K. S. PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) ON a remand made by a Division bench of this Court in WA No. 635 of 1975, this writ petition has been posted before me for hearing. ( 2 ) IN this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the petitioners have challenged the order dt. 31. 10. 1972 of the Divisional Commissioner, Mys. Dn. Mysore (hereinafter referred to as the commissioner) in Case No. MUN. I. 30/72-73 (Ex-D), the order dt. 12. 4. 1972 of the Deputy Commissioner, Mys. Dist. , Mysore (hereinafter referred toas the DC) in case No. Municipal Appeal 5/69-70 (Ex-C) and the resolutions dt. 30. 10. 1969 and 21. 11. 1969 of the Town Municipal Council, Bannur (hereinafter referred to as the TMC) (Exs. A and B ). ( 3 ) LAND bearing Sy. No. 643/1 of bannur Town measuring an extent of 3 acres 4 guntas had been acquired by government at the instance of the tmc before 26. 1. 1959 from which day the country is governed by the Constitution of India. The respondents claim that the land that belonged to a muslim gentleman of the town, had been acquired at the instance of Muslim residents of the town adjoinins the said land for providing house sites exclusively to Muslims and no others. But, for various reasons with which we are not concerned, sites were not formed on the said land, much less they were allotted to the residents or to the Muslims of the area before the Constitution of the Country came into force. ( 4 ) AS late as on 3. 10. 1969 and 21. 11. 1969, the TMC decided to allot unreserved sites formed on the said land exclusively to Muslims of that town. Against the said resolutions of the TMC, the petitioners un-success fully filed an appeal before the DC and a revision before the Commissioner. ( 5 ) THE petitioners who are the residents of Bannur town and who do not profess Islam as their religion have urged that it was not open to the TMC to allot the sites exclusively to Muslims in violation of Arts. 14 and 15 of the Constitution. ( 5 ) THE petitioners who are the residents of Bannur town and who do not profess Islam as their religion have urged that it was not open to the TMC to allot the sites exclusively to Muslims in violation of Arts. 14 and 15 of the Constitution. ( 6 ) IN its return, respondent No. 1 has asserted that the land was acquired from a Muslim gentleman to extend a Muslim colony of the town before the Constitution came into force and therefpre, it was open to it to fulfil the object of acquisition notwith standing the promulgation of the Constitution and the same is not violative of arts. 14 and 15 of the Constitution. Respondents 2 and 3 have filed their separate returns supporting respondent No. 1. ( 7 ) SRI. S. K. Venkataranga Iyengar, learned Counsel for the petitioners, contends that the resolutions of the TMC to allot sites exculsively to the members of Muslim leligion and not to the needy persons of the town irrespective of their religion, caste and creed is violative of Arts. 14 and 15 of the Constitution and by their failure to annul such resolutions, the Commissioner and the DC have committed a manifest illegality, apparent on the face of the record. In support of his contention, Sri Iyengar strongly relies on a Division Bench ruling of the high Court of Bombay in Jagwant kaur Kesarsing v. State of Bombay (1 ). ( 8 ) SRIYUTHS K. "p. Ashok Kumar, learned counsel appearing for respondent No 1 and some other respondents, U. Abdul Khader, learned High court Government Pleader, appearing for respondents 2 and 3 and Manohar rao Jagirdar, learned counsel appearing for some of the respondents, sought to justify the impugned resolutions of the TMC and the orders made by the commissioner and the DC. ( 9 ) A municipality constituted and runctioning under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 is a State within: the meaning of that term occurring in art. 12 of the Constitution. Hence, the TMC falls within the meaning of the term 'state' occurring in Art. 12 of the Constitution. ( 10 ) IN adjudging the validity of the grants made by the TMC after the Constitution came into force, the period of acquisition the purpose of acquisition and the person from whom the lands were acquired are totally irrelevant. Hence, the TMC falls within the meaning of the term 'state' occurring in Art. 12 of the Constitution. ( 10 ) IN adjudging the validity of the grants made by the TMC after the Constitution came into force, the period of acquisition the purpose of acquisition and the person from whom the lands were acquired are totally irrelevant. In this view I do not propose to examine the purpose of acquisition, the person or from whom the land was acquired by Government. ( 11 ) IN its resolutions, the TMC has stated that the sites on the land excent those that are reserved should be allotted only to Muslims or exclusively to members that profess Islam as their religion. In other words, allotment of sites is exclusively to members of a particular religion and no others. ( 12 ) THE scope and ambit of Art. 14 and 15 of the Constitution have been explained by the Supreme Court and this Court in a large number of rulings and it is not necessary to refer to all of them. But, according to all of them, allotment of sites by the tmc exclusively to the members of a particular religion, solely on the ground of religion and defolt the same to others that do not profess that religion or profess another religion, whether all of them are similarly situated, is plainly violative of Arts. 14 and 15 of the Constitution. The action of the tmc is a naked violation of the equality clause enshrined in Art. 14 of the constitution. ( 13 ) AS early as in the year 1952 a division Bench of the Bombay High court speaking through Chagla, CJ. Has condemned a similar discrimination meted out to members of a particular community. On the ratio of the High Court in j. K. K. Dang's case (1), Wit which I am in respectful agreement, the resolutions of the tmc are plainly violative of Arts. 14 and 15 of the constitution and are liable to be quashed. Unfortunately the Commissioner and the DC have failed to undo the resolutions that are plainly violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. In this view, their orders are liable to be quashed. ( 14 ) AS to how the sites formed on the land should be utilised or allotted by the Municipality in future is a matter for it to examine and decide. In this view, their orders are liable to be quashed. ( 14 ) AS to how the sites formed on the land should be utilised or allotted by the Municipality in future is a matter for it to examine and decide. But, I have no doubt that in making any fresh allotment, it will not give room to a similar objection. ( 15 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondents contend that there is a delay of more than 20 years in the petitioners approaching this Court and, therefore, this Court should decline to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction. In favour of the petitioners. ( 16 ) AS seen earlier, the resolutions allotting sites were made by the TMC for the first time on 3. 10. 1969 and 21. 11. 1969. Both the said resolutions were challenged by the petitioners in an appeal and a revision provided by the Municipalities Act and the final order of the Commissioner was made only on 31. 10. 1972. Without any loss of time thereafter the petitioners have approached this Court and thus there is really no delay at all. I see no merit in this contention of the respondents and I reject the same. ( 17 ) IN the light of my above discussion, I hold that the orders of the commissioner and the DC and the lesolutions of the TMC are liable to be quashed. I, therefore, quash the impugned orders and the resolutions of the TMC. ( 18 ) RULE issued is made absolute. But, in the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .C