JUDGMENT - Manohar Sujata J.:- This is an application by the Official Assignee for a declaration that the family arrangement dated 30th October 1967 under which the tenancy rights of two shops bearing Nos. 4 and 5 situate at 177, Dongri Street, Bombay belonging to the insolvents were allotted to Bai Ratanbai Morarji Kanji, and which arrangement has been declared as a fraudulent transfer by a judgment of this Court dated 8–10–1971 confirmed in Appeal by this Court on 13–1-1981, be set aside, and the Official Assignee may be ordered to take possession of these'shops and to proceed thereafter with the sale thereof either by public auction or by private treaty as the Official Assignee may deem fit and proper. The Official Assignee has also prayed that the “transfers” made by Bai Ratanbai in respect of the said shops under an agreement dated 11–4-1974 to Atul Doongarsi Co. and under an agreement dated 13–10–1978 to Varsha Traders as well as a partnership deed dated 23–12–1968 between Bai Ratanbai Morarji and Babubhai Govindji Thakkar be declared as null and void and not binding on the Official Assignee. 2. In the present case the relevant facts are as follows: The debtors, namely, Babubhai Jadavji Thakkar, Mithabai Jadavji Thakkar and Jayantilal Dwarkadas Thakkar, all carrying on business in the firm name and style of Messrs Morarji Kanji Co. and Messrs Jayantilal Jadavji Co., were adjudicated insolvents on 8–10–1971 on a petition dated 31–1-1969 filed by the petitioning creditor. One of the acts of insolvency which was alleged was a family arrangement of 30th October 1967 under which the insolvents purported to transfer their tenancy rights in Shop Nos. 4 and 5 situate on the ground floor of Ismail Dossa Building, 177/79, Dongri Street, Bombay-9 in favour of Bai Ratanbai Morarji Kanji, who is a grand-mother of two of the debtors. By its judgment and order dated 8–10–1971 this Court held that the so-called family arrangement under which the tenancy rights in respect of the said shops were transferred to Bai Ratanbai were fraudulent transfers and that those transfers themselves constituted. an act of insolvency. The Court passed an order of adjudication upon the debtors. From this order the transferee Bai Ratanbai preferred an appeal to a Division Bench of this Court. This appeal was dismissed by a judgment and order dated 13–1-1981. 3. an act of insolvency. The Court passed an order of adjudication upon the debtors. From this order the transferee Bai Ratanbai preferred an appeal to a Division Bench of this Court. This appeal was dismissed by a judgment and order dated 13–1-1981. 3. After the order of adjudication, the transferee Bai Ratanbai entered into an agreement dated 11–4-1973 with M/s Atul Doongarsi Company. This agreement is an agreement of leave and licence between the transferee Bai Ratanbai and M/s Atul Doongarsi Co. under which M/s Atul Doongarsi Co. have been permitted to use a portion of shop Nos. 4 and 5 for the purpose of storing their goods on the terms and conditions mentioned in that agreement. Prior to the execution of this agreement, there is a recording letter from M/s Atul Doongarsi Co. addressed to Bai Ratanbai and dated 31–3-1973, under which they have declared that they have on 31st March 1973 surrendered vacant possession of the said premises to Bai Ratanbai and that they have no right whatsoever in respect of the use and occupation of the said shop premises. Bai Ratanbai has also entered into an agreement dated 13–10–1978 with M/s Varsha Traders under which the said M/s Varsha Traders have been permitted to occupy such portion of the said shop premises as may be convenient for storing their goods. 4. Prior to the order of adjudication the transferee Bai Ratanbai entered into a Deed of Partnership dated 23–12–1968 with Babubhai Govindji Thakkar, the husband of the transferee's grand-daughter. Under the Deed of Partnership it was provided that the partnership business shall be carried on at the said shop premises. Clause 3 of the said Deed of Partnership, however, provided that the transferee Bai Ratanbai was the tenant of the said shops and had allowed the use of the said shops only for the purpose of business of the partnership and only during the continuance of the partner-ship. The clause expressly provided that the tenancy and the possession of the said shops are of and belonging to the transferee Bai Ratanbai. 5. In view of these agreements which have been entered into by the transferee pertaining to these shops, I have to consider what are the rights of the Official Assignee in respect of those shop premises. 6. The clause expressly provided that the tenancy and the possession of the said shops are of and belonging to the transferee Bai Ratanbai. 5. In view of these agreements which have been entered into by the transferee pertaining to these shops, I have to consider what are the rights of the Official Assignee in respect of those shop premises. 