JUDGMENT : P.K. Mohanti, J. - An order of transfer of the Petitioner, who is a Primary School Teacher, is challenged in this writ petition. The order was passed on 27-5-1982 by opposite party No. 2 the District Inspector of Schools (vide Annexure-E) and it was communicated to the Petitioner on 29-5-1982 by the Block Development Officer, Cuttack Sadar (vide Annexure-I). She was directed to be relieved of her duties with effect from the afternoon of 31-5-1982 and to join her new station immediately. 2. It is alleged that the transfer is the outcome of mala fides of opp. party No. 3 Shri H.B. Singh. the Sub-Inspector of Schools, Cut tack Sadar, Bidyadharpur Circle. It is also alleged that opp. party No. 2 was not competent to pass the order of transfer inasmuch as under Government order No. 36100 dated 14-12-1967 it is the Block Development Officer alone who can transfer a teacher within the Block. It is further alleged that the order of transfer has been passed as a measure of punishment. According to the Petitioner Shri G.C. Das, the former District Inspector of Schools, Cut tack made a false report against her to the Superintendent of Police, Cuttack upon which a criminal case under Sections 353, 506 and 341 read with Section 34, I.P.C. was started against her along with one Alam Giri Baig. The case was heard on 16-3-1982 and the depositions of Shri G.C. Das and Shri H.B. Singh were recorded by the Magistrate. In course of cross-examination they broke down. So Shri G.C. Das filed a petition for withdrawing the case which was allowed by the Magistrate. This was a great discomfiture for the former District Inspector of Schools and Shri Singh, the S.I. of Schools. Shri Singh (opposite party No. 3) bore a grudge against the Petitioner since then and he not only harassed the Petitioner but ultimately succeeded in getting her transferred. It was alleged that Smt. Krishna Nag, the present District Inspector of Schools who passed the order of transfer was prejudiced against the Petitioner at the instance of opposite party No. 3. On 31-5-1982 the Petitioner made a representation to the District Inspector of Schools with copies to the D.P.I. (Schools) and Secretary to the Government, Education Department. This representation was favourably recommended by the Chairman, School Committee and the Head Pandit of the School. On 31-5-1982 the Petitioner made a representation to the District Inspector of Schools with copies to the D.P.I. (Schools) and Secretary to the Government, Education Department. This representation was favourably recommended by the Chairman, School Committee and the Head Pandit of the School. The School Committee also made a written request to the D.P.I. (Schools) to cancel the order of transfer. Operation of the order was stayed by the D.P.I. (Schools) by his D.O. letter No. 487 dated 16-6-1982, but the District Inspector of Schools misled the D.P.I. (Schools) by submitting a false report against the Petitioners. The Petitioner personally met the D.P.I. (Schools) on 15-9-1982 and submitted a representation, but no action was taken on the same. Before the order of transfer was passed the Petitioner had submitted a representation against the behaviour of the Sub Inspector of Schools towards her In the office of the Block Development Officer on 18-5-1982 explaining as to how she was threatened with immediate transfer. Copies of that representation were forwarded to the Education Minister, D.P.I. (Schools), the Inspector of Schools, Cut tack I Circle, and Block Development Officer, Sadar, Cut tack. It is alleged that the Petitioner had been transferred seven times in course of about eight years of service. She is an unmarried lady living with her old father at Cuttack and her present transfer to Kajipatna will be most inconvenient to her as she will have to spend about Rs. 10/- everyday for going to the School at Kajipatna by rictcshaw and for her return journey she may not be able to get a ricksha w at all. She had just completed one year of service in the Tinigharia U.P. School when the impugned order was passed. Upon these allegations the Petitioner prays for quashing the order of transfer in Annexure 1 and for directing the opposite parties 1, 2 and 3 not to interfere with her service at Tinigharia U.P. School or in the alternative to transfer her to any other School within the city of Cuttack outside the jurisdiction of opposite party No. 3. 3. In the counter affidavit filed by opposite parties 1 and 2 the allegations of mala fide are denied and it is contended that the impugned order of transfer was made on adininistrative grounds. 