K. S. PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) IN these petitions under Art. 226 of the constitution, the petitioners have challenged the constitutionality of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain lands) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the order dt. 14-11-1980 (Annexure A) made by the A'. st. Commissioner, tiptur (hereinafter referred to as 'the AC') under the said Act. ( 2 ) SO far as the constitutionality of the act, a Division Bench of this Court in s. V. Krishnappa v. Munichnnappa (1) and (connected caces decided on 16- 9-1982) rejecting the very contentions urged for the petitioners, has upheld the same. Following the Division Bench ruling in Krishnappa's (1) case, the challenge of the petitioners to the Act is, rejected. ( 3 ) IN the course of his order the AC has found that the lands granted in the year 1965 have been alienated in violation of the erms of the grant and that respondent no. 3 is, Therefore entitled for their restoration under the Act. ( 4 ) SRI H. Kumaraswamy, learned counsel for the petitioners, contends that the term 'granted land' occurring in Ss. 3 (b) and 4 of the Act must be literally construed as lands granted by State Government only and does not apply to lands granted by any of the lower authorities empowered by the Kar. Land Revenue Act, 1964 and the Land Grant Rules made thereunder. In support of his contention sri Swamy strongly relies on a ruling of this Court in Abdul Basheer Sab v. State of mysore (2) and a Division Bench ruling of the Bombay High Court in State of Bomhay v. Chaganlal Gangaram Lavar (3) followed with approval in Abdul Basheer sab's (2) case. ( 5 ) THE words 'granted land' by Government occurring in Ss. 3 (b) and 4 of the act cannot be construed as only lands granted exclusively and directly by State government only. The construction suggested by Sri Swamy on the term 'granted land by Govunment's too literal and if accepted will defeat the very scheme and object of enacting the Act, the validity of which has been upheld in Krishnappa's (1) case. The words 'granted lands by Govern- ment' should be construed ad lands granted by all Government Officers or authorities. The construction suggested by Sri Swamy on the term 'granted land by Govunment's too literal and if accepted will defeat the very scheme and object of enacting the Act, the validity of which has been upheld in Krishnappa's (1) case. The words 'granted lands by Govern- ment' should be construed ad lands granted by all Government Officers or authorities. Without any doubt this construction will promote tnc scheme and object of the Act and is also in consonaned with the Division bench ruling in krisyhnappa's (1) case. ( 6 ) IN Ablul Basheer Sab's (2) case that followed the ruling of the Bombay High court in C. G. I avad's (5) case the question of construin ander term oceuiring in the Act did not arise and, therefore, that ruling does not really bear on the point. ( 7 ) AS all the contentions urged for the petitioners fail, there writ petitions are liab'. e to be dismissed, I, therefore, dismiss these writ petitions and dicharge the rule issued in these caces. But, in the circumstances of the cases, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. After I dictated the order dismissing the writ petitions, Sukumanaswamy seeks for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the supreme Court under Arts. 132 and 133 of the Constitution of India. As the order made by me is not final so far as this Court is concerned. I cannot grant the certificate of fitness sought by the petitioners though the Division Bench in Krisnappa's (1) case has granted a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme court of India. Hence, I reject the oral application made by the petitioners for a certifreate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court of India. 3. In these cases the interim order of stay granted by this Court has been in force from 5 1 1981. In Krishnappd"s (1) case the Division Bench has granted stay of the operation of its order for a period of 3 month. In these circumstances it is just and proper to stay the operation of my order for a period of 3 months to enable the petitioners to move the Supreme court of India in Special Leave to appeal and seek for stay. I. therefore, stay the oppration of my order for a period of 3 months from this day. --- *** --- .