A. N. DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) IT is a settled principle of law that no person can take advantage of his own wrong. Will it make any difference if the wrongdoer is the mighty Government ? It is true that the Government is an artificial person and has to act through human agency. But can the Government escape its responsibility if the human agency working for it or on its behalf does some wrong and then in the name of the Government some advantage is not sought to be taken of such wrong ? This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India requires this Court to examine the petitioners grievances against non protection of his pay and emoluments while declaring him surplus in the light of my aforesaid observations. ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this petition are not many and are not in dispute either. The petitioner obtained his graduation from the faculty of Arts with Hindi as his special subject from the Gujarat University in 1972 with flying colours. He got his first class thereat. He successfully completed his postgraduation again in Hindi from the same University in 1974 with second class. Shri Trivedi for the petitioner informs me at the Bar that he secured 53 per cent marks thereat. He obtained his B. Ed. degree from the Gujarat University in 1984 again with first class. At his graduation course in education he opted for Hindi and Gujarati as his special methods. He appears to have got his name registered with the Employment Exchange. He received some call letter from it for the post of Lecturer in Hindi. He was interviewed therefore and was appointed as such with effect from 7/12/1974 by one Notification of 1/01/1975 issued by respondent No. 2 herein. Its copy is at Annexure A to this petition. It may be mentioned that he was appointed against a clear vacancy as transpiring from the Notification at Annexure A. Surprisingly enough he was given appointment for a period not exceeding 12 months or till a Public Service Commission selected candidate became available whichever occurred earlier. He was given such appointment orders from time to time upto March 1979. The last Notification is at Annexure F to this petition. No date appears to have been mentioned therein. He was given such appointment orders from time to time upto March 1979. The last Notification is at Annexure F to this petition. No date appears to have been mentioned therein. I am however told by Shri Trivedi for the petitioner at the Bar that it was dated 19th January 1979 and that its date is indicated in the index page and also in Para 4 of the petition. It becomes clear on perusal of all these Notifications that his appointment was made against a clear vacancy and was for a period not exceeding 12 months or till a Public Service Commission selected candidate become available whichever occurred earlier. He appears to have become surplus with the introduction of the new pattern of education of 10 + 2 + 3. The District Education Officer at Surendranagar by his communication of 11/05/1980 requested the concerned Principal of each non Government school presumbaly in the District to absorb the teachers named therein on the ground that they became surplus from June 1980 on introduction of the new pattern of education of 10 + 2 + 3. Its copy is at Annexure H to this petition. The petitioners name figures therein at serial number 7. It appears that the petitioner was given employment in the school represented by Respondent No. 3 herein with effect from 18/08/1990 in the lower pay scale of Rs. 330 420. It may be mentioned that according to the petitioner in his college service he was getting the pay scale of Rs. 700-1600. It may be mentioned that after joining his service in the school represented by Respondent No. 3 the petitioner passed his B. Ed. examination in 1984 with first class. He was therefore placed in the pay scale of Rs. 440-700. On introduction of the new pattern of education of 10 + 2 + 3 the State Government issued certain resolutions for protection of pay and emoluments of certain teachers becoming or being rendered surplus on account of such introduction of the new pattern of education. The copies of these resolution are at Annexures I J and K to this petition. The petitioner was not given any benefit thereunder as a surplus teacher. He appears to have made representations to various authorities but to no avail. The copies of these resolution are at Annexures I J and K to this petition. The petitioner was not given any benefit thereunder as a surplus teacher. He appears to have made representations to various authorities but to no avail. He has therefore invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court for redressal of his grievances against denial of benefits to him as a surplus teacher under the Government Resolution at Annexures I J and K to this petition. ( 3 ) THE preliminary objection against maintainability of this petition on the ground of delay on the part of the petitioner need not be entertained at this stage. The reason therefore is quite simple. In the first place no such contention is raised by or on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2 in the