JUDGMENT V. Khalid, J. 1.This is an appeal against the judgment in O. P. No. 5109 of 1981.Theappellants are the State of Kerala, represented by the Secretary to Government, Planning and Economic Affairs Department; the Centre for Water Resources Development and Management, Kerala, represented by its Registrar (hereinafter called the 'Centre'), and Shri G. Gopalakrishna Pillai, I.A.S., Special Secretary, Irrigation and Rehabilitation Department. The respondent is the petitioner Dr. P. Kumaraswamy. The prayers in the petition were to quash Ext. P-6 by which the services of the respondent were terminated, to declare R.17 of the G.W.R.D.M. Rules as ultra vires Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution and for other consequential directions. The learned Judge who disposed of the petition quashed Ext. P-6, the order of termination on the ground that it was arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice and therefore void in law. It was held to be non est and it was directed that the respondent would be entitled to continue in his position as Executive Director of the Centre. The prayer to strike down R.17 was not granted. In the course of the judgment, the learned Judge held that the Centre for Water Resources Development and Management was an 'authority' within Art.12 of the Constitution. The learned Additional Advocate General who appeared for the appellants contended that the Centre was not an authority within Art.12 of the Constitution, that Ext. P-6 order was an order of 'termination simpliciter' under the relevant rules governing the service conditions of the respondent and was not in any manner violative of any law or opposed to principles of natural justice. 2. The facts of the case: The respondent was working as Director of the Institute of Hydraulics and Hydrology, Poondi under the administrative control of the Tamil Nadu Government. He is an eminent scientist with many reputed performances to his credit and is a highly qualified scientist. He had a brilliant academic career. As the Head of the Institute he could have continued in service till he attained the age of 58 and had the prospect of being promoted to the post of Chief Engineer of the Poondi Institute if he had continued there. The Government of Kerala was in search of a reputed scientist to be appointed as the Executive Director of the Centre to succeed Dr. C. M. Jacob on his retirement. Dr. The Government of Kerala was in search of a reputed scientist to be appointed as the Executive Director of the Centre to succeed Dr. C. M. Jacob on his retirement. Dr. P. K. Gopalakrishnan, the 4th respondent in the O. P., went to Madras and to Poondi to persuade the respondent to leave the Government of Tamil Nadu service on voluntary retirement and to take up the assignment of the Executive Director of the Centre. He was offered a salary of Rs. 3,000 per mensem, service till he attained the age of 60, a promise that his pension and gratuity on voluntary retirement from the Tamil Nadu Government service would not be deducted from his salary in the Centre, chat he would be provided with free furnished accommodation or house rent allowance of not less than Rs. 500 and a car with certain conditions. He was not given to understand that he was being offered a temporary employment under the Centre. Everyone concerned understood it to be a permanent post. He left the service under the Tamil Nadu Government. Originally, he was required to accept the post of head of the Academic Divisions on a salary of Rs. 2,500. Ext. P1 is the copy of the appointment order. He would be the 2nd ranking officer in the Centre just below the Executive Director. Subsequently, by Ext. P-4 order he was appointed as Director of the Centre and the said order was corrected by Ext. P-5 order substituting the word Executive Director in Ext. P-5 for the word Director in Ext. P-4.According to him, he found the administration of the Centre in complete disarray when he assumed charge of the Centre and he went about enforcing discipline in the Centre vigorously. This irritated some important persons in the Centre. Some petitions containing allegations against him were sent to the Minister and the members of the Governing Body. The Minister in his capacity as Chairman requested Mr. Gopalakrishna Pillai to look into the matter and informed the Centre to allow Mr. Pillai to have access to the necessary files. Subsequently a meeting of the Executive Committee was held. On 23rd September 1981, the petitioner left for Kottayam for an inspection. He had sent a copy of the tour programme to the Chairman before he left. There were costly equipments and valuable books belonging to him in his room at the Centre. Pillai to have access to the necessary files. Subsequently a meeting of the Executive Committee was held. On 23rd September 1981, the petitioner left for Kottayam for an inspection. He had sent a copy of the tour programme to the Chairman before he left. There were costly equipments and valuable books belonging to him in his room at the Centre. On 24th September 1981, when the petitioner returned to the guest house at Kottayam, Shri K. J. Mathew, a Deputy Secretary of the Planning Department, who was deputed as a special messenger served a copy of the order Ext. P-6 terminating his services, at 8.15 p. m. This, in short, is the background leading to the institution of the petition. 3. The grounds taken in the petition are: (1) Ext. P-6 order is arbitrary and illegal, (2) R.17 to the extent to which it provides for termination of service of unconfirmed employees without notice, is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution, (3) Ext. P-6 assumes that the respondent is a temporary employee. Even so temporary employees are entitled to reasonable notice and disclosure of reasons for termination of service, (4) the manner in which Ext. P-6 order was served on the petitioner smacks of mala fides. The subsequent action taken in dealing with the belongings of the respondents confirms this, (5) the appellants are bound by promissory estoppel. 