N. D. VENKATESH, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a defendant's second appeal. He was the defendant in O. S. No. 458 of 1975 on the file of the Addl. Munsiff, civil Stn. , Bangalore. Having suffered a decree for eviction by the judgment and decree dated 19. 1. 1979 of the Munsiff in the above suit, he had preferred an appeal before the I Addl. City Civil Judge, Bangalore City, in r. A. No. 862 of 1980 on his file. The learned City Civil Judge has confirmed the judgment and decree of the Munsiff. In this second appeal the aforesaid decrees are under challenge. Repon dents herein were plain'iffs in the 'rial court. ( 2 ) PLAINTIFFS are the owners of the suit schedule property bearing Mun. Door No. 8, situated in millers Road, Civil Stn. , Bangaloer the building is under the occupation of the defendant as a tenant. Claiminig possession of the premises the plaintiffs, purporting to have terminated the lease by issuing a notice as contemplated under S. 106 of the Transfer of property Act, brought this suit for possession of the premises for arrears of rent, and other consequential reliefs. In his written statement the defendant, amongst other pleas, has also stated that the lease was for manufacturing purposes and the notice issued terminating the lease in question was bad in law and that, therefore, the suit was not maintainable. ( 3 ) THE learned Munsiff had framed as many as seven issues. On behalf of the plaintiff three persons were exa- mined including plaintiff No. 1 (P. W. 2), and 35 documents were marked as exs. P. 1 to P. 35. On behalf of the defendant two persons were examined including the defendant (D. W. 2) and 18 documents were exhibited as exs. D. 1 to D. 18. The Munsiff answered the relevant issues in favour of the plaintiffs-landlords and granted a decree as sought for. It may be noted that the Munsiff had held that the lease was a monthly one and that the notice dt. 4. 6. 1975, Ex. P-8, issued, in order to terminate the lease, was a va1id one. It was also his finding that the lease was not for manufacturing purposes as contended by the defendant. It may be noted that the Munsiff had held that the lease was a monthly one and that the notice dt. 4. 6. 1975, Ex. P-8, issued, in order to terminate the lease, was a va1id one. It was also his finding that the lease was not for manufacturing purposes as contended by the defendant. In the appeal before him the leanned city Civil Judge, having focussed his attention only to two questions, the first concerning the duration of the lease, and the other as to the validity of the quit notice, answered both the questions in favour of the landlords and confirmed the decree of the munsiff. On the question whether the lease was for manufacturing purposes the learned City Civil Judge was of the view that it was a lease for manufaeturing purposes. But, in his view there was "a contract to the contrary" within the mearing of sec. 106 of the Transfer of Properly Act, 1882 (the Act) creating a monthly tenancy. ( 4 ) CHALLENGING the order of the civil Judge the learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the Civil judge, having held that the lease was for manufacturing purposes, had erred in treating the same as a monthly tenancy. He further argued that the finding of the court below on the validity of the quit notice is also not correct. ( 5 ) WHILE supporting the decree of the courts below it was argued by the learned Counsel for the respondents that it was not op?n to the appellant to challenge the findings of the court ; below; based as they are, on facts He further submitted that ro subsiantial question of law within the meaning of s. 100 C. P. C. is involved in this appeal and therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. ( 6 ) THE learned Judge, who has admitted this appeal, was of the view that the following two substantial questions of law arise in the case;"1. Whether the learned appellate judge has correctly applied the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramkumar Das vs. Jagadischandra Deo (1) ? 2. ( 6 ) THE learned Judge, who has admitted this appeal, was of the view that the following two substantial questions of law arise in the case;"1. Whether the learned appellate judge has correctly applied the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramkumar Das vs. Jagadischandra Deo (1) ? 2. Haying regard to the facts ani circumstances established in the case, the finding recorded bv the appellate court on point No. 1 raised by him is jurtified in law ?" ( 7 ) IN the light of the arguments advanced before me by the learned counsel appearing for the contesting parties, the following questions arise for consideration:1 Is the appeal not maintainable there being no substantial question of law as contemplated under sec. 100 C. P. C. ?2. Is the finding of the City Civil judge that though the lease on question as one fo manufacturing purposes, it was a monthly lease there being a contract to the contrary between the parties as contemplated under sec 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 correct?3. Is not the lease in question for manufacturing purposes as held by the City Civil Judge? and4. Assuming that it is a monthly lease, has the lease not been validly terminated by the notice (Ex. P. 8) issued by the landlords prior to the suit? ( 8 ) LET me first consider the first point formulated above. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that since no "substantial question of law" withm the meaning of sec. 100 c. P. C is involved in the appeal, it should be dismissed in limine. The 1st appellate court is of the view that the lease involved in the instant case is a lease of an immoveable property for manufacturing purposes. Unless there is a contract to the contrary such a lease is, as provided under sec. 106 of the Act, "dsemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee by six months notice expiring with the end of a vear of the tenancy. " The 1st appellate court has held that in the instant case the parties have agreed to treat the lease as a monthly one and, therefore, 15 days' notice would suffice to terminate the lease. " The 1st appellate court has held that in the instant case the parties have agreed to treat the lease as a monthly one and, therefore, 15 days' notice would suffice to terminate the lease. What is urged in this appeal is that the facts placed in the case do not spell out any such contract, and that the court below has not properly construed this term "contract to the contrary" mentioned in the opening sentence of sec. 106 of the Act. In the circumstances, one of the important questions that arises for consideration in this appeal touches the construction to be placed on sec. 106 and allied provisions of the Transfer of Property act. This indeed is a substantial question of law and, therefore, i am not inclined to agree with the learned Counsel for the respondents that the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law deserving a hearing in this second appeal. ( 9 ) THE trial court was of the view that the lease was not a lease for manufactuing purposes. The 1st appellate court has taken a contrary view. The learned I Addl. City Civil judge, after thoroughly examining all aspects of the matter has come to the conclusion that the lease was a lease for manuacturing purposes. The learned Judge, while dealing with the evidence adduced by the parties in this connection, has made a special mention to the evidence of the plaintiffs' first witness, A. K. Laxman, who had been appointed by the court as a Commissioner to visit the spot and to report as to how the premises in question was being used by the occupier and to report as to whether any damage etc. had been caused to the building. He has stated that garment manufacturing is done in the premises. In this connection the learned City Civil Judge observes as follows at para-10 his judgment:"it is, therefore, clear that Dr. Ratnam, the lessor, was fully in the know as to what was being done in the suit property. The tenor of his letter at Ex. D-18 does not indicate even remotely that Dr. Ratnam had no concurrence for what the defendant was doing there. If this letter is appreciated in the context of other evidence alluded to herein above particularly Ex. D. 4 dated 17. 9. The tenor of his letter at Ex. D-18 does not indicate even remotely that Dr. Ratnam had no concurrence for what the defendant was doing there. If this letter is appreciated in the context of other evidence alluded to herein above particularly Ex. D. 4 dated 17. 9. 1971 wherein it stated that the goods mannfactured are handlcom, silk, cotton fabrics, and garments, the same would warrant a legitimate interence that the lease of property was for the purpose for which it was being used. In the light of the principles laid down in allenbury Engineer's case (Allenbury Engineer vs. S. R. K. Dalmia - AIR 1973 S. C. 425) by the Supreme Court and in the light of the decision of our hon'ble High Court in John Augustine's case (John Augustine vs. N. Datna Naik 1971 (2 ). Mys. L. J. 200) i have no hesitation to hold that the lease was for manuiacuring purpose. "i have gone through the evidence and I have no reasons to differ from the above finding of the City Civil judge in this respect. The learned counsel who, while supporting the judgment of the 1st appellate court, had challenged this finding of that court, has not been able to persuade me to lake a contrary view: ( 10 ) NOW to deal with the second point formula ed above as already stated the learned City-Civil Judge though he has held that the lease was a, lease for manufacturing purpores states that it was liable for termination by 15 days' notice in view of the fact that the parties had agreed to treat the lease as a monthly lease. While assail" ing this finding, the main thrust of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the first appellate court had reached that conclusion by rot contectly applying the ratio of the decision in ram Kumar's case (1) (Supra ). While assail" ing this finding, the main thrust of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the first appellate court had reached that conclusion by rot contectly applying the ratio of the decision in ram Kumar's case (1) (Supra ). ( 11 ) UNDER S. 106 of the Act, unless there is a contract to the contrary or a local law or usage providing otherwise "a lease of an immoveable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year terminable either on the part of the lessor or lessee by six months' notice expiring with the end of year of the tenancy and a lease for any other purpose shall be a lease terminable either by the lessor or lessee by 15 days' noiice expiring with the end of the month of the tenancy " The first appellate court holds that though this is a lease for manufacturing purposes it cannot be deemed to be a lease from year to year requiring a six months' notice for its termination there being a "contract to the contrary" and that, in the circumstances of the case, it was a monthly lease terminable by 15 days, notice. While examining the scope of this provision we should also keep in view the next section, Section 107 of the Act, which provides as to how leases should be made. This prov'sion says that "a lease of an immoveable property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent can be made only by registered instrument" and that "all other leases of immoveable properly may be made either by registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. " In Ram Kumar's case (1) the learned Judge B. K. Muherjea. J. , observes (with whom the other learned Judges Patanjali Sastry, c. J. , S. R. Das. and Vivian Bose, J. J. , also agreed) that "contract to the contrary" as envisaged in S. 106 should be a valid contract between the parlies to the lease i. e. , a contract as envisaged in S. 107 of the Act. J. , observes (with whom the other learned Judges Patanjali Sastry, c. J. , S. R. Das. and Vivian Bose, J. J. , also