SHENOY v. CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA — 1982 DIGILAW 211 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. These two petitions which are being disposed of by this common judgment come before us on reference, since important questions of law, a decision on which would have impact on the service conditions of a large number of Bank employees, are involved in them. 2. O. P. 4788/77 is by two Sub-Accountants in the Central Bank of India, one employed at the Ernakulam office and the other at the Quilon office and are respectively the President and the General Secretary of the Central Bank of India Employees' Union at the respective places. O. P. 542/ 78 is by a Clerk-cum-shroff and a Teller of the Indian Bank. The 1st petitioner is described also as the General Secretary and the 2nd petitioner as Joint Secretary of the Indian Bank Employees' Union, Kerala. In both the petitions, the respondents are the concerned Banks and their officers. The petitioners sought leave under Order I R.8 C. P. C, to enable them to prosecute the petitions in a representative capacity by two petitions; C.M.P. Nos. 3839 and 4002/82. Both of them were dismissed as highly belated. 3. Central Bank of India and Indian Bank are the two Banks involved here. These two Banks along with others were taken over by the Central Government under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970, Act 5 of 1970. The petitioners hold official positions in their respective Employees' Unions which are constituents of the All India Central Bank of India Employees Federation, which in turn are affiliated to the All India Bank Employees' Association. A charter of demands was submitted as early as in 1974 by the All India Employees' Association to the Banks in India stating that the employees would go on strike if their reasonable demands contained in the charter were not met. Notice of strike was issued. Pursuant to this notice, the employees of the Central Bank struck work as follows: By Ext. P1 dated 21-9-1977 issued by the Deputy General Manager, Central Bank of India, Bombay, the employees were told that full day's wages would be deducted from their salaries for everyday on which they might go on strike for however short a period that be. This intimation was communicated to the various branches for compliance (Exts. P2 and P3 series are the true copies). This intimation was communicated to the various branches for compliance (Exts. P2 and P3 series are the true copies). The 2nd petitioner caused a notice sent to the Officers of the Bank on 30-11-1977 informing them to desist from making the threatened deductions and to refund the amounts, if any, deducted. There was no reply to this notice. The respondents implemented the threat contained in Ext. P1 and deducted two days' salary for the month of November and one day's salary for the month of December. Exts. P1, P2 and P3 series in O.P. 4788/77 are challenged as violative of Art.19(1)(f) read with Art.31, Art.14 and 23(1) of the Constitution of India. 4. The petitioners in the second petition are workmen. In their case, they struck work for four hours from 10 a.m. on 29-12-1977. They reported for duty at 2 p.m. and worked thereafter as usual till the close of the working hours at 5 p.m. There was a full day's strike on 30-12-1977 also. By Exts. P1 and P2 two days.' salaries were directed to be deducted for the aforementioned strike. These two orders are challenged on the ground that they are mala fide, punitive, in violation of the principles of natural justice, confiscatory in nature and violative of the petitioners' fundamental right to hold and acquire property. 5. The grounds urged in this petition are (1) that under the conciliation settlement dated 19-10-1966 popularly known as the first bipartite settlement, "absence without leave" as in this case, could only be treated as a misconduct which is punishable in accordance with the procedure laid down therein and deduction of salary otherwise than in accordance with the said procedure is unauthorised and illegal; (2) that under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 only pro rata deduction of salary for the period of unauthorised absence is permissible and a deduction of full day's salary is in violation of S.7 read with S.9; and (3) deduction which has visited the petitioners with civil consequences are punitive in nature and such deduction without hearing the petitioners is void and violative of the principles of natural justice. The orders are challenged as offending Art.14 and 23(1) of the Constitution also. No counter affidavit is filed in this petition. 6. The orders are challenged as offending Art.14 and 23(1) of the Constitution also. No counter affidavit is filed in this petition. 6. In the counter affidavit filed in O.P. No. 4788 of 1977, the case of the petitioners is met as follows: The orders sought to be quashed are all internal circulars issued by the respondents as employer of the petitioners by which the employees were told that the fraction of a day on which they worked while striking for the other fraction will not be taken into consideration while disbursing the monthly wages. An employee of the Bank according to the terms of employment is expected to work during the full working hours fixed to earn a day's wages. It is not open to him to work for a few hours and claim pro-rata wages for the hours worked. The petitioners are officers of the Bank. The action taken by the respondents is in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment and deduction of wages does not amount to a penalty. The action taken by the respondents is neither arbitrary nor without jurisdiction. It does not violate any of the fundamental rights of the petitioners. The petitioners are not entitled to any hearing. 