4. The case of the appellants as disclosed in the counter affidavit filed is as follows: The first counter affidavit filed on behalf of the 1st respondent is sworn to by the Additional Secretary to Government, Planning and Economic Affairs Department. The affidavit discloses the following facts. On 24th October 1979 a decision was taken by the Executive Committee of the Centre to authorise the then Executive Director and the Secretary to Government, Planning and Economic Affairs Department, to discuss with the petitioner certain matters relating to his appointment as the Head of the Academic Division in the Centre.On29thOctober1979,the Governing Body of the Centre ordered that a post of Scientist-P on a scale of Rs. 2,000-2,500 be created. On 20th July 1979 the Chief Minister approved the proposals of the Planning Secretary to Government to consider Dr. J. T. Panicker, Dr. K. A. V. Pandala and the petitioner for appointment as Director of the Centre. 2,000-2,500 be created. On 20th July 1979 the Chief Minister approved the proposals of the Planning Secretary to Government to consider Dr. J. T. Panicker, Dr. K. A. V. Pandala and the petitioner for appointment as Director of the Centre. On 29th August 1979 the Council of Ministers decided, after considering the proposals of the Planning Secretary, to appoint Dr. J. T. Panicker as the Executive Director of the Centre. On 7th November 1979, the then Executive Director of the Centre Dr. A. Abraham wrote to the petitioner offering him an appointment in the Centre in a suitable grade and inviting him for discussions on that matter. After discussion, the Centre agreed to appoint the petitioner as the Head of the Academic Division on a salary of Rs. 2,500 in the scale of Rs. 2,000-2,500. It was specifically made clear that he would have the second rank of officers in the Centre. On 15th February 1980 the petitioner took up the appointment as Head of the Academic Division. On 23rd April 1980, the council of Ministers decided to appoint the petitioner as Director of the Centre and appointed him as such by G.O. Ms. 18/80/Plg., dated 25th April 1980. On 26th April 1980, the petitioner took charge as the Director. The Government amended the G.O. as requested by the petitioner substituting the words "Executive Director" for the word "Director". On 24th May 1980 the petitioner sent a proposal to the Government for fixation of the terms and conditions of his appointment. In the said letter the petitioner specifically stated that he would be governed by the rules of the Centre in all matters other than his pay and allowances. To the proposal made by the petitioner, the Government agreed to pay him a salary of Rs. 3,000 but disagreed about the deduction of pension and pension equivalent of gratuity from his pay. To this effect a G.O. was issued by the Government on 6th December 1980 which also made it clear that in other matters, the petitioner would be governed by the rules of the Centre. 5. R.16 of the rules relates to temporary and permanent service and R.17 termination of service. Ext. P-6 order of termination was passed by the Government in exercise of the powers under R.17, offering three months' pay in lieu of notice by way of abundant caution. 5. R.16 of the rules relates to temporary and permanent service and R.17 termination of service. Ext. P-6 order of termination was passed by the Government in exercise of the powers under R.17, offering three months' pay in lieu of notice by way of abundant caution. The petitioner was a temporary employee of the Centre under the rules, because he had not been confirmed by any decision of the Government at any time. The Government, therefore, had the power to terminate his service without notice, and the offering of three months' pay was only by way of abundant caution and on compassionate grounds. 6. The averment in paragraph 9 of the petition, that a petition containing allegations against the petitioner was sent to the Chairman of the Governing Body, was denied. It is, however, stated that an anonymous petition was sent to the Chief Minister. The said petition was processed and enquiry into the allegations was made. Shri Gopalakrishna Pillai conducted a preliminary enquiry into the matter and submitted a report to the Government. No action was initiated in pursuance to the report and no decision was taken at any time against the petitioner on the basis of the said report. The decision to terminate the petitioner's services was not on the basis of any finding arrived at against him and no such finding afforded the foundation for the decision to terminate him. The question whether the petitioner is a temporary employee or a permanent employee does not assume any importance in view of the fact that three months' salary was offered to the petitioner. 7. In the additional counter affidavit filed on behalf of the 1st respondent, the allegations made against the then Minister for Irrigation and against the Special Secretary to Government, were denied. It is admitted that the Government received certain representations disclosing a sharp cleavage between the petitioner on the one hand and a large majority of scientists in the Centre on the other resulting in a lack of understanding with adverse repercussions on the smooth functioning of the organisation. A preliminary enquiry was conducted at the instance of the Government and a report was made available to the Government. The report disclosed that the Centre was not functioning smoothly. A preliminary enquiry was conducted at the instance of the Government and a report was made available to the Government. The report disclosed that the Centre was not functioning smoothly. Without apportioning any blame on any one, the Government had to consider about the steps to be taken to put the matters right and bring back the administration of the Centre to proper functioning. The Government felt that this could be achieved by terminating the petitioner's services without assigning any blame on him. The Government also felt that the better course would be to do this instead of sending away all the Heads of the Divisions and other scientists and retain the services of the petitioner. That the petitioner is a temporary employee is reiterated. Art.311 of the Constitution does not apply to him. Even if he is entitled to reasonable notice, that was compensated by the offer of three months' salary. The termination order was not as a measure of punishment, but was intended to restore the normal and smooth functioning of the Centre. 8. It is stated that the petitioner is not an employee of any statutory body nor that he holds a civil post either under the Union or the State. The terms and conditions of his service are not regulated by any rules framed under any statute. The Rules framed by the Centre are contractual in character. Even if assuming, without admitting, that the termination is in violation of any rules regulating his conditions of service, he is not entitled to get a declaration that the termination of his service is illegal and the consequential reinstatement. 9. We will refer to the following exhibits, as a background for our discussion of the appeal. Ext. P-1, dated 20th November 1979 is from the Executive Director to the petitioner informing him that n continuation of the personal discussions, the Centre is agreeable to appoint him as the Head of the Academic Divisions on a salary of Rs. 2,500 in the scale of Rs. 2,000-2,500plus the usual allowances admissible as per C.S.I.R. Rules. He will be the second ranking officer in the Centre just below the Executive Director. As per Ext. P-4,dated 25th April 1980 the petitioner was appointed as the Director of the Centre and as per Ext. P-5 the word Director in Ext. P-4 was substituted by the word Executive Director. 2,000-2,500plus the usual allowances admissible as per C.S.I.R. Rules. He will be the second ranking officer in the Centre just below the Executive Director. As per Ext. P-4,dated 25th April 1980 the petitioner was appointed as the Director of the Centre and as per Ext. P-5 the word Director in Ext. P-4 was substituted by the word Executive Director. On 6th December 1980 G.O. (Ms) No. 55/80/Plg. was issued stating that "the Government are pleased to order that Shri P. Kumaraswamy, Executive Director, Centre for Water Resources Development and Management, Kozhikode will be given a pay of Rs.3,000 per mensem less pension and pension equivalent of gratuity. In other matters he will be governed by the Rules of the Centre". The petitioner had sent a letter, dated24thMay1980 making his demands on the Government, regarding his pay, dearness allowance and house rent allowance and that in respect of other matters it may be ordered that he will be governed by the Rules of the Centre. Reference to the last two documents is from the file made available to us by the learned Additional Advocate General. The order of termination, Ext. P-6, dated 23rd September 1981, reads as follows: "GOVERNMENT OF KERALA Abstract Centre for Water Resources Development and Management - Shri P. Kumaraswamy, Executive Director - Termination of service - Orders issued. PLANNING AND ECONOMICAFFAIRS DEPARTMENT G. O. No. 39/81/Plg., Trivandrum, dated 23rd September 1981. Read.-1. G.O. (Ms.) No. 18/80/Plg., dated 25th April 1980. 2. G.O. (Ms.) No. 21/80/Plg., dated 15th May 1980. 3. G.O. (Ms.) No. 55/80/Plg., dated 5th December 1980. ORDER In the G.O. 1st cited Shri P. Kumaraswamy was appointed Director of the Centre for Water Resources Development and Management, Calicut. In the G.O. 2nd cited the designation was changed as Executive Director. Government now order, after due consideration, that the appointment of Shri Kumaraswamy, ordered in the G.O. first cited, as amended in the G.O. 2nd cited, be terminated with immediate effect. Shri G. Gopalakrishna Pillai, Special Secretary to Government (Irrigation and Rehabilitation) is appointed Executive Director until further orders in addition to his own duties. Shri Kumaraswamy's appointment is not a permanent one and so he is not entitled to notice or pay in lieu thereof. However, Government order that he will also be paid three months.... pay on termination of the service. (By order of the Governor) (Sd.) S. ANANTHAKRISHNAN, Chief Secretary to Government. Shri Kumaraswamy's appointment is not a permanent one and so he is not entitled to notice or pay in lieu thereof. However, Government order that he will also be paid three months.... pay on termination of the service. (By order of the Governor) (Sd.) S. ANANTHAKRISHNAN, Chief Secretary to Government. To Shri P. Kumaraswamy, Executive Director, Centre for Water Resources Development and Management, Kunnamangalam, (MBR) Kozhikode - 673571. Shri Gopalakrishna Pillai, Special Secretary to Government (Irrigation and Rehabilitation), Trivandrum. The Registrar, Centre for Water Resources Development and Management, Kunnamangalam (MBR), Kozhikode-673571. The Accountant General, Kerala, Trivandrum. The Finance Department. The stock file." From the older Ext. P-6, it is clear that the petitioner's appointment was not considered a permanent one by the Government, and that three months' pay was offered to be paid though he was not strictly entitled to the same. This order does not disclose any reason for the action taken nor does it indicate that it was as a sequel to any enquiry for misconduct, or by way of punishment. 10. The questions that fell to be decided by the learned Judge and which were pressed before us are: (1) Whether the Centre is an authority under Art.12 of the Constitution (2) Whether the petitioner is a permanent employee or a temporary employee (3) What are the Rules of service that govern the petitioner (4) Whether R.17 offends Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution (5) Whether the petitioner is entitled to the protection of Art.311 of the Constitution and (6) Whether Ext. P-6 was bad for all or any of the grounds urged by the petitioner. 