3. In the counter affidavit filed by opposite parties 1 and 2 the allegations of mala fide are denied and it is contended that the impugned order of transfer was made on adininistrative grounds. It is stated that the Petitioner has been transferred from time to time either on her own request or for her disobedience of higher austerities and for creating law and order situation in the locality. While serving in Champati L.P. School under Salipur Police Station she developed enmity with the Head Pandit and other teacher of the School. She created taw and order situation in the locality for which the Superintendent of Police, Cuttack sent a confidential letter (Annexure-A) to the District Inspector of Schools, Cut tack recommending her transfer. Similarly the Head Pandit of the School made a representation on 22-5-1979 (Annexure A/1) for transfer of the Petitioner and in June, 1979 the Secretary at the School also moved for her transfer. Then the Petitioner was transferred to Fakirpada U.G.M.E. School where she used to attend School late at 10.30 a.m. and did not follow the teaching syllabus. Her behaviour towards the student being very rough, a good number of complaints were received by the Headmaster from the students and guardians. She was most obstinate and showed disobedience towards the Headmaster of the School. On 24-11-1979 the Headmaster submitted a report to the District Inspector of Schools, Cuttack recommending for her transfer as per Annexure-B and on 4-3-1981 the Managing Committee of the School also passed a resolution for her transfer. The Petitioner's allegation that she submitted a representation to die District Inspector of Schools is denied. It is pointed out that Tinigparia U.P. School and. Kajipatna U.G.M.E. School are within Cuttack Sadar Block and the District Inspector of Schools is competent to make transfer of Pnmary School teachers either within the Block or outside the Block. 4. The case has been argued at some length by Dr. S.C. Dash appearing on behalf of the Petitioner and Mr. R.K. Patra, the learned Additional Government Advocate appearance on behalf of the State The arguments at Mr. Patra centre mainly on the point whether this Court has jurisdiction to interfere in such matters. It was submitted that the order at transfer is not justiciable before the Court as it has been passed in the exigencies of public Service. The submissions of Dr. Dash are three fold. Patra centre mainly on the point whether this Court has jurisdiction to interfere in such matters. It was submitted that the order at transfer is not justiciable before the Court as it has been passed in the exigencies of public Service. The submissions of Dr. Dash are three fold. The first submission made by him is that the Dist. inspector of Schools was not competent to pass the order of transfer. The second submission is that the order of transfer being mala fide and having been made for a collateral purpose and not having been made in the exigencies of public service deserves to be quashed. Thirdly, according to Dr. Dash, the sequence of events in which the order of transfer came to be made clearly establishes that it has been passed as a measure of punishment by circumventing the disciplinary machinery. 5. The first question for consideration is whether the order of transfer by an administrative authority is open to judicial review. No doubt, it will not be proper for this Court to intervene in orders of transfer made by administrative authorities for administrative exigencies or other valid reasons. It is the inherent right of an administrative authority to transfer its employees from one place to another in the interests of public service. The administrative authority is obviously in the best position to judge how to distribute its man power. Whenever a transfer is made, the Government employee so transferred from one place to other may steel unhappy for one or the other reason. He is however not entitled to say that he should be allowed to continue at a particular station. Transfer being an implied condition of service, he should be prepared to work at, different stations. When he Joins service he should know that he would be liable for transfer at any time. So long as the transfer is made in the exigencies of public service it would be valid and would not be open to challenge in a court at law. This is the general idea behind the powers which are conferred on an administrative authority to transfer its employees. That, however, does not mean that this power is absolute and that this Court has no jurisdiction to intervene in an order of transfer when it is made arbitrarily or capriciously. This is the general idea behind the powers which are conferred on an administrative authority to transfer its employees. That, however, does not mean that this power is absolute and that this Court has no jurisdiction to intervene in an order of transfer when it is made arbitrarily or capriciously. Judicial review is permissible if the transfer is made as a measure of punishment or if it suffers from the vice of mala fide or if it has been made arbitrarily or for some collateral purpose. 