7. The 1st petitioner has filed a reply affidavit. It is stated that the monthly salary payable to the petitioners is a fixed sum and does not vary either with the number of days worked or with the number of hours worked. That being so, the case of the respondents that the petitioners can earn wages only on the days or hours during which they worked is without merit. The monthly salary is one and indivisible. Though the petitioners had agreed to a pro-rata deduction of salary for the number of hours of strike, it is not sanctioned by the express terms of employment. The Bank had been making such pro-rata deduction of salaries when officers like the petitioners went on strike. The monthly salary is one and indivisible. Though the petitioners had agreed to a pro-rata deduction of salary for the number of hours of strike, it is not sanctioned by the express terms of employment. The Bank had been making such pro-rata deduction of salaries when officers like the petitioners went on strike. It is further stated that the conditions of service of the petitioners are not governed by contract of service but by the Central Bank of India Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 and Central Bank of India Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976, framed under S.19 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970, Act 5 of 1970 by the Board of Directors of the Bank in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India and with the previous sanction of the Central Government. The contract of service has thus been superseded by these statutes. According to the petitioners, they have been dealt with to their detriment in a manner otherwise than laid down in the above Regulations. 8. The questions to be decided in these petitions are as follows: 1. Whether the action taken by the Bank in deducting the day's salary during the period of strike violates Art.14,19(1) (f), 23(1) and 31 of the Constitution of India. 2. Do the deductions violate the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. 3. Do the deductions effected violate the provisions of the bipartite agreement of 1966. 4. Do the deductions effected violate the principles of natural justice. 9. The challenge against the action of the Banks in deducting the day's salary as violative of Art.14, 19(1)(f), 31 and 23(1) of the Constitution of India is on the assumption that these Banks are authorities within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The limits of such challenge are outlined by the Supreme Court as follows in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib (AIR. 1981 SC. The limits of such challenge are outlined by the Supreme Court as follows in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib (AIR. 1981 SC. 487) in Para.12: "The definition of "State" in Art.12 which includes an "authority" within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India is not limited in its application only to Part III and by virtue of Art.36, to Part IV, it does not extend to the other provisions of the Constitution and hence a juristic entity which may be "State" for the purpose of Parts III and IV would not be so for the purpose of Part XIV or any other provision of the Constitution," The Banks being authorities under Art.12 and since the challenge is based on infraction of fundamental rights the challenge has necessarily to be considered. 10. The challenge under Art.19(1)(f) and Art.31 is as follows: The Officers and workmen in the Bank had worked for a portion of the day and had struck work only for another portion. By so working they had earned their salary or wages. The salaries and wages so earned constitute property under Art.19(1)(f). By the orders under challenge they have been deprived of this property in violation of their fundamental rights, under Art.19(1)(f) and 31. The deduction effected being without any sanction of law or of any provision having the force of law violates their fundamental rights. Shri E. Subramani appearing for the Indian Bank met this plea contending that right to property which was a fundamental right under Art.19(1)(f) had ceased to be one after the 44th Amendment Act, 1978. According to him, Art.19(1)(f) and Art.31 were deleted from the Constitution by the Amendment of 1978 and they can no longer be availed of by a citizen on the basis of the violation of right to property. Art.19(1)(f) was one of the fundamental rights under the Constitution. This sub-article was repealed by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act 1978. Similarly, Art.31 was omitted by S.6 of the same Act. Instead, Art.300-A was inserted by the 44th Amendment with effect from 20-6-1979 which Article reads: "No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law." Whether the insertion of this Article in this form has widened the scope of property right or not is outside the pale of discussion in this case. Instead, Art.300-A was inserted by the 44th Amendment with effect from 20-6-1979 which Article reads: "No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law." Whether the insertion of this Article in this form has widened the scope of property right or not is outside the pale of discussion in this case. For the purpose of disposal of the challenge under the above two Articles it is sufficient to note that a challenge to the constitutionality of the orders in dispute on the ground of infringement of the freedom of property guaranteed under Art.19(1)(f) and 31 is no longer available to a citizen since right to property has ceased to be a fundamental right. The petitioners' counsel submits that at the time the right accrued, it was a fundamental right and that the subsequent deletion will not affect that right. 44th amendment came into force on 15-5-1978 and Art.300-A was inserted on 20-6-1979. The question is whether the deletion of these articles by the 1978 Act would deprive the petitioners of a right of challenge of what took place in 1977. 