JUDGMENT The petitioner in each of the cases has been convicted under sections 263 and 264 read with section 336 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and has been sentenced respectively to pay a fine of Rs. 35 and in default to serve simple imprisonment for 5 days and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,700 and in default to serve simple imprisonment for three months. 2. The facts in all these seven cases are similar and questions arising for determination are also common. Therefore, it would be sufficient if the facts in one of the cases are set out for proper appreciation of the questions of law that fall for determination. I shall, therefore, refer to the relevant facts in Crl.R.C.No. 157 of 1980. 3. The petitioner was running a workshop known as “M/s. Kumar Engineering Works” since 1974 having installed a 1-75 HP Electric Motor without permission. The workshop was located in Gopalareddy Road, Governorpet, Vijayawada 2 in the premises bearing Door No. 27-23-154. On 1st January, 1974, she had submitted an application, Exhibit D-3 to the Director of Town Planning, Hyderabad, through the Commissioner and Special Officer, Vijayawada Municipality for permission for installation of motor and welding set. The Municipal Council, Vijayawada considered the application of the petitioner on 8th July, 1974, and passed a resolution No. 384, dated 8th July, 1974 refusing permission to the petitioner for installation of the electric motor and welding set. In pursuance of the said resolution the Municipal Commissioner, Vijayawada issued an order Exhibit D-1, dated 19tb July, 1974, informing the petitioner that the permission sought by her for the installation of electric motor and welding set bad been refused as the installation fell within the residential area and it was a source of nuisance to the public Inspite of the refusal the petitioner installed an electric motor and machinery in the premises anil was running the workshop, since 1974 The tax receipts Exhibits D-4 to D-7 shew that profession tax of Rs. 16 was collected from the petitioner for the years 1975 to 78. 4. P.W. 1, the Building Inspector of Vijayawada Municipal Council inspected the area abutting the Gopalreddi Road on 2nd November, 1976. 16 was collected from the petitioner for the years 1975 to 78. 4. P.W. 1, the Building Inspector of Vijayawada Municipal Council inspected the area abutting the Gopalreddi Road on 2nd November, 1976. He found that the petitioner was running a workshop by name ‘Kumar Engineering Works’ in the premises by installing a drilling machine and grinder with 1.75 H.P. Electric Motor without containing the requisite permission to instal the machinery under section 264 of the Act or licence to run the workshop under section 263 of the Act. Therefore, he sent up a report Exhibit P-1 to his Superiors. Thereupon, the Commissioner issued a notice Exhibit P-2 under section 35-A of the Act to the petitioner informing her that she had installed the motor and the grinder without the requisite permission from the Vijayawada Municipal Council as required under section 264 of the Act and the machinery was being run without a licence as required under section 263 of the Act and directed her to stop the run-ning the machinery and remove the entire machinery along with the electric motor within a week of the receipt of notice. This notice was served on the Managing Partner of M/s. Kumar Engineering Works on 16th November, 1976. But the petitioner did not take any steps to stop the running of the machinery or to remove the machinery as required under Exhibit P-2. The Building Inspector, P.W.1 again inspected the installation of Kumar Engineering Works on 14th March, 1977, and found that the industry was working with electric motor and machinery inspite of the notice served on the petitioner on 16th November, 1976. Therefore, P.W. 1 sent up a report Exhibit P-3 seeking permission to prosecute the petitioner. The Commissioner an d Special Officer authorised P.W.1 under the proceedings Exhibit P-4 to file a complaint in the Court a gainst the petitioner for contravention of the provisions of sections 263 and 264 of the Act. Accordingly P.W.1 filed the complaint before the IV Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Vijayawada. The defence of the petitioner accused was one of denial. On behalf of the Prcsecution P.W.1 was examined. No defence witness was examined on behalf of the accused. The learned Magistrate convicted the petitioner-accused under section 336 of the Act for violating the provisions of sections 263 and 264 of the Act and sentenced her as stated above. 5. The defence of the petitioner accused was one of denial. On behalf of the Prcsecution P.W.1 was examined. No defence witness was examined on behalf of the accused. The learned Magistrate convicted the petitioner-accused under section 336 of the Act for violating the provisions of sections 263 and 264 of the Act and sentenced her as stated above. 5. On appeal the learned Sessions Judge confirmed the convictions and sentences of the petitioner. In this revision petition the conviction of the petitioner under section 263 leadwith 336 of the Act has not been challenged in this criminal revision case. Only the conviction of the petitioner under section 264 read with section 336 of the Act is assailed. 6. The learned Counsel makes a two-pronged attack on the validity of the conviction under section 264 read with section 336 of the Act. (1) The permission to instal the machinery must be deemed to have been granted to the petitioner under section 264 of the Act, since the permission sought for was not refused within 90 days from the date of the application of the petitioner. (2) Installation of any machinery or manufacturing plant is not a continuing offence. Therefore the prosecution must be launched within 3 months from the date of the commission of the offence i.e., 3 months from the date of failure to comply with the notice served under section 359 (1) of the Act. So the prosecution was barred by limitation. 