11. Before considering the above contentions, in the light of the findings entered by the learned Judge, we would like to dispose of a preliminary objection raised by the respondent's counsel before us on three grounds. According to him the appeal is filed by three persons: (1) The State of Kerala represented by the Secretary for Planning and Economic Affairs, (2) The Centre, represented by its Registrar and (3) Shri Gopalakrishna Pillai, Special Secretary. Normally, in all proceedings the State of Kerala is to be represented by its Chief Secretary. Any other Secretary can initiate proceedings in courts only if specially authorised to do so. In this case it is the planning Secretary who has filed the appeal in the absence of any special authorisation. Normally, in all proceedings the State of Kerala is to be represented by its Chief Secretary. Any other Secretary can initiate proceedings in courts only if specially authorised to do so. In this case it is the planning Secretary who has filed the appeal in the absence of any special authorisation. The appeal for this reason is incompetent, (ii) The Centre is a body corporate. There is nothing on record to show that the Centre had passed any resolution resolving to challenge the decision of the learned Judge by filing an appeal. What is more, the Centre is not a person aggrieved in this case, because no order passed by the Centre had been called in question or had been set aside. The Executive Director is an appointee of the Government. The judgment quashing Ext. P-6 does not in any way render it necessary for the Centre to file an appeal. Hence the appeal by the 2nd appellant is incompetent. (iii) The 3rd appellant, a Secretary by name, has no locus standi to file this appeal because he is not aggrieved. He has no business to challenge the judgment by filing this appeal. The learned Additional Advocate General refuted these preliminary objections with the plea that the appeal was presented in proper form and it was not for the respondent to complain about the propriety of filing the appeal or maintainability of such an appeal but for the Government to decide whether the appeal was necessary or not. It is with the full concurrence of the Government that the appeal had been filed. There is no legal infirmity in the appeal. As to whether the Government is properly represented or not is not a matter for the respondent but only for the Government. The objections, according to him, do not merit any consideration and had to be rejected. We have considered the objections and the refutation to them. We find that the objections have no merits and that the appeal ia not bad or not maintainable for the objections raised. Hence the objection is overruled. 12. The learned Judge traced in detail the origin of the Centre, its objects, its constitution and the rules and regulations that govern it. We find that the objections have no merits and that the appeal ia not bad or not maintainable for the objections raised. Hence the objection is overruled. 12. The learned Judge traced in detail the origin of the Centre, its objects, its constitution and the rules and regulations that govern it. Then he addressed himself to the question whether the Centre would come within the ambit of the term "other authority" in Art.12 of the constitution and hence could be considered to be State. The attack against Ext. P-6 was based on several grounds. The learned Judge held that Ext. P-6 was invalid and void in law. He left the question of mala fides raised by the respondent open. The learned Judge proceeded on the assumption that the action of termination was violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. The learned Judge held that the petitioner's appointment was not a temporary appointment. It was a regular appointment. There was no question of it being probationary for a period. In view of the manner in which the respondent was brought from his Tamil Nadu assignment the learned Judge felt that it was unfortunate that the State had advanced this argument and it was most unfair to say that the appointment was temporary. He was appointed regularly in the first instance as the second rank officer and then as Executive Director. The learned Judge did not uphold the case that the respondent was a civil servant entitled to invoke the benefit of Art.311. The request to declare R.17 as offensive to Art.16 and 17 was also not granted. 13. From the judgment under appeal, we find that the learned Judge devoted some space to the manner in which Ext. P-6 termination order was served on the petitioner, and the manner in which Ext. P-6 order was implemented (vide paragraph 14 of the judgment). He deplored that the whole procedure looked strange and that it was against good manners. It was noticed that the locked room of the respondent was opened without notice to him, as a result of which he lost some valuable moveables. The learned Judge appointed a retired District Judge as Commissioner, to prepare an inventory of the goods found in the respondent's room. A list was accordingly prepared. It was noticed that the locked room of the respondent was opened without notice to him, as a result of which he lost some valuable moveables. The learned Judge appointed a retired District Judge as Commissioner, to prepare an inventory of the goods found in the respondent's room. A list was accordingly prepared. The unpleasantness created by the conduct of the officers in taking charge of the office of the respondent provoked the following observations by the learned Judge: "If officers of his status behave like this against another senior officer and a reputed scientist, how can common man have faith in the working of the Government? If there was such an 'urgency in ousting the petitioner why is the court not informed of such urgency? Something is stinking here, disgraceful of the functioning of the Government at the top level". (para 16) From the judgment under appeal and the materials before us we too share the view of the learned Judge that the manner in which Ext. P-6 order was served and implemented leave much to be desired. Such a thing should have been avoided. However, for the decision of the legal questions involved in the appeal, we will steer clear of the unpleasantness created by this conduct and be not influenced by it. 14. We will first address ourselves to the question