6. Under section 55 of the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act any transfer of property, not being, inter alias, a transfer made in favour of a purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration, shall, if the transferor is adjudged insolvent within two years after the date of the transfer, be void against the Official Assignee. In the present case, the transfer made by the insolvents of' the tenancy rights of the shop premises in favour of Bai Ratanbai has been held to be a transfer not in favour of a transferee in good faith and for valuable consideration. In fact, the learned single Judge who passed the order of adjudication as well as the learned Judges sitting in appeal held that this transfer was a fraudulent transfer made deliberately to the know-ledge of the transferee with a view to shield the said property from the creditors of the insolvents. In view of this finding, it is not necessary for me to again re-examine whether the family arrangement of 30th October 1967 is a fraudulent transfer or not. Since the fraudulent transfer itself constitutes an act of insolvency on which the debtors have been adjudged insolvents, it is a transfer which can be avoided by the official assignee under section 55 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. A formal application by the official assignee is, however, necessary for this purpose. 7. In the case of (Ramaswami v. Official Receiver)1, the Supreme Court held that even where the order of adjudication is based on an act of insolvency constituted by a transfer of property found to be a fraudulent preference, the transfer stands till it is set aside. A separate order annulling the transfer would be necessary even in such a case. Similarly in the case of (Shah Sukrajv. A separate order annulling the transfer would be necessary even in such a case. Similarly in the case of (Shah Sukrajv. The Official Assignee)2, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court following the above Supreme Court decision held that once a particular transfer has been found to be an act of insolvency and the adjudication is based on that transfer, though it is necessary for the official assignee to file a separate application to avoid the transfer, the moment such an application has been filed, the annulling of the transfer must follow as a matter of course on proof of the order of adjudication itself without anything more. In other words, an order of adjudication itself does not annul the transfer; a separate order on an application made by the Official Assignee is necessary for annul-ling the transfer. But once such an application is made, the order of annul-ling follows as a matter of course on proof of adjudication itself. 8. In view of those judgments it was necessary for the Official Assignee to make the present application for annulment. However, in view of the ratio of these judgments the annulment must follow as a matter of course in the present case, inasmuch as the transfer in question itself is the basis of the order of adjudication. 9. Mr. Makhija, learned counsel for one of the transferees has, how-ever, argued that this is not a case where the Official Assignee is claiming the property from the transferee of the insolvents. In the present case the transferee has herself transferred the property to third parties. He has submitted that these third parties are bona fide transferees for valuable consideration. The Official Assignee, he submits, cannot claim the property from such bona fide transferees of the transferee. In this connection it is important to bear in mind that the insolvency law is a Code by itself. Under the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, there are express provisions which protect certain kinds of transfers made to persons who can be considered as bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration. Thus, for example, under section 55 itself protection is given to transfers which have been made by an insolvent .in favour of a purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration. Under the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, there are express provisions which protect certain kinds of transfers made to persons who can be considered as bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration. Thus, for example, under section 55 itself protection is given to transfers which have been made by an insolvent .in favour of a purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration. Similarly, under section 57 certain bona fide transactions are protected; for example, the section provides that any transfer by the insolvent for valuable consideration or any contract or dealing by or with the insolvent for valuable consideration will not become invalid in the case of insolvency provided that such a transaction had taken place before the date of the order of adjudication and the person with whom such a transaction has taken place did not have at the time notice of the presentation of any insolvency petition by or against the debtor. Only certain transfers are thus expressly protected under the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act. In view of these provisions it is not possible to protect other types of transfers not protected by the Act by resorting to provisions of other Acts or by resorting to principles of equity. There is no provision under the insolvency law which will protect transfers made by a fraudulent transferee after the order of adjudication. 