PRABHAKAR, M. v. V. VENKATASWAMY — 1982 DIGILAW 184 (KAR)

M. S. PATIL, J. ( 1 ) THE landlords have made this interlocutory application with a prayer to recall the order dt. 30-6-1982 passed by this court on I A No. V made by the tenant. A few facts necessary for disposal of the i A stated in brief are as follows : The landlords sought for eviction of the tenant on the ground mentioned in Cl. (h) of sub- sec. (1) of S. 21 of the Karnataka Rent control Act, (hereinafter referred to as the act), from the premises in his occupation in HRC No. 2639/75, on the file of the iii Addl Civil Judge, Bangalore City, and obtained the order of eviction. Since the tenant was running a printing press in the premises in his occupation, while making the order of eviction, the Court below also granted certain time to give vacant possession, obviously In exercise of inherent powers of the Court for the ends of justice. The tenant being aggrieved by the order of eviction preferred a revision as provided under S. 50 (1) of the Act. When the matter came before Mahendra, 3. , the parties entered into a compromise, in terms of which the tenant agreed to vacate the premises as ordered by the Court on or before 30 6 1982. That was, however, sub ject to the condition that the tenant would regularly pay or deposit the rent for every month within the 15th of the succeeding month and on his failing to do so for two months, the landlord would be at liberty to take out execution and recover possession. Consequently, the order of eviction passed by the Court below was confirmed subject to the modification as indicated in the compromise memo and the revision filed by the tenant was dismissed. ( 2 ) THEREFORE, on 23 6-1982, before the time fixed could run out, the tenant made i A V for extension of time invoking the provisions of S. 151 of CPC on the ground that in spite of efforts made by him, he was not able to get any alternative accommodation so far. On 30-6-1982, by special order of the Chief Justice, 1a V was posted before me for orders. On 30-6-1982, by special order of the Chief Justice, 1a V was posted before me for orders. The counsel appearing for the tenant moved the Court to take I A V for orders in the early hours and it was posted before the court for orders at 2 30 PM. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the tenant submitted that on the Counsel of the landlord refusing to receive the copy of I A he had served the same on the landlord by registered post. Though by I A V the tenant had sought for extension of of time till 30 6 1983, yet having regard to the fact that the time originally granted to the tenant was to expire by 30-6 1982 itself and in the affidavit n support of I A v the tenant had also stated that he has been paying the rent regularly and had not committed any default in payment of rent, without notice to the landlord time was extended for three more months. It was also made clear that the tenant should hand over possession of the premises by the end of Sept. , 1982, and again subject to the same condition that he shall also continue to pay the rent regularly. It is this order made regarding the extension of time that is sought to be recalled by the landlords by I A VI. ( 4 ) WHEN I A VI came before me on 6-7-1982 and the counsel appearing for the landlords used unparliamentary words; without even making any record of the same, I directed that the matter may be placed before any other Judge. Accordingly by special order of the Chief Justice the matter came to be placed before mahendra, J. The counsel appearing for the landlord then filed a memo for withdrawing all the allegations made in the affidavit filed in support of I A VI unconditionally, But, later on he sought leave to withdraw the memo and he was permitted to do so. Therefore, the matter is once again posted before me. ( 5 ) THE order dt. 30-6-1982 has been sought to be recalled on the ground that time was granted to the tenant by consent, and therefore, the Court had no jurisdiction to extend time without the consent of the party. Therefore, the matter is once again posted before me. ( 5 ) THE order dt. 30-6-1982 has been sought to be recalled on the ground that time was granted to the tenant by consent, and therefore, the Court had no jurisdiction to extend time without the consent of the party. It is also submitted, I A Y had been allowed without notice to the landlord and hence it is prayed that the order be recalled. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the landlords relying upon R. 5 in Chap. III and rr. 4 and 5 in Chap. X of the Karnataka high Court Rules. 