree on the ground of misdescription of property. The learned Munsif rejected this contention by his order dated June 30, 1981. This order has been assailed in this revision. 3. Objection was raised by the Petitioner u/s 47 of the CPC as to the executability of the decree on the ground of misdescription of property. The learned Munsif rejected this contention by his order dated June 30, 1981. This order has been assailed in this revision. 3. The same ground taken before the learned Munsif as to the misdescription of property, which, as observed by the learned Munsif, had no substance, had been taken. Later, however, an additional ground had been taken in this revision. Mr. S.S. Rao appearing for the Petitioner has raised only one contention, viz., that the decree is illegal and cannot be executed in the absence of any order of the Controller at the time of disposal of the case under the Act that he was satisfied that a ground for eviction did exist. Mr. B.B. Ratho, the learned Counsel for the opposite party, has contended that there were valid grounds for the eviction of the Petitioner which had been pleaded by the opposite party in his application under the Act and by effecting the compromise, the Petitioner had submitted to the grounds raised by the opposite party for eviction and the Controller, after proper application of his mind, had passed the order of eviction. Reference has been made at the Bar to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, this Court and the Calcutta High Court in some reported cases. 4. It has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Bahadur Singh and Anr. v. Muni Subrat Das and Anr. (1969) 2 S.C. 432, that a decree for eviction passed in contravention of the Rent Control Act would be null and void and cannot be executed. In Kaushalya Devi and Others Vs. Shri K.L. Bansal a decree for ejectment had been passed on the basis of a compromise effected by the parties and the following order had been passed: In view of the statement of the parties counsel and the written compromise a decree is passed in favour of the Plaintiff against the Defendant. The High Court held that the decree was a nullity as the order passed on the basis of the compromise did not indicate that any of the statutory grounds mentioned in Section 13 of the relevant Act had been satisfied. The Supreme Court held: 5. The High Court held that the decree was a nullity as the order passed on the basis of the compromise did not indicate that any of the statutory grounds mentioned in Section 13 of the relevant Act had been satisfied. The Supreme Court held: 5. xx xx In Bahadur Singh's case (1969)2 S.C. 432, Civil Appeals Nos 2464 and 2468 of 1966, D/- 16-10-1968 reported in (1969) 1 S.C.W.R. 51 this Court held that the decree passed on the basis of an award was in contravention of Section 13(1) of the Act because the Court had passed the decree in terms of the award without satisfying itself that the ground of eviction existed. Bachawat, J., speaking for the Court, observed that on the plain wording of Section 13(1) the Court was forbidden to pass the decree. The decree is a nullity and cannot be enforced in execution. This Court, accordingly, declared inter alia that the decree in so far as it directs delivery of possession of the premises to the landlord is a nullity and cannot be executed. 6. The present case is also governed by the provisions of Section 13(1) of the Act and, as we have said before, this appeal must fail, in view of the judgment of this Court in Bahadur Singh's case (1969) 2 S.C. 432, Civil Appeals Nos. 2464 and 2468 of 1966 DJ-16-10-1968 reported in (1969) 1 S.C.W.R. 51.... 5. In Ferozi Lal Jain Vs. Man Mal and Another a decree had been passed in terms of the compromise effected by the parties. The Supreme Court observed: From the facts mentioned earlier, it is seen that at no stage, the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question whether the alleged subletting is true or not. Order made by it does not show that it was satisfied that the subletting complained of has taken place, nor is there any other material on record to show that it was so satisfied. It is clear from the record that the court had proceeded solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties. That being so there can be hardly any doubt that the court was not competent to pass the impugned decree. Hence the decree under execution must be held to be a nullity. 6. A similar question was raised before the Supreme Court in K.K. Chari Vs. That being so there can be hardly any doubt that the court was not competent to pass the impugned decree. Hence the decree under execution must be held to be a nullity. 6. A similar question was raised before the Supreme Court in K.K. Chari Vs. R.M. Seshadri, which was a case under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and in which a compromise decree for eviction of the tenant had been passed. It has been laid down therein that an order of eviction based on the consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact viz., the existence of one or more of the conditions for eviction, was shown to have existed when the Court made the consent order. The satisfaction of the Court, which is a prerequisite for the order of eviction, need not be by a manifestation borne out by judicial finding. If at some stage, the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it before the parties invited it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the Court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was based. Before making an order for possession, the Court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlord's claim. But when the tenant, in fact, admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act, it is open to the Court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further enquiry. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court had taken into consideration the principles laid down early by the same Court in Bahadur Singh and Anr. v. Muni Subrat Das and Anr. (1969) 2 S.C. 432, Kaushalya Devi and Others Vs. Shri K.L. Bansal, and Ferozi Lal Jain Vs. Man Mal and Another. It has further been observed that each case will have to be decided on its own facts to find out whether there is any material to justify an inference that an admission, express or implied, has been made by the tenant about the existence of one or other of the statutory grounds. Man Mal and Another. It has further been observed that each case will have to be decided on its own facts to find out whether there is any material to justify an inference that an admission, express or implied, has been made by the tenant about the existence of one or other of the statutory grounds. Alagiriswamy, J. has observed: Of course, a compromise can be valid only if it is in accordance with the Act, i.e. only if the landlord has asked for possession of the building on one of the grounds laid down in the Act. For instance, a landlord merely on the ground that he is the owner of the building cannot come to the Rent Controller and ask for possession of the property and the Rent Controller cannot pass a valid order merely because the tenant submits to an order of eviction. Bahadur Singh and Another Vs. Muni Subrat Dass and Another, is an instance in point. In that case the landlord did not even apply for eviction. But where the landlord specifically asks for possession on anyone of the grounds on the basis of which he is entitled to ask for possession under the provisions of the Act there will be no objection to the' tenant either submitting to an order of eviction or entering into a compromise submitting to an order of eviction. There is no magic in the words 'if the Controller is satisfied' in Section 10(3)(e).... 7. It has been laid down in Nagindas Ramdas Vs. Dalpatram Ichharam alias Brijram and Others arising out of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act: From a conspectus of the cases cited at the Bar, the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. 8. In Smt. Nai Bahu Vs. Lala Ramnarayan and Others the Supreme Court held: 14. It is true that a decree for eviction of a tenant cannot be passed solely on the basis of a compromise between the parties See K.K. Chari Vs. R.M. Seshadri. 8. In Smt. Nai Bahu Vs. Lala Ramnarayan and Others the Supreme Court held: 14. It is true that a decree for eviction of a tenant cannot be passed solely on the basis of a compromise between the parties See K.K. Chari Vs. R.M. Seshadri. The Court is to be satisfied whether a statutory ground for eviction has been pleaded which the tenant has admitted by the compromise. Thus, dispensing with further proof, on account of the compromise, the court is to be satisfied about the compliance with the statutory requirement on the totality of facts of a particular case bearing in mind the entire circumstances from the stage of pleadings upto the stage when the compromise is effected. 15. When a compromise decree is challenged as a nullity in the course of its execution the execution court can examine relevant materials to find out whether statutory grounds for eviction existed in law. If the pleadings and other materials on the record make out a prima facie case about the existence of statutory grounds for eviction a compromise decree cannot be held to be invalid and the executing court will have to give effect to it. 9. In the case of Suleman Noormohamed and Others Vs. Umarbhai Janubhai which arose, out of a case for eviction u/s 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, it has been laid down that where an eviction suit under the Act was disposed of on compromise between the parties, the tenant having either expressly or impliedly suffered a decree for eviction as being liable to be eviction in accordance with Section 12(3)(b) of the Act and there was abundant intrinsic material m the compromise itself to indicate that the decree passed upon its basis was not in violation of the Act but was in accordance with it, the compromise decree was not a nullity and could be executed on non-compliance. With regard to the compliance of Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, their Lordships have held that it is not necessary for the court to say in express terms in the order that it was satisfied that the compromise was a lawful one and it would be presumed to have done so, unless the contrary is shown. 10. Referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Bahadur Singh and Anr. 10. Referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Bahadur Singh and Anr. v. Muni Subrat Das and Anr. (1969) 2 S.C. 432 and Kaushalya Devi and Others Vs. Shri K.L. Bansal this Court has held in Jami Bhimaraju and Others Vs. Konchada Kedarnadha Subudhi that it is necessary for the Tribunal to satisfy itself that one of the grounds of eviction existed and Section 7 of the Act requires the satisfaction of the Controller that any of the grounds stated therein is satisfied before actual ejectment can be ordered. It was, however, held, for the reasons recorded by Hon'ble R.N. Misra, J. (as he then was), that the decree passed on the compromise could be acted upon and the Judgment-debtor would not be entitled to any assistance. 11. In Smt. Tara Laxmi Joshi v. Baidyanath Chapolia M.A. No. 136 of 1980, (unreported), the learned Chief Justice of this Court has answered a similar objection raised on behalf of the judgment-debtor in the following terms: In House Rent Control Case No. 69 of 1964 there was an order of eviction based upon compromise which ran thus: "Case disposed of according to the terms of the compromise petition, in so far as it is in conformity with the Act" In the compromise the lessor and the lessee had undertaken to comply with the terms and there was a clear term obliging the tenant to deliver vacant possession. When the decree was put to execution, objection was raised to the tenability of the decree on the ground that parties could not have as between themselves decided to bring an end to the tenancy. This obviously was on the basis of the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Nagindas Ramdas Vs. Dalpatram Ichharam alias Brijram and Others. In a later decision the Supreme Court in the case of Suleman Noormohamed and Others Vs. Umarbhai Janubhai, has clarified the legal position. I am of the view that the term of the order of eviction, though based on compromise, in the instant case brought the matter within the rule formulated in the later case of the Supreme Court. Though parties compromised, the Controller directed eviction on the basis of the statutory provision. The objection seems to be without any justification and the lower appellate court appears to have done wrong in accepting the objection. Though parties compromised, the Controller directed eviction on the basis of the statutory provision. The objection seems to be without any justification and the lower appellate court appears to have done wrong in accepting the objection. I am inclined to agree with the executing court's view of the matter. I would accordingly allow the appeal, vacate the appellate decree and restore that of the executing court. The net effect is that the objection u/s 47, CPC must stand rejected and the executing court would be free to execute the decree of eviction passed by the Controller in accordance with law. 12. In Sushil Chandra Sur and Others Vs. Smt. Sadhana Bakobi and Another it has, been held in a case u/s 13(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act that in a suit to evict a tenant. On the ground of default in payment of rent and requirement of premises for re-building, if there be no indication that the Court, while passing the decree, applied its mind as to the existence of the statutory grounds of eviction, the decree passed on compromise is a nullity and cannot be executed as the executing court cannot go behind the decree. u/s 13(1) of the West Bengal Act, the Court cannot pass a decree for eviction except on one or more of the grounds enumerated in that section. 13. On the principles laid down in the aforesaid reported cases, I would sum up the legal position. A decree for eviction passed in contravention of the Rent Control Act would be null and void and cannot he executed. The Controller is to be satisfied before ordering eviction that the ground for evicting existed. An order of eviction passed without application of mind and passed solely on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the parties is not legal and valid. If the existence of one or more of the conditions for eviction did exist when the court made the consent order, the order of eviction is not necessarily void. The satisfaction of the court about the existence of a ground for eviction need not be by a manifestation borne out by the judicial finding. If the existence of one or more of the conditions for eviction did exist when the court made the consent order, the order of eviction is not necessarily void. The satisfaction of the court about the existence of a ground for eviction need not be by a manifestation borne out by the judicial finding. When the tenant admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or more of the statutory grounds, it is open to the court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further enquiry. Each case will have to be decided on its own facts to find out whether there is any material to justify an inference that an admission, express or implied, has been made by the tenant about the existence of one or more of the statutory grounds. If at the time of passing the decree, there was some material for the prima facie satisfaction of the court about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction apparently passed on the basis of a compromise would be valid. When in an execution proceeding, a compromise decree is