10. Under section 51 of the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act the insolvency of a debtor shall be deemed to have relation to and to commence at the time of the commission of the act of insolvency on which an order of adjudication is made against the debtor. Under section 52 of the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act the property of the insolvent which vests in the Official Assignee shall comprise of such property as may belong to or be vested in the insolvent at the time of commencement of the insolvency. In the present case, therefore, the insolvency is deemed to have commenced at the time of entering into the family arrangement dated 30–10–1967 by which certain fraudulent transfers were sought to be made. The property of the insolvent as at the date of the family arrangement, therefore, vests in the Official Assignee and is available for distribution amongst his creditors. This would include the tenancy rights in respect of the shop premises Nos. 4 and 5 which then belonged to the insolvents. The property of the insolvent as at the date of the family arrangement, therefore, vests in the Official Assignee and is available for distribution amongst his creditors. This would include the tenancy rights in respect of the shop premises Nos. 4 and 5 which then belonged to the insolvents. The tenancy rights in respect of these shops vest in the Official Assignee. Therefore, under the provisions of the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, after the order of adjudication there can be no title left in the transferee Bai Ratanbai under which she can create any rights infavour of any third party. If the transferee herself did not have any right in respect of the shop premises, she could not have created rights in favour of any third parties. The transferees of Bai Ratanbai, there-fore, in the present case do not have any right title or interest in respect of the shop premises as against the Official Assignee. 11. Mr. Makhija relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the Case of (Mahabir Gope v. Harbans Narain Singh).3 as well as the observations of the Court of Chancery Division in the case of (Sanguineiti v. Stuckey's Banking Company)4 and the decision in the case of In re SLOBODINSKY.5 He relied upon those cases in support of his submission that the Official Assignee would take the property subject to all equities in favour of the subsequent transferees. Unfortunately none of these authorities deal with the rights of the transferees of the transferees. The decision of the Supreme Court does not deal with the provisions of the insolvency law at all. It deals with the rights of a mortgagee to create a lease in respect of the mortgaged land. It has no bearing on the present case. 12. The decision in Sanguinetti's case dealt with the question whether the settlement created by the bankrupt, which had been by consent declared as void against the trustee in bankruptcy at the instance of the plaintiff who was one of the secured creditors of the bankrupt enured for the benefit of the secured creditors or for the benefit only of the trustee in bankruptcy who would hold the property for the benefit of the unsecured creditors. The discussion in that case does not throw any light on the question at issue in the present case. The discussion in that case does not throw any light on the question at issue in the present case. The decision in Slobodinsky's case dealt with the transfers which were effected by the insolvent and which were sought to be challenged by the trustee in bankruptcy. Certain transfers in that case were held to be in favour of transferees who had taken the property bona fide and for valuable consideration and hence these transfers were held to be good transfers. This decision again is of no assistance in the present case. 13. None of these cases deal with the rights of bona fide transferees from a fraudulent transferee. As I stated earlier, there is no provision under the insolvency law which protects bona fide transfers by a fraudulent transfer, especially when those bona fide transferees have obtained transfers after the order of adjudication. 