affidavit in reply filed on their behalf by respondent No. 2. It is true that the affidavit was filed by respondent No. 2 for the limited purpose of opposing admission of this petition at the stage of its preliminary hearing. Even at that stage no objection as to its maintainability on the ground of inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in preferring this petition to this Court was raised. After rule on this petition was issued on 21/03/1988 no further affidavit has come to be filed by or on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2 objecting to its maintainability on the ground of inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner. If such objection was taken the petitioner might have explained such delay on his part. This is one reason why the said preliminary objection need not be sustained at this stage. ( 4 ) THE second reason for overruling such objection is that respondents No. 1 and 2 have not chosen to show what prejudice has been caused to them on account of such delay on the part of the petitioner in invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for redressal of his grievances against not granting of the benefits as a surplus teacher under the Government Resolutions at Annexures I J and K to this petition. In this connection a reference deserves to be made to the relevant observations made by this Court in its Division Bench ruling in the case of Kiritkumar D. Vyas v. The State of Gujarat and Another reported in 1982 Gujarat Law Hearld at page 687. The relevant observations are found in paras 9 to 11 at pages 694-695 of the reported ruling. They read thus:"there cannot be any blanket rule and as such there is none that a delay of a particular period should be considered to be unreasonable irrespective of the facts of a particular case. Unreasonable delay is a relative concept and what may be considerd to be unreasonable delay in one case may not be so in the facts and circumstances of another inference by the observations of the Supreme Court in a case reported at AIR 1974 SC 259 (R. S. Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra ). In the said case there was a delay of more than 10 or 12 years in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause of the complaint and it was contended by the respondents in the said case as it was contended by Mr. Shah before us that this unreasonable delay was sufficient to disentitle the petitioner to any relief in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. While repelling the said contention the Supreme Court observed: "the Rule which says that a Court may not inquire into belated or stale claims is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. The question is one of discretion to be followed on the facts of each case. IT may also be noted that the principle on which the Court proceeds in refusing reliefs to the petitioner on ground of laches or delay is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there was reasonable explanation for the delay. IT may also be noted that the principle on which the Court proceeds in refusing reliefs to the petitioner on ground of laches or delay is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there was reasonable explanation for the delay. It may be noticed that the claim for enforcement of the fundamental right of equal opportunity under Article 16 is itself a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 32 and this Court which has been assigned the role of a sentinel on the qui vive for protection of the fundamental rights cannot easily allow itself to be persuaded to refuse relief solely on the genuine ground of laches delay or the like". Again the Court will frown upon delay and laches on the part of the aggrieved party if in the meanwhile the rights of innocent persons have intervened. And howsoever the grievance of the aggrieved partly may be if by condoning the delay rights of other innocent persons were to be adversely affected or jeopardized then the Court would be reluctant to brook such delays. In the instant case we do not feel that the petitioner who was only class IV servant i. e. on the lowest rung of the ladder and who claims nothing more than reinstatement (he does not claim backwages for the duration of the period of delay) is likely to adversely affect the rights of any innocent third person. AGAIN in a case reported in AIR 1970 SC 898 (Tilokchand Motichand v. H. B. Munshi) while dealing with question of delay the Supreme Court in para 11 of the judgment observed as under: "the question is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to case. This Court need not necessarily give the total time to the litigant to move this Court under Art. 32 even though he may be within statutory limitation. Similarly in a suitable case this Court may entertain a petition even after limitation. It will all depend on what the breach of the Fundamental Right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose". It is true that in the instant case the appellant has not approached the Tribunal within time. Similarly in a suitable case this Court may entertain a petition even after limitation. It will all depend on what the breach of