JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS appeal has been preferred by the appellants against a decree for eviction passed by Civil Judge Class I, Satna in Civil Suit no. 2-A/73 dated 19-10-1978, maintained on appeal by Additional District judge, Satna in Civil Appeal No. 46-A/79 dated 29-1-1980. ( 2. ) THE plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for eviction against the appellants as the appellant No. 3 had the office in the premises. It appears that the suit was decreed without considering any grounds under Section 12 (1) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act holding that the provisions of Madhya Pra-desh Accommodation Control Act are not applicable to the premises in dispute as the place where these premises are situated did not fall within the municipal area of Satna Municipality but was subsequently, by a notifica-tion, added in the municipal limits. It is not disputed that now the premises are situated within the area included within the municipal limits of Satna and it is also not in dispute that when M. P. Accommodation Control Act was brought in force this place where these premises are situated did not fall within the area which was the municipal area of Satna. ( 3. ) IT was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that although the area where these premises are situated originally did not fall within the municipal limits of Satna but as now this area has been included in the municipal limits, the Act will be applicable and the Courts below committed an error in decreeing the suit for eviction without going into the grounds under Section 12 (1) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act. Learned counsel contended that the decision reported in Nandlal v. Motilal, AIR 1977 SC 2143 , now settles the dispute and even where this area has subsequently been brought within the municipal limits still it could not be contended that a fresh notification for application of the provisions of Madhya Pradesh accommodation Control Act will be necessary as this area now falls within the municipal limits. The schedule which provided that this Act will be applicable to the municipal area of Satna Municipality would be enough and the provisions of M. P. Accommodation Control Act will be applicable. The schedule which provided that this Act will be applicable to the municipal area of Satna Municipality would be enough and the provisions of M. P. Accommodation Control Act will be applicable. It was, therefore, contended that the case will have to be sent buck to the trial Court for considering the question of grounds under Section 12 (1)before a decree for eviction could be passed against the appellants. ( 4. ) IT was also contended by learned counsel that the property admittedly is a trust property and the suit having been filed by the respondent claiming to be Sanchalak of the trust, other trustees were not joined and, therefore, the suit was bad. ( 5. ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent on the other hand, contended that in nandlal v. Motilal (supra), their Lordships were dealing with a case of a new municipality created but the question in this case pertains to a particular area which has now been included in the Municipal limits of Satna town and in this view of the matter, it was contended that a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in Gangadin Behari v. Addt. Deputy Commissioner, 1954 NLJ 122 clearly lays down that where a new area is brought within the municipal limits a fresh notification would be necessary. The learned counsel also placed reliance on a decision in Balwant v. Sadashiv, Civil Revision No. 472 of 73 decided on 24-1-1974. It was also contended by learned counsel for the respondent that the rent which was originally fixed was enhanced by the order of the Collector and if the provisions of madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act are applicable, the enhanced rent will be payable which admittedly has not been paid and, therefore, a ground under section 12 (1) (a) is made out. ( 6. ) AS regards the second question, it was contended that the Sanchalak of the trust who under the trust-deed itself has been authorised to be sued and sue on behalf of the trust has filed the present suit and it was in this view of the matter that both the Courts below came to the conclusion that the respondent Sanchalak could tile a suit on behalf of the trust and, therefore, it could not be said that the view taken is in any manner erroneous. ( 7. ( 7. ) BOTH the learned counsel agreed that grounds under sectiou 12 (1)of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act have also been alleged in the plaint but the Courts below did not examine those grounds as both the Courts below felt that the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Accommodation control Act were not applicable to the suit in question. Learned counsel for both the sides, therefore, agreed that if it is held that Madhya Pradesh accommodation Control Act is applicable, the only course will be to remand the suit to the trial Court to try questions regarding the grounds under section 12 (1) and dispose of the suit in accordance with the law. ( 8. ) AS regards the question about the maintainability of the suit filed by the Sanchalak of the trust, it is clear that the trust-deed itself authorises the Sanchalak to sue and be sued for and on behalf of the trust. This aspect of the matter has not been challenged by the learned counsel for the appellants and it is, therefore, clear that if the Sanchalak was authorised to file a suit on behalf of the trust and he has filed the suit, it is not necessary that ail the trustees be joined. This contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants, therefore, is without any substance. ( 9. ) THE only question which deserves consideration is about the application of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act to the premises in dispute. Admittedly, when M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 was brought into force this place where the premises are situated was not within the municipal limits. It is also not disputed that by subsequent notification the municipal limits of Satna Municipality have been extended and now this place where the premises are situated is within the municipal limits of Satna. Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, section 1, clause (3) provided: " (3) The Act shall, in the first instance, be in force in the areas specified in the Schedule. It shall come into force in other areas of the state on such dates as the State Government may, by notification, appoint; and different dates may be appointed for different areas and for different provisions of the Act and thereupon the Schedule shall be deemed to have been amended accordingly. " and a Schedule under this clause is provided under the Act itself. " and a Schedule under this clause is provided under the Act itself. In this schedule, item 38 refers to Satna Municipal area and it is not disputed that by the Schedule this Act was made applicable to the municipal area of satna Municipality initially. It is also not disputed that subsequently the place where the premises are situated has been brought within the municipal area of Satna Municipality. But it was contended by learned counsel lor the respondent that this being an additional area which has been subsequently brought within the municipal area, this Schedule will not apply to this area which has been subsequently added and it needed a subsequent notification making this Act applicable to this area. Learned connsel placed reliance on the decision reported in Gangadin Behari v. Addl. Deputy Commissioner. In this decision, a Division Bench of this Court was considering the language of C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 and it was observed : - "it is evident that the term "area" or "areas" in these provisions has a geographical aspect and means an expanse of land lying within certain bounds. It