whether the Centre is an authority under Art.12 of the Constitution or not. The learned Judge after referring to the composition of the Centre and the Rules and Regulations governing the office bearers and employees under the Centre, observed thus in paragraph 10: "I may here itself express my view about the Centre, that it is really a governmental creature set up to function as an agency of the Government. The Governmental functions as it is now well understood take in the wide activities that the Government now take up as part of its sovereign powers in areas or spheres vital to socio economic development of the State. I will further deal with this question in the relevant context." Then the question was further discussed from paragraph 28 onwards. In paragraph 28, the learned Judge opened the discussion thus: "I have no doubt that the Centre will come within the expression 'other authorities' and hence of 'State' as comprehended in that Article. I will further deal with this question in the relevant context." Then the question was further discussed from paragraph 28 onwards. In paragraph 28, the learned Judge opened the discussion thus: "I have no doubt that the Centre will come within the expression 'other authorities' and hence of 'State' as comprehended in that Article. I have in the introductory portion of the judgment detailed how this institution came into existence, the purpose for which it was created etc. I also pointed out there itself that it is a Governmental agency carrying out sovereign function of the State as can be conceived in the well recognised present day principle of the State's duty in the socio economic development of the State. In the Policy Resolution of Government of Kerala passed in 1977 it is stated without any inhibition that the conscious promotion of science and technology for human welfare is one of the principal objectives of any progressive Government. It is further stated therein that the Government control of science so far has been largely viewed only from" the administrative context and that too without reference to its role in development. In the historical process of the evolution of scientific departments in the country, they had functioned as field or executive agencies which played only a subordinate or minor role in shaping Government Policies. The State Government, the resolution states, feels that this system should be replaced by a new outlook in the handling of science and technology at Government level by the association of scientists and technologists with the Government machinery and policy making and by the development of research institutes which will maintain a high standard of activity and intellectual integrity and will pay the highest consideration to the pursuit of knowledge and its application to human welfare as a worthwhile endeavour in itself. 'During the fifth plan period, the State Government have established a series of autonomous scientific and social research institution which are conceived with one or more of the four areas of Science and Technology, viz. research and development, application, provision of science and creation and diffusion of scientific knowledge. 'During the fifth plan period, the State Government have established a series of autonomous scientific and social research institution which are conceived with one or more of the four areas of Science and Technology, viz. research and development, application, provision of science and creation and diffusion of scientific knowledge. They are: (1) Centre for Development Studies (2) Kerala State Electronic Development Corporation (3) Sree Chitra Thirunal Medical Centre (4) Kerala Forest Research Institute (5) Institute for Water Resources Development and Management (under formation)' and the G.O. of 29th December, 1977 which gives the sanction for the establishment of the Centre as pointed out earlier states: 'The objective under the State's Fifth Five Year Plan Programme under Science and Technology is to establish a few autonomous institutions for Research and Development in certain areas vital to the socio economic development of the State. One of the institutions so contemplated is the Centre for Water Resources Development and Management. A provision of Rs. 15 lakhs has been included for the purpose in the annual plan for 1977-78'." Then the learned Judge observed thus in paragraph 29: "29. Thus the origin of the Centre, the nature of its constitution, the fact that the funds of the Centre consist mainly (now solely) of grants and loans from Government, the control and supervision of the Government on the Centre and that its accounts are subject to audit by the Accountant General of the State and scrutiny by the State Government all point out conclusively to the fact that it is only a creation of the State and an instrumentality of the State." The learned Additional Advocate General mounted a serious attack on these observations in general and to the statement by the learned Judge that the funds of the Centre consisted mainly (now solely) of grants and loans from the Government in particular. He contended that the approach made by the learned Judge was not in consonance with the law of the land settled by the Supreme Court in decisions approximately similar to the facts of the case. He contended that the approach made by the learned Judge was not in consonance with the law of the land settled by the Supreme Court in decisions approximately similar to the facts of the case. The learned Judge referred to the following decisions in paragraph 30: Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India ( AIR 1975 SC 1329 ), Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatros ( AIR 1975 SC 1331 ), Remana v. I. A., Authority of India ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ), U.P. Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narayan (AIR 1980 SC 940), Sen Prakash v. Union of India ( AIR 1981 SC 212 ) and Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib ( AIR 1981 SC 487 ). In paragraph 31, the learned Judge referred to the concurring but separate judgment of Mathew, J. in Sukhdev Singh's case ( AIR 1975 SC 1331 ) and observed that the said observations were accepted by Bhagawati, J. in International Airport Authority's case ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ) and also observed that any doubt on this question had been now set at rest by the Constitution Bench in its decision reported in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib ( AIR 1981 SC 487 ). The learned Judge copiously extracted from the observations of Krishna Iyer, J. in Sen Prakash's case ( AIR 1981 SC 212 ). Before us also, these decisions were discussed in extenso by counsel on both sides. 15. We do not think it necessary to parade these decisions one by one and discuss their facts and the conclusions arrived at by the Supreme Court in those cases. According to us, it would be sufficient for the purposes of this case to consider AIR 1975 SC 1329 , AIR 1975 SC 1331 and AIR 1981 SC 487 because in our view the question at issue can be resolved with reference to these three decisions. In view of this approach that we take we are relieved of the obligations to resolve the dispute projected before us about the binding nature of the observations of Mathew, J. in Sukhdev Singh's case ( AIR 1975 SC 1331 ) in a concurring but slightly dissentient judgment for the reason that Mathew, J.'s observations have been in toto accepted by Bhagawati, J. speaking for the Constitution Bench in Ajay Hasia's case ( AIR 1981 SC 487 ). 16. 16. It would be appropriate at this stage to refer in brief to the composition of the Centre about which the learned Judge has referred in great detail in his judgment. The Centre was established as an autonomous institution and registered under the Travancore - Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955. The Centre was so established as per G.O. (Ms.) No. 50/77/ Plg., which stated that the objective under the State's Fifth Five Year Plan programme under Science and Technology was to establish a few autonomous institutions for Research and Development in certain areas vital to the socio economic development of the State. The Centre is one such institution so contemplated. A provision of Rs. 15 lakhs was included for this purpose in the annual Plan for 1977-78. 17. The management of the affairs of the Centre would be entrusted, according to the notification, to a governing body consisting of the following members to begin with: "1.The Minister for Irrigation, Kerala - Chairman. 2.The Chairman, State Committee on Science and Technology. 3. The Vice-Chancellor, Kerala Agricultural University, Mannuthy, Trichur. 4. The Secretary to Government Planning and Economic Affairs Department, Government of Kerala. 5.The Director, Kerala Forest Research Institute, Trichur. 6. Dr. A. Vaidyanathan, Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum. 7.Dr. S. Vasudev, Director of Technical Education 8. Sri V. P. Narayanan Nair, Chief Engineer (Retired), Public Health Engineering Department, Bhama Vilas, M. G. Road, Trivandrum. 9.The Executive Director of the Centre." In the Memorandum of Association, it is provided that the control, administration and management of the affairs of the Centre shall vest in accordance with a the Rules and Regulations of the Centre in the governing body of which the members shall be: "(i) The Minister for Irrigation, Kerala - Chairman. (ii) The Chairman, State Committee on Science and Technology, Kerala - Vice-Chairman. (iii) The Vice-Chancellor of the Kerala Agricultural University. (iv) Six experts in Water Technology and related disciplines of all India eminence, (v) The Secretary, Planning and Economic Affairs Department, (vi) The Director, Kerala Forest Research Institute. (vii) Dr. A. Vaidyanathan, Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum. (viii) Dr. S. Vasudev, Director of Technical Education, Trivandrum. (ix) Sri V. P. Narayanan Nair, Chief Engineer (Retd.), Public Health Engineering Department, Bhama Vilas, M. G. Road, Trivandrum-1. (x) One of the Chief Engineers of the State Irrigation Department to be nominated by the Government of Kerala. (vii) Dr. A. Vaidyanathan, Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum. (viii) Dr. S. Vasudev, Director of Technical Education, Trivandrum. (ix) Sri V. P. Narayanan Nair, Chief Engineer (Retd.), Public Health Engineering Department, Bhama Vilas, M. G. Road, Trivandrum-1. (x) One of the Chief Engineers of the State Irrigation Department to be nominated by the Government of Kerala. (xi) The Executive Director of the Centre appointed by Government of Kerala who shall be the Member-Secretary of the Governing Body." The office-bearers of the Centre are the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and the Executive Director. The Minister for Irrigation, Kerala, shall be the ex officio Chairman. In the absence of the Minister, the Chief Secretary shall act as Chairman. The Chairman, State Committee on Science and Technology shall be the ex officio Vice-Chairman. The Executive Director shall be a Technologist/Scientist of eminence in Water Resources to be appointed by the Government of Kerala, and he shall also be the Treasurer and Secretary Ex officio. The Executive Committee was also provided with five members. The provision for budget is as below: "(a) Once every year the Executive Committee shall frame a budget of the estimated income and expenditure of the Centre and place it before the Governing Body at its annual meeting for consideration and adoption. (b) Once every year the accounts of the Centre shall be audited by the auditors appointed for the purpose by the Governing Body from out of a panel approved by the Government. The accounts of the Centre shall be audited by the Accountant General also. (c) A statement of the accounts so audited by the auditors appointed by the Centre together with the comments thereon of the auditors shall be placed before the Governing body as far as practicable at its annual meetings and if the statement of audited accounts be not ready by the date of the annual meeting it should be placed before the Governing Body at a subsequent