Judgment : The facts are briefly these: An enquiry into the working, constitutions, and financial position of the Paramakurichi Jaggery Manufacturing Co-operative Society Limited, was ordered under section 65 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1961. The Co-operative Sub-Registrar in the office of the Assistant Director (Palmgur), Tuticorin, was deputed and the enquiry was in progress. The revision petitioner, as the President of this Society was called upon by the enquiry officer to produce among others, the cash book of the Society. As this was not done, the Assistant Director (Palmgur), Tuticorin, addressed the Superintendent of Police, Tirunelveli, for taking necessary action against the revision petitioner as the disobedience on his part constituted an offence section 175, Indian Penal Code. The letter of the Assistant Director was forwarded to the Sub-Inspector of Police, Srivaikuntam, for doing the needful. 2. On receipt of this, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Srivaikuntam, incorporated this as a first information report under section 175, Indian Penal Code, assigning a Crime No. 8 of 1980 to this. An offence under section 175, Indian Penal Code, being a non-cognisable one, this officer moved the Judicial II Class Magistrate, Tiruchendur, for permission to investigate the case, as under section 155 of the Criminal Procedure Code such a permission is obligatory. Apparently on coming to know of this move, the revision petitioner appeared by counsel before the learned Magistrate and filed an application objecting to the grant of such a permission and praying for sending certain records of the proceedings initiated under section 65 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act (LIII of 1961). 3. The learned Magistrate entertained this application as Crl.M.P. No. 304 of 1980 and dismissed it holding that the records sought for were not necessary for granting the permission and that it was not fair to reject the request for permission to investigate the case. 4. The contentions raised in this revision are, firstly, that the learned Magistrate ought not to have taken cognisance of the offence in the absence of a complaint in writing by the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate as provided under section 195 (1) (b), Criminal Procedure Code, and secondly, that the alleged offence having been committed in or before October, 1976, the cognisance by the learned Magistrate on 4th January, 1980, is Barred by limitation. 5. 5. There is no force in either of these con-tentions. In this case, the stage; of taking cognisance has not been reached at all. The complaint of the Assistant Director (Palmgur), Tuticorin, having prima facie disclosed an offence under section 175, Indian Penal Code, which is non-cognisable, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Srivaikuntam, had recorded this complaint in the form of a first information report and approached the Magistrate having jurisdiction for permission to investigate the case, a course which is obligatory under section 155 (2), Criminal Procedure Code. The Sub-Inspector of Police should not have registered the first information report in this case, as under the Police Standing Orders P.S.O. No. 583, an information in respect of a non-cognisable; offence should be recorded only it the General Diary and not in the form of First Information Report which can be done only in cases of cognisable offences or cases referred for enquiry or report under section 144, 145 or 174 of the Criminal Procedure Code (P.S.O. 573). But then, this being at the most a procedural irregularity is of no consequence in this case. The stage, therefore, in this case is one relating to the information to the Police and, their powers to investigate, provided under Chapter XII of the Code. It is needless to point out that the participation of the Magistrate during the investigation of a case relates to a stage long prior to his taking cognisance of a case under Chapter XV of the Code. The orders of a Magistrate for investigating a non-cognisable offence are of the areas of the exercise of the police powers intended as a limitation and a safeguard against undue interference of the liberty of a citizen. The fact that the permission to investigate a non-cognisable offence does not extend to the powers of arrest, shows that the statute has intended to restrict the powers of police officers only to cognisable offences. 6. It is only after an investigation by an officer in charge of a police station under Chapter XXII of the Code that he can send up a final report to the Magistrate as provided for under section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is only then than the question of taking cognisance can arise and at no stage earlier. It is only after an investigation by an officer in charge of a police station under Chapter XXII of the Code that he can send up a final report to the Magistrate as provided for under section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is only then than the question of taking cognisance can arise and at no stage earlier. Even in case triable on complaints other than police, reports, a Magistrate under section 200, Criminal Procedure Code, taking cognisance has first to apply his mind for the purpose of proceedings under that section and subsequent sections under Chapter XV of the Code. It is only after he chooses to act under section 202 or 204, Criminal Procedure Code, that he can be considered to have taken cognisance of the case. In this case such a stage is yet to be reached. It may well be said that even after investigation by the Police, which affords ample opportunities to an accused to put forward his case and produce or cause to be produced documents relied upon by him the investigation officer may hold that there is no caste for sending up the accused before Court and inform the Magistrate accordingly. In such a case there is and can be no question of the Magistrate taking cognisance of the case. As such this contention must fail. 7. While at this, it is necessary to refer to the procedure that has been followed by the learned Magistrate in this case, which is wholly irregular and against law. The learned Magistrate was in error in having allowed the revision petitioner to intervene in a proceeding, which is clear from Chapter XII of the Code, is one entirely between the investigating agency and the Magistrate. It is well-settled that an accused cannot be permitted to participate in a proceeding at a stage when the very question, whether a person complained against is to be called upon to answer an accusation, is yet to be considered by the Magistrate. The entire scheme of the Code is that an accused person does not come into the picture at all till process is issued to secure his presence. As such the revision petitioner in this case had no right to take part in the proceedings nor has the Magistrate any jurisdiction to permit him to do so. The entire scheme of the Code is that an accused person does not come into the picture at all till process is issued to secure his presence. As such the revision petitioner in this case had no right to take part in the proceedings nor has the Magistrate any jurisdiction to permit him to do so. In Chandra Deo Singh v. Prakash Chandra Bose1, the Supreme Court in considering the question, whether an accused person had a right to intervene at the stage of an enquiry under section 202, Criminal Procedure, Code, and suggest to the Magistrate to put question to the witness, at a stage when no process had been issued against him, has held that an accused has no right to participate in the proceedings and permitting an accused person to intervene during the enquiry should frustrate the very object and that was why the Legislature had made no specific provision permitting him to take part in an enquiry and the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to permit an accused to do so. The position of the petitioner in this case is still worse. It is not a case where, as in the Supreme Court case, there was a complaint under section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code, followed by an enquiry under section 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In this case, the matter is only at the stage of the police officer seeking the permission of the Magistrate under section 155 (2), Criminal Procedure Code, with a view to take up investigation. As such, neither section 190 nor section 200, Criminal Procedure Code, is attracted or applicable, in which case alone the question of cognisance by the Magistrate within the scope of section 195 (1) (5), Criminal Procedure Code, will arise. Consequently, the learned Magistrate has clearly acted in excess of jurisdiction in entertaining the application of the revision petitioner. It follows that the order which is now sought to be revised is itself non est in the eye of law. 8. Coming to the question of limitation, while it is true that the Code has prescribed a period of limitation for taking cognisance of certain offences and an offence under section 175, Indian Penal Code, is one of these offences to which these provisions will apply. 8. Coming to the question of limitation, while it is true that the Code has prescribed a period of limitation for taking cognisance of certain offences and an offence under section 175, Indian Penal Code, is one of these offences to which these provisions will apply. It is unnecessary in view of my finding on the first point to consider this question in this case as the Court has not yet taken cognisance of the offence. It is open to the revision petitioner, in the event of a charge-sheet being laid against him, to urge this bar before the Court. Even otherwise, the Code has not placed any blanket bar on actions commenced beyond the period of limitation prescribed therein. Provision has been made under section 473 enabling a Court to take cognisance of an offence even after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice. This contention also must fail. 9. In the result, the criminal revision petition is dismissed.