Judgment :- 1. The petitioners are I grade Draftsmen of the Public Health Engineering Department. Under the Special Rules for the. Kerala Public Health Engineering Subordinate Services, brought into force from 1966 and amended in 1969, vacancies in the next higher post of Junior Engineer (now called Asst. Engineer) are to be filled up by direct recruitment of Engineering graduates, and by promotion of I Grade Draftsmen in service, in the ratio of 6: 4. Among the draftsmen in service, there are holders of diploma and certificates, and the promotion quota available for them has to be divided in the ratio of 3: 1. Thus, out of every ten vacancies, six go to graduates, three to diploma holders, and only one goes to the certificate holder. Further, while the diploma holder can get promoted after two years of service, a minimum service of five years is required for the certificate holder. 2. By Ext. P1 dated 16-11-1979 Government ordered that sixteen Draftsmen I Grade be promoted as Junior Engineers into vacancies earmarked for direct recruitment. The idea was apparently to cure some deficiencies which had arisen prior to 1966, in the matter of working out the promotion quota, in accordance with orders then in force. By the same order, it was also directed that as and when these 16 persons retired or were promoted, the resultant vacancies were to be restored to the direct recruits. 3. The first point raised on behalf of the petitioners is about the validity of the latter direction in Ext. P1; it is contended that those 16 vacancies should have been treated as permanently allotted for the promotees. The second contention is that the Special Rules, in so far as they provide for a ratio of 3:1 between diploma holders and certificate holders in the matter of promotion, are discriminatory. 4. The limited attack against Ext. P1 can easily be disposed of by stating that this Court cannot be a party to perpetuating an illegality. Ext. P1 violated the quota rule when it directed diversion of 16 direct recruitment vacancies in favour of the promotees; Government apparently thought that a temporary violation of the statutory rules could pass muster, with a safeguard f or the future. What the petitioners now want is that it should be made a permanent affair, at the instance of this Court; and plainly, this Court cannot oblige them. 5. What the petitioners now want is that it should be made a permanent affair, at the instance of this Court; and plainly, this Court cannot oblige them. 5. Turning to the plea of discrimination, the relevant averments in ground (B) of the Original Petition are these: "As per the qualifications prescribed for promotion as Junior Engineer a Diploma Holder in the category of I Grade Draftsman/ Overseer is eligible for promotion if he has rendered service under the Government for a minimum period of two years. But a certificate holder in that category is eligible for promotion only after he has rendered service under the Government for a minimum period of 5 years of which not less than 2 years should be in the category of Overseer/ Draftsman Grade I. Thus the certificate holders are eligible for promotion as Junior Engineer only after completing a longer period of service and experience than the Diploma holders. It is arbitrary and illegal to discriminate the certificate holders further and give them only a very small quota of promotion. The provisions in the Special Rules restricting the chances of promotion of Certificate holders are arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the guarantee under Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Certificate holders are entitled to equal treatment with the Diploma holders in the matter of promotion." In my opinion, the above averments are not sufficient for this Court to hold that there is discrimination between the two groups or classes. It is well-settled that the right to equality under Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution does not militate against every classification. When persons or things are arranged into different classes, on the basis of a differential which has relation to the object sought to be achieved, such classification will not amount to discrimination. The most that could be said is that the classification must be real, that the differential must be intelligible, and that it should have a rational nexus with the object. Obviously, diploma holders and certificate holders belong to two well-defined classes, the basis for the classification being superiority in technical qualification. The distinction is also reflected in the difference in qualifying service prescribed for eligibility. The apparent object of the rule is that there should be a higher percentage of better qualified hands among Junior Engineers. Obviously, diploma holders and certificate holders belong to two well-defined classes, the basis for the classification being superiority in technical qualification. The distinction is also reflected in the difference in qualifying service prescribed for eligibility. The apparent object of the rule is that there should be a higher percentage of better qualified hands among Junior Engineers. There is no averment that diploma holders and certificate holders are equal in all respects; there is not even a specific averment (assuming that averments alone would be sufficient) that a certificate holder with five years