6. In Merricks and Anr. v. Nott-Bower and Ors. (1964) II WLR 702, Denning M.R. observed: ...It is a well-known principle of our law that any powers conferred by statute or regulation on an executive or administrative authority must be exercised in good faith for the purpose for which they are granted. The must not be misused or abused by being applied to an ulterior purpose. Whether that principle applies here or not, I do not say all I do say is that if the Plaintiffs allege, as they do, that this was a misuse of the power of transfer that it was used, not for the purpose of good administration and efficiency but for the motive of punishment they have an arguable case which they are entitled to have tried by the courts. In Dr. (Sm.) Pushpika Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal and Ors. 1972 S.L.R. 910. (Cal.), the question before the Court was that when an officer is transferred simply to accommodate another officer whether the. Court is competent to interfere even though no civil or evil consequences would follow from such an order. The Court held: It is no doubt true that orders of transfer of Government servants like any other Government administrative or executive order are passed invariably for administrative purposes or in public interest. Such order normally are outside the purview of examination by courts of law. It is also the law, as observed by this Court in (1) Mihir Kumar Sarkar and Others Vs. State of West Bengal and Others, that an executive decision or action or an administrative decision is liable to be struck down if It is used mala fide or for a collateral purpose. In the case of N.N. Singh and Ors. v. General Manager, Chittaranjan Locomotive Works and Ors. State of West Bengal and Others, that an executive decision or action or an administrative decision is liable to be struck down if It is used mala fide or for a collateral purpose. In the case of N.N. Singh and Ors. v. General Manager, Chittaranjan Locomotive Works and Ors. 1973 (1) S.L.R. 1153 the question for consideration before the Calcutta High Court was whether by merely mentioned that the order is for administrative purpose, the jurisdiction of the Court to see the nature of the order is ousted. The Court observed: At the same time it may be obvious or apparent on the facts evident, admitted or established that the orders of the authorities, though otherwise legal and valid have not been issue for the professed purposes as in this case in public or administrative interest or, in the exigencies of service but they are only passed for other purposes in the garb of ostensible purposes. The court of law in such cases has thought it, fit and competent for itself to probe in and scrutinise such orders to see if they have been passel for other purposes under colourable exercise of power or if such orders are accordingly mala fide. xxx xxx xxx The administrative orders, not otherwise justiciable, thus come under Court's scrutiny if there are allegations of mala fides or colourable exercise of powers behind such orders, even though they are free from violation of any constitutional or statutory provisions. Such orders again are liable to be interfered with if the allegations noted above are established or evident on materials on record in absence of any rebuttable evidence. In the case of S. Pratap Singh Vs. The State of Punjab the law relating to executive sections was laid down by the Court in positive terms. The following dictum of Lord Lindley in General Assembly of Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun (1904) A.C. 515, was quoted: I take it to be clear that there is a condition implied in this as well as in other instruments which create powers, namely, that the power shall be used bona fide for the purposes for which they are conferred. It was pointed out by Ayyangar, J. as follows: ...The Constitution enshrines and guarantees the rule of law and Article 226 is designed to ensure that each and every authority in the State, including the Government acts bona fide and within the limits of its power and we consider that when a Court is satisfied that there is an abuse or misuse of power and its jurisdiction i& invoked, it is incumbent on the Court to afford justice to the individual.... In the case of G. Ramanathan v. Acting Zonal Manager, Food Corporation of India 1980 S.L.J. 94 (Madras), the Court held as under: ...Courts are chary to interfere with an order of transfer made for administrative reasons. An innocuous order of transfer, which not only on the face of it appears to be one made in order to further the administrative interest of an organisation, but which even on a deeper scrutiny does not pose any irregular or malafide exercise of power by the concerned authority, it is generally uphold by civil courts, as courts cannot substitute their own opinion and interfere with ordinary orders of transfer of employees of established organisations. But, if in a given case, an order of transfer appears to be a deliberate attempt to bypass all disciplinary machinery and offend the well-known principle of audi alterm partem, if ex facie it is clear that the order of transfer was not made for administrative reasons, but was made to achieve a collateral purpose, then It is open to the court to crack the shell of innocuousness which wraps the order of transfer and piercing such a veil, find out the real purpose behind the order of transfer. No doubt, a normal order of transfer can, under no circumstances be misunderstood as a punitive measure. No doubt, a normal order of transfer can, under no circumstances be misunderstood as a punitive measure. But if the circumstances surrounding such an order lead to a reasonable inference by a well-instructed mind, that such an order was made in the colorable exercise of power and intended to achieve a sinister purpose and based on irrelevant considerations, then the arm of the court can be extended so as to decipher the intendment of the order and set it aside on the ground that it is one made with a design and motive of circumventing disciplinary action and, particularly when a civil servant is involved, to avoid the stringent but mandatory procedure prescribed in Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. 