11. S.6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that notwithstanding the repeal of an enactment, such repeal shall not affect any right, privilege and obligation or liability acquired or incurred under any enactment so repealed unless a different intention appears in the statute. The Amendment Act 1978 does not contain any provision keeping alive the rights acquired under Art.19(1)(f) or Art.31 before their deletion. It is a repeal as though these two Articles never found a place in the Constitution. Neither does the amendment indicate a contrary intention. It has therefore to be held that the petitioners cannot put forward a challenge under these two Articles after the 44th Amendment Act complaining of a deprivation of the property though such deprivation took place before the Act came into force, for the reason that the rights acquired before the 44th Amendment Act have not been kept alive. The result is that the petitioners' challenge on this ground has to fail. 12. The challenge is based also on Art.14 and 23(1) of the Constitution. The result is that the petitioners' challenge on this ground has to fail. 12. The challenge is based also on Art.14 and 23(1) of the Constitution. In Ground D in O. P. 4788 of 1977 what is stated is that the respondents have deducted only three hours' salary from the other sections of employees for having absented themselves during the same period participating in the same agitation and have thus violated Art.14 of the Constitution. In Ground H in O.P. No. 542/78 it is stated that the petitioners had worked from 2 p. m. till close of working hours on 29--12-1977 and the respondents have treated them and those who did not work at all alike and had made equal deductions from their salaries, which is in violation of Art.14 of the Constitution. Beyond making these bald allegations, there is nothing else brought to our notice in support of the plea based on Art.14 of the Constitution. In the absence of necessary materials to prove hostile discrimination, it is not necessary for us to consider the plea based on Art.14 and we venture to observe that these bald allegations extracted above are not in anyway sufficient to make out a case of violation of Art.14 of the Constitution. If officers were treated differently from workmen, that is a reasonable classification. To find out whether workmen among themselves were treated differently, the materials are scanty. The challenge under Art.14 has therefore to fail. The challenge under Art.23 (1) of the Constitution has also to fail as no arguments were addressed before us to show as to how the action impugned in these petitions offended Art.23 (1) of the Constitution. 13. That takes us to the question whether the orders complained against in O.P. No. 542 of 1978 offend the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 and whether they are bad for that reason. While considering this question we will have to first address ourselves to the objection put forward by the Banks' counsel that resort to this Court by the writ petitioners at this stage is premature and that the petitioners should have first exhausted their remedies under the payment of Wages Act. Under S.2(4) of the Shops dan Commercial Establishments Act, for short the Shop Act, a Bank is included in the definition of "commercial establishment". Under S.2(4) of the Shops dan Commercial Establishments Act, for short the Shop Act, a Bank is included in the definition of "commercial establishment". Under S.17 of the Shop Act, the provisions of Payment of Wages Act and the Rules made thereunder have been made applicable to all or any class of employees in establishments to which the Shop Act applies. For this purpose, a notification in the Gazette is necessary. As per notification No. 81691/H3/63/HLD dated January 16,1963 published in Kerala Gazette dated January 29, 1963, the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act and the Rules made thereunder were made applicable to all the employees in shops and establishments to which the Shop Act applied. S.5 of the Shop Act enables the Government to exempt in public interest or in other circumstances either permanently or for any specific period, any establishment or class of establishment from all or any of the provisions of the said Act, by notification in the gazette. By SRO. 980/81 published in Kerala Gazette No. 34 dated August 25,1981, the Government of Kerala exempted the Nationalised Banks from the provisions of the Shop Act. Thus the Nationalised Banks were subject to the provisions of the Shop Act prior to 1981 by virtue of the earlier notification and hence their employees were governed by the Payment of Wages Act then. 14. According to the respondents' counsel, the Payment of Wages Act is a self-contained Code and the remedy provided by it for redressal of grievances of employees is efficacious and nature of enquiry contemplated much more exhaustive than in a petition under Art.226. S.15(2) enables a person aggrieved by any deduction contrary to the provisions of that Act to move the competent authorities for a direction to refund the amount deducted. The competent authority is given the requisite power under S.15(3) to direct the refund in addition to other penalty provided for under sub-section (4). S.17 of the Act enables the party aggrieved by an order under sub-section (2) of S.15 or against a direction made under sub-section (3) or (4) to file an appeal against such an order before a competent authority which is the court of small causes or the District Court, as the case may be. In addition to the above remedies, S.17(4) provides for a reference to the High Court on any question of law. In addition to the above remedies, S.17(4) provides for a reference to the High Court on any question of law. These are effective remedies available to an employee as of right, unlike a reference under S.10 of the Industrial Disputes Act where intervention of the State makes it elusive. The counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners should not be denied their relief on the ground that the alternative remedy was not availed of since what they complain here is denial of an important right. 