of service is equal to a diploma holder with two years of service for all purposes, so far as the needs of the office of junior Engineer is concerned. When equality itself is not claimed with specific averments and sufficient material in support thereof, a plea based on unequal treatment has necessarily to fail. 6. Counsel would however contend that the rule itself recognises that a certificate holder with five years of service is equal to a diploma holder with two years of service, when it provides that both could be promoted as Junior Engineers, and having recognised equality in such a manner, there can be no justification for allotting three vacancies to one group while allotting only one to the other. Equality is implicit in regarding both the groups as fit for promotion, and the claim for equal opportunity is denied when further provision is made for a higher quota for one of the two groups it is argued. Decisions are also cited to support this line of argument. 7. Now, can it be assumed from the mere circumstance that diploma holders and certificate holders are eligible for promotion under the Rules as Junior Engineers, that the two classes are equal in all respects? Examining the rule as a whole, what is seen is that certificate holders can be directly recruited only as Draftsman (Overseer Gr. II), while diploma holders can be directly recruited as Draftsman Gr. I (Overseer Gr. I). Graduates in Engineering are eligible for direct recruitment as Junior Engineers, while Diploma holders can get directly recruited only to the lower post of Draftsman Gr. I and certificate holders to the still lower post of Draftsman. II), while diploma holders can be directly recruited as Draftsman Gr. I (Overseer Gr. I). Graduates in Engineering are eligible for direct recruitment as Junior Engineers, while Diploma holders can get directly recruited only to the lower post of Draftsman Gr. I and certificate holders to the still lower post of Draftsman. Sixty percent of the vacancies in the cadre of Junior Engineers is set apart for direct recruitment from among graduates, while the diploma holders and certificate holders get only 30 and 10 percent of the vacancies by promotion. As I understand the Rules, the best men for manning the posts of Junior Engineers, in the opinion of the rule-making authority, are graduates. They are superior to the others in the matter of general and technical qualifications. In an ideal situation, all the vacancies can go to the graduates so that the best men are there to perform the duties attached to the post. But the rule-making authority was also aware that it was not dealing with an ideal situation, but a different one where those in service in the lower posts, facing stagnation, were aspiring for promotion. In the interests of efficiency it thought that while the bulk of the posts (60 percent) should go to graduates, some provision could be made for those in the lower grades also, because discontentment at those leval was also a matter likely to affect efficiency of the service as a whole. A smaller percentage of the vacancies was therefore set apart for them. Among those eligible, the diploma holders were comparatively better qualified and they were allotted 30 percent of the 'vacancies. The least suited were the certificate holders, but they too had to be kept satisfied. Ten percent of the vacancies was accordingly fixed as their quota. A balance was thus attempted between the needs of efficiency in the cadre of Junior Engineer, and the needs of efficiency (arising from contentment) in the lower cadres. Dilution upto 30 percent was found possible without serious detriment to efficiency, in the case of diploma holders; but in the case of certificate holders„ the rule-making authority thought that such dilution should not exceed ten percent. Can it be said that a rule creating such a scheme of things is based on an implied recognition of equality between diploma holders and certificate holders? Can it be said that a rule creating such a scheme of things is based on an implied recognition of equality between diploma holders and certificate holders? In my opinion, the rule recognises that graduates, diploma holders and certificate holders are not equal in all respects. The difference in the matter of eligibility for direct recruitment to the various posts, and the prescription of different percentages for appointment to the cadre of Junior Engineers, can be understood only on the premise that in the opinion of the rule-making authority atleast, the three groups were unequal. 8. Assuming that diploma holders with two years of service and certificate holders with 5 years are equals, for the purpose of being considered for promotion, does 'it necessarily follow that recognition of any further preference in favour of diploma holders, by earmarking a larger quota for them, is discriminatory? Promotion by selection on the basis of merit is a well-known method of appointment. Where AB and C are equally qualified and their performances are evaluated as 'satisfactory', 'good' and 'outstanding' in that order, it is common knowledge that C who may be the junior most would be preferred for promotion by any selection body. If a further preference is thus permissible, despite equality of qualification or eligibility, with reference to the needs of the office, what is wrong if such preference is based on superiority of academic, technical or other relevant qualification, and is made in the shape of allowing a larger quota for the better qualified? We are not here concerned with selection posts, but recognition of preference in favour of a few people belonging to a group of equally qualified persons, underlies one of the accepted principles of appointment. 