7. In the present case the order of transfer (Annexure-E) is apparently innocuous. But in view of the allegations made by the petiteness, we think it necessary to find out whether the order of transfer was made innocently or whether it was made as a punitive measure or it is an outcome of mala fide. 8. So far as challenge to the impugned order on the ground that it is vitiated by mala fides is concerned, it is the well established rule that the burden of establishing mala fiddles very heavily on the person who alleges it. The Petitioner has to prove malus animus indicating that the opposite party No. 2 was actuated either by spite or ill-will against her or by indirect or improper motives. The Petitioner's allegations in the writ petition are that her transfer is the outcome, of mala fide of opposite party No. 3, the Sub-Inspector of Schools, Cuttack Sadar - vide paragraphs 5 and 8. It appears, however, that the order of transfer (Annexure B) was made by Smt. Krishna Nag, the District Inspector of Schools (opposite party No. 2) and it is not shown that she had any malus animus against the Petitioner. It is also not shown that Shri H.B. Singh (opposite party No. 3) had anything to do in connection with the impugned order of transfer. The criminal case started against the Petitioner at the instance of the former District Inspector of Schools appears to have been withdrawn on 16-3-1982 (vide Annexure 4/C) and the impugned order of transfer was passed by the present District Inspector of Schools (opp. party No. 2) on 27-5-1982 (vide Annexure-E). The criminal case started against the Petitioner at the instance of the former District Inspector of Schools appears to have been withdrawn on 16-3-1982 (vide Annexure 4/C) and the impugned order of transfer was passed by the present District Inspector of Schools (opp. party No. 2) on 27-5-1982 (vide Annexure-E). The Petitioner has not produced any material to show that Smt. Nag, the present District Inspector of Schools was actuated by any ill-will or spite against her. We accordingly held that the Petitioner has failed to establish that the impugned order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides. 9. The next contention of the Petitioner is that Smt. Nag (opp. party No. 2) was not competent to make the order of transfer. The Petitioner relied upon Government order No. 36100 dated 14-12-1967 in order to show that it is the Block Development Officer alone, who can transfer a teacher within the Block. It was accordingly contended that as the Petitioner was transferred within the Block the District Inspector of Schools was not competent to make the order of transfer. The learned Addl. Govt., Advocate has produced before, us the latest Government order bearing No. 22000/E dated the 6th May, 1976 which modifies the previous Government order. This Government order provides, inter alia, that the transfer of primary school teachers within or outside the Block shall be done by the District Inspector of Schools. In view of the revised instructions contained in the Government order No. 22000/E dated the 6th May, 1976 (Annexure F) the contention that opposite party No. 2 was not competent to make the impugned order of transfer has no force. 10. The Petitioner has challenged her transfer on the ground that it was made by way of punishment. The order of transfer does not mention that it had been passed as a measure of punishment against the Petitioner. But it does appear from the administrative file which was made available to us by the learned Addl. Government Advocate at the time of hearing that the order was passed on the basis of confidential D.O. letter No. 1295 dated 15-5-1982 sent by the Block Development Officer, Cuttack Sadar to opposite party No. 2. The contents of the D.O. letter are extracted below: Dear Smt. Nag, This is regarding obstinate behaviour and threat given to the S.I. of Schools, Bidyadharpur Circle, by Smt. Santipriya Kar. Asst. Teacher. The contents of the D.O. letter are extracted below: Dear Smt. Nag, This is regarding obstinate behaviour and threat given to the S.I. of Schools, Bidyadharpur Circle, by Smt. Santipriya Kar. Asst. Teacher. Tinigharia U.P. School, in Block Office today, at the time of disbursement of salary to Primary School Teachers. It is learnt that Sri G.C. Dash, ex-D.I. of