15. On a careful consideration of the rival contentions put forward, we are of the view that the objections raised by the respondents' counsel have great force. If the Payment of Wages Act applied to the petitioners and if they were aggrieved by the deductions effected, they should have approached the appropriate authority mentioned in the Payment of Wages Act and should not have straight away approached this Court seeking relief under its extraordinary powers. If individual employees are permitted to flood this court with such petitions, that would not only make the mechanism provided under the Payment of Wages Act for such purposes ineffective but also result in the abuse of the 226 jurisdiction of this Court. In a case like this, where an individual employee tries to ventilate his grievances, inviting this Court to pronounce upon various questions, which involve reference to dispute of facts also, this Court would decline such relief when an effective alternative remedy is available. 16. Now we will consider the case of the petitioners in OP. 4788/77 that the deduction effected in this case is improper and in any ease only pro rata deduction is permissible. The case of the respondents is that the working hours of the Bank is a full day and not a portion of a day and salaries and wages cannot be calculated for a portion of the day. When the petitioners struck work they were told that the full day's deduction would be effected and that they were not expected to work for the rest of the hours during which they did not strike. The pay and wages are regulated by contract and deduction effected is strictly in conformity with the terms of the contract of employment. When the petitioners struck work they were told that the full day's deduction would be effected and that they were not expected to work for the rest of the hours during which they did not strike. The pay and wages are regulated by contract and deduction effected is strictly in conformity with the terms of the contract of employment. It was also submitted that the contract of employment is not divisible and the unit For purpose of pay and wages is a day and not an hour. 17. Before considering the decisions cited before us, we may briefly refer to the exhibits in O. P. 4788/77. Ext. P1 is a communication by the District General Manager to all Assistant General Managers informing them to deduct full day's wages of the officers who strike work; Ext. P2 dated 5-10-1977 is by the Divisional Manager to all officers in Cochin Division to follow the instructions regarding the deduction; Exts. P2(a) and P2(b) also reiterate the same thing; Ext. P3 dated 11-10-1977 also stated that a full day's wages of the concerned officers should be deducted irrespective of the period of their absence. To the same effect is Ext. P3. From these exhibits, the stand of the employer Bank is clear. According to them, absence for a portion of the day would be treated as absence for the whole day. If an employee, either an officer or a workman, wants to absent himself for a portion of the day, the Bank does not expect them to work for the rest of the day. In the eye of the Bank, absence without permission for a portion of the day and work for the rest of the day would not entitle the employees to earn wages for the rest of the day. 18. The relationship between an employer and an employee is normally governed by the terms of the contract between them. The employer can always stipulate the conditions of service including remuneration. When the employee agrees about such terms, he will be bound by them. The normal rule in contract of service is "no work no pay". Courts had occasion to consider cases of claims by employees for remuneration for the work done, when they absented from duty without the permission of the employers for period or periods when they were expected to work under the contract of employment. 19. The normal rule in contract of service is "no work no pay". Courts had occasion to consider cases of claims by employees for remuneration for the work done, when they absented from duty without the permission of the employers for period or periods when they were expected to work under the contract of employment. 19. We will briefly refer to the cases brought to our notice. We may at the outset state that the petitioners in these cases have taken a definite stand that pro rata deduction of salary for the hours during which they struck work could be effected but not for the whole day, namely, for the rest of the hours in which they worked or in which they were not permitted to work. The definite stand of the respondents as is seen reflected in the exhibits produced is that the employees would not be permitted to wont for a portion of the day and absence from duty for a portion of the working day would be considered as absence for the whole day. We will begin the discussion by referring to Chokalinga Mudaliar v. Mohamed Sherief Saib (1912) 23 MLJ. 680 where Sadasiva Aiyar J. had to consider the case of an employee who was employed for one year from 1st April, 1908 to 31st March 1909 and who left the service without justification on 20th March, 1909 and whose claim for salary for the period that he worked, namely, from 1st April 1908 to 20th March 1909 was disallowed by the first court. The learned judge in appeal reversed the judgment of the first court and held that the employee was entitled to recover wages for the 11 months during which he worked. This finding was entered on the absence of a case in the written statement that the employer had suffered any damages on account of the failure on the part of the employee to work during the last 10 days of the stipulated period of one year. However, wages for toe 20 days in March 1909 were disallowed. In that case, a month was considered as a unit for purposes of fixing wages. In Amar Singh v. Gopal Singh (AIR. 1931 Lahore 133) the claim of an employee for recovery of arrears of pay for 2 