is, therefore, clear that when under Notification No. 3731-3140-11, dated the 26th July 1949, the Provincial Government extended Chapter II of the Rent Control Order, 1949, to the Municipalities in the Central Provinces and Berar, the extension applied only to the areas which were then included within the said municipalities. It is true that subsequently the area comprising village Borgaon was included within the Municipality of Nagpur, but this could not ipso facto have the effect of extending the operation of Chapter II of the Rent Control order, 1949, to that area. The extension of a statute to any area cannot be made or extinguished by implication, and, therefore, while by the subsequent notification village Borgaon became suoject to the provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, Chapter II of the Rent Control Order, 1949, could not be deemed to extend to that area in the absence of any express notification to that effect. " It appears that a village Borgaon which originally was not included in the limits of Nagpur Municipality was by a subsequent notification included in the Municipal area and a question arose that Borgaon was not a Municipality or a municipal area originally and, therefore, when the Act was applied to all the Municipalities of the State, this village could not be brought within it as it was brought within the municipal area by a subsequent notification. ( 10. ) IN Nandlal v. Motilal, (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court also considered the provisions contained in C. P. and Berar Letting of houses and Rent Control Order, 1949. In this case, the premises were situated in a village Tiroda which originally was not a Municipality but by subsequent notification was declared to be a Municipality and in this context, their Lordships observed : - "4. The validity of the notification which was issued on July 26, 1949, under section 2 of the Act, has not been challenged before us, so that there can be no doubt that while Chapter I became applicable to the whole of the Central Provinces and Berar and the integrated States, chapters II and IV became applicable to all Municipalities in that State with effect from that date. Tiroda was not a Municipality at that time and did not come within the purview of the notification. But it became a Municipality on June 12, 1956 and the notification became applicable to it from that date. We, therefore, see no justification for the argument that the notification was confined to those Municipalities which were in the existence on July 26, 1949, and that a fresh notification was necessary to extend the benefit of the Rent Control Order to a subsequently constituted Municipality. There is nothing in the wordings of the notification to justify any such argument. On the other hand, the wordings of the notification are quite unambiguous and there is no reason why they should not be given their simple and natural meaning. They clearly provide that Chapters II and IV of the Rent Control Order extend to "all the Municipalities" in the State. As Tiroda was constituted as a Municipality on June 12, 1956, the provisions of those chapters became applicable to it from that date. They clearly provide that Chapters II and IV of the Rent Control Order extend to "all the Municipalities" in the State. As Tiroda was constituted as a Municipality on June 12, 1956, the provisions of those chapters became applicable to it from that date. We are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court that the protection of Clause 13 of the Rent Control Order was not available to the appellants. As they raised a defence against the maintainability of the suit on the ground that previous permission of the controller was not taken by the respondent, the High Court clearly erred in rejecting that defence and in setting aside the judgment of the Court of first appeal by which the plaintiffs suit was dismissed. " ( 11. ) IN this decision, their Lordships considered the notification under section 2 by which Chapters II and IV were made applicable to all the municipalities of the State. It appears that the notification which their lordships of the Supreme Court were considering was dated 26-7-1949 and the Division Bench of this Court in 1954 N. L. J. 122 also was considering the same notification dated 26-7-1949 issued under Section 2 of the Act and in view of this decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, no assistance could be sought from the decision reported in 1954 N. L. J. 122. In view of this decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, it is not even necessary for me to go into the other decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent. Admittedly, there is no such decision after this decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court reported in Nandlal v. Motilal referred to above. It is, therefore, clear that the Courts below committed an error of law in coming to the conclusion that the provisions of M. P. Accommodation Control Act are not applicable. ( 12. ) IT was contended by learned counsel for the respondent that even if the M. P. Accommodation Control Act is applicable, ground under section 12 (1) (a) is made out as admittedly all arrears on the basis of the rent fixed by the Collector have not been paid. ( 12. ) IT was contended by learned counsel for the respondent that even if the M. P. Accommodation Control Act is applicable, ground under section 12 (1) (a) is made out as admittedly all arrears on the basis of the rent fixed by the Collector have not been paid. But it is apparent that the courts below have neither considered this question nor it is clear under what provision the Collector fixed the rent nor the facts necessary for consideration of the ground under section 12 (1) (a) have been found by the courts below. It appears that both the Courts below did not examine any of the grounds which were available and alleged by the respondent-plaintiff under section 12 (1) as both the Courts came to the conclusion that the provisions of M. P. Accommodation Control Act are not applicable. In this view of the matter, therefore, this contention advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent could not be accepted. ( 13. ) IT was contended by learned counsel that the applicability of the law to all the Municipalities and the applicability of the law to a particular area will have to be differently interpreted. But as stated above, their lordships of the Supreme Court were examining the notification which was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Gangadin v. Addl. Deputy commissioner (supra), on which reliance was placed by learned counsel for the respondent. In this view of the matter, in face of the decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court, it could not be contended that 1954 N L J 122 still can be considered with regard to the case in hand. ( 14. ) IN the light of the discussion above, therefore, in my opinion, both the Courts below committed an error of law in coming to the conclusion that the provisions of M. P. Accommodation Control Act are not applicable to the premises in question. Apparently, in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the provisions of the Madhya pradesh Accommodation Control Act are applicable to the premises in question. As it is not disputed that the suit has not at all been considered in the light of the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, the case will have to be sent back to the trial Court. ( 15. As it is not disputed that the suit has not at all been considered in the light of the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, the case will have to be sent back to the trial Court. ( 15. ) CONSEQUENTLY, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below are set aside and it is directed that the suit shall be sent back to the Court of Civil Judge Class I, Satna who shall proceed to try and dispose of the suit in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.