JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwal, J. - Petitioner Dr. Data Ram Sharma, is a Lecturer in Hindi in B.S.M. College, Roorkee. This college is affiliated to the Meerut University, Meerut, which is governed by the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973. The college applied to the Vice-Chancellor for sanction in order to run post graduate classes in Hindi in the said college. This sanction having been granted the post of Reader in Hindi was advertised and an interview was held on 29th June, 1974. The petitioner was not selected to the said post but Dr. Y.N. Sharma, respondent No. 4 was selected. On 10th July, 1974 an appointment letter was issued to Dr. Y.N. Sharma appointing him as the Reader in Hindi in the said college subject to the approval of the Vice-Chancellor. It appears that after the said appointment was made the petitioner represented against the selection of Dr. Y.N. Sharma and ultimately the matter was referred to the Vice-Chancellor. On 10th Sept., 1974 the Assistant Registrar of the Meerut University communicated the decision of the Vice-Chancellor to the Secretary of the College intimating therein that the petitioner was not qualified fort the post of Reader and that the Vice-Chancellor had been recommended by both the experts appointed by the Vice-Chancellor. The petitioner aggrieved by the order dated 10th Sept., 1974 filed the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in this Court. 2. At the commencement of the hearing of the petition a preliminary objection was taken by the respondent's counsel to the effect that since the petitioner is challenging the order of the Vice-Chancellor, he has an alternative remedy to approach the Chancellor of the Universities under Section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and as such the present petition is not maintainable. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties length on this question. 4. Section 68 of the Act entitles a person who is aggrieved by the decision of an authority or officer of the University to file a representation before the Chancellor. It further provides that the decision given by the the chancellor on such a reference shall be final. Section 9 enumerates the various officers of the University. The Vice-Chancellor is one of the officers of the University as defined in the Act. It further provides that the decision given by the the chancellor on such a reference shall be final. Section 9 enumerates the various officers of the University. The Vice-Chancellor is one of the officers of the University as defined in the Act. Subsequently, a person aggrieved by the decision of the Vice-Chancellor can file a representation under Section 68 of the Act. In this view of the matter the petitioner who is aggrieved by the order dated 10.9.1974. passed by the Vice-Chancellor clearly had a right of filing a representation before the Chancellor. In our opinion, therefore, the petitioner had an effective alternative remedy. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner in opposition to the preliminary objection raised by the counsel for the respondent, has raised two contentions before us. His first contention is that the petition should not be held to be not maintainable on the ground of alternative remedy. His second contention is that in view of the proviso to S. 68 of the Act a reference could have only been made within three months of the date of decision by the Vice-Chancellor and since this time had elapsed the petition should not be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. 6. In so far as the first contention of the learned counsel is concerned, learned counsel laid emphasis on the decision in Lala Hirday Narain v. Income Tax Officer, Bareilly AIR 1971 SC 33 . A similar argument was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Managing Committee, R.P. Degree, v. Vice Chancellor, Kanpur University, Kanpur, 1980 U.P.L.B.E.C. 270. The case of Lala Hirday Narain (supra) was distinguished by this Court on the ground that in that case not only the petition was admitted but it has also been heard on merits and as such the Supreme Court did observe that the petition should not have been dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. But where a preliminary objection has been taken in regard to the alternative remedy the principles laid down in the case of Lala Hirday Narain would not apply. He respectfully agree with the decision given in the case of Managing Committee, R.P. Degree College (supra). 7. In the instant case also the counter affidavit of Jagdish Chandra Sharma was filed in this Court on 14th Mar. 1975. He respectfully agree with the decision given in the case of Managing Committee, R.P. Degree College (supra). 7. In the instant case also the counter affidavit of Jagdish Chandra Sharma was filed in this Court on 14th Mar. 1975. A copy of this counter affidavit was given to the counsel for the petitioner on 13th Mar. 1975. In this counter affidavit in para 57 a categorical objection was taken that the petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground that the petitioner has not availed of the alternative remedy available under the U.P. State Universities Act. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that so far as the first contention of the learned counsel is concerned, it has no merit. 8. In regard to the second contention of the learned counsel, though in S. 68 of the Act it is provided that the person aggrieved can file a reference within not more than three months after the date of decision, but there is another proviso' added in the said section empowering the Chancellor in exceptional circumstances to act suo motu or entertain a reference after the expiry of the period mentioned in the proceeding proviso, namely the period of three months. In view of the proviso, therefore, it cannot be said that since the period of three months had expired, the remedy of the petitioner has ceased to exist. The Chancellor has been given a power to entertain a reference in exceptional circumstances after the expiry of period of three months and as such it is open to the petitioner to approach the Chancellor for entertaining the reference though the period had expired. Since the delay has been due to the fact that petition was pending in this Court, there appears to be no reason why the Chancellor would not entertain the reference after the expiry of the period of three months, and we are confident that if the petitioner seeks the indulgence of the Chancellor with proper grounds the Chancellor shall duly consider the matter. 