months and 5 days happened to be considered. He was paid by the month. In that case, a month was considered as a unit for purposes of fixing wages. In Amar Singh v. Gopal Singh (AIR. 1931 Lahore 133) the claim of an employee for recovery of arrears of pay for 2 months and 5 days happened to be considered. He was paid by the month. He left the services without notice. He was not paid wages for the number of days worked in November since he left service without notice. It was held that when wages were due periodically the employee would not be entitled to be paid for the portion of the time during which he served since the last periodical payment. Thus, the claim for wages for a portion of a month was disallowed. These two authorities dealt with the normal case of contract of service, in which a month as a unit for pay was accepted. It was held that an employee who absented himself without notice would not be entitled to the salary for the portion of a month in which he worked. That an employee who wilfully absents himself, thus obstructing the work of the employer, either singly or collectively, will be deemed guilty of breach of contract is the view taken by Lord Denning M. R. in Employment Sec. v. Aslef (N. 1. R. C.) (1972) 2 WLR.1362: (1972) 2 All E. R.1949, as follows: "So much for the case when a man is employed singly. It is equally the case when he is employed, as one of many, to work in an undertaking which needs the service of all. If he, with the others, takes steps wilfully to disrupt the undertaking, to produce chaos so that it will not run as it should, then each one who is a party to those steps is guilty of a breach of his contract." 20. In N. K. Bose v. Bank of India (1977-11 LLJ. 285) Amarendra Nath Sen J. of the Calcutta High Court had to consider more or less the identical question that we are confronted with. Among the various questions considered by the learned judge, one was the right of an employer, a Bank in that case, to deduct the wages of its employees on a pro rata basis for the time during which they were absent from their desks by participating in demonstrations. Among the various questions considered by the learned judge, one was the right of an employer, a Bank in that case, to deduct the wages of its employees on a pro rata basis for the time during which they were absent from their desks by participating in demonstrations. The learned judge, with great respect, took the extreme position that even a pro rata deduction of salary by the Bank on account of the absence of the employees for a portion of the day was not permissible as the contract of wages was subsisting and as the employees did not earn his monthly salary by putting in any fixed number of hours worked in course of the month and the salary payable to an employee per mensum was a fixed sum and the contract of wages not divisible. S. Mukherjee, J. of the same High Court had occassion to consider the above decision in Algemena Bank v. Central Govt. L. C. (1978-11 L. L. J. 117). In that case, the matter reached the High Court on a complaint by the employees of the Bank in proceedings under S.33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act when the Bank deducted wages for the period during working hours when the employees were absent. The learned judge did not agree with Sen J. and held that wages were payments for the service rendered and deduction from service pro rata for absence without notice resulting in failure of consideration was permissible. 21. In V. Ramachandran v. Indian Bank (1979-1 L.L.J. 122) a Division Bench of the Madras High Court upholding the principle "no work no pay" held that an employee had to do his duty to earn his wages and absence from duty would deprive him of the remuneration for the time during which he was absent. The Division Bench repelled the contention that the employer could under such circumstances only sue for breach of contract and claim compensation and not unilaterally effect a deduction from the pay. 22. A Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court had to deal with a similar question in Dharam Singh v. Bank of India, Bombay (1979 Lab. I. C. 1879). The Bench held that since the hours of work of the Bank had been fixed the employees had a duty to work for the full working hours to earn their wages. I. C. 1879). The Bench held that since the hours of work of the Bank had been fixed the employees had a duty to work for the full working hours to earn their wages. Any stoppage of work during the working hours would vitally affect the work for the whole day and it might paralyse the work of the Bank. The employees cannot split up the working hours into further sub-units when the working hours of each day were considered as one single unit. It was also held that where the wage paid was monthly, though a month could be reasonably split up into a number of days during the month, could not be further split up into hours, minutes and seconds. It was held that the employees could not have unrestricted discretion to report for work at any time of the day they want and still be at liberty to claim remuneration by working for the remaining part of the day. A deduction of pay for the full day for the absence of a portion of the day was upheld in that case. In V. Ganesan v. State Bank of India (1981-1 LLJ 64), Padmanabhan J, of the Madras High Court had to consider a similar case. Before the learned judge it was conceded on behalf of the employees that the Bank would be entitled to deduct the pro rata salary of the employees for the period of their absence from duty but would not be entitled to deduct the whole day's salary. The contention of the Bank that the employees would not be entitled even to claim the pro rata wages was repelled by the court for the reason that the Bank in that case acquiesced in the breach committed by the employees by allowing them to work for the rest of the hours during which they did not strike. Though the learned judge observed