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1982 DIGILAW 189 (KAR)

P. M. GURUVAIAH v. KRISHNAVENAMMA

1982-08-26

K.A.SWAMI

body1982
K. A. SWAMI, J. ( 1 ) THESE two CRPs are preferred by the defendant and the plainiiff respectively against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Small Causes Judge of the court of Small Causes, Bangalore, in SC no. 1764 of 1974. The Small Causes Court, after coming to the conclusion that the mortgage and the lease formed part of one transaction and the lease was only a design for securing prompt payment of interest, had decreed the suit on the basis that the suit was for recovery of interest. The suit in question was, in fact, for recovery of arrears of rent. It was because of this, the suit was filed as a small cause suit in the Court of Small Causes. ( 2 ) THE defendant has challenged the decree on the ground that it is without jurisdiction and the plaintiff has challenged the correctness of the finding that the mortgage and the lease formed part one transaction and the lease was an integral part of the same transaction and it was only designed for securing prompt payment of interest. It is not in dispute that the mortgage deed and the lease deed have been executed on the same day i. e. , 13 9-1962. ( 3 ) IT was contended on behalf of the petitioner defendant that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant ; that the lease was an integral part of the mortgage transaction and it was only intended to ensure prompt payment of interest to the mortgagee ; that the Small Causes court on coming to the conclusion that the lease transaction was an integral part of the mortgage and it was intended to ensure prompt payment of interest, ceased to have jurisdiction over the matter and as such, it was not open for it to decree the suit as it was not open for the Small causes Court to pass a decree for recovery of arrears of interest due from a mortgagor to a mortgagee, inasmuch as such a claim was nothing but to recover an interest in the immoveable property which was beyond the purview of a Small Causes Court. ( 4 ) A suit for possession of immoveable property but not including a suit for ejectment, or for the recovery of any interest in such property is one of the suits excepted from the cognizance of the Court of Small causes as per Cl. (4) of the Schedule read with S. 8 of the Kar. Small Cause Courts act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act' ). Of course, a suit for recovery of arrears of rent is cognizable by a Court of small Causes as per para (b) of Cl. (4) of the Schedule to the Act. Cl. 10 of the schedule to the Act, further takes out from the purview of the Small Causes Court, a suit for the determination or enforcement of any other right to or interest in immoveable property. When once a finding is recorded by a Small Cause Court that it is not a lease but it is a part of the mortgage transaction and is intended to ensure prompt payment of interest on the mortgage debt, the suit ceases to be a suit for recovery of arrears of rent and in such a situation, the suit in effect will be a suit for recovery of interest in the immoveable property or at any rate will be a suit for enforcement of a right or interest in the immoveabie property, in either case such a suit will be beyond the purview of the court of Small Causes ; as such, the suit in question is excepted from the cognizance of the Court of Small Causes by cls. 4 or 10 of the Schedule to the Act. ( 5 ) HOWEVER, the learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that it was not open for the Small Causes Court to go into the question whether the lease transaction formed part of the mortgage transaction, when there was a registered lease deed. It was also further contended that a suit for recovery of interest due on the moregage debt was not a suit for recovery of interest in immovable property. ( 6 ) IT is not possible to accept the contention that it was impermissible for the small Causes Court to go into the quetiion whether the lease in qution was a part of the morgage transactor. ( 6 ) IT is not possible to accept the contention that it was impermissible for the small Causes Court to go into the quetiion whether the lease in qution was a part of the morgage transactor. When a plea was raied be fore the Court and there was no legal obstacle what soever for the Court to deal with such a plea, the Court was required to contder the same. Therefore the Court of Small Cause was justised in considering the contention of the defendant that the lease wan not an Independent transaction, but it was a part of the morgage transction ( 7 ) IT was next contended that the Court was not justified in holding that the lease transaction was a part and parcel of the mortage transaction. This confention also cannot be accepted. It is not disputed that the lease deed came to be executed simultaneously with the execution of the morgage deed. The lease deed makes a reference fo the two deeds of morgage. That the parties intended it to be a device or arrangement to cecure the payment of interest by the