JUDGMENT 1. - I have heard learned counsel for both the parties at length. 2. So far as the question of defaults in payment of rent is concerned, the learned District Judge has given the details regarding the payment of rent made from May, 1975 to July, 1976. The argument of learned counsel for the appellants is that the date in respect of money-order coupons, which have been considered by the learned District Judge, represented the date on which the money-orders were received back after refusal thereof. For the purposes of Section 13(1) and 19 A(3)(a) and 19 A(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, the date of remitting the money-orders should be taken into consideration. Even if, for the sake of argument, the contention of learned counsel is accepted, it appears that at least the rents for the months of June, September, November and December of the year 1975 and March and July of the year 1976, were admittedly neither paid nor tendered within the meaning of being remitted before the 15th of the next succeeding month. I am not expressing any opinion on the question as to whether the date of remitting the money-order or the date of refusal thereof, should be considered as the date of tender, but even if the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, then also on account of non-payment or tender of rent for the months of June, September, November and December of the year 1975 and March and July of the year 1976 within the specified time, it must be held that the tenant had neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for a period of six months, within the meaning of Section 13(1)(a) of the aforesaid Act, at the time of the institution of the suit. 3. Another argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants is that as the suit was filed on 13th of August, 1976, the default in payment of rent for the month of July, 1976 could not have been taken into consideration. I am unable to accept this submission. The rent for the month of July, 1976 became due on the expiry of that month and the same became payable as soon as it fell due. I am unable to accept this submission. The rent for the month of July, 1976 became due on the expiry of that month and the same became payable as soon as it fell due. On account of Section 19A, in case the tenant makes payment of rent, in the absence of any contract by the 15th day of the next following month then such payment shall be deemed to have been made within time. Under sub-clause 4 of Section 19A, if rent is paid, remitted or deposited, by any of the methods specified in sub-section (3) of Section 19A, upto the 15th day of the next following month, then the tenant shall be deemed to have paid or tendered the amount of rent due from within time for the purposes of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act. Now, his fiction of law is attracted only if rent is paid or tendered within the specified period viz. by the 15th of the next following month and not otherwise. It is the admitted position that rent for the month of July, 1976 was sent by money-order on 9th of September, 1976 vide Ex. A-22. Thus, the rent for the month of July, 1976 was neither paid nor remitted or deposited within the permissible period and as such, it cannot be deemed to have been paid or tendered within time, for the purposes of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 13. The default in payment of rent occurred when the rent fell due and became payable by the tenant and thus six months rent had fallen due on the date of the institution of the suit. But the situation could have been remedied if payment or tender would have been made, in accordance with the provisions of Section 19A, within the period provided therein and in the manner prescribed in that section; or even the rent of July, 1976 would have been paid or remitted by money-order before 15th August, 1976. As the provisions of Section 19A were not complied with, so far as the payment of rent for the months of June, September, November and December of the year 1975 and March and July of the year 1976 are concerned, the tenants should be considered to have committed defaults in payment of rent for a period of six months. As the provisions of Section 19A were not complied with, so far as the payment of rent for the months of June, September, November and December of the year 1975 and March and July of the year 1976 are concerned, the tenants should be considered to have committed defaults in payment of rent for a period of six months. Thus, even if the disputed remittances are not taken into consideration, the appellants cannot seek protection of the provisions of Section 13, because they had neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from them for the period of six months, on the date of the institution of the suit. 4. The first appellate Court also found that the plaintiff-landlord has reasonable and bonafide necessity for the shop in dispute and that greater hardship shall be caused by refusing to pass the decree, than by passing the same. These questions of fact have been found in favour of the plaintiff by the first appellate Court and have not been contested before me. However, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the question of partial eviction was not considered by the first appellate Court and in the absence thereof the decree for eviction could not have been passed, as the mandate of para 2 of Section 14(2) has not been complied with. Learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in Rehman Jeo Wangnoo v. Ram Chand and others, 1978(1) Rent Control Reporter 572 (SC) : AIR 1978 Supreme Court 413 in support of his connection. 5. It may be pointed out that no argument was advanced in either of the two Courts below on the aforesaid question nor any plea was taken on behalf of the defendants that the reasonable requirement of the plaintiff would be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenants from only a part of the premises. Neither any issue was framed nor any evidence was led on this question by the defendants. Moreover, any such question of partial eviction could not have been raised in the present case as the subject-matter of the suit is only a single shop. Neither any issue was framed nor any evidence was led on this question by the defendants. Moreover, any such question of partial eviction could not have been raised in the present case as the subject-matter of the suit is only a single shop. The decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Rehman Jeo Wangnoo's case (supra), can only be applicable where there are number of apartments in the rented premises in question and where the reasonable requirement of the landlord may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from only some of them, thus eviction from only a part of the premises would have been enough. In those circumstances, the mandate of the law requires the decision of the question of partial eviction because the requirement of the landlord may be satisfied if only a few of the apartments are vacated by the tenant and are handed over to the landlord. But when the rented premises consists of a single shop or a single room or apartment, the question of partial eviction cannot arise, as either the tenant could not be evicted from that shop or room or he could not be evicted therefrom and it is not possible to evict him from a part of the shop or room, when the subject-matter of tenancy is one single shop or a single apartment. In my humble view, the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court is not applicable to the case of a single shop or a single apartment, like the present case. No other point was argued before me.The appeal has no force and the same is dismissed.Appeal dismissed. *******