14. In the present case, morever, I do not find anything in the agreements which have been disclosed by the parties which would go to show that there have been transactions which can even be construed as transfers in favour of these third parties. The property in question consists of tenancy rights in respect of the two shop premises. Under the Deed of Partnership dated 23–12–1968, which is the first document executed by the transferee Bai Ratanbai, the tenancy rights continued to vest in Bai Ratanbai, as stated earlier. Under the Deed of Partnership, therefore, no transfer is effected of the tenancy rights in respect of these shop premises at all. 15. The next document is the agreement of 11–4-1973 in favour of M/s. Atul Doongarsi and Company. This purports to be a leave and licence agreement in favour of M/s. Atul Dongarsi and Company. This agreement is not protected under any provision of the Bombay Rent Act since it has been executed after 1st February 1973 and is not protected under the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. M/s. Atul Doongarsi Co. did not have any right to the premises prior to 11–4-1973, and if they had any right, they had surrendered it prior to the agreement of 11–4-1973. The letter which is executed by Atul Doongarsi Co. M/s. Atul Doongarsi Co. did not have any right to the premises prior to 11–4-1973, and if they had any right, they had surrendered it prior to the agreement of 11–4-1973. The letter which is executed by Atul Doongarsi Co. on 31–3-1973 makes it clear that they had surrendered vacant possession of the said promises to Bai Ratanbai on 31st March 1973 and that they had no right whatsoever in respect of the use and occupation of the said premises from that date. Similarly, the agreement of leave and license with Varsha Traders is also executed in October 1978 and is not protected under any provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. These agreements, therefore, do not create any interest in favour of Atul Doongarsi Co. or Varsha Traders in the tenancy rights in respect of the shop premises. Such persons cannot be described as transferees of Bai Ratanbai. In any case, the person from whom those parties claim to derive their title had herself no right to create any interest in favor of any third party in respect of these premises since she herself had no right, title or interest in those shop premises. 16. Mr. Makhija submitted that the title of M/s. Atul Doongarsi Co. and M/s. Varsha Traders as against Bai Ratanbai was a matter which could not be investigated by. the insolvency court. He submitted that this is a matter which is within the exclusive domain of the Court of Small Causes at Bombay under the Provisions of section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. Under Section 7, however, of the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act the insolvency court has full power to decide all questions of priorities and all other questions whatsoever, whether of law or fact, which may arise in any case of insolvency coming within the cognizance of the Court, or which the Court may deem it expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice or making a complete distribution of property in any such case. It is true that there is a difference in the language of section 7 of the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, 1928 as compared to section 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920. Under section 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, the Court has full power to decide all questions whether of title or priority or of any nature whatsoever, etc. It is true that there is a difference in the language of section 7 of the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, 1928 as compared to section 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920. Under section 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, the Court has full power to decide all questions whether of title or priority or of any nature whatsoever, etc. Thus an express power is conferred on the insolvency court to decide questions of title under section 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. Mr. Makhija submitted that since the words “questions of title” are not expressly present in section 7 of the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, the powers of the Court under the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act are somewhat narrower and the Court cannot investigate a question of title under the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act. This submission has no merit. The Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act is an earlier Act of 1909. When the Provincial Insolvency Act was enacted later in 1920, in order to avoid all controversies, questions of title were expressly included in section 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. A later Act cannot, by implication, exclude the question of title from the purview of an earlier Act. Section 7 of the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act is couched in the widest possible terms to include all questions of whatsoever nature, whether of fact or of law. It must necessarily include questions, of title also. 17. Mr. Makhija also submitted that even de hors the family arrangement dated 30–10–1967 Bai Ratanbai as the widow of Morarji Kanji was one of the heirs of Morarji Kanji and would have a share in the tenancy rights of Jhose two shops. This submission was made across the Bar for the first time while arguing the present case. It has been nobody's case until now that Bai Ratanbai was otherwise entitled to the tenancy rights of those shops premises or was otherwise entitled to create any third party rights in respect