meeting called for the purpose. The audited accounts together with the comments thereon of the Governing Body shall be sent to Government within two months of the meeting which considered the audited accounts." Amendments to the Rules and Regulations are provided in clause 12. Clause 17 deals with the powers of the Government to issue directions as stated therein. The audited accounts together with the comments thereon of the Governing Body shall be sent to Government within two months of the meeting which considered the audited accounts." Amendments to the Rules and Regulations are provided in clause 12. Clause 17 deals with the powers of the Government to issue directions as stated therein. The funds of the Society come from (1) grants from the Government and any other State Governments and the Government of India (2) loans and contributions from other corporate bodies, agencies, institutions and persons (3) loan from Government and other financing institutions. From the above details, we get a conspectus of the composition of the Centre, its rights and duties, the extent of governmental control, and sources of finance for working the Centre. With these details, we will consider whether the Centre answers to the requirements of an authority under Art.12 of the Constitution in the light of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court. 18. As already indicated we feel it safe to consider Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India ( AIR 1975 SC 1329 ) and Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib ( AIR 1981 SC 487 ) alone in some detail since they offer the necessary guidelines for deciding the dispute on hand. The other decisions cited related to cases which are dissimilar. AIR 1975 SC 1329 dealt with the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research. This judgment was rendered on 21st February 1975 by a Constitution Bench. The same Constitution Bench rendered another judgment on the same day reported in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram ( AIR 1975 SC 1331 ) which considered the question whether the Oil and Natural Gas. Commission, the Life Insurance Corporation and Industrial Finance Corporation, were authorities within Art.12. In paragraph 4 of the earlier decision, the Supreme Court observed thus: "4. Extracting the features as aforesaid, it was contended that these would indicate that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research was really an agency of the Government. This contention is unsound. The Society does not have a statutory character like the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, or the Life Insurance Corporation, or Industrial Finance Corporation. Extracting the features as aforesaid, it was contended that these would indicate that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research was really an agency of the Government. This contention is unsound. The Society does not have a statutory character like the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, or the Life Insurance Corporation, or Industrial Finance Corporation. It is a society incorporated in accordance with the provisions of the Societies Registration Act." The Supreme Court further held: "The fact that the Prime Minister is the President or that the Government appoints nominees to the Governing Body or that the Government may terminate the membership will not establish anything more than the fact that the Government takes special care that the promotion, guidance and cooperation of scientific and industrial research, the institution and financing of specific researches, establishment or development and assistance to special institutions or departments of the existing institutions for scientific study of problem affecting particular industry in a trade, the utilisation of the result of the researches conducted Under the auspices of the Council towards the development of industries in the country are carried out in a responsible manner." (para 4). Thus the Supreme Court made a clear and conscious distinction between the C.S.I.R. case ( AIR 1975 SC 1329 ) and the other bodies considered in Sukhdev Singh's case ( AIR 1975 SC 1331 ). Now we will consider the special features of the C.S.I.R. In the opening sentence of paragraph 2 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observes that in order to entitle the petitioner in that case to impeach the circular on the ground of infraction of Articles, 14 and 16, the petitioner has to establish that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research is an authority within the meaning of Art.12 of the Constitution. Then the Supreme Court proceeded to enumerate the composition of the C.S.I.R. The following are the salient features of its composition: (1) it is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act (2) under R.3, the Prime Minister of India is the ex officio President of the Society (3) under R.30, the Governing Body consists of inter alia some persons appointed by the Government of India representing the administrative ministry under which the C.S.I.R. is included (4) some representatives of the Ministry of finance and one or more members appointed by the Government of India (5) the Government of India may terminate the membership of any member or at one and the same time of all members other than the ex officio members of the governing body. R.45 states that the governing body shall have the management of all the affairs and funds of the society. R.46 states that the governing body shall have power with the sanction of the Government of India to frame, amend or repeal bye laws not inconsistent with the rules for the administration and management of the affairs of the Society and in particular to provide for the terms and tenure of appointments, emoluments, allowances, rules of discipline and other conditions of service of the officers and staff of the Society. The Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 states that all matters relating to the C.S.I.R. would be under the department of Science and Technology. With these materials the Supreme Court was not prepared to hold that the C.S.I.R. was an authority, since it did not have a statutory character. 