Schools, Cuttack had instituted some G.R. Case against Smt. Kar, in which Sri H.B. Singh, S.I. of Schools, Bidyadharpur Circle appeared as an witness on behalf ot the prosecution. As such, Smt. Kar is angry with Sri Singh. She appeared before me today and complained about deduction of Recurring Deposit and summoned Sri Singh to clarify the matter. During this discussion, Smt. Kar showed arrogant behaviour and later on Sri Narendra Das. Secretary of the Block Primary School Teachers' Association reported me that she was threatening Sri. Singh outside, before other teachers. This has adversely affected the disciplined atmosphere of the Block and shall had repercussions over the teachers as well as administration. Since, the teacher possesses some prejudiced views against the S.I. of Schools, I suggest that she may atonce be transferred elsewhere' for administrative convenience. On the left hand margin of this D.O. letter opposite party No. 2 has passed an order on 20-5-1982 directing the dealing assistant of her office to put up suggestions for transfer. 11. It appears that subsequent to the impugned order of transfer, the opposite party No. 1 Director of Public Instruction (Schools) wrote a D.O. letter to the opposite party No. 2 to the following effect: Dear Miss Nag, The Chairman and some members of the School Committee of the Tinigharia U.P. School met me today and complained about the transfer of Smt. Shantipriya Kar, a teacher of the said School although she has been there hardly for one year. They have further said that she is a disciplined teacher and that her teaching is satisfactory. Please let me know why you have transferred her in such circumstances. She may be allowed to continue in the same school till you get clearance from me. In the meantime please send your report as soon as possible. In reply to the above D.O. letter, opp. Please let me know why you have transferred her in such circumstances. She may be allowed to continue in the same school till you get clearance from me. In the meantime please send your report as soon as possible. In reply to the above D.O. letter, opp. party No. 2 sent a confidential report bearing No. 7489 dated 20th August, 1982 wherein it is stated that the Petitioner was transferred on administrative grounds on the basis of a confidential D.O. letter received from the Block Development Officer. Cuttack Sadar. It is also stated therein that the Petitioner had committed acts of misconduct in the past and that off and on the Petitioner was going to the office of opposite party No. 2 and a busing her staff and also using abusive and filthy language against her. 12. When the order of transfer is read along with the aforesaid D.O. letter of the Block Development officer and the confidential report of opposite party No. 2 it is manifestly clear that the order of transfer was made on account of the alleged acts of misconduct of the Petitioner and as such it was made as a measure of punishment and not purely on administrative grounds. In the counter affidavit filed by opposite parties 1 and 2 averments have also been made about the past misconduct of the Petitioner. The facts and Circumstances disclosed by the counter affidavit and the aforementioned correspondence would warrant disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner but the power of transfer was used as a disciplinary measure and it was made with motive to circumvent disciplinary action and to bypass the disciplinary machinery. It was improper to transfer the Petitioner merely because the Block Development Officer wanted it without the administrative authority going into the merits of the complaint made against the Petitioner. Such transfer would, in our opinion amount to punishment of the Petitioner. A punishment can be only inflicted in accordance with the relevant rules. Nor could the punishment be noted out without affording the Petitioner sufficient opportunity to meet the case against her. 13. We are conscious of the fact that normal orders of transfer ought not to be interfered with by courts. But after appreciating the circumstances of the case we are of the view that the impugned order though apparently innocuous was meant really to punish and harass the Petitioner. 13. We are conscious of the fact that normal orders of transfer ought not to be interfered with by courts. But after appreciating the circumstances of the case we are of the view that the impugned order though apparently innocuous was meant really to punish and harass the Petitioner. It appears to us to be a colourable exercise of powers and is liable to be struck down. 14. We, therefore, allow the writ application and quash the orders of transfer as per Annexures 1 and E so far as they relate to the Petitioner. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. If the authorities desire to take any disciplinary action against the Petitioner it is open to them to start a disciplinary proceeding and pass appropriate orders after giving the Petitioner an opportunity to explain her conduct. B.N. Misra, J. 15. I agree. Final Result : Allowed