9. Again, if the rule is assumed to contain a statutory declaration that diploma holders with two years' service and certificate holders with five years' service are equal, it also contains a similar declaration that both these groups of people are equal to raw engineering graduates, because they constitute another category eligible to be appointed to the same post. Direct recruitment being only one of the methods of appointment and having no sanctity in itself in the context of the equal opportunity clauses of Art.14 and 16, the logical conclusion from the above approach must be that allotment of 60 per cent of the vacancies to the graduates is also bad. Direct recruitment being only one of the methods of appointment and having no sanctity in itself in the context of the equal opportunity clauses of Art.14 and 16, the logical conclusion from the above approach must be that allotment of 60 per cent of the vacancies to the graduates is also bad. If reservation of a higher percentage in favour of diploma holders is discriminatory, in a rule which assumes that they are equal to certificate holders, reservation of a still higher percentage in favour of the graduates must also be discriminatory for the same reason, That means that all recruitment rules providing for quotas based on qualifications will have to be struck down. Besides the Public Health Engineering Subordinate Service Rules with which we are here concerned, similar rules relating to the Engineering Subordinate Services of other branches will also have to be struck down for the same reason. The casualty list may not stop there, because other rules applicable to other services (like the Architectural Subordinate Service, Draftsman Training Subordinate Service, Forest Subordinate Service, Labour Subordinate Service, to mention only a few) also prescribe different ratios for different classes of qualified groups. If the rules really offend principles of equality, they should all be struck down, irrespective of their number, nature and the consequences; but should all that be done on the mere assumption that whenever two or three classes of persons are made eligible for appointment with prescribed quotas, all of them are equal in all respects? 10. Assumptions apart, the authorities are clear on the point that even where material is available for evaluation of equivalence, that is a matter which should ordinarily be left to others, and that courts are ill-equipped to deal with conflicting claims relating to methods of recruitment, ratio and the like. In Bihan Sarup v. Union of India (AIR. 1974 SC. 1618), the Supreme Court said: "When considering this point it must be clearly understood that this court is not concerned with Govt.'s policy in recruiting officers to any service. Government runs the service and it is presumed that it knows what is best in the public interest. In Bihan Sarup v. Union of India (AIR. 1974 SC. 1618), the Supreme Court said: "When considering this point it must be clearly understood that this court is not concerned with Govt.'s policy in recruiting officers to any service. Government runs the service and it is presumed that it knows what is best in the public interest. Government knows the calibre of candidates available and it is for the Government to determine how a particular service is to be manned whether by direct recruits or by promotees or 'by both and, if by both, what should be the ratio between the two sources having regard to the age factor, experience and other exigencies of service. Commissions and Committees appointed by the Government may indeed give useful advice, but ultimately it is for the Government to decide for itself." The position was re-stated in different words, in Mohd. Shujat Ali v. Union of India (AIR. 1974 SC. 1631): "It must be noted that the question in regard to equivalence of educational qualifications is a technical question based on proper assessment and evaluation of the relevant academic standards and practical attainments of such qualifications and where the decision of the Government is based on the recommendation of an expert body which possesses the requisite knowledge, skill and expertise for adequately discharging such a function, the Court, uninformed of relevant data and unaided by the technical insights necessary for the purpose of determining equivalence, would not lightly disturb the decision of the Government. It is only where the decision of the Government is shown to be based on extraneous or irrelevant considerations or actuated by malafides or irrational and perverse or manifestly wrong that the Court would reach out its lethal arm and strike down the decision of the Government." Where the courts feel ill-equipped to disturb the balance of qualifications and quotas even when data are available, they cannot legitimately act on mere assumptions supposed to be implicit in a rule. Equal treatment of unequals is as much discrimination as unequal treatment of equals; and if the assumption of equality rests on a slender foundation, any direction to do away with unequal treatment may itself run the risk of being discriminatory. The problem is a delicate one; and as pointed out in Mohd. Shujat Ali (AIR. 1974 SC. Equal treatment of unequals is as much discrimination as unequal treatment of equals; and if the assumption of equality rests on a slender foundation, any direction to do away with unequal treatment may itself run the risk of being discriminatory. The problem is a delicate one; and as pointed out in Mohd. Shujat Ali (AIR. 1974 SC. 1631), "the burden is always on him who attacks the constitutionality of a legislation to show that the classification made by it is unreasonable and violative of Art.14 and 16." The petitioners in this case have not discharged that burden, and they cannot pass it on to the court by inviting it to proceed on assumptions. 