that the contract of employment was one whole and indivisible, the decision was rested both on the concession made by the employees' counsel and on the fact of acquiescence by the Bank in permitting the employees to work for the rest of the working hours. In R. Rajamanickem v. Indian Bank (1981-11 LLJ. 367) Nainar Sundaram J. after considering the various authorities referred above, distinguished V. Ganesan v. State Bank of India (1981-1 LLJ. In R. Rajamanickem v. Indian Bank (1981-11 LLJ. 367) Nainar Sundaram J. after considering the various authorities referred above, distinguished V. Ganesan v. State Bank of India (1981-1 LLJ. 64) on the ground of acquiescence and held that where the Bank had not permitted the striking employees to work for the rest of the day, the Bank was entitled to deduct the whole day's salary on the principle "no work no pay" as stated in the Division Bench ruling in V. Ramachandran v. Indian Bank (1979-1 LLJ. 122), to which he was also a party. The deduction effected by the Bank in that case by the salary cut of the whole day for demonstration of four hours was held to be valid. 23. From the above discussion what we find is that there is difference of opinion on the question whether the employer can deduct full day's, wages for absence for a portion of the day. So far as the petitioners in OP. No. 4788 of 1977 are concerned, they were clearly told that absence from duty for portion of the day would be treated absence for whole day and full day's wages would be deducted. They are officers not governed by the Payment of Wages Act. Their service conditions are governed by contract. An institution like a Bank has to discharge onerous duties to the public. Paralysing the activities of the Bank for a portion of the day by a token strike would seriously affect the working of the Bank for the rest of the day also. An Officer cannot be said to earn his salary by hour or minutes. The minimum unit for purpose of remuneration of an officer should be taken as a day. They absented from duty though for portion of the day, despite being warned about the consequences. Officers like the petitioners in this writ petition, should have a sense of responsibility and should therefore suffer the consequences for their conduct in holding at ransom the Bank and the general public by activities like the one in question. On our finding that in case of officers the day should be deemed to be the unit of the contract of employment, the order deducting a day's salary for what they did, cannot be invalidated in proceedings under Art.226. We hold against the petitioners in O.P.No.4788 of 1977 on this ground. 24. On our finding that in case of officers the day should be deemed to be the unit of the contract of employment, the order deducting a day's salary for what they did, cannot be invalidated in proceedings under Art.226. We hold against the petitioners in O.P.No.4788 of 1977 on this ground. 24. Regarding the petitioners in O. P. No. 542 of 1978, we do not wish to express ourselves either way in this writ petition. They are governed by the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act. Deductions of wages in their case will have to conform to and comply with the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act. We have already referred to the machinery provided under the Act for getting disputes like the one before us adjudicated by a competent authority and the appellate authority and even by the High Court on reference on questions of law. The question whether the petitioners reported for duty after the strike, whether they were prevented by the Bank from working for the rest of the day and whether the Bank and its officers had acquiesced in the strike by allowing the petitioners to work, are all questions of fact for a competent authority to go into. In our view, resort to the remedy under Art.226 in this case when there are other efficacious alternative remedies available to the petitioners, has to be discountenanced and discouraged. The petitioners will be at liberty, if so advised, to take appropriate action under the relevant provisions of the Payment of Wages Act. 25. The petitioners in O. P. No. 4788/77 are officers. They are governed by the Central Bank of India Regulations. These Regulations are made in exercise of the powers conferred by S.19 of Act 5 of 1970. Clause.13(1) of the Conduct Regulations states that no officer employee shall absent himself from his duty or be late in attending office or leave the station without having first obtained the permission of the competent authority. This is subject to the proviso that in cases where previous permission could not be obtained due to unavoidable circumstances such permission should be obtained later, subject to the satisfaction of the competent authority. Clause.24 provides that a breach of any of the provisions of the Regulations would be deemed to constitute a misconduct punishable under the Discipline and Appeal Regulations, 1976. Clause.24 provides that a breach of any of the provisions of the Regulations would be deemed to constitute a misconduct punishable under the Discipline and Appeal Regulations, 1976. Under Clause.4(d) of the said Regulations, "recovery from pay or such other amount as may be due to him of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Bank by negligence or breach of orders" is one of the minor penalties. Under Clause.8, the procedure for imposing minor penalties is provided. This clause makes it necessary to inform in writing of the imputations against the employee and" to give him an opportunity to submit his case. The petitioners' counsel contended that the procedure laid down for imposing this penalty had not been followed by the Bank and therefore deduction effected was in violation of such procedure and hence bad. The reply to this contention is that the deduction of salary in this case is not by way of a penalty or in the nature of misconduct but in enforcement of the terms of the contract. If it was a misconduct the Bank had the requisite power to effect deduction in the salary and also to initiate disciplinary proceedings under the bipartite settlement between the Bank and its employees. We agree with this contention that the deduction effected in this case is not by way of penalty but was only in enforcement of the terms of the contract and as such does not violate any of the provisions of the Regulations. 