JUDGMENT U.C. Srivastava, J. - This writ petition is directed against the order passed by the Prescribed Authority as well as the III Additional District Judge, Allahabad, affirming the said order passed by the Prescribed Authority allowing the application filed by the landlord-Opposite Party No. 3 under Section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act for release of the premises in dispute. The premises in dispute are in the city of Allahabad admittedly owned by opposite party No. 3 and the petitioner is a tenant of the same who is employer in M/s. Triveni Structurals as an Engineer and the said premises is in his occupation. The respondent-landlord was a railway employee and after his retirement he was re-employed with M/s. Coral Club run by the officials of Northern Railway, Allahabad. As per allegation he was provided with a portion of the bungalow in which Coral Club is situate. Being in Coral Club he was told by his employer that his services, are no longer required and he has to vacate the portion in his possession. It was further averred by the landlord that although he was a bachelor but virtually he had adopted Shri R.S. Bhattacharya as his son and he was living as his family member. Thus, according to him he required the premises in dispute for his personal use which includes the family of Shri R.S. Bhattacharya. 2. The petitioner contested the case and pleaded that the landlord was every time interested in enhancing the rent, that is why he demanded exorbitant rent, but the petitioner refused to pay it. He also alleged that the need of the landlord was not genuine. Though the termination of employment was pleaded by the landlord, but it was denied that the landlord has been asked by Coral authorities to vacate the premises in possession of the landlord-opposite-party. 3. Before the Prescribed Authority evidence in the shape of affidavits was filed. Apart from filing affidavit two letters were filed by the landlord from the Secretary, Coral Club requiring him to vacate the premises in Coral Club. 3. Before the Prescribed Authority evidence in the shape of affidavits was filed. Apart from filing affidavit two letters were filed by the landlord from the Secretary, Coral Club requiring him to vacate the premises in Coral Club. One letter was of the year 1974 in which the landlord was asked to make arrangement to vacate the portion of Coral Club in his occupation as the same was required for School extension, while the other letter was of the year 1977 in which the landlord was reminded that no steps for vacating the premises were made by him and he was asked to vacate the portion in his possession within fifteen days. The petitioner filed a letter to the effect that the landlord is residing in Coral Club and no proceedings were instituted against him for his eviction and in reply to the same the landlord filed letter dated 16.7.1978 written by the Secretary, Coral Club, asking him to vacate the premises of Coral Club in his possession as he has no right to stay in the same and the said portion was allotted to one. Om Prakash, a School Assistant and the landlord was threatened with coercive measures in case the premises were not vacated by him within 15 days. The Prescribed Authority came to the conclusion on the basis of evidence on record that the needs of the landlord were genuine and that the tenant can arrange for an alternative accommodation and according to him the landlord was to suffer great hardship than the tenant in case the application was refused, consequently the application filed by the landlord was allowed. 4. Against the order passed by the Prescribed Authority the tenant-petitioner filed an appeal before the District Judge which came up for hearing before the Additional District Judge. Before the appellate Court the landlord moved an application praying that additional evidence be admitted which was in the shape of affidavit in the affidavit it was stated that he was on the roll of Coral Club till July, 1978 and since 1st August, 1978 he was removed from service and was no longer in employment of Coral Club. He was at the mercy of Om Prakash, the allottee of the said portion in Coral Club, who may turn him out any day. He was at the mercy of Om Prakash, the allottee of the said portion in Coral Club, who may turn him out any day. In the said affidavit it was stated that he was occupying the portion of the entire premises which were in his possession at the mercy of Om Prakash who has allowed him to stay in the said premises for the time being. Additional District Judge after taking into consideration the evidence on record and comparative needs of the parties agreed with the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority and dismissed the appeal vide his order dated 16.8.79 and granted 45 days time to arrange for suitable accommodation. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. On behalf of the petitioner it was strenuously contended that there was no clear evidence on behalf of the landlord that the landlord was allowed to occupy the Coral Club buildings as part of his employment and after termination of the same he was to vacate it. In this contention reference to various paragraphs of the writ petition including the affidavits and letters was drawn, while on behalf of the landlord it was contended that opposite party was given possession of Coral Club building only as a part of employment and the same were allotted to him and he ceased to have any right to occupy the same for which threats were extended to him and he was at the mercy of the allottee. Om Prakash, who has already taken possession of the same, but allowed him to stay for the time being. It may be that at one particular place it has not been stated that after retirement the landlord got re-employment with Coral Club and it as a party of employment he was allowed to occupy the premises till the tenure of his service. A perusal of the landlord's application, the affidavit and document filed by him clearly show that the contention which has been raised by the landlord is correct and he was allowed to occupy the building because he was employed with Coral Club and he was required to vacate the same in unmistakable terms when his services were terminated. A perusal of the landlord's application, the affidavit and document filed by him clearly show that the contention which has been raised by the landlord is correct and he was allowed to occupy the building because he was employed with Coral Club and he was required to vacate the same in unmistakable terms when his services were terminated. This is well clear from paragraphs 7 and 8 of the application under Section 21 of the 'Act filed by the landlord and there is no specific denial of averments mentioned in paragraph 8 of the application. There is also no denial of averments mentioned in para 7 of the application and the averment that he was allowed to occupy the portion of the out-house as a party of the contract of his employment is correct. The assertions made by the landlord were clear from the letters which were filed by him of the years 1974-77 and 1978 which fact found further support from the affidavit which was filed by him before the appellate Court, a copy of which has been filed with the writ petition as Annexure 8'. As such the contention which has been raised on behalf of the petitioner has no force. It was then contended on behalf of the petitioner that the landlord has come out with the case that Shri R.S. Bhattacharya who is nephew of the landlord was virtually adopted by him and his family, was member of his family and a will has been executed in his favour and he will succeed his property and look-after his affairs. Section 91 of the 'Act uses "the building........ is bonafide required..... by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family. The words' by the landlord for occupation by himself cannot be construed very narrowly and cannot be taken to mean that the words only mean by himself only. It may include landlord is servants or some other person or persons who look-after him or take care of him or whose company and assistance is or has become necessary, though technically they may not be members of his family as defined in the 'Act'. It may include landlord is servants or some other person or persons who look-after him or take care of him or whose company and assistance is or has become necessary, though technically they may not be members of his family as defined in the 'Act'. R.S. Bhattacharya may not be members of his family, but if he was residing with him and managing his affairs and nursing him, then his stay with the landlord who requires the premises for himself cannot altogether be lost sight of. Even otherwise from the facts is it clear that the landlord has no right to occupy the premises owned by Coral Club and he has already been asked to part away with the same and is being asked to vacate the same. As such it could not be said that he does not need the premises in dispute bonafide for his personal occupation for which he has been fighting from the before termination of his employment. Even if there is some departure in the purpose for which premises were needed by the Coral Club which has a right to divest the use, it cannot be said that there is inconsistency in the case taken or that landlord's case stands disproved. The diversion of use by Coral Club does not affect the need of landlord for his premises at all. The findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority and the Additional District Judge are findings of facts and are based on appreciation of evidence and are not perverse, as such no interference in the same can be made. Both the prescribed Authority and the Additional District Judge also compared the comparative needs of the tenant and the landlord and they have rightly come to the conclusion that so far as question of hardship is concerned, it is the landlord who will suffer more than the tenant who can make arrangement for alternative accommodation and not the landlord who has retired from service and is on risk of being ousted from the portion of the Coral Club building. 6. The writ petition is dismissed. Although there was an order against the tenant to vacate the premises in the year 1978, but time upto 30th June, 1982 is granted to the tenant petitioner to vacate the premises in question and handover its vacant possession to the landlord. 6. The writ petition is dismissed. Although there was an order against the tenant to vacate the premises in the year 1978, but time upto 30th June, 1982 is granted to the tenant petitioner to vacate the premises in question and handover its vacant possession to the landlord. Till then he may not be evicted in execution of the eviction order passed against him. In case vacant possession is not handed over after 30th June, 1982 to the landlord the order of eviction of the tenant-petitioner will obviously become executable without any objection. In the circumstances of the case parties will bear their own costs.