7. Let me take the first submission first. It is necessary to read the relevant provision of the Act. Section 264 of the Act reads: “264. Application to be made Jor construc-tion, establishment or installation of factory workshop or work-place in which steam or other power is to be employed (1) Every person intending- (a) to constructor establish any factory workshop or work-place in which it is proposed to employ steam-power, water-power or other mechanical power or electrical power; or (b) to instal in any premises any machinery or manufacturing plant driven by steam, water or other power as aforesaid (not being machinery or manufacturing plant exempted by rules) shall before beginning such construction establishment or installation, make an application in writing to the council for permission to undertake the intended work. (2) The application shall specify the maximum number of workers proposed to be employed on any day in the factory, workshop, workplace or premises and shall be accompanied by- (i) a plan of the factory, workshop, workplace or premises prepared in such manner as may be prescribed by rules made in this behalf by the Govern-ment; and (ii) such particulars as to the power, machinery plant or premises as the council may require by bye-laws made in this behalf. 3 The council shall within sixty days after obtaining approval under sub- section (4)- (a) grant the permission applied for, either absolutely or subject to such conditions as it thinks fit to impose; or (b) refuse permission, if it is of opinion that such construction, establishment or installation is objectionable by reason of the density of the population in the neighbourhood or that it is likely to cause a nuisance. * * * 8. The section envisages that every person intending to construct or establish any factory or to instal in any premises any machinery or manufacturing plant driven by steam, water or other power, should before beginning such construccion, establishment or installation make an application in writing to the council for permission to undertake the intended work. There is no dispute that the petitioner in this case installed a drilling machine and a grinder driven by 1.75 H.P. Motor in the workshop without obtaining the necessary permission from the concerned authority. 9. The contention of the learned Counsel is that he submitted an application Exhibit D-3 to the Municipal Council on 1st January, 1974, that it was received by the Municipality on 2nd January, 1974, and that no order was passed on that application or communicated to the petitioner within 90 days from the date of the receipt of the application viz., 2nd January, 1974. According to the learned Counsel, the Council passed a resolution refusing permission only on 2nd July, 1974, and it was communicated to the petitioner on 19th July, 1974, i.e., more than 90 days after the date of the receipt of the application by the Municipal Council and therefore the permission must be deemed to have been granted to instal the machinery by virtue of the provisions of section 344 (13) of the Act. The relevant portion of section 344 reads: “344. The relevant portion of section 344 reads: “344. General provisions regarding licences and permissions-(1) Every licence and permission granted under this Act or any rule or by-law made under this Act shall specify the period if and for which, and the restrictions, limitations and conditions subject to which the same is granted, and shall be signed by the Commissioner. (13) The acceptance by the council of the prepayment of the fee for a licence or permission or for registration shall not entitle the person making such prepayment to the licence or permission or to registration, as the case may be, but only to refund of the fee, in the case of refusal of the licence or permission or of registration; but an applicant for the renewal of the licence or permission or registration shall, until communication of orders on his application, be entitled to act as if the licence or permission or registration had been renewed; and save as otherwise specially provided in this Act, if orders on an application for or renewal of licence or permission, or registration, are not communicated to the applicant within ninety days in the case of the grant of a licence, per-mission or registration and thirty days in the case of the renewal of a licence, permission or registration, after the receipt of the application by the Commissioner, the application shall be deemed to have been allowed for the year or for such shorter period as is mentioned in the application subject to the conditions imposed by or under this Act.” 10. No doubt, sub- section (13) of section 344 provides that if the orders on the application of a person tor permission are not communicated to the appli-cant within 90 days after the receipt of the application by the Commissioner, the application shall be deemed to have been allowed for the year. But the question is whether the petitioner submitted a valid application to the Municipal Council for permission to instal the machinery? In my opinion, there was no valid application made by the petitioner. She made the application Exhibit D-3 for permission to Director of Town Planning through the Special Officer and Commissioner, Vijayawada Municipality. She did not present the application as contemplated under section 264 of the Act to the Municipal Council, Vijayawada. Therefore, the provisions of section 344 (13) cannot be rightly invoked by the petitioner in this case. 11. She made the application Exhibit D-3 for permission to Director of Town Planning through the Special Officer and Commissioner, Vijayawada Municipality. She did not present the application as contemplated under section 264 of the Act to the Municipal Council, Vijayawada. Therefore, the provisions of section 344 (13) cannot be rightly invoked by the petitioner in this case. 11. The learned Counsel, however invited my attention to the decision of the Madras High Court in Public Prosecutor v. T. Krishna Rao, (1957) 2 MLJ. 637: I.L.R. (1958) Mad. 330. In that case, the application was made by the applicant for installation of the machinery to the Municipal Council. But no orders were passed or the application by the Council. The applicant commenced the work. The Madras High Court held that there was no order of refusal of permission by the Municipal Council within 30 days from the date of the application and that the application must be deemed to have been allowed under section 321 (2) of the Madras District Municipalities Act, which is analogous to section 344 (13) of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act. To the same effect is another decision of the Madras High Court in Ramaswamy v. Municipality of Coimbatore, (1968) 1 MLJ. 199 . 