9. A similar argument was addressed before a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Hon'ble Chandrashekhar, C.J. and Hon'ble Sinha J. in writ petn. No. 4035 of 1977, Committee of Management v. Vice Chancellor, Meerut University, Neerut. The Bench by its judgment dated 16.3.1978. dismissed the petition on the ground of alternative remedy. 9. A similar argument was addressed before a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Hon'ble Chandrashekhar, C.J. and Hon'ble Sinha J. in writ petn. No. 4035 of 1977, Committee of Management v. Vice Chancellor, Meerut University, Neerut. The Bench by its judgment dated 16.3.1978. dismissed the petition on the ground of alternative remedy. The question of invoking the aid of second proviso to S. 68 was disposed of by the Bench in the following terms :- "True, the normal limitation for making a reference under section 68 is three months from the date when the question could have been raised for the first time. There is, however, a further proviso to S. 68 which states that in exceptional circumstances the Chancellor can act suo motu or entertain a reference even after the expiry of the aforesaid period of three months. The petitioner can invoke the aid of second proviso to S. 68 while making the reference and we are confident that, in the event of proper grounds being set out, that will receive due consideration of the Chancellor." 10. We respectfully agree with the decision given in the Committee of Management (supra). The petitioner , however, in this connection has relied upon the decision of another Bench of this Court in writ petn. No. 5279 of 1978 Ku. Madhu Jain v. Chancellor, Rohilkhand University, Bareilly reported in 1980 U.P.L.B.E.C. 300. In this case Ku. Madhu Jain had already filed a reference to the Chancellor on 5.6.78 but since the the Chancellor did not decide the reference expeditiously, Ku. Madhu Jain filed a petition in this Court challenging the order of the Vice Chancellor and seeking a relief from this Court. Since Ku. Madhu Jain was seeking a relief against the Chancellor the question of dismissing the petition on the ground of alternative remedy available with the Chancellor did not arise. In any case, a further argument was raised in that case, a further argument was raised in that case that because of Sub-cl. (3) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which was brought about by the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act 1976 the alternative remedy having already been availed if there was an absolute bar to the entertaining of the petition. This argument was repelled by the Bench on the ground that since Ku. (3) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which was brought about by the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act 1976 the alternative remedy having already been availed if there was an absolute bar to the entertaining of the petition. This argument was repelled by the Bench on the ground that since Ku. Madhu Jain had filed a reference before the Chancellor after expiry of three months, it cannot be said that there was an absolute bar under Constitution of India as amended by the (42nd Amendment Act) 1976 to the filing of the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, as the petitioner cannot claim that her representation be considered as a matter of right. The case of Ku. Madhu Jain is clearly distinguishable and it does not lay down that merely because the period of three months had expired, it cannot be said that the petitioner had an alternative remedy. It may be further observed here that so far as the present petition is concerned, the order which has been challenged is of 10th Sept., 1974 and the present petition was filed on 15th Oct., 1974. Three months period had not expired and the petitioner could very well have filed the reference within time before the Chancellor and as such the decision given in Ku. Madhu Jain's case (supra) does not, in our opinion, help the petitioner. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has however, further urged before us that the order dated 10th Sept., 1974 is not an order passed by the Chancellor, but is an order passed by the Assistant Registrar of the University and the Assistant Registrar not being an officer of the Universities no reference lay to the Chancellor. This contention of the learned counsel, in our opinion is without any foundation. The order dated 10th Sept., 1974 itself shows that it is an order intimating the decision of the Vice Chancellor. In the counter affidavit of Jagdish Chandra Sharma filed on behalf of the University in para 15 it has been stated that the letter dated 10th Sept., 1974 was issued under the instruction of and by and on behalf of the Vice Chancellor. It was further stated that in the said letter in the original record of the University, the Vice Chancellor had accorded his approval and in fact, it was the order of the Vice Chancellor which was communicated to the petitioner. It was further stated that in the said letter in the original record of the University, the Vice Chancellor had accorded his approval and in fact, it was the order of the Vice Chancellor which was communicated to the petitioner. In view of the assertion we summoned the original record from the University and we found that a draft of the letter dated 10th Sept., 1974 was prepared by the Assistant Registrar under the direction of the Vice Chancellor which was approved by the Vice Chancellor on 10th Sept., 1974. The word written on the draft letter is 'yes' and thereafter signed by the Vice Chancellor. In our opinion, thereafter, the order was passed by the Vice Chancellor on 10th Sept., 1974 which was communicated to the petitioner by the letter of the Assistant Registrar dated 10th Sept., 1974. Since the actual order was passed by the Vice Chancellor under S. 68 of the Act. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that the order of the Vice Chancellor is not in accordance with law and in the manner required under the various provisions of the Act. Since we are of the opinion that the petitioner had alternative remedy, are expressing no opinion on this question, except that there is, in fact, an order of the Vice Chancellor against which a reference lies to the Chancellor. 13. In view of the fact that the petitioner has an alternative and efficacious remedy, we accordingly dismiss the petition. The parties are, however, directed to bear their own costs.