11. As to the decisions cited, it is true that courts have been called upon from time to time to tackle different facts and situations in dealing with equality pleas in service matters. Differences between direct recruits and promotees, graduates and non-graduates, test-qualified hands and unqualified hands, with reference to seniority, promotion and prescription of Quotas, have frequently been projected on the judicial screen, for being censured in accordance with the rules of equality. In the natural lottery called "god's big distribution of intelligence and health", equality has seldom been the pervading spirit, with the result that marked differences do exist as facts of life, a fact recognised by the theory of classification itself. But the drawbacks of divine justice are attempted to be cured by human justice, which in its drive towards equality, sometimes takes the shape of compensating past inequalities by ordaining inequality for the present, as is disclosed by the provisions requiring reservation in favour of the backward classes. The ideal of equality of opportunity can be attained only by ordering a vast re-distribution of benefits, sufficient to satisfy the moral claims of groups which had been the victims of poverty and prejudice in the past. Such re-distribution, in the realm of public employment, fun the risk of undermining efficiency, as the rewards are not always for the competitively excellent. The framers of our Constitution were aware of this danger, as could be seen from the provisions of Art.335. Judicial pronouncements are not recipes for the malady of social and economic inequalities; they cannot take the place of a nation's deliberate attempt to re-order compensatory social justice. The framers of our Constitution were aware of this danger, as could be seen from the provisions of Art.335. Judicial pronouncements are not recipes for the malady of social and economic inequalities; they cannot take the place of a nation's deliberate attempt to re-order compensatory social justice. The greatest conceivable intellect can work only with the tools which its environment vouchsafes to it; and after all, the only tools available to the judges are the rules of interpretation. With these tools in hand, how can a court decide as to who should bear the burden of the redistribution, and to what extent? Poverty, backwardness, class distinctions and the like cannot be eradicated by decrees of courts; the best that could be said is that in a given case, the court can approach the controversy by giving a meaningful and realistic content to the 'equality provisions of the Constitution. 12. The complaint voiced before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in State of Mysore v. Narasinga Rao(AIR.1968 SC. 349) was that matriculate tracers were being given a higher scale of pay than non-matriculate tracers. Both kinds of tracers were doing the same kind of work, and it was argued that grant of a better pay-scale to the matriculates was discriminatory, because the duties were of a technical nature and matriculation had nothing to do with technical competence. The court rejected the contention by holding that even general education, which enriches a man's intelligence and instils a better sense of responsibility in him, can be a reasonable basis for favoured treatment. If grant of better pay-scales on the basis of superior general qualifications cannot amount to discrimination in the case of posts requiring technical skill, prescription of a higher promotion quota based on superior technical qualifications, cannot also be discriminatory. The only difference is that in one case, the higher qualification is rewarded by higher pay, while in the other, it is rewarded by more promotional avenues. Tested on the principles of Narasinga Rao's case, a rule providing for a ratio of 3: 1 between diploma holders and certificate holders cannot be held to be bad. 13. Mervyn Continho v. Collector of Customs (AIR. 1967 SC. 52) was a case where seniority disputes between direct recruits and promotees had to be resolved. Appraisers of the Customs Department were being appointed both by direct recruitment and promotion, in rotation. 