JUDGMENT R.B. Lal, J. - This appeal is directed against the order of acquittal dated 22-1-1977 passed by Sri Yashpal Lukaria, Munsif Magistrate, First Class, Agra. 2. Food Inspector Rajendra Mohan Chaturvedi (P.W. 1) visited Gujranwala Sweet House situated in Heeng ki Mandi within the limits of Nagar Mahapalika Agra, on 29-1-74 at about 12 o'clock noon and found Chimman Lal Chawla, respondent No. 1 selling sweets prepared from chhena. Chimman Lal Chawla gave out that Brij Mohan Chawla was the owner of the sweet house. The Food Inspector disclosed his identity and gave a notice of his intention to purchase chhena sweet for analysis. He purchased 1200 grams of chhena sweets on payment of Rs. 12/- and sealed it in three sample bottles in equal quantity, after observing all the rules and procedures. One sample bottle was handed over to Chimnran Lal Chawla. The Food Inspector also prepared the usual papers. 3. A sample bottle was sent to the Public Analyst, Lucknow, who reported that the sweets contained unpermitted coal tar dye. A copy of this report was sent to the accused Dr. Narendra Nath. Nagar Swasthya Adhikari, Nagar Mahapalika Agra, filed a complaint against the present respondents for selling adulterated sweets, an offence punishable under sections 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (briefly the Act). 4. The stand taken up by Chimman Lal Chawla was that the sweets in question from which the sample was taken by the Food Inspector, were got prepared by one Kali Charan Gupta. The sweets were not meant for sale and he was not selling the same. Brij Mohan Chawla also took up a similar stand. He added that Chimman Lal Chawla was not selling chhena sweets on his behalf. Both the accused examined Kali Charan Gupta in defence. 5. The learned Magistrate observed that rule 22 of the rules framed under the Act required that 500 grams sample of any prepared food should be sent to the Public Analyst for purposes of analysis, but in this case admittedly only 400 grams of sweets were sent to the Public Analyst and thus, there was a breach of the mandatory provisions of the rule. Hence the secured not be convicted and both were entitled to get the benefit of doubt. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Rajal Das v. State of Maharashtra, 1975 (I)FAC 1. Hence the secured not be convicted and both were entitled to get the benefit of doubt. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Rajal Das v. State of Maharashtra, 1975 (I)FAC 1. In the result, he acquitted both the accused. 6. The Nagar Swasthya Adhikari did not feel satisfied and filed this appeal by leave. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 8. By a later decision in case of the State of Kerala v. Alassary Mohammad, 1978 (1) FAC 145 the Supreme Court overruled Rajal Das's case (supra) and held that rule 22 is directory and not mandatory. The Supreme Court further held : - "If the quantity sent to the Public Analyst, even though it is less than that prescribed, is sufficient and enables the Public Analyst to make a correct analysis, then merely because the quantity sent was not in strict compliance with the rule will not result in the nullification of the report and obliterate its evidentiary value. If the quantity is less, it is for the Public Analyst to see whether it is sufficient for his analysis or not." In the decision in the case of Ram Das v. Sada Nand, 1979 (II) FAC 215, their lordships of the Supreme Court observed thus : "Where the High Court in a Food Adulteration case held that there was non-compliance with rule 22 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules in not sending the minimum quantity of sample to Public Analyst and thus acquitted the accused relying on a decision of the Supreme Court, but subsequently, that Supreme Court decision was overruled, the acquittal by the High Court was clearly wrong on point of law. Therefore, in an appeal against acquittal, the exercise of discretion by the Supreme Court not to interfere with the High Court's order of acquittal on the ground that the law as it then stood was correct, would not arise more so, when it was a case of economic offence." In view of the above legal position the order of acquittal bared on the ground of non-observance of rule 22, cannot be sustained and must be set aside. 9. I asked the learned counsel for the respondents if he could support the order of acquittal on any other ground or could point out any other defect which would vitiate the trial. 9. I asked the learned counsel for the respondents if he could support the order of acquittal on any other ground or could point out any other defect which would vitiate the trial. The learned counsel candidly stated before me that there was nothing else which could be urged in support of the order of acquittal and there was no other defect vitiating the trial. The learned counsel, however, urged that there was no material on the record to show that Brij Mohan Chawla was the owner of the Sweet House and that Chimman Lal was selling the sweets on behalf of Brij Mohan Chawla. 10. Notwithstanding the above statement of the learned counsel for the respondents, I have gone through the lower court's record to satisfy myself if the material on the record is sufficient to come to the conclusion that the respondents or any one of them were guilty of an offence under section 7(i) read with Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act. The prosecution had examined the Food Inspector Rajendra Mohan Chaturvedi (P.W. 1), Mewa Singh, Assistant Sanitary Supervisor (P.W. 2) and Mahesh Chandra, Licence Clerk (P.W. 3). 11. The prosecution did not adduce any evidence to prove that Brij Mohan Chawla was the owner of the Sweet House and Chimman Lal Chawla was selling sweets on his behalf. The statements of the Food Inspector and the Assistant Sanitary Inspector that Chimman Lal Chawla had told them that he was selling sweets on behalf of Brij Mohan Chawla is not sufficient to establish that Brij Mohan Chawla was the owner of the shop. Chimman Lal Chawla did not say that the Sweet House belonged to Brij Mohan Chawla and he was selling sweets on his behalf. Brij Mohan did not admit that Chimman Lal was selling sweets on his behalf. The defence witness clearly said that the shop belonged only to Chimman Lal. He was not cross-examined on this point. Thus the evidence is not sufficient to hold that Chimman Lal Chawla was selling sweets on behalf of Brij Mohan Chawla and the Sweet House belonged to the latter. 