JUDGMENT Sen, J.: The plaintiff is the petitioner before us in this revisional application. The application is being heard on notice to and on contest by the defendant. It is not in dispite that the defendant was a lessee under the plaintiff where the leasehold premises was described as follows :–– "ALL THAT piece or parcel of land together with the boundary wall-being Premises No.7, Nawab Abdur Rahaman Street in the town of Calcutta in the Schedule hereunder more fully described hereinafter referred to as the demised premises which term shall include the said land and boundary wall in the said Premises No.7, Nawab Abdur Rahaman Street (a) also all buildings and structures which may hereafter be erected thereon by the lessee and additions, alterations and improvements therein or thereto and the fittings and fixture thereof but excluding any machines, stocks, plants, accessories, fans, air-condition plants and contrivances, wooden and/or steel partitions (whether fixed to the earth or the buildings in the said premises and excluding the special installations and fittings worked by electricity or gas or otherwise set up by the lessee." One of the terms in the lease provides as follows :–– "Provided, however, that all such new constructions with fittings and fixture (save and except any machines, tools, plants, accessories, fans, air-condition plants and contrivances, wooden and/or steel partition whether fixed to the earth or the buildings and the special installations and fittings worked by electricity or gas or otherwise and set up by lessee) shall be deemed to be the property of the lessor and included in the term 'demised premises' under these presents." Such a lease was for 51 years. 2. The plaintiff instituted Title Suit No. 1695 of 1975 of the 9th Bench of learned Judge, City Civil Court, Calcutta, out of which the present revisional application arises, for recovery of possession of the demised premises as aforesaid on the ground of forfeiture of the lease on breach of covenants incorporated therein and also for arrears of rent. 3. Pending the suit, the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), having come into effect, an objection was raised on behalf of the defendant that the suit has abated under the provisions thereof. 3. Pending the suit, the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), having come into effect, an objection was raised on behalf of the defendant that the suit has abated under the provisions thereof. Referring to the provision of section 19 of the said Act the learned Judge seems to have taken the view that the plaintiff's claim for recovery of possession on eviction of the defendant stands abated though not the claim for recovery of arrears of rent. The learned Judge by the impugned order accordingly recorded abatement of the suit in part and feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff has preferred the present revisional application. 4. Mr. Mitra appearing in support of this revisional application has raised two points. In the first place it has been contended by Mr. Mitra that the suit being one for recovery of possession as against a lessee based on forfeiture of the lease, section 19 of the said Act can have no application. According to Mr. Mitra, the said provision contemplates a proceeding under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 which alone abates on the statutory mandate incorporated in section 19 and not any and every proceeding including a suit for eviction of a lessee who was not a thika tenant in terms of the provision of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949. The second point raised by Mr. Mitra is to the effect that, in any event, in the present case on the terms of the lease the defendant being a lessee in respect of the structures which, though built by him, vested in ownership with the lessor, a suit for eviction of such a lessee is not hit in any manner by any of the provisions of the said Act. 5. Mr. Rahaman appearing on behalf of the defendant has contested both the points thus raised by Mr. Mitra. According to Mr. Rahaman, section 19 speaks of all proceedings and as such, it need not necessarily be limited to proceedings as under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949. It has been further contended by Mr. 5. Mr. Rahaman appearing on behalf of the defendant has contested both the points thus raised by Mr. Mitra. According to Mr. Rahaman, section 19 speaks of all proceedings and as such, it need not necessarily be limited to proceedings as under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949. It has been further contended by Mr. Rahaman that the defendant being a thika tenant within the extended meaning of the term as on the definition clause in the said Act or at least he being a lessee in respect of a land held under a written lease for a period extending more than 12 years, the lessor's interest vested in the State as such the lessor's right to claim eviction stands abated because of such vesting. 6. So far as the first point raised and controverted before us is concerned, we feel inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Mitra. Section 19 of the said Act reads as follows :–– "All proceedings including appeals and all proceedings in execution of orders passed in proceedings including appeals under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, pending on the 19th day of July, 1978, for the ejectment of thika tenants and Bharatias shall stand abated with effect from the 19th day of July, 1978, as if such proceedings, appeals or execution proceedings had never been made. 7. Reading section 19 in the background of the new definition clause 'thika tenant' and the provision of section 5 it does not appear to us to be the intention of the legislature to mean and include in the term all proceedings in section 19, a proceeding of the present nature, namely, a suit for eviction of a lessee on forfeiture of the lease. In our view, the vesting of the landlord's or lessor's interest under section 5 is independent of section 19. Section 19 on its terms refers to proceedings of various nature but all based on the provisions of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949. That Act being repealed by section 21, the legislature intended and directed all proceedings under the said repealed Act to abate by virtue of the statutory mandate incorporated in section 19. Such being the position, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Rahaman that a suit of the present nature would come within the mischief of section 19 and would abate accordingly. 8. Such being the position, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Rahaman that a suit of the present nature would come within the mischief of section 19 and would abate accordingly. 8. But the above conclusion of ours would not resolve the dispute because even if the suit does not abate under the provision of section 19, it may as well a bate because of the provision of section 5 if it is ultimately found and held that the defendant is either a thika tenant within the definition of the term as in the said Act or is a lessee holding land under any person either in perpetuity or under a registered lease for a period of not less than 12 years. If it is held as such, then the landlord's or lessor's interest vested in the State and because of the statutory loss of title, his right to sue would abate. Such being the position, the pertinent issue which arises for consideration in the present case, is as to whether the defendant is either a thika tenant as defined by the said Act or is a lessee holding land under any person in perpetuity or under a registered lease for a period of not less than 12 years. On this point there has been a serious dispute raised before us. According to Mr. Mitra, on the terms of the lease the lessee is not a lessee in respect of the land but he is a lessee in respect of the demised premises which includes the structures though raised by the lessee. Because of that, according to Mr. Mitra, the lessee can claim neither to be a thika tenant nor to be a lessee holding land under any person in perpetuity or under a registered lease for a period of not less than 12 years. This issue has not been decided appropriately by the learned Judge in the Court below. So that as it may, but for a technical difficulty we would have gone on to decide this issue on the construction of the lease itself and on other materials on record, but we find a technical difficulty in deciding the issue without bringing on record the State in whom the interest of the landlord or the lessor vests, if at all, under the provisions of section 5. 9. 9. Such being the position, we set aside the impugned order and remand the suit back to the learned trial Judge to raise an appropriate issue in this regard after an opportunity is given to the plaintiff to add the State of West Bengal as a party defendant in whose presence this disputed issue should be decided. In order to enable the plaintiff to add the State of West Bengal as a party defendant after service of the necessary notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure we direct stay of further proceedings of the suit for a period of 4 (four) months from date. As and when the State of West Bengal is made a party and the summons of the suit is served upon the State, the learned Judge would proceed to decide the issue referred to hereinbefore as preliminary issue in the presence of the parties including the State, if it chooses to contest. The revisional application is disposed of accordingly. Chakrabarti, J.: I agree.