13. Mervyn Continho v. Collector of Customs (AIR. 1967 SC. 52) was a case where seniority disputes between direct recruits and promotees had to be resolved. Appraisers of the Customs Department were being appointed both by direct recruitment and promotion, in rotation. An appraiser was eligible to be promoted as Principal Appraiser only after 5 years of service. It so happened that the number of direct recruits to the cadre of appraisers over a few years was low, with the result that the bulk of vacancies in the higher grade of Principal Appraisers went to promotee-appraisers. The direct recruits had to wait for 5 years; and in order to compensate them, the department decided that promotions to the cadre of Principal Appraisers should also be made on a rotational basis i.e. one vacancy was to go to the promotee and the next to the direct recruit. The court held that this system was discriminatory because there was only one class (i.e. appraisers) from which promotion had to be made and that recognition of preference in favour of some members of the class on the basis of their source of origin alone, was improper. The principle was further clarified in Roshan Lal v. Union of India (AIR. 1967 SC. 1889) where it was held that when direct recruits and promotees were integrated into one class, there could be no justification for a further classification among them for the purposes of promotion to the next higher grade, based on the sole circumstance that some had come into the class by promotion and others through direct recruitment. These two decisions can easily be fitted into the theory of classification evolved by courts i.e., for preferential treatment, there should be different classes and intelligible differentia between them. When the two classes in the feeder category are fused into one for all practical purposes, there are no longer different classes among them for purposes of promotion; at any rate, an attempt to further classify them by looking at the source from which they came, can have no nexus with the object. 14. The apparent difference between the lines of approach in the above two cases and in Narasinga Rao ((AIR. 1968 SC. 14. The apparent difference between the lines of approach in the above two cases and in Narasinga Rao ((AIR. 1968 SC. 349), one frowning upon preference being shown after two different classes are fused together, and the other, favouring further favoured treatment, was sought to be taken advantage of, in Ganga Ram v. Union of India (AIR. 1970 SC. 2178). The Railway Establishment Manual provided that seniority among Gr. I Account Clerks had to be fixed with reference to the dates of appointment in the case of direct recruits, while in the case of promotees to Gr. I, it was to be determined with reference to their substantive seniority in Gr. II. A Bench of six judges considered the plea of discrimination arising from application of different standards in the matter of determining seniority between direct recruits and promotees, and held: "The State which encounters diverse problems arising from a variety of circumstances is entitled to lay down conditions of efficiency and other qualifications for securing the best service for being eligible for promotion in its different departments. In the present case the object which is sought to be achieved by the provisions reproduced earlier is the requisite efficiency in the Accounts Department of the Railway Establishment. The departmental authority is the proper judge of its requirements. The direct recruits and the promotees like the petitioners, in our opinion, clearly constitute different classes and this classification is sustainable on intelligible differentia which has a reasonable connection with the object of efficiency sought to be achieved. Promotion to Grade I is guided by the consideration of seniority-cum-merit. It is, therefore, difficult to find fault with the provision which places in one group all those Grade II clerks who have qualified by passing the Appendix 2 examination. The fact that the promotees from Grade II who have officiated for some time are not given the credit of this period when a permanent vacancy arises also does not attract the prohibition contained in Art.14 and 16. It does not constitute any hostile discrimination and is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. It applies uniformly to all members of Grade II clerks who have qualified and become eligible." Mervyn's case (AIR. 1967 SC. It does not constitute any hostile discrimination and is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. It applies uniformly to all members of Grade II clerks who have qualified and become eligible." Mervyn's case (AIR. 1967 SC. 52) was distinguished by stating that: The distinction between direct recruits and promotees as two sources of recruitment being a recognised difference, not obnoxious to the equality clauses, the provisions which concern us cannot be struck down on the ratio of this decision." 15. The validity of the Jammu and Kashmir Engineering (Gazetted) Service Recruitment Rules, 1970 was considered by another Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in State of J. & K. v. T. N. Khosa (AIR. 1974 SC. 1). The rules specified that only graduate Asst. Engineers were eligible to be promoted as Executive Engineers, though the cadre of Asst. Engineers included promotee-diploma-holders also. The contention was that when graduates and nongraduates were grouped together into an integrated class of Asst. Engineers, there was no further room for preferring graduates only for promotion as Executive Engineers. Chandrachud J. (as he then was) opened the judgment by formulating the question for decision in the following terms: " If persons drawn from different sources are integrated into one class, can