agreed) that "contract to the contrary" as envisaged in S. 106 should be a valid contract between the parlies to the lease i. e. , a contract as envisaged in S. 107 of the Act. Therefore, according to the learned Judge, if a party to the lease not being a lease for agricultural or manufacturing purposes, pleads that the lease was an annual one and therefore requires a six months' notice for its termination, he can succeed in his plea only if he is able to to show that such a lease had been brought about as provided under S. 107 of the Act i. e. , by a registered instrument. This is so in view of the fact that S. 107 provides that a lease of an immoveable property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving yearly rent can be made only by registered instrument. Even if there is no registered instrument evideneing the lease, if the lease is for agricultural or manufacturing purposes,. S. 106 deems it to be an yearly lease for purposes of termination demanding a six months' notice. Even in such a case there is no bar to plead, that it wag a monthly lease and that the lease was an oral one. This is because the law" does not insist on a registered instrument in the case of a monthly lease. On the other hand, in the case of an yearly lease such a lease "can be made only by a registered instrument. " In ram Kumar's case (1) the lease was neither for manufacturing nor agricultural purposes. Therefore six months statutory notice as contemplated under S 106 of the Act was not required. But, it was pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant in that case that the facts placed spelled out an annual lease. According to him one of the strongest indications was the annual payment of rent. There was no written contract as contemplated under s. 107 of the Act evidencing that lease. The Supreme Court observes that "the contract to the contrary" as contemplated under sec. 106 of the Act, need not be an express contract and that it may be also be implied. There was no written contract as contemplated under s. 107 of the Act evidencing that lease. The Supreme Court observes that "the contract to the contrary" as contemplated under sec. 106 of the Act, need not be an express contract and that it may be also be implied. However, according to their Lordships, it should be a valid contract. Since a valid contract bringing about an annual lease can only be by a registered instrument, they were of the view, there being no such valid contract, the appellant before them could not have asked for a six months' notice on the plea that there was an annual lease. The following observations of the court at para-13 of the judgment may be noted:"in these circumstances, it could be regarded as a tenancy from month to month, unless there was a contract to the contrary. The question now is, whether, there was a contract to the contrary in the present case? mr. Setalvad relies very strongly upon the fact that the rent paid here was an annual rent and he argues that from this fact it can fairly be inferred that the agrecment between the parties was certainly not to create monthly tenancy. It is not disputed that the contract to the contrary, as contemplated by Sec. 106 of T. P. Act need not be an express contract; it may be implied, but it certainly should be a valid contract If it is no contract in law, the section will be operative and regulate the duration of the lease. It has no doubt been recognised in several cases that the mode in which rent is expressed to be payable affords a presumption that the tenancy is of a character corresponding thereto. Consequently, when the rent reserved is an annual rent, the presumption would arise that the tenancy was an annual tenancy unless there is something to rebut the presumption. But the difficulty in applying this rule to the present case arises from the fact that a tenancy from year to year or reserving a yearly rent can be made only by registered instrument as laid down in Sec. 107 T. P. Act. But the difficulty in applying this rule to the present case arises from the fact that a tenancy from year to year or reserving a yearly rent can be made only by registered instrument as laid down in Sec. 107 T. P. Act. "adverting to the arguments of the learned Counsel for the appellant in that case that a lease for one year certain might fairly be inferred from the payment of annual rent and that a stipulation like that would not come within the mischief of S. 107 of the act, the Court observes at para-15 of its judgment as follows:"but one serious objection to this view seems to be that this would amount to making a new contract for the parties. The parties here certainly did not intend to create a lease for one year. The lease was intended to be for a period exceeding one year but as the intention was not expressed in the proper legal form, it could not be given effect to. It is one thing to say that in the absence of a valid agreement, the rights of the parties would be regulated by them in the same manner as if no agreement existed at all; it is quite another thing to subsitute a new agreement for the parties which is palpably contradicted by the admitted facts of the case. " ( 12 ) LEASES of immoveable properties either for manufacture or agricultural purposes or for any other purpose can be made by express contract or the existence thereof may be inferred from possession and acceptance of rents and other circumstances. But, if it is an annual lease, as contemplated under S. 107 of the Act, it can only be brought about, as envisaged there in, by a registered instrument. ( 13 ) IN the rase on hand the landlord's plea is that the lease is a monthly lease because the parties had agreed to treat it as such. A monthly lease, as already stated, is not required to be evidenced by registered instrument and, therefore, there is no constraint to plead and prove (if it is possible to prove) that the lease in question, though a lease for manufacturing purposes, is a monthly lease. If the facts and circumstances spell