1959, vehemently argued, even if there was any urgency, a written request should have been made to the Registrar to post I A for orders before the appropriate Bench, and even though the application was made on 23-6 1982, no such written request has been made to the Registrar to post it for urgent orders and only on the last day the tenant had moved, and even then, instead of posting the matter before the appropriate Bench, it had been placed before this Court in violation of the Rules of Practice, According to him, the appropriate Bench before which I A V should, have been posted was mahendra, J. , as it is Mahendra, J. , who had made the earlier order fixing the time within which the tenant had to give vacant possession. ( 7 ) THERE is no substance in the contention that I A should have been posted before maheudra, J. , because R. 5 in Chap. III contemplates, petition or application for review, reconsideration or correction of judgment, decree, order or sentence. It is only when the petition or application is of any of those categories, then only the question of posting it before the Judge who had made the order would arise. I A V does not come under any of those categories. It is an independent application for extension of time originally granted and, therefore, could be posted before a Judge having jurisdiction to deal with such matter on the particular day. Anyhow, it is within the exclusive jurisdiction and power of the Chief Justice to constitute benches and allot or distribute the judicial work to them. As already stated, the application (I A V) had been posted before me by the special order of the Chief justice. Anyhow, it is within the exclusive jurisdiction and power of the Chief Justice to constitute benches and allot or distribute the judicial work to them. As already stated, the application (I A V) had been posted before me by the special order of the Chief justice. Such nature of work was also allotted to me during that period. Of course, Rr 4 and 5 in Chap. X contemplate, in case of urgency, a written request should be made to the Registrar and when such request is made, it is for the Registrar to get (he papers made ready, if they are not already scrutinised, and post the application before the appropriate Bench. There is no such indication, but the fact that application was made on 23-6-1982 and thereafter matter had been placed before the Court on 30 6-1982 showed that having regard to the special facts and circumstances of the case, the Chief Justice having satisfied about the urgency had ordered to post it before me on 30-6 1982. Therefore, it is clear there is no violation of the Rules as such. ( 8 ) THE other contention that the landlords had no notice of the application or there was no indication that the matter would be moved on a particular day, in the facts and circumstances of the case, also cannot be accepted. No doubt in para 2 of the affidavit filed in support of I A V, the deponent has stated that the Counsel appearing for the tenant sent the application (I A V) to him (deponent) and he received it only on 28-6 1982 and the other landlords received the notice on 30-6-1982 end there was also no indication that the tenant was going to move the Court on 30 6 1982 at 2 30 PM and the counsel appearing for the tenant had also not informed their (landlords') counsel and the order has thus been taken behind the back brushing aside the practice of the Court and that was nothing but a fraud. This has been countered by the tenant. In his affidavit, he has stated that his counsel personally went to the Advocate of the landlords to serve a copy of the application on him as required under the Civil rules of Practice, but the learned counsel appearing for the landlords asked. This has been countered by the tenant. In his affidavit, he has stated that his counsel personally went to the Advocate of the landlords to serve a copy of the application on him as required under the Civil rules of Practice, but the learned counsel appearing for the landlords asked. him to send Ihe application to the party directly and, therefore the question of informing the counsel of the landlords that the matter would be moved on 30 6 1982 at 2 30 PM did not arise, since he had refused to take notice of the case earlier. These are the affidavits filed by the parties, may be on the information furnished to them by their counsel. In the absence of affidavits of the respective counsel, it is difficult to say who is right and who is wrong. But, however, there is clear indication of the fact that the counsel of the landlords had asked the counsel of the tenant to send the application directly to the party. In other words, he had indicated his refusal to receive any such application for extension of time and that, we find in the affidavit filed by one of the landlords in reply to the counter affidavit filed by the tenant. What is stated in the affidavit is, that the tenant's counsel told his own counsel that he was going to make an application for extension of time and his advocate asked him to send it directly to the party. Thus it is clear, the Counse appearing for the landlords refused to receive the application. Of course, there is no such endorsement made on the application I A V regarding the refusal, but, as earlier stated, when I A V came before me for orders and the Counsel appearing for the tenant was questioned about the service of notice on the Counsel appearing for the landlords, he made a submission that the counsel appearing for the landlords had refused to receive the application. There is thus substantial compliance with the Rules. Admittedly one of the landlords had received the notice of the application on 28-6 1982. In the circumstances, it can also be presumed that he knew that the application would be moved on any date before the expiry of time granted. There is thus substantial compliance