they be classified for purposes of promotion on the basis of their educational qualifications?" And it was answered, in the concluding part of the judgment, in the following form: "We are therefore of the opinion that though persons appointed directly and by promotion were integrated into a common class of Assistant Engineers, they could, for purposes of promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers, be classified on the basis of educational qualifications. The rule providing that graduates shall be eligible for such promotion to the exclusion of diploma-holders does not violate Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution and must be upheld." The principle was thus unequivocally affirmed that despite integration or fusion of different classes into one group, further classification was permissible on the basis of educational qualifications. The integrated group may consist of direct recruits and promotees, matriculates and non-matriculates, degree holders and diploma holders, and persons drawn from other different sources; the integration does not altogether obliterate all differences in the matter of qualification, if such differences are relevant for promotion, from the standpoint of efficiency in the higher post. The integrated group may consist of direct recruits and promotees, matriculates and non-matriculates, degree holders and diploma holders, and persons drawn from other different sources; the integration does not altogether obliterate all differences in the matter of qualification, if such differences are relevant for promotion, from the standpoint of efficiency in the higher post. If the above be the true principle, preference can certainly be given to diploma holders over certificate hands, on the basis of superior qualification, and such preference can take the form of allotting a higher percentage of the vacancies to former. 16. One of the arguments in Khosa's case was that the diploma engineers of Kashmir were being promoted as Executive Engineers during the period from 1939 to 1969, and that the burden of justifying the ban imposed by the 1970 rules was on the State. The State answered by pointing out that because of dearth of engineering graduates, it was not possible in the initial stages to insist on fully qualified hands at all levels. Even among Asst. Engineers, the ratio was 1:2 between graduates and non-graduates till 1968; in 1968 it was modified as 2:1. From 1949 onwards, direct recruitment was the close preserve of graduates. The idea was to ensure better efficiency at higher levels by reducing the number of non-graduates to the extent possible, and the 1970 Rules was the culmination of a process of offering higher incentives to graduates. The court accepted this answer and held that the State's preference for graduates was not based on fancy, but on considerations of efficiency. Talent and efficiency could probably be found among the ranks of diploma holders also, it was conceded, but judicial scrutiny could not extend: "to embarking upon a nice or mathematical evaluation of the basis of classification, for were such an inquiry permissible, it would be open to the courts to substitute their own judgment for that of the legislature or the rule-making authority on the need to classify or the desirability of achieving a particular object." As to burden of proof, it was observed: "In order to establish that the protection of the equal opportunity clause has been denied to them, it is not enough for the respondents to say that they have been treated differently from others, not even enough that a differential treatment has been accorded to them in comparison with others similarly circumstanced. Discrimination is the essence of classification and does violence to the constitutional guarantee of equality only if it rests on an unreasonable basis. It was therefore incumbent on the respondents to plead and show that the classification of Assistant Engineers into those who hold diplomas and those who hold degree is unreasonable and bears no rational nexus with its purported object. Rather than do this, the respondents contend themselves by propounding an abstract theory that educational qualifications are germane at the stage of initial recruitment only." 17. The more formidable attack against the Kashmir rules was that graduates and non-graduates having been integrated into a single class of Asst. Engineers, there was no further scope at all for again classifying them for the purposes of promotion to the post of Executive Engineers. This attack was mounted from the heights of Marvyn (AIR. 1967 SC. 52) and Koshan Lal (AIR. 1967 SC. 1889), but was repulsed by the court by observing that the principle of those cases applied only when preference was shown with reference to the source of recruitment, and not when preference was shown with. reference to superior qualification i.e. on a basis other than the one that they were drawn from different sources. Educational qualification, it was reiterated, was a recognised criterion for classification at least from the days of Narasinga Rao (AIR. 1968 SC. 349), and there was no reason to jettison the principle or confuse it with classification based on source only. Chandrachud J. even hinted that had the question of superior qualification, inherent in the facts of Roshan Lal, been sufficiently highlighted before court, the conclusion in that case could probably have been different. 