BHAILAL JAGATRAM v. SHADILAL RAM RAKHAMAL — 1982 DIGILAW 200 (MP)

JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is revision against the order dated 13-2-1982, passed by the Second Civil Judge Class II, Gwalior, in Execution Case No. 116 A of 1967 x 1981, rejecting thereby the application dated 12-2-1982 in which certain objections were raised that the Executing Court has no jurisdiction to determine the standard rent for purpose of compensation in a decree passed under Section 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). ( 2. ) THE facts of the case are that a suit for eviction was filed for nonresidential accommodation by the landlord one Shadilal, against the tenant defendants Bhailal apd Gulshanrai. The suit was decreed on the ground under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. The landlord-deceree-holder is entitled for possession only on payment of compensation to the tenant as contemplated under Section 12 (6) of the Act. The case was fixed for evidence of the parties on 27-3-1982 and evidence was recorded. The judgment-debtors moved an application objecting that the Executing Court has no jurisdiction to determine the standard rent for purpose of compensation, but it is only the Rent controlling Court, which should decide the matter. The learned Executing court heard the parties and rejected the application. Agrrieved by the said order, the present revision is filed. ( 3. ) THE submission made by the learned counsel for the applicants is that the plaintiff-landlord is entitled to get possession only after payment of the compensation to the tenants and for calculating compensation, it is necessary to see as to what is the standard rent of the suit accommodation. After knowing as to what is the standard rent, then alone, the compensation can be calculated on the basis of the duration during which the tenant occupied the shop and for deciding the matter as to what is the standard rent, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred under Section 45 of the Act which is as under:- "45. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts barred in respect of certain matters. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts barred in respect of certain matters. (I)Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no Civil Court shall enteretain any suit or proceeding in so far as it relates to the fixation of standard rent in relation to any accommodation to which this Act applies or to any other matter which the Rent Controlling Authority is empowered by or under this Act to decide, and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by the Rent Controlling Authority under this act shall be granted by any Civil Court or other authority. (2) Nothing in sub-section (I) shall be construed as preventing a civil Court from entertaining any suit or proceeding for the decision of any question of title to any accommodation to which this Act applies or any question as to the person or persons who are entitled to receive the rent of such accommodation. " Similar provision existed in the repealed Act, namaly, Madhya Pradesh accommodation Control Act, 1955 and under that Act also, it was the executing Court which used to decide the amount of compensation to be paid by the landlord to the tenant on the basis of annual reasonable rent. In ghanshyamdas v. Gyasobai, Second Appeal No. 242 of 1967 decided on 12-2-1968. the similar point came before this Court and in para 9 of the Judgment, it was held as under :- "9. In the result, the decree for ejectment is affirmed but the direction relating to payment of compensation is set aside and instead it is hereby ordered that, before the decree for ejectment is executed, the executing court itself shall speedily determine after giving to the parties an opportunity to adduce evidence, the compensation payable to the defendant under section 12 (6) (b) of the Act and the plaintiff shall not be entitled to obtain possession of the accomodation before paying the compesnation so determined. Since the decree of the courts below has been varied only slightly and the defendant himself is not free from blame in the matter, he shall bear his own costs and pay those incurred by the plaintiff throughout. Hearing fee according to schedule. " Similarly, in Firm Chhitarmal Ramdayal v. Laxmandas and two others, Civil Revision No. 866 of 1978 decided on 25-11-978. Hearing fee according to schedule. " Similarly, in Firm Chhitarmal Ramdayal v. Laxmandas and two others, Civil Revision No. 866 of 1978 decided on 25-11-978. the point which is raised before me was argued before this Court and this Court has observed as under:- "by this revision, the applicant-Judgment-debtor seeks interference with the order made by the executing court proceeding to determaine the amount of compensation required to be paid to the judgment-debtor-tenant in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (6) of Section 12 of the m. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The executing court is proceeding to determine the said amount of compensation by following the guidelines contained in section 7 and 10 of the Act. It is apparent that the executing court is not going to fix standared rent in respect of the suit premises payable by the tanant to the landlord. In pith and substance, the executing court is determining the amount of compenation which is to be paid as a condition precedent before actual eviction of the judgment-debtor-tenant. After passing of the decree for eviction there is no relationship of landlord and tanant existing in between the parties and, as such, there is no question of determination of standard rent of the premises. The application is apparently misconceived. 