12. In this case, as already noticed, there was no valid application made by the petitioner to the Municipal Council of Vijayawada. The application of the petitioner for installation (Exhibit D-3) was addressed to the Director of Town Planning through the Commissioner and Special Officer of Vijayawada Municipal Council and not to the Municipal Council of Vijayawada. In those circumstances, the Court below rightly held there was no valid application presented by the petitioner within the meaning of section 264 of the Act. 13. Then there remains the more formidable submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, namely that the prosecution of the petitioner for the breach of section 264 of the Act was barred by limitation. He contends that the installation of machinery is not a continuing offence and when once the machinery is installed, the offence is complete on the date of installation. He contends that the installation of machinery is not a continuing offence and when once the machinery is installed, the offence is complete on the date of installation. So he pleads that the prosecution must be launched under section 366 of the Act for the installation of the machinery without permission under section 264 of the Act within 3 months from the date of non-compliance with the notice under section 359 (1) of the Act to remove the offensive installation. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Madras High Court in S.V. Palaniappan v. The Commissioner of Salem Municipality, (1966) MLJ. (Crl.) 595. In that case the petitioner failed to demolish the offending construction within the time allowed in the notice. Section 347 of the Act provided a period of limitation for commencing the prosecution. The Madras High Court held that on the failure of the accused to remove the offending construction within the time stipulated in the notice, the offence was complete and to such a case the proviso to section 347 of of the Act has no application. Section 366 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act is analogous to section 347 of the Madras Municipalities Act. Section 366 of the Act reads thus: “365. Persons empowered to prosecuts:-Subject to the provisions of section 375, no person shall be tried for any offence against the provisions of this Act, or of any rule or by-law made under it unless complaint is made by the Commissioner or by a person expressly authorised in this behalf by the council within three months of the commission of the offence. But nothing therein shall affect the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act II of 1974) in regard to the powers of certain magistrates to take Cognizance of offences upon information received or upon their own knowledge or suspicion: Provided that failure to take out a licence, obtain permission or secure registration under this Act shall, for the purposes of this Section, be deemed a continuing offence until the expiration of the period, if any, for which the licence, permission or registration is required and if no period is specified complaint may be made at any time within twelve months from the commencement of the offence.” 14. Section 336 prescribes a period of limitation for launching a criminal prosecution for any offence against the provisions of the Act. It places statutory injunction against the trial of any person for an offence under the Act unless the complaint is filed within three months of the commission of the offence. The purpose of the provision is obvious-for the purpose of peace and repose. People will not have peace of mind because of the apprehension of criminal prosecution, if there is no period of limitation for launching the prosecution. 15. In this case, the notice Exhibit P-2 was given to the petitioner under section 359(a) of the Act to remove the offending installation on 6th November, 1976. She was given a week's time to remove the electric motor and the machinery from the workshop. Indisputably, the petitioner did not comply with the notice and she failed to remove the electric motor and the machinery from the premises on or before 23rd November, 1976. So the offence was complete by 23rd November, 1976. The prosecution was launched in this case on 25th June, 1977 i.e., more than three months after the commission of the alleged offence. Therefore, the prosecution is clearly barred by the provisions of section 366 of the Act. 16. This Court in The Public Prosecutor v. Katta Krishnamurthy, (1971) M.LJ. (Crl.) 372 also held that once the unauthorised work is completed the offence is completed and the continuance of the unauthorised construction is not a continuing offence. To the same effect is the decision of the Madras High Court in N. Kandaswami Pillai v. The Executive Officer, (1947) 1 MLJ. 172 : 60 L.W. 150: A.I.R. 1947 Mad. 306 (1). In that case, the Madras High Court held that “the erection of a factory cannot be deemed to constitute a continuing offence because it is an act which can be performed only once although the running of the factory may constitute a continuing offence.” 17. The learned Public Prosecutor, however, placing reliance on the decision of the Madras High Court in The Public Prosecutor v. Veera Bhadrappa Lakshminarayana Shetty, (1952) 2 MLJ. 453 : I.L.R. (1953) Mad. 561: 65 L.W. 849: A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 204 submits that the offence committed in this case was a continuing one and, therefore, the prosecution was not barred by limitation. 453 : I.L.R. (1953) Mad. 561: 65 L.W. 849: A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 204 submits that the offence committed in this case was a continuing one and, therefore, the prosecution was not barred by limitation. In that case, the Madras High Court was dealing with the complaint of failure to construct a pucca dust-proof husk chamber. In that case the Inspector of Factories visited the factory for the second time on 24th January, 1951 and he found that the accused had failed to construct a pucca dust-proof husk chamber. He laid a complaint on 15th March, 1951, for an offence under section 92 of the Factories Act. The High Court held that the complaint was not barred by limitation as it was launched within three months from the date of the knowledge of the offence on 24th January, 1951. I do not, therefore, think that this decision has any relevancy to the facts of this case. 18. In the result, the convictions and sentences of the petitioner in each of these cases under section 263 read with section 336 of the Act are confirmed. The convictions and sentences under section 264 read with section 336 of the Act are set aside. The fine amount if any paid already shall be refunded to the petitioners. 19. The criminal revision cases are partly allowed. R.S. ----- Revision partly allowed.