out such a case, the landlords have to succeed in their plea. If the facts and circumstances spell out such a case, the landlords have to succeed in their plea. The principles laid down in Rom Kumar's case (1) do not bar such a plea in this case. ( 14 ) NOW, let us see as to whether the plaintiffs-landlords in this case have been able to establish any contract bringing about a monthly lease. As observed in Ram Kumar's case (1) "the rule of construction embodied in s. 106 applies not only to leases of uncertain duration but also to leases implied by law which may be inferred from possession and acceptance of rent and other circumstances," and as is clear from what is extracted above the terms of contract need not be expressed in writing but may be implied by facts and circumstances. In para-2 of the plaint the landlords have stated that "the defendant is a tenant therein on a rental of Rs. 650 per month, the tenancy month being the english calendar month. " In response to what is stated in para-2 of the plaint, this is what the defendant states in his written statement at para-1 : "the averment in para-2 of the plaint that the plaintiffs are the owners of the suit schedule property is true. The defendant admits that he is a tenant therein on a monthly rent of Rs. 650. But he demes the allegation that the tenancy month is the English calendar month. As ad mitted by the plaintiffs in the plaint the suit schedule premises is ronresidential in nature and was leased by the plaintiffs to the defendant for manufacturing purposes. ' thus, what the defendant states is that, no doubt, he is a tenant paying a monthly rent, but the monthly period does not run from the 1st day to the last day of the English calendar month. He does not say that it was not a monthly lease at all. While chaleng ing the validity of the quit notice (Ex. P-8) he does not specifically plead that the termination requred a six months' notice but what he stats is that the notice was not u proper or valid one and it had not legally tarminated the lease. It may be noted that the landlords, treating this as a monthly lease under the English calendar month have issued notice terminating the lease by the end of the calendar month. It may be noted that the landlords, treating this as a monthly lease under the English calendar month have issued notice terminating the lease by the end of the calendar month. Perhaps, the If nant's plea appears to be that the commencement of the monthly case was not the 1st of each month that somewhere in the middle. This is what the defendant (D w. 2) states in his deposition at para-2: "i took the suit premises bearnig No. 8, Miller's Road, on lease from Dr. V. D. Ratnam on 12. 6. 1968. on a monthly rent of Rs. 650/ -. Though i took possession of the suit premses on 12. 6. 1968 as per the letter Ex. D. 3, it was agreed that the teranaly should commence from 15. 6. 1968. " this is the state of the pleadings. The notice Ex. P-8 dated 4. 6 1975. issued to the tenant by the Counsel for the landlords reads:"you are a tenant under our client in respect of a residential premises bearing No. 8, Miller's Road, on a monthly rent of Rs. 650/-, the tenancy being English calendar month. . . . . . . "ex. P-10 dated 21. 6. 1975 is the reply got issued by the tenant to the landlords. In para-1 it is stated that "my client. . . . . . . is the tenant of your clients on a montly rent of Rs. 650/ -. " These things amply make it clear that the parties had agreed this to be a monthly lease. In Ram Kumar's case the Supreme Court does not say that the mode of payment of rent is not relevant in determining the duration of the lease or the period of the lease. But what they say is that, except in the case of a lease deemed statutorily (sec. 106) as an annual one requiting a six months' notice for its termination, in all other cases the demand for six months' notice on the ground that it is an annual lease can ho countenanced only if there is an annual lease evidenced bv a registered instrument. However, as already staled, there is no bar to plead that even a lease for manufacturing or agricultural purpose was a monthly lease there beintg a contract to treat it as such. However, as already staled, there is no bar to plead that even a lease for manufacturing or agricultural purpose was a monthly lease there beintg a contract to treat it as such. The observations of the Supreme court at para 13 extracted above makes this position very clear. In the circumstances, I am not prepared to say that the learned City Civil Judge has misconstrued the ratio enunciated in Ram Kumar's case. His finding that this is a monthly lease has to be sustained. ( 15 ) WHETHER this monthly lease was as per English calendar month or otherwise has also been examined thoroughly by both the courts below. The munsiff, is this connection, has rightly taken note as to how the rent used to be paid. It appears the rent used to be paid taking the English calendar month as a unit. I have carefully gone through the findings of both the courts below on this aspect and I find no reason to differ from the same. ( 16 ) THEREFORE, for the reasons stated above, this appeal has to fail and accordingly it is dismissed with costs. ( 17 ) AT this stage the learned Counsel for the appellant-tenant requests that, in the circumstances some time may be granted to his client to vacate and hand over possession. It is true that this is a non-residential premises but, the learned Counsel for the respondent-landlord submitted that no manfuacturing business is, at present, being carried on in the premises and, therefore, there was no need to grant any time. After hearing both the partier t feel that it would be in the ends of justice to grant some time to the tenant. The learned District Judge has granted six month' time, and that has already expired. The tenant is granted six months' time from this day to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the premises in question in favour of the landlord. --- *** --- .