26. A further submission was made by the petitioners' counsel for the Officers of the Central Bank that Ext. P1 did not have the force of law since they were not regulations framed in exercise of the powers under S.19 of Act 5 of 1970, and as such could not be enforced against the petitioners. This argument was met, and according to us, successfully, by the respondents' counsel that Ext. P1 series were only inter-departmental communications in furtherance of administrative or executive orders issued by the Bank which in the absence of Regulations touching the subject were permissible and had the force of law. 27. The next question urged by the petitioners in O.P. 542/78 is the case based on the violation of the terms of the bipartite agreement of 1966. 27. The next question urged by the petitioners in O.P. 542/78 is the case based on the violation of the terms of the bipartite agreement of 1966. According to them, the conduct of the petitioners in striking work was a minor misconduct on their part for which the Bank should have taken disciplinary proceedings in the manner prescribed and could have effected deduction from their salary, if found guilty. We feel that the petitioners cannot succeed on this plea either. Para.13.7 of the agreement (Leave rules Chap. XI) provides for deductions from the salary for overstaying leave and states that such employee would render himself liable for such disciplinary action as the management may think fit to impose. The procedure for taking disciplinary action in addition to deduction from the salary is. provided in Chapter XIX. Absence without leave is a minor misconduct under Clause.19.7(a).19.8 gives the punishment for minor misconduct. 19.11 onwards lays down the procedure when disciplinary proceedings are contemplated. What the Bank did in this case is strictly in conformity with the terms of the bipartite agreement. The bipartite agreement does not disable the Bank from ordering deduction from salary. It enables the Bank to effect deductions from the salary and also to initiate disciplinary proceedings. Since no disciplinary proceedings were contemplated or initiated, there is no question of non-compliance with the procedure laid down. Thus the contention that the bipartite agreement bad been violated in this case has no force. 28. The respondents had an additional argument to deny the petitioners any claim based on the bipartite agreement before this Court. Under S.18 of the Industrial Disputes Act a settlement between the parties like the bipartite agreement is a binding settlement. If the employer commits breach of the settlement S.29 of the Act provides for penalty on such breach. The employees have an effective remedy to compel the employer observance of the terms of the bipartite agreement. The employees can raise a dispute on the basis of this breach and get an effective and proper adjudication of their claim based on such breach. This submission is not without force. But on our finding that there is no violation of the terms of the bipartite agreement, we do not think it necessary to probe this aspect of the case further. 29. The last submission made is that in passing Ext. This submission is not without force. But on our finding that there is no violation of the terms of the bipartite agreement, we do not think it necessary to probe this aspect of the case further. 29. The last submission made is that in passing Ext. P1 series orders the Bank has violated the principles of natural justice. In the case of the petitioners in O.P. No. 542/78, the plea of violation of natural justice is met as follows. Under the Banking Companies Act 5 of 1970 the affairs of the Bank have to vest in a Board of Directors. The conditions of service of its employees are to be governed by Regulations made by the Board of Directors under S.19 (v) (d) of the Act. S.19 (3) provides that the Articles of Association of the Bank, Regulation, Bye-law or Order made by the Bank shall be deemed to be Regulations made under S.19 (1) till such Regulations are made by the Board of Directors. In the case of employees like the petitioners no regulation as in the case of Officers were made. The bipartite agreement of 1966 cannot be treated as a Regulation under S.19 (3) of the Act. It has no statutory force. A violation of any of the terms of the agreement cannot be questioned in proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution on the ground that there is violation of the principles of natural justice. 30. In the absence of any Regulations framed under S.19(1)(d) of the Act relating to the conditions of service of the employees like the petitioners, the Bank has powers to issue administrative circulars on the subject. The only restriction on the administrative circulars is that they must fall within the confines of the Regulations making powers under S.19(1)(d) of the Act. The power of the Government to issue such administrative instructions has been granted by the Supreme Court: vide B. N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore (AIR. 1966 SC. 1942). Similar powers have been extended to the statutory corporations also. In V. T. Khanzode v. Reserve Bank of India (1982) 2 SCC. 7, the Supreme Court has conceded the power to issue administrative instruction or circulars regarding conditions of service to the Reserve Bank. 1966 SC. 1942). Similar powers have been extended to the statutory corporations also. In V. T. Khanzode v. Reserve Bank of India (1982) 2 SCC. 7, the Supreme Court has conceded the power to issue