of the tenancy rights of those shop premises. Throughout those proceedings, Bai Ratanbai has claimed the tenancy rights in respect of those shop premises on the basis of the family arrangement. She has not, and even now she does not lay claim to tenancy rights in the said shop premises in any other capacity except as a transferee under the family arrangement. Her transferees cannot now improve upon her title by making oral submissions across the bar. 18. She has not, and even now she does not lay claim to tenancy rights in the said shop premises in any other capacity except as a transferee under the family arrangement. Her transferees cannot now improve upon her title by making oral submissions across the bar. 18. It was lastly submitted by Mr. Makhija that the application by the Official Assgnee is barred by the law of limitation. He submitted that the family arrangement dated 30–10–1967 could not be now avoided by the Official Assignee. This argument has no substance because the family arrangement was challenged in the petition for an order of adjudication and it was declared as fraudulent within two years of the family arrangement. In fact it was so declared when an order of adjudication was passed. The present application is, therefore, only consequential to the order of adjudication. This order of adjudication was challenged by the transferee Bai Ratanbai in appeal and the appeal of Bai Ratanbai was finally decided only on 13th January 1981. Thereafter the Official Assignee has made the present application on 22nd June 1982. It cannot be said that this application is barred by the law of limitation. It is true that during the pendency of appeal no stay had been obtained of the order of adjudication. But the transaction was the subject-matter of challenge before the Court of Appeal by the transferee. In view of these circumstances, the period of limitation can run only from the date of the order in appeal viz. 13–1-1981. 19. My attention was drawn to the observations in the case of (Hurda-trai Jagdish Prasad v. Official Assignee of Calcutta)9. There, the Court observed that no period of limitation is prescribed under the insolvency laws for an application to set aside the transfer as fraudulent by the Official Assignee. The Court observed that the intention of the Legislature seems to be that such a proceeding could be instituted so long as the insolvency continues and that is the reason why no fixed period of limitation has been prescribed for such an application either by the Insolvency Act or the Limitation Act. These observations, however, are based upon the provisions of the Limitation Act as it was then in force. Under Article 181 of the old Limitation Act of 1903, applications under the Insolvency Act were not covered. These observations, however, are based upon the provisions of the Limitation Act as it was then in force. Under Article 181 of the old Limitation Act of 1903, applications under the Insolvency Act were not covered. The present Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies how- ever, not merely to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure but to all applications. This article, therefore, applies to applications by the Official Assignee also. In any case I need not examine this aspect further in view of the fact that in the present case even assuming that Article 137 applies, the application by the Official Assignee is made within 3 years of the order of the Appellate Court dated 13-1-1981 dismissing the transferee's appeal and is, therefore, within time. 20. In the premises, it is clear that the family arrangement dated 30–10–1967 Ex. D to the report of the Official Assignee, in so far as it declares that the tenancy in respect of shop Nos. 4 and 5 on the ground floor of the property bearing S. No. 177, Dongri Street, shall belong absolutely to Bai Ratanbai, is null and void as against the Official Assignee and the Official Assignee is entitled to the tenancy rights in respect of shop Nos. 4 and 5 situate at 177, Dongri Street, Bombay-9; the purported agreements made by Bai Ratanbai in favour of M/s Atul Doongarsi Co. and M/s Varsha Traders dated 11–4-1974 and 13–10–1978 respectively are null and void and of no effect as against the Official Assignee; under the Deed of Partnership dated 23–12–1968 the firm of M/s Mulraj Co. and/or Babubhai Govindji Thakkar have no right, title or interest in the tenancy rights in respect of the said shop premises; and the Official Assignee is directed to take possession of the said shops from Bai Ratanbai Morarji, M/s Atul Doongarsi Co., Varsha Traders, Babubhai Govindji Thakkar and/or M/s Mulraj Co. for the benefit of the general body of unsecured creditors of the insolvents. 21. There will be no order as to costs. 22. At the request of Mr. Makhija, the Official Assignee is directed not to take possession of the shop premises till 30th August 1982. Ad interim injunction in terms of prayer (c) to continue till 30th August 1982 in view of the direction given to the Official Assignee not to take possession till that date. Order accordingly. -----