the Fundamental Right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose". It is true that in the instant case the appellant has not approached the Tribunal within time. But then the Tribunal could well have taken a broad view and condoned the delay on condition that he would not be paid backwages for the period of delay even if he succeeds. Taking into consideration the fact that the impugned order of dismissal was by itself an order which was null and void being violative of the principles of natural justice coupled with the fact that the petitioner was on the lowest rung of the socio economic hierarchy we feel that he has been a victim of a grave injustice the redressal of which need not be blocked merely on the score of delay. Chill penury and stark deprivation were his lot after his summary dismissal and if this Court were to disown him only on the ground of delay it would be selling its seal on an indefensible and unsustainable act of injustice. We therefore feel that in the instant case despite the delay this court need not be slow in exercising its jurisdiction under Article 228 for redressing an injustice. The Special Civil Application preferred by the petitioner must be treated as one challenging the original order of dismissal from service since the Tribunal refused to entertain the appeal. The order passed by the learned Single Judge also shows that it was treated as a petition under Article 226 directing against the impugned order of dismissal (that is why there is a reference of 4 1/2 years of delay ). We feel that the appellant (Ori. petitioner) need not be denied justice in the facts and circumstances of the case since delay will hurt only the petitioner and will not occasion any prejudice and detriment to the State by what we propose to do. The petitioner will not get any backwages for the period of delay. Once we totally deny him backwages for the period of delay there can be no prejudice or detriment to the State. Thus by our order delay will cause prejudice and will solely hurt the petitioner. The petitioner will not get any backwages for the period of delay. Once we totally deny him backwages for the period of delay there can be no prejudice or detriment to the State. Thus by our order delay will cause prejudice and will solely hurt the petitioner. In this view of the matter the petitioner need not be obliged to submit to a void order of dismissal. All that he will get is an opportunity to work and earn his bread at the sacrifice of backwages which he will have to forego on account of the delay in approaching the Court. It is needless to say that sitting as a Single Judge I am bound by the aforesaid view of the Division Bench of this Court. Even otherwise I am in respectful agreement therewith. This Division Bench ruling of this Court in the case of Kiritkumar F. Vyas (supra) provides a complete answer to the preliminary objection raised by Shri Bhatt for respondents No. 1 and 2 as to the maintainability of this petition on the ground of inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner. ( 5 ) THERE is no more reason which would militate against denial to the petitioner his due relief in this petition on the ground of delay and laches on his part. As pointed out hereinabove rule on this petition has come to be issued on 21/03/1988. More than 3 1/2 years have rolled by since then. It is too late in the day for this Court to inform the petitioner that his petition cannot be entertained on the ground of delay on his part after keeping the petition pending for such a long period. If he is entitled to his due relief from this Court he need not be non-petitioned on such ground after keeping his petition pending for more than 3 1/2 years in this Court. ( 6 ) COMING to the merits of the case one thing becomes clear that the petitioner was appointed as a Lecturer in Hindi in M. P. Shah Arts and Science College at Surendranagar against a clear vacancy. That post was not within the purview of the Gujarat Public Service Commission when the petitioner was first appointed by the Notification of 1st January 1975 at Annexure A to this petition. That post was not within the purview of the Gujarat Public Service Commission when the petitioner was first appointed by the Notification of 1st January 1975 at Annexure A to this petition. This becomes clear from para 4 of the affidavit in reply sworn by respondent No. 2 on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2 on 30/03/1988 It has clearly been mentioned therein that Lecturers in the Arts the Science and the Commerce colleges are appointed in accordance with the Lecturers at the Arts Science and Commerece Colleges Recruitment Rules 1980 (the Recruitment Rules for brief ). It is thus clear that the Recruitment Rules came into force some time in 1980. It is an admitted position that the post of Lecturer was placed within the purview of the Gujarat Public Service Commission under the Recruitment Rules. IT is not the case of respondents No. 1 and 2 that the Recruitment Rules have been given any retrospective effect. Nothing is shown to me by or on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2 to the effect that the post of Lecturer in any Government