2. The contention raised on behalf of the applicant judgment-debtor was that even for determining the amount of compensation, during the course of execution of Rent Controlling Authority has jurisdiction to fix the standard rent on the basis of which the amount of compensation will have to be determined and paid. It was urged that according to the provision of section 45 of the Act, no civil Court shall entertain any such application or proceeding for fixation of standard rent in relation to any accommodation. As has been already stated above, in the present order and also in the judgment (para 7) given by this Court in second appeal, as reproduced below, there is no question of the bar of jurisdiction under section 45 of the Act to the present proceedings. Actually speaking this position was not disputed by the applicant at the time of hearing of the second appeal: -"para. 7. It is true as stated by both the parties, that no annual standard rent has been fixed in respect of the suit accommodation. Actually speaking this position was not disputed by the applicant at the time of hearing of the second appeal: -"para. 7. It is true as stated by both the parties, that no annual standard rent has been fixed in respect of the suit accommodation. Under these circumstances, it would be necessary for the executing Court to determine the amount of compensation and for doing so, it will be necessary to calculate the amount of the annual standard rent on the lines of section 7 read with section 10 of the Act. I would clarify that while doing so the executing Court will not be fixing the annual standard rent of the suit accommodation as is being done by the Rent Controlling Authority. These proceedings by the executing Court will be purely confined to the determination of the amount of compensation. The stage of payment of compensation arises after the passing of the decree for eviction and, therefore, the same will have to be done by the executing Court. This position was not disputed by either side. " 3. This application is thus wholly misconceived and appears to have been moved mala fide in an attempt to anyhow to delay and defeat the execution of the decree for eviction which has ultimately become final and conclusive. Learned counsel referred to certain observations made in the case of Harishankar v. Raghunath, 1976 MP W R Note 230. In the aforesaid case, the question involved was about the determination of rent payable by the tenant to the landlord. The defendant-tenant in the said case raised a contention that he was not liable to pay the agreed rent as claimed by the landlord because, according to him, the standard rent as calculated in accordance with the provisions of section 7 of the Act was Rs. 6. 25 p. P. M. only was payable and, therefore, the civil Court was barred to determine and fix the standard rent even if the Rent Controlling Authority has not fixed any such rent. In the aforesaid context it was observed that the jurisdiction to fix standard rent was exclusively with the Rent Controlling Authority and not with the civil Court. " ( 4. ) THE learned counsel referred to me to different rulings of the supreme Court, but, in may opinion, they are not applicable to the case in hand. In the aforesaid context it was observed that the jurisdiction to fix standard rent was exclusively with the Rent Controlling Authority and not with the civil Court. " ( 4. ) THE learned counsel referred to me to different rulings of the supreme Court, but, in may opinion, they are not applicable to the case in hand. The point before the Supreme Court was altogether a different one and as such, the rulings are of no help to the submission made by the learned counsel for the applicants. Further, he submitted that under M. P. Public trust Act, if the Court has to decide whether the Trust is Public Trust or not, it can ask the party to get it decided under the said Act and till then the proceedings before the Court are stayed. Similar procedure should be adopted in the present case and the defendant or the landlord be asked to get the standard rent decided by the Rent Controlling Authority and then the compensation should be computed and till then, the proceeding before the executing Court should be stayed. But, this submission also cannot be accepted because the Act contemplates the relationship of landlord and tenant if tenant wants to get the standard rent fixed. But as soon as the decree is passed, the relationship of landlord and tenant comes to an end and the provisions of the Act are not applicable to such parties. "1 he definition of the tenant given in the Act is as under :- " "tenant" means a person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any accommodation is, or, but for a contract express or implied, would be payable for any accommodation and includes any person occupying the accommodation as a sub-tenant and also any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy whether before or after the commencement of this Act; but shall not include any person against whom any order or decree for eviction has been made. " Learned counsel for the applicants submitted before me that in certain cases, even though the relationship of landlord and tenant comes to an end, the Act has given protection to the tenant. He has referred to me to sections 15 and 17 of the Act. " Learned counsel for the applicants submitted before me that in certain cases, even though the relationship of landlord and tenant comes to an end, the Act has given protection to the tenant. He has referred to me to sections 15 and 17 of the Act. But, when these sections are taken into consideration, the words in section 2 of the Act to the effect, "unless the context otherwise requires" will have to be taken into consideration to interpret those sections and the definition of tenant cannot be extended so as to include a person against whom a decree of eviction is already granted. If such an interpretation is accepted, the whole Act will become meaningless. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel cannot be accepted and the person against whom a decree is passed will not get protection under the Act as a tenant and he has no right to move the Rent Controlling Authority under the Act to get the standard rent fixed. Therefore, the suggestion of the learned counsel that the landlord should be asked to get the standard rent decided by the Rent controlling Authority and till then the proceedings of eviction should be stayed, cannot be accepted and I reject the same. Further, I may mention that from 1955 till date, the consistent view of this Court is that it is the executing Court which should decide the amount of compensation. That being the position, I am of the view that the objection of the learned counsel carries no weight and I see no reason to differ from the view taken by this Court. ( 5. ) THE result, therefore, is that the revision petition has no merit and it is dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs. Revision Petition dismissed.