JUDGMENT K.P. Singh, J.- By means of, this writ Petition, the petitioners have prayed for quashing the judgment of the revisional court dated 8-12-1976 in Revision No. 169, under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, Qutubuddin v. Ram Adhin and another. 2. The petitioners were recorded in the basic year and the contesting opposite party Qutubuddin had filed an objection under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The claim of the contesting opposite party before the Consolidation Officer was that the sale deeds in favour of the petitioner were void and their names were wrongly recorded in the basic year. The Consolidation Officer and the appellate authority did not accept the Contentions raised on behalf of the contesting opposite party on the ground that the contesting opposite party had no right to challenge the sale deed in the year 1967 and also that the petitioners were in possession. The appellate authority has confirmed the judgment of the Consolidation Officer on the around that the petitioners were in possession for more than statutory period on the date when the consolidation started in the village, hence appeal preferred by the contesting opposite party Qutubuddin had no merit. Aggrieved by the judgment of the appellate authority, the contesting opposite party Qutubuddin had preferred a revision petition which has been allowed by the revisional court through its judgment dated 8-12-1976. Aggrieved by the judgment of the revisional court the petitioners have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended before me that the revisional court has patently erred in basing its judgment on the rulings cited by the contesting opposite party when those rulings were not good law in view of a Division Bench ruling of this Court. Secondly it has been contended that the petitioner's claim was recognised by the appellate authority on the basis of continuous possession for more than statutory period and the revisional court has failed to record any categorical finding in that connection. 4. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has tried to support the impugned judgment of the revisional court. According to him the petitioners had not taken any plea before the Consolidation Officer regarding their claim based on adverse possession, hence the plea should not be investigated by the revisional court any more. 4. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has tried to support the impugned judgment of the revisional court. According to him the petitioners had not taken any plea before the Consolidation Officer regarding their claim based on adverse possession, hence the plea should not be investigated by the revisional court any more. According to him the contesting opposite party Qutubuddin was minor on the date of sale in favour of petitioners, hence the enquiry into the claim of the petitioners with regard to acquisition of right on the basis of continuous possession for more than statutory period entails investigation into questions of fact which should not be directed by this Court in the exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. It is evident the revisional court has patently erred in relying upon the ruling cited by the contesting opposite party Qutubuddin before it. According to a Division Bench case of this Court reported in 1972 R.D. page 451 (1) the possession of an illegal transferee is adverse and it is not permissive as held by a learned Single Judge of this Court earlier and followed by the Board of Revenue later. The appellate authority had recognised the claim of the petitioners on the basis of their possession for more than statutory period and it had recorded a finding that the contesting opposite party Qutubuddin had become major in the year 1962. In this view of the matter the examination of the petitioner's claim based on continuous possession for more than statutory period against the consent of the tenure holder assumes importance and the revisional court has failed to examine that question, hence it is in the ends of justice that the revisional court should be asked to re-examine the claim of the petitioners based on continuous possession for more than statutory period. 6. The contention of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party that the plea based on adverse possession is a plea not purely legal but is a question of fact and law mixed, hence it should not be directed to be examined by the revisional court. 6. The contention of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party that the plea based on adverse possession is a plea not purely legal but is a question of fact and law mixed, hence it should not be directed to be examined by the revisional court. It is sufficient to indicate that the aforesaid plea arises out of pleadings of law and facts narrated by the parties and in this view of the matter when the appellate authority had entertained that plea and had answered it in favour of the petitioners, it is desirable that the revisional court should also specifically deal with that claim. In this regard a suggestion has been made that the contesting opposite party Qutubuddin was minor on the date of the sale in favour of the petitioners and there is a dispute as to when he attained majority and this aspect of the matter should also be dealt with by the revisional court. I think that the parties should be permitted to raise the legal plea before the revisional court. 7. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment of the revisional court dated 8-12-1976 is hereby quashed and the revisional court is directed to re-examine the claims of the parties strictly in accordance with law. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.