morgagor on the mortgage money was also established by the evidence on record. The various circumtances which to establish that the lease was resorted to as a device to ensure payment of interest on the morrgage money, have been clearly stated in paras 15 and 16 of the judgment of the Court below, which are as follows :"15. It is true that Ex. P 1 stipulates that Rs. 90 was payable by the detendant per month as rent. The controversy in this case cannot be settled merely on the basis of Ex. P 1 overlooking the concomitant circumstances. Ex. P1 had come into existence on the date of second mortgage and letus see what was the circumtance obtained earlier. After the first mortgage on 14 12 1961. the deferdant had paid Rs. 45 on 23- 12-61, vids Ex D 1 (a ). It is this receipt to whith both Krishnaiali Setty and plaintiff had signed. This receipt reads that rs. 45 was one month rent towards the petititioes. After the second mortgage the re was incriced twice over. Now, the two mortgages were for Rs. 4,000 each. the deferdant had paid Rs. 45 on 23- 12-61, vids Ex D 1 (a ). It is this receipt to whith both Krishnaiali Setty and plaintiff had signed. This receipt reads that rs. 45 was one month rent towards the petititioes. After the second mortgage the re was incriced twice over. Now, the two mortgages were for Rs. 4,000 each. Because the principal amount advanced was doubled, the amount payable by the defendam was also increased in the same preportion and this inference is in escapuble. Rs. 90 stipulated in ex. P 1 must be taken as interest payable for the total amount advanced to the defendant. Hence there was no valid reason for increase of rent from rs, 43 to Rs. 90 and if really the lease was independent of the mortgages, such an enhancement would have been almost impermissible and impossible. 16. If a contract of lease had been imposed by and between the parties for the first time, vide Ex. P-1, then there was do question of paying rent earlier to 13 9 62. Ex. p 1 (a) makes a specific reference that Rs. 45 represents the rent for one month. Even the second receipt which is dt, 20 5 62 makes a reference to payment of rent. This antecedent circumsrence is a relevant factor in understanding the intention between the parties in raising the rent from Rs. 45 to 90 with the advent of the second mortgage. The mortgage dt. 13 9-62 and the lease deed at Ex. P 1 were simuitaneoualy executed. Both were registered. These are the factors relevant in the context. The percentage premium payable by the defendant proportionately enhanced with the increase of ad- vance on a mortgage from Rs. 4,000 to rs. 8,000. In the lease deed Ex. P 1 reference was made to both the mortgages. The defendant says that he had never parted with the actual possession of the property and I am inclined to believe this. The lease deed stipulated payment of rent every month regularly. From the nature of the payment made by the defendant as manifest from Ex. D -1, it gives an impression that what was paid was in reality towards interest, for if it had been rent, there would have been some regularity. The lease deed stipulated payment of rent every month regularly. From the nature of the payment made by the defendant as manifest from Ex. D -1, it gives an impression that what was paid was in reality towards interest, for if it had been rent, there would have been some regularity. All these things in cumulation lead to an irresistible conclusion that ft mortgage and the lease was only a design for securing payment of interest promptly". That being so, the Interest accruing on the mortgage debt cannot be considered to be independent of the interest In the 1m- moveable property which is the subject matter of the mortgage. As per S. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, a mortgage is the transfer of an interest in specific immoveable property for fhe purpose of securing fhe payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan, an existing or future debt, or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability. Therefore, a suit to recover the interest accrued on the mortgage debt is nothing but a suit to recover an interest in the immoveable property which is the subject matter of the mortgage. That being so, such a suit is exceptcd from the cognizance of the Court of small Causes as per Cl. (10) and the first portion of Cl. (4) of the Schedule to the act. This view of mine also receives support from the decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Baboolal Byansingh v. Sundarlal Mannalal (1 ). ( 8 ) FOR the reasons stated above, it has to be held that the judgment and decres passed by the Court of Small Causes, art without jurisdiction, as the suit Itself is not cognizable by a Court of Small Causes. ID this view of the matter, CRP No. 317 of 1977 is allowed. The judgment and decres passed by the Court of Small Causes are set aside. The Small Cause Court is directed to return the plaint to the plaintiff under S. 16 of the Act, for presentation to the proper Court. Consequently, CRP no. 1043/77 filed by the plaintiff is dismissed. --- *** --- .