administrative instruction or circulars regarding conditions of service to the Reserve Bank. In J. Kumar v. Union of India (1982) 2 SCC, 116, the Supreme Court has laid down that in the promulgation of a statutory rule governing seniority, no previous notice is necessary and principles of natural justice have no application (para 37). On this principle, it was contended that in issuing administrative circulars relating to the conditions of service, the principles of natural justice cannot be extended. Petitioners' counsel submits that the principles of natural justice are all-pervasive and should apply equally to violation of statutory provisions as well as administrative instructions and if the Court finds such violation, the action pursuant to it has to be faulted. We do not pause to consider this question in detail (though we are not interested with it) for the reason that it is not strictly necessary in view of what we propose to say presently in the succeeding paragraph. 31. The petitioners before us are individual employees. Even if it is assumed that there was violation of natural justice it falls to be considered and decided whether any useful purpose would be served by directing notice to be issued to the petitioners and inviting their objections. Would this Court when appraised of the entire facts issue futile writs just for the pleasure of it when this court is satisfied that the issuance of such writs would not in any manner advance the interests of the petitioners before it. Writs would issue if there was violation of natural justice only on being satisfied that by subsequent proceedings conforming to the principles of natural justice the aggrieved party could get effective reliefs from the offending party. If even after conforming to the principles of natural justice, the same results would follow as the one that the court had to consider before quashing the orders, the court would normally stay its hands from interfering with the orders which in its opinion would be an exercise in futility. In this case the definite stand of the Bank is that a day's salary would be denied if the employees strike work for a portion of the working hours. In this case the definite stand of the Bank is that a day's salary would be denied if the employees strike work for a portion of the working hours. Neither the Bank nor its officers can change this decision even if the employees are given an opportunity of being heard. It is a decision taken by the Bank binding on the respondents. Supposing the petitioners are given an opportunity to explain and they submit their explanation, even then the respondent officers will have to respect Exts. P1 and P2 and effect deduction from the salary as directed by them. They cannot go against Exts. P1 and P2. Therefore, interference with Exts. P1 and P2 on this ground would be purely an academic exercise. On the administrative circulars in question only one conclusion is possible and only one penalty and that is deduction of salary for the day. The ultimate benefit to the petitioners in getting the orders quashed is therefore next to nothing. Even if this court is to presume the existence of a duty on the Bank to observe the rules of natural justice this court would always see whether by exercise of its power under Art.226 any concrete benefit will accrue to the petitioners. In 1981 S. C. 136, the following observation would be apposite: "As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs.". (para. 24) 32. The Bank and its officers have no discretion in this matter. They have to respect Exts. P1 and P2. Therefore, if we compel compliance with principles of natural justice and the employees are given an opportunity to be heard the same results, as has happened now, would follow. If the officers had a discretion in the matter, things would have been different. 33. As a last resort, the petitioners' counsel submits that despite the dismissal of the two applications made by him to permit the petitioners' to agitate the case in a representative capacity, this petition should be deemed to be one made in representative capacity, for, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are not applicable to writ proceedings. 33. As a last resort, the petitioners' counsel submits that despite the dismissal of the two applications made by him to permit the petitioners' to agitate the case in a representative capacity, this petition should be deemed to be one made in representative capacity, for, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are not applicable to writ proceedings. Having moved the Court for leave to prosecute the petitions in a representative capacity, and having got worsted, we do not think it necessary to consider this case, not covered by the pleadings, raised at this last stage. 34. To sum up, (1) the petitioners in O.P.No. 4788 of 1977 are officers. They are not governed by the Payment of Wages Act. Exts. P1, P2 and P3 series under question were passed in enforcement of the contract of service. They were told that if they struck work for a portion of the working day, their salary for the whole day would be deducted. So far as they are concerned, the day is a unit of the contract of employment. The action of the Bank in deducting a day's salary is valid. (2) The petitioners in O.P. No.542 of 1978 are governed by the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act. They had more than one efficacious alternative remedies. Not having resorted to those remedies, this writ petition is premature. Disputed questions of fact will have to be considered before granting the petitioners their reliefs which is outside the pale of Article natural justice, to issue a writ in this case would be futile. There is no violation of the bipartite agreement. In both the cases there is no violation of any fundamental right. 35. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the petitions are to fail. We dismiss the same directing the parties to bear their costs.