12. The statement of the Food Inspector shows that he had taken the sample of chhena sweets from Gujranwala Sweet House on 29-1-1974 at about mid day after observing all the relevant rules. 12. The statement of the Food Inspector shows that he had taken the sample of chhena sweets from Gujranwala Sweet House on 29-1-1974 at about mid day after observing all the relevant rules. He had found Chimman Lal Chawla, respondent No. 1, selling and exposing for sale sweets prepared from chhena. One bottle of sample sweets was given to Chimman Lal Chawla. The usual papers were also prepared on the spot A bottle of sample sweets was sent to the Public Analyst, Lucknow who submitted report dated 8-4-1974 saying that the sample contained un-permitted coal tar dye Rhodamine B.C.I. 45170 of 1956. A copy of this report was sent to the accused for information. Thereafter Dr. Narendra Nath Nagar Swasthya Adhikari, Nagar Mahapalika Agra, filed the complaint, Ext. Ka-8, under his own signature. This witness added that no public person came forward to be a witness of the taking of the sample. He denied that Chimman Lal Chawla had told him that the sweets in question were prepared on the order of Kali Charan Gupta from the material supplied by him He also denied that the price of the sweets purchased by him was not paid to Chimman Lal Chawla. Mewa Singh supported the statement of the Food Inspector. Chimman Lal Chawla admitted certain facts about taking of the sample. 13. The report of the Public Analyst was not assailed on any ground and the accused did not claim to send another sample to the Director of Central Food Laboratory for analysis. The report of the Public Analyst was very clear and showed that the sample was adulterated. The Nagar Swasthya Adhikari had authority to launch prosecution and had himself signed the complaint. 14. The accused had examined only one witness in defence, namely Kali Charan Gupta (D.W. 1). He no doubt said that the sweets in question were prepared by the accused on his order from the material supplied by him, but this statement does not deserve preference over the statements of the Food Inspector and the Assistant Sanitary Supervisor. This witness admitted that he knew Chimman Lal Chawla for the last eight or ten years. He was an interested person 15. In view of the convincing and unshaken prosecution evidence, the conclusion is inevitable that Chimman Lal Chawla was selling and exposing for sale adulterated sweets. This witness admitted that he knew Chimman Lal Chawla for the last eight or ten years. He was an interested person 15. In view of the convincing and unshaken prosecution evidence, the conclusion is inevitable that Chimman Lal Chawla was selling and exposing for sale adulterated sweets. Hence, he is guilty of an offence punishable under section 7(i) read with section 16(1)(a)(i). So far as Brij Mohan Chawla is concerned, he cannot be held guilty because it is not proved that Chimman Lal was selling the sweets on his behalf. 16. On the question of sentence the learned counsel for the respondents has referred to the decision in the case of Ram Das v. Sada Nand (supra) and pointed out that in that case the article of food, namely, confectionary drops, was found to contain coal tar dye, and the Supreme Court bad passed only a sentence of fine of Rs. 2000/- and had not chosen to award any substantive sentence of imprisonment. He has urged that a similar sentence may be awarded to the guilty respondents in the instant case and no sentence of imprisonment may be imposed. the learned counsel for the appellant has opposed this suggestion. He has urged that under section 16(1)(a)(i) as it stood in January, 1974, the minimum sentence which could be awarded for such an offence was imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 1000/-. The proviso giving discretion to the Court to pass a sentence below the prescribed minimum, was not applicable to the instant case because the sweets in question were adulterated under sub-clause (j) of clause (i) of section 2 of the Act as it stood in January, 1974. He has further urged that rule 30 of the rules framed under the Act prescribes the minimum limit of the permitted coal tar food colour and existence of coal tar colour in excess of that limit would also amount to adulteration within the term 'adulterated'. He has added that in Ram Das's case (supra) it was not clear if an un-permitted coat tar dye was found in the sample or a permitted coal tar dye was found in excess of the prescribed maximum limit. He has added that in Ram Das's case (supra) it was not clear if an un-permitted coat tar dye was found in the sample or a permitted coal tar dye was found in excess of the prescribed maximum limit. The learned counsel for the respondents has not disputed the contention that for an offence of adulteration falling under sub clause (j) the minimum sentence prescribed under the aforesaid provision of law as it was in force in January, 1974, was imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 1000/-. This minimum sentence was not reduced by any subsequent amendment of the Act. In view of the clear provision of law with regard to the minimum quantum of sentence I have no option but to award at least that much of sentence to respondent No. 1. 17. No other submission has been made on behalf of the respondents in this appeal. 18. In the result, the appeal succeeds in part. The order of acquittal of Chimman Lal Chawla dated 22-1-1977 is set aside. He (Chimman Lal Chawla) is convicted of an offence under section 7(1) read with section 16(1) (a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-. He is allowed three months time from today to pay up the fine. In default of payment of fine, he shall further undergo rigorous imprisonment for four months. He shall be taken into custody to serve out the sentence according to law. 19. The order of acquittal of Brij Mohan Chawla is upheld.