challenged as a nullity, the executing court can examine the relevant materials to find out whether statutory grounds for eviction existed in law. If the pleadings and other materials on the record make out a prima facie case about the, existence of any such ground, a compromise decree cannot be held to be invalid and the executing court will have to give effect to it. When an eviction suit under the Act is disposed of on compromise between the parties, the tenant having either expressly or impliedly suffered a decree for eviction as being liable to be evicted in accordance with law and there is abundant intrinsic material 'in the compromise itself to indicate that the decree passed upon its basis is not in violation of the Act but is in accordance with it, the compromise decree is not a nullity and can be executed on non-compliance. 14. I have already quoted the terms of the compromise on the basis of which the impugned order had been passed by the Controller for eviction of the Petitioner and also the impugned order. 15. 14. I have already quoted the terms of the compromise on the basis of which the impugned order had been passed by the Controller for eviction of the Petitioner and also the impugned order. 15. The grounds for eviction in the instant case were the wilful default on the part of the Petitioner and the bona fide requirement of the tenanted house by the opposite party for his use and occupation. Thus two valid grounds for eviction had been pleaded by the opposite party seeking eviction of the Petitioner. The Petitioner and the opposite party effected a compromise and the Petitioner, who was well aware of the grounds taken by the opposite party for his eviction, agreed to vacate the tenanted house before 28-2-1978 and to deliver possession of the house to the opposite party. Both the parties made a prayer to record the terms of compromise and pass a decree in the interests of justice. Thus the parties to the compromise had sought a decree on its basis in accordance with law and in the interests of justice. No doubt, the Controller had not, in terms, recorded in his order that he had been satisfied that there were grounds for eviction, but from the pleadings of the parties, the terms of compromise, the fact that the Petitioner had expressly suffered a decree for eviction as being liable to be evicted u/s 7 of the Act and the compromise effected to pass a decree in the interests of justice, it would be clear that the Controller, having kept in view the legal grounds for eviction, accepted the compromise and directed the eviction of the Petitioner by a particular date as agreed upon. The manner in which the parties effected the compromise and the order of the Controller was passed would lead one to a reasonable conclusion that the Controller was satisfied about the existence of the grounds for eviction before accepting the petition of compromise and directing eviction in terms thereof. There had been an implied admission by the Petitioner about the existence of the rounds for eviction when he submitted to effect the compromise and agreed to leave the tenanted house. The Petitioner, after entering into a compromise, consented to a decree and submitted to it. Even in the execution proceeding the Petitioner had not raised the legal objection now raised in this Court. The Petitioner, after entering into a compromise, consented to a decree and submitted to it. Even in the execution proceeding the Petitioner had not raised the legal objection now raised in this Court. This ground had not been taken in the application in revision and has been added as an additional ground. 16. When the landlord has sought possession on one or more of the statutory grounds on the basis of which he is entitled to ask for eviction under the provisions of the Act, there can be no valid objection to the passing of a decree on the basis of a compromise if the tenant either submits to an order of eviction or enters into a compromise submitting to an order of eviction. If the court is satisfied, on a consideration of the terms of the compromise in the context of the pleadings and other materials in a case that the agreement is lawful, as in any other suit, the court can record the compromise and pass a decree in accordance, therewith. The passing of a decree for eviction on adjudication of the requisite facts or on their admission in the compromise, either express or implied, is not different. As has been held by the Supreme Court in Smt. Nai Bahu Vs. Lala Ramnarayan and Others if the pleadings or other materials on record make out a prima facie case about the existence of the statutory grounds for eviction, the compromise decree cannot be held to be invalid. As earlier indicated, the view of the Supreme Court in Suleman Noormohamed and Others Vs. Umarbhai Janubhai. is that it is not necessary for the Court to say on express terms in the order that it was satisfied that the compromise was a lawful one. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view that the legal objection raised on behalf of the Petitioner as to the executability of the decree cannot prevail and has to be rejected. 18. In the result the revision is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, I would make no order as to costs. Final Result : Dismissed