18. It is true that the emphasis was slightly shifted by Bhagwati J. in Mohd. Shujat Ali (AIR. 1974 SC. 1631) when considering the validity of the Andhra Pradesh Engineering Service Rules, 1966 which provided for a ratio of 3:1 between graduate Supervisors and non-graduate Supervisors, in the matter of promotion to the cadre of Asst. Engineers. After noticing that Khosa's case was concerned with a prohibition against promotion of non-graduates based on considerations of efficiency, his Lordship observed: "But where graduates and non-graduates are both regarded as fit and, therefore, eligible for promotion,. Engineers. After noticing that Khosa's case was concerned with a prohibition against promotion of non-graduates based on considerations of efficiency, his Lordship observed: "But where graduates and non-graduates are both regarded as fit and, therefore, eligible for promotion,. it is difficult to see how, consistently with the claim for equal opportunity, any differentiation can be made between them by laying down a quota of promotion for each and giving preferential treatment to graduates over non-graduates in the matter of fixation of such quota." But having made the observation, his Lordship did not strike down the rule because: "This differentiation is not something brought about for the first time by the Andhra Pradesh Rules. It has always been there in the Engineering Services of the Hyderabad and the Andhra States. The graduate Supervisors have always been treated as a distinct and separate class from non-graduate Supervisors both under the Hyderabad Rules as well as the Andhra Rules and they have never been integrated into one class." In other words, where the feeder category consists of graduates and non-graduates, and where the rule regards both the classes as fit for promotion to a higher category, it can be presumed that the two classes in the feeder category have been integrated into one group; and if this presumption is right, no further favour can be shown to one of the classes in that group in the matter of promotion. But the presumption about actual integration can be rebutted, and when it is so rebutted by facts, prescription of different quota cannot be held to be discriminatory. 19. The question then is how far the facts relating to the Kerala Public Health Engineering Subordinate Service support or undermine the presumption regarding integration or fusion of diploma holders and certificate holders. As I said, the petitioners have supplied no data. There were no statutory rules for the T.C. area prior to 1-11-56, but the Madras Engineering Subordinate Rules (applicable to the Sanitary branch also), which governed allotted personnel from that State, dated back to an earlier period. "Supervisors" stood at the head of the different categories covered by those rules; and the first prescription was that graduate Supervisors alone were to be designated as Junior Engineers. Vacancies in the cadre of Supervisors were to be filled up both by direct recruitment and promotion, but non-graduates were eligible only when suitable graduates were not available. "Supervisors" stood at the head of the different categories covered by those rules; and the first prescription was that graduate Supervisors alone were to be designated as Junior Engineers. Vacancies in the cadre of Supervisors were to be filled up both by direct recruitment and promotion, but non-graduates were eligible only when suitable graduates were not available. Among the non-graduates, there were Upper Subordinate and LCE. diploma holders, and also licentiates, whose qualifications were considered inferior to the diploma. These licentiates could get only a maximum of 10 per cent of the posts in the cadre of Supervisors, while there was no such restriction regarding diploma holders. In the case of licentiates, there was a further restriction that they must have been in service, and certified as suitable by the Executive Engineer. In March, 1956 the rule was amended reserving a quota of 25 per cent to the non-graduates, and the position on the eve of States reorganisation was that diploma holders could get atleast 15 per cent of the vacancies, while licentiates could get only a maximum of 10 per cent. In Travancore-Cochin also, there were executive orders recognising the difference between graduates, diploma holders and certificate holders in the matter of promotion to various engineering posts. Special Rules for the Kerala Engineering Subordinate Service were framed in 1958, and here again, the distinction between diploma-and certificate holders was maintained, with different ratios for promotion. The P. H. E. Department was originally part of the P. W. D., and when Special Rules for the Engineering Subordinate Services in P. H. E. D. were first framed in 1966, the same pattern was followed. The ratio between diploma and certificate holders was initially 3:2, and was modified as 3:1 by an amendment of 1969. As could be seen from Ext. P1, the quota system was there even before 1966; that order was itself designed to cure imbalances of the post. Engineering branches outside the P. W. D. and P. H. E. D. were also having similar ratios. The State Electricity Board which employs a large number of engineering personnel maintains such ratios at various levels. To my knowledge, the genetic differences between