Arts Science or Commerce College was within the purview of the Gujarat Public Service Commission by any rules prior thereto. In that view of the matter the petitioner could not have been appointed on a clear vacancy against the contingency of availability of a candidate selected by the Gujarat Public Service Commission or for that matter as any other Public Service Commission. He was wronged by giving to him appointment for a limited period not exceeding 12 months or till the Public Service Commission selected candidate became available whichever occurred earlier. The subsequent notifications giving him appointment on very such terms on the same post would also suffer from the same vice. This does not mean that the petitioner could not have been appointed on probation or on a temporary basis against a clear vacancy. What is disapproved of by this Court in this petition is his appointment on an ad hoc basis by way of some stop gap arrangement against a clear vacancy. The appointing authority has thus done wrong to the petitioner. It cannot be gainsaid that the appointing authority acted on behalf of the State Government. The wrongdoer to the petitioner is thus the State Government. The appointing authority has thus done wrong to the petitioner. It cannot be gainsaid that the appointing authority acted on behalf of the State Government. The wrongdoer to the petitioner is thus the State Government. It cannot be permitted to take advantage of its own wrong by saying that the petitioners appointment was purely on some ad hoc basis by way of some stopgap arrangement and he would therefore not be entitled to the benefits as a surplus teacher under the Government Resolutions at Annexures I J and K to this petition. This Court might have frowned upon a private employer if he had chosen to resort to such tactics. Courts have from time to time pronounced that the Government should be a model employer. In that view of the matter it would not lie in the mouth of respondent No. 2 filing his affidavit on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2 to contend that the petitioner cannot be said to be a surplus teacher on account of the fact that he was appointed on some ad hoc basis by way of some stop gap arrangement. ( 7 ) AGAIN in the concerned Government Resolutions at Annexures I J and K to this petition the term surplus teacher has not been defined. Nowhere it has been mentioned that a person appointed on some ad hoc basis or by way to stopgap arrangement would not be entitled to benefits as a surplus teacher. The Government Resolution at Annexure I was the first in point of time and was issued on 7/03/1977. Thereby protection of pay and emoluments was afforded to every surplus teacher becoming as such on introduction of the new Resolution at Annexure J to this petition of 12/04/1977 is a sequel to the earlier Resolution of 7/03/1977 at Annexure I to this petition. The Resolution at Annexure J provides that only such teachers who were on position on 15/07/1976 would be entitled to the benefits under the Resolution of 7th March 1977 at Annexurnexure I to this petition. The cut off date of 15/07/1976 was changed to 15/08/1976 by the Resolution of 21/07/1977 at Annexure K to this petition. The notification of appointment at Annexure C to this petition clearly shows that the petitioner was given a fresh appointment as a Lecturer in Hindi with effect from 8/07/1976. The cut off date of 15/07/1976 was changed to 15/08/1976 by the Resolution of 21/07/1977 at Annexure K to this petition. The notification of appointment at Annexure C to this petition clearly shows that the petitioner was given a fresh appointment as a Lecturer in Hindi with effect from 8/07/1976. He was thus eligible for the purpose of benefits in view of the Resolution of 12/04/1977 Annexure J to this petition specifying the cut off date to be of 15/07/1976. ( 8 ) IT cannot be gainsaid that the petitioner was not absorbed in college service after his last appointment of 1 9/01/1979 because of introduction of the new pattern of education of 10 + 2 + 3. This becomes clear from the letter of 11/05/1980 of the District Education Officer at Surendranagar at Annexure H to this petition. In view of this petition on record it does not lie in the mouth of the deponent of the affidavit in reply given on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2 to say that the petitioner could not be said to be a surplus teacher. As pointed out hereinabove there is no escape from the conclusion that the petitioner became a surplus teacher on introduction of the new pattern of education of 10 + 2 + 3 in view of the Government Resolutions at Annexures I J and K to this petition and in view of the communication of 11/05/1980 at Annexure H to this petition. ( 9 ) IT is true that the petitioner has accepted a fresh appointment in the school represented by respondent No. 3 some time from 18/08/1980 in the lower pay scale of Rs. 330 420 as against the pay scale of Rs. 700-1600 as was enjoyed by him in his college service. It may be that he accepted that appointment out of his own volition without making any grievance in that regard at the relevant time. His peculiar predicament and plight