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1982 DIGILAW 193 (KAR)

OURULINGAPPA, D v. SECRETARY, R. T. A. , SHIMOGA

1982-09-02

K.S.PUTTASWAMY

body1982
K. S. PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition under Art. 226 of the constitution, the petitioner has challenged the Order No. RTA/scp/tpa-85/82-83 dt. 30 6-1982 (Annexure-B) of the Secretary, regional Transport Authority, Shimoga (hereinafter referred to as 'the Secretary' ). ( 2 ) ON 28 3 1982, respondent No. 2 has made an application under S. 58 of the motor Vehicles Act of 1939 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') before the Regional transport Authority, Shimoga (hereinafter referred to as 'the RTA') for renewal of his stage carriage permit No. P. St. P. 1/ 73/74 valid for the route Davanagere to thanigere and back, which unfortunately is still pending before that authority. But during the pendency of the said application, respondent no. 2 made an application for a temporary permit under S. 62 (1) (d) of the Act for the period from 2-4-1982 to 30-6-1982 before the Secretary, who very rightly granted the same. Before the expiry of that temporary permit, respondent No. 2 made another application on 28-6-1982 before the Secretary for a temporary permit on the same route for the period from 1-7-1982 to 30-9-1982 (Annexure-A), who by his order dt. 30 6 1912 (Annexure-B) has granted the same. ( 3 ) THE petitioner as an existing operator on certain sections of the route for which a temporary permit has been granted to respondent No. 2, has urged that It was not open to the Secretary to grant a second temporary permit prohibited by the 2nd proviso to S. 62 of the Act. ( 4 ) RESPONDENT 1 who has been duly served, has remained absent and is unrepresented. But respondent No. 2 in his return while justifying the grant made in his favour, has urged that the petitioner is riot an aggrieved person and that this is a fit case in which this Court should decline to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction. ( 5 ) SRI S. V, Krishnaswamy, learned counsel for the pititioner contends that the grant of a second temporary permit in continuation of the first temporary permit prohibeted by the second proviso to S. 62 of the Act, is without jurisdication and illegal ( 6 ) SRI Mohandas N. Hede, learned counsel For respondent No 2 in refuting the contention of Sri Krishnaswamy. urged that the petitioner who does not operate his services on the route is not an aggrieved person and that in any event tthis ia fit case in which this Court should decline to exercise Its extraordinary jurisdication, As the contention urged by Sri Hegde on the locus standi of the petitioner goes to the root of the matter, it is necesary to examine the same first and then deal with the other conventions if they become necessary. ( 7 ) IN his petition the petitioner has asserted that in respect of one of his itage carriage service there is a common route for a distance of about 26 miles to the route on which a temporary permit has been granted by the Secretary which assertion is not denied by respondent No. 2, ( 8 ) WHEN the petitioner is operating a stage carriage service on some portion of the route on which a temporary permit is granted to respondent 2, he is personally injured by the same and has locus standi to chailange the same. Hence, I see no merit is this contention of Sri Hegde and I reject the name ( 9 ) A temporary permit can be granted pending decision on an application for renewal of a stage carriage permit and such a temporary permit was granted to respondent No. 2 for the period from 2-4-1982 to 30 6 1982 are not in dispute but the question is whether a second or successive temporary permits can be granted pending renewal of an application for a permir An answer to the same depends on the construction to be placed on the second proviso of S. 62 of the Act, which reads thus : "provided fruther that a temporary permit under this section shall, in respect case granted more than once in respect of any route or here specified in an application for the renewal of a permit during the pendency of such application for renewel " this proviso directs the Transport authority not to grant a temporary permit pending renewal of an application for a permit not more than once. A temporary permit, pending an application for renewal of permit, can be granted only once and not more than once for a period not exeesding four months and no more. A temporary permit, pending an application for renewal of permit, can be granted only once and not more than once for a period not exeesding four months and no more. Under no circumance it is open to a transport authority to grant a tetnporary permit pending renewal of an application for more than once and for a period exceeding four months. Even if a person has obtained a temporary permit for a period less than four months, it is not open to the transport authority to grant another temporary permit for the remaining period of four months or for any other period. ( 10 ) A proviso is generally used to remove special cases from. the general enectment and provide for somthing that is special. Secondly the use of the word shall in a provision unlees the context otherwise requires case a presumption that such a provision has to be construed as a mandatotry provision. But more than that, the use of negative termes in a provision is a clear and define indication that the legislation requires such a provison to be construed as a peremptory or mandatory provision. On the application of the above general principles and reading the second proviso is. the context bearing all other rule of construction of statutes, it is clear that the second proviso is a peremptory or mandatory provision, the disobedience of which is impermissible under any circumstance. II. On the above discussion it follows that the impugned order granting a second temporary permit to respondent-2 is with out jurisdiction, illegal and is therefore liable to be quashed. ( 11 ) IN my view, none of the circumstances justify this Court to hold that the petitioner had disentitled himself to relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution. I, therefore, reject this contention of Sri hegde. ( 12 ) AN application made by respondent no. 2 for renewal of his existing permit is pending be fore the RTA for more than 6 months. AD application for renewal is normally required to be decided before the expiry of the term of that permit to enable the permit holder to continue to operate the service covered by that permit without and break. An application for renewal, that too when the permit-holder is disabled from operating his service on the route, is tequired to be decided with utmost expedition. An application for renewal, that too when the permit-holder is disabled from operating his service on the route, is tequired to be decided with utmost expedition. ( 13 ) LEARNED counsel for the parties submit that the next meeting of the RTA is scheduled to be held on the 13th or 14th september, 1982. In these circumstances, it is necesssary to direct the RTA to dispose of the application made by respondent no. 2 for renewal of his stage carriage permit No. P. St. P 1/73-74 in the very next meeting of the RTA. ( 14 ) IN the light of my above discussion, I make the following orders and directions : (i) I quash the impugned order made by the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority, Shimoga, by issue of a writ of certiorari: (ii) I direct the Regional Transport authority, Shimoga to consider and dispose of the application made by respondent No. 2 for renewal of his stage carriage permit No. P. St. P 1/73-74 valid for the route of Davanagare to Thanigere that is ready for disposal in its very next meeting itself on priority basis. ( 15 ) WRIT petition is disposed of in the above terms. But in the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. ( 16 ) LET a copy of this order be communicatd to respondent No. 1 forthwith. --- *** --- .