diploma and certificate holders had not been completely obliterated at any time, either by rules or by executive orders. No question of discrimination can therefore arise, on the test accepted in Mohd. Shujat Ali. 20. The State Electricity Board which employs a large number of engineering personnel maintains such ratios at various levels. To my knowledge, the genetic differences between diploma and certificate holders had not been completely obliterated at any time, either by rules or by executive orders. No question of discrimination can therefore arise, on the test accepted in Mohd. Shujat Ali. 20. Counsel points out that the test was applied by a Division Bench of this Court in Abdul Basheer v. Karunakaran (ILR.1981 (2) Ker. 527), where a rule recognising preference for graduate Preventive Officers in the matter of promotion as Excise Inspectors, was struck down. The facts there were clear, and essentially different. In the services of Travancore-Cochin, there was originally a ratio of 3:1 between graduates and non-graduates. Soon after the formation of Kerala State, the ratio was reduced to 1:1 by an order issued on 19-11-1957. It was also clarified that the arrangement was temporary, and that the idea was to do away with graduate-non-graduate distinctions. Allotted officers from Madras and persons appointed in Kerala Service were not subject to the ratio at any time. Whether the ratio fixed in 1957 could apply to posts of Preventive Officers of Travancore-Cochin was itself a matter of some doubt; in fact, Government had clarified the position in 1966 by holding that that order would apply only to ministerial posts. Consequent on a direction issued by this Court in some writ petitions. Government framed Special Rules in 1974 for regulating promotion to the cadre of Excise Inspectors. This rule also did not provide for any ratio between graduates and non-graduates. An executive order was later issued, but that was struck down. In the meanwhile, the Special Rules of 1974 were attempted to be amended by fixing a ratio between graduates and non-graduates, retrospectively from 1-11-1956; and it was this amendment which was challenged before the court. The Division Bench found, as a fact, that: (i) Preventive Officers allotted from Madras, and Preventive Officers appointed after the formation of the Kerala State, were being treated as one group all throughout, without distinctions based on graduation; (ii) The petitioners before the court were themselves persons appointed after 1-11-1956, to whom the old T.C. ratio was not applicable. The Division Bench found, as a fact, that: (i) Preventive Officers allotted from Madras, and Preventive Officers appointed after the formation of the Kerala State, were being treated as one group all throughout, without distinctions based on graduation; (ii) The petitioners before the court were themselves persons appointed after 1-11-1956, to whom the old T.C. ratio was not applicable. and (iii) graduate and non-graduate officers were doing the same type of work in the field, and that there was nothing to suggest, either from the history of the services or from the facts otherwise disclosed, that graduation had any nexus with the needs of the higher post. Such is not the position in the present case. So far as engineering personnel are concerned, the distinction between diploma and certificate people was always there. The petitioners themselves were appointed at a time when there was a separate ratio. It cannot also be said that higher technical qualification can have nothing to do with the needs of efficiency in a technical post. As was remarked by Bhagwathi J. in Mohd. Shujat Ali, no decision can be considered as laying down an invariable rule. "irrespective of the nature and purpose of the classification or the quality and extent of the differences in the educational qualifications. It must be remembered that "life has relations not capable always of division into inflexible compartments". The moulds expand and shrink. The test of reasonable classification has to be applied in each case on its peculiar facts and circumstances." 21. To my mind, the facts of the present case are more similar to those in Khosa's (AIR, 1974 SC. 1) and Narasinga Rao (AIR. 1968 SC. 349), where preference on the basis of superior qualification was held permissible, despite integration of the differently qualified classes of people in the lower category. In a sense, the facts are also similar to Mohd. Shujat Ali because the history of the Engineering services militates against the presumption that diploma holders and certificate holders had been fused into one group for all purposes. In a sense, the facts are also similar to Mohd. Shujat Ali because the history of the Engineering services militates against the presumption that diploma holders and certificate holders had been fused into one group for all purposes. If the rule-making authority had ordained that vacancies in the post of junior Engineer could be filled up only from among graduates and diploma holders, the certificate holders would have nothing to complain of on the basis of Art.14 and 16, and the mere circumstance that it thought of diluting efficiency to a very small extent, in order to keep every one contented, cannot be a basis for any genuine complaint in proceedings under Art.226. The Original Petition is therefore dismissed. No costs. Dismissed.