with the Rules. Admittedly one of the landlords had received the notice of the application on 28-6 1982. In the circumstances, it can also be presumed that he knew that the application would be moved on any date before the expiry of time granted. In the circumstances, it appears, the lai dlords could neither be heard to complain of non-service of notice ; nor the order dated 30 6-1982, which came to be made without notice to them, can be said to be invalid. ( 9 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the landlords, however, vehemently argued that the time having been fixed by consent of pai ties, the Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time without the consent of the landlords. In support of this contention he strongly placed reliance on the decisions in the cases of Hukumchand v. Bansilal (1), k. C. Dora v. G. Annamanaidu (2) as also the decision of this Court in K. Gunavelu v. M. Ramalah (3 ). The decision in K. C. Dora's (2) case seems to be exclusive. The question of law that arose for decision in the said case was, whether an appeal from a compromise decree was competent and and it was held, if the compromise was lawful, the decree to that extent was a consent decree and was not appealable because of the express bar contained in s. 96 (3) of CPC. The decision in the case of Hukumchand (1), it appears, has also no bearing. The question before the Supreme court was one where there was a statutory limit for doing of an act which could not be extended by any Court without the consent of the parties. We are not concerned here in this case with any such statutory limit or time. It is the provisions S. 148 of CPC that were for consideration there. There is no such statutory provision in the present case either in allowing or limiting any time for giving vacant possession of the premises after an order of eviction made against the tenant. The decision in the case of K. Gunavelu (3) no doubt appears to support the contention advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the landlords. There is no such statutory provision in the present case either in allowing or limiting any time for giving vacant possession of the premises after an order of eviction made against the tenant. The decision in the case of K. Gunavelu (3) no doubt appears to support the contention advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the landlords. With due respect, I am unable to accept the view expressed in the said decision that the agreement or compromise is final and binding between the parties and cannot be modified or altered in any way and the Court has no power to extend time without the consent of the parties where time already given was fixed by consent of parties. The protection from eviction given to a tenant under the Rent control Act comes to an end the moment the order of eviction is made and he will have no right to continue in possession of the premises. The landlord becomes entitled to recover possession in execution of the order of eviction, unless the execution is stayed. Because of this, a practice has been developed and hardened into law to give reasonable time to the tenant to give vacant possession of the premises to the landlord. When the original Court makes an order of eviction and grants time and the revisional Court confirms the order of eviction and grants time, it does so in exercise of the inherent powers while disposing of the matter. This time is granted with or without the consent of the landlord. Where the landlord consents, it is well and good. Even when the landlord does not consent, the Court exercises its own power and grants such time as would be reasonable in the circumstances of the case. When the Court grants such time, it has also jurisdiction to extend such time where the tenant makes out sufficient cause for extension. The provisions of S. 151 of CPC are procedural. It is not the consent that gives jurisdiction to make an order regarding the time, but the Court has inherent powers vested in it to make such order where it is necessary for ends of justice to do so. In other words, in cases not covered by express provisions and in the absence of any statutory bar, the Court can in exerci e of its inherent power extend time already granted. In other words, in cases not covered by express provisions and in the absence of any statutory bar, the Court can in exerci e of its inherent power extend time already granted. The High court has ample powers, to do justice to a litigant if sufficient cause is made, to extend time. Even where the time is fixed by consent of the parties, it will not be a bar for the Court for extending time when it becomes necessary to do so for the ends of justice. It is in view of those considerations and having regard to the fact that the tenant stated that in spite of efforts made by him he was not able to secure my alternative accommodation, it was considered necessary to grant some more time. Though he had asked for one year's time, only three months time more was granted keeping in view the need and requirement of the landlords, as found established. Therefore, there is no merit in this application. ( 10 ) IN the result, for the reasons stated above, I A VI is rejected. --- *** --- .