at the relevant time cannot and need not be ignored. He was rendered jobless by introduction of the new pattern of education of 10 + 2 + 3. The plight of an unemployed youth can be understood better by experience than by description. No words can adequately describe his mental condition at that time. His peculiar predicament and plight at the relevant time cannot and need not be ignored. He was rendered jobless by introduction of the new pattern of education of 10 + 2 + 3. The plight of an unemployed youth can be understood better by experience than by description. No words can adequately describe his mental condition at that time. No fault can be found if he accepted any employment offered to him in such circumstances without any reservation or without making any grievance at that time. He cannot be denied his due benefits available to him under the Government Resolutions at Annexures I J and K to this petition simply on the ground that he voluntarily accepted the post of a Teacher in the school represented by respondent No. 3 without making any grievance at that time. ( 10 ) AGAIN it is difficult to come to the conclusion that he did not voice his grievances against denial of benefits in view of the clear cut averment made by him in this petition to the effect that he made representations to the authorities for giving to him the benefits as a surplus teacher under the Government Resolutions at Annexures I J and K to this petition. In this view of the matter I do not think that acceptance of the post of a teacher in the school represented by respondent No. 3 should come in the way of the petitioner in claiming the relief claimed by him in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. ( 11 ) IT is true that the petitioner has approached this Court quite belatedly. He has voiced his grievances against his ad hoc appointment by way of stop gap arrangement under the notifications at Annexures A to F to this petition for the first time in this petition. His grievances are certainly found to be genuine. But then there is no escape from the conclusion that they are belatedly made. Similarly he accepted his present position as a teacher way back in 1980. It appears that he did not approach this Court for his entitlement of benefits under the Government Resolution at Annexures I J and K to this petition soon after he was informed by one letter of 2 1/10/1980 that he was not entitled to such benefits as averred by him in para 10 of his petition. It appears that he did not approach this Court for his entitlement of benefits under the Government Resolution at Annexures I J and K to this petition soon after he was informed by one letter of 2 1/10/1980 that he was not entitled to such benefits as averred by him in para 10 of his petition. In that view of the matter he need not be given full benefits of arrears from the date he became entitled to as such. The interests of justice will fully be met if it is directed that his entitlement as a surplus teacher under the Government Resolutions at Annexures I J and K be notionally fixed from the date he became surplus and should actually be given on the basis of his continuous service from the date of this petition. ( 12 ) IT may be mentioned at this stage that the petitioner has been serving in the school represented by respondent No. 3. This respondent school has no objection against acceptance of this petition by this Court and grant of relief claimed by him in his petition indicating that the school has to pay to its teachers in accordance with the grant received from the State Government. It is an admitted position that the State Government pays 100 per cent grant towards the salary of higher secondary school teachers. ( 13 ) IN the result this petition is accepted. It is hereby declared that the petitioner is entitled to the benefits as a surplus teacher under the Government Resolutions at Annexures I J and K to this petition from the date he became surplus. The respondents are directed notionally to fix his entitlement from the date he was rendered surplus and on the basis of his continuous service and to pay actually to him all the benefits as such with effect from the date of this petition that is 27/07/1987. Respondent No. 3 is directed to prepare on or before 31/07/1992 the necessary salary bill for the period from 27/07/1987 after notionally fixing his pay from the date he became surplus and respondents No. 1 and 2 are directed to sanction such bill if it is found in order as early as possible preferably by 31/08/1992 but in any case not later than 30/09/1992. Rule is accordingly made absolute however with no order as to costs on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. The Registry is directed to send the writ in this case as early as possible or in any case latest by 31/05/1992. It will be open to the petitioner to produce a certified copy of this judgment before respondent No. 3 and/or the competent authority on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2 for the purpose of expediting the matter. The respondents are directed to act on production of such a certified copy if the writ from this Court is not received by that time. (NSS)Petition allowed. .