19. The learned additional Advocate General strongly relied upon the above decision and contended that the principle settled by it still held the field and had been approved by the Constitution Bench in Khalid Mujib's case ( AIR 1981 SC 487 ). According to him, the special features of the C.S.I.R. were almost similar to the Centre in this case. He said that a close scrutiny of the special features of the C.S.I.R. and the centre would bring out differences only to whittle down the governmental character of the Centre rather than exalt it to the position of an authority. According to him, the special features of the C.S.I.R. were almost similar to the Centre in this case. He said that a close scrutiny of the special features of the C.S.I.R. and the centre would bring out differences only to whittle down the governmental character of the Centre rather than exalt it to the position of an authority. Particular reference was made by him to the composition of the governing body over which there was no over riding power vested in the Government, to the funds of the society the source of which was not from Government alone, and the powers of the governing body to make amendments to the Rules and to the Regulations. He further said that clause 17 of the Rules and Regulations under which the Government was given the power to issue direction and instruction for the conduct of the affairs of the Centre or for any other matter pertaining to its management and administration, was in pari materia with the provisions in the Cooperative Societies Act, whereunder also the Government had similar powers. Sri V. Sivaraman Nair for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that C.S.I.R. case ( AIR 1975 SC 1329 ) should be restricted to its facts alone, for the decision in Sukhdev Singh's case ( AIR 1975 SC 1331 ) had expanded the horizon of authority under Art.12 and in so doing placed great reliance on the separate judgment of Mathew, J. He said that the composition of the Centre had a preponderance of Government representatives, the Centre took its birth pursuant to Governmental decision to establish autonomous institutions, that 15 lakhs of rupees were initially included for its purpose in the annual Plan for 1977-78, that further amounts were given to the Centre from time to time and that on a fair consideration of the composition of the Centre, its objectives and its Rules and the Regulations, the conclusion is in escapable that it is an instrumentality of the State and a public authority as espoused by Mathew, J. in Sukhdev Singh's case ( AIR 1975 SC 1331 ). He also pleaded that the Centre answered to the requirements laid down by the Supreme Court in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib ( AIR 1981 SC 487 ). 20. He also pleaded that the Centre answered to the requirements laid down by the Supreme Court in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib ( AIR 1981 SC 487 ). 20. It has therefore become necessary for us to consider the rival contentions in the light of the decisions rendered by the two Constitution Benches of the Supreme Court, one in the C.S.I.R. case ( AIR 1975 SC 1329 ) and the other in the Ajay Hasia's case (AIR 1981SC 487). It has to be noted that Bhagawati, J. speaking for the Bench in Ajay Hasia's case ( AIR 1981 SC 487 ) endorsed the principle settled in the C.S.I.R. case ( AIR 1975 SC 1329 ) in paragraph 13 as follows: "13.The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents Nos. 6 to 8, however, relied strongly on the decision in Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India, [ 1975 (3) SCR 616 : ( AIR 1975 SC 1329 )] and contended that this decision laid down in no uncertain terms that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 can never be regarded as an 'authority' within the meaning of Art.12. This being a decision given by a Bench of five Judges of this Court is undoubtedly binding upon us but we do not think it lays down any such proposition as is contended on behalf of the respondents. The question which arose in this case was as to whether the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research which was jurisdically a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 was an 'authority' within the meaning of Art.12.The test which the Court applied for determining this question was the same as the one laid down in the International Airport Authority's case and approved by us, namely, whether the Council was an instrumentality or agency of the Government. The Court implicitly assented to the proposition that if the Council were an agency of the Government it would undoubtedly be an 'authority'. But, having regard to the various features enumerated in the judgment, the Court held that the Council was not an agency of the Government and hence could not be regarded as an 'authority'. The Court implicitly assented to the proposition that if the Council were an agency of the Government it would undoubtedly be an 'authority'. But, having regard to the various features enumerated in the judgment, the Court held that the Council was not an agency of the Government and hence could not be regarded as an 'authority'. The Court did not rest its conclusion on the ground that the Council was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 but proceeded to consider various other features of the Council for arriving at the conclusion that it was not an agency of the Government and therefore not an 'authority'. This, would have been totally unnecessary if the view of the Court were that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act can never be an 'authority' within the meaning of Art.12." 21. When we consider the scope of the expression 'other authorities' in Art.12 of the Constitution, we would usefully extract the following passage which contains a word of caution (1981 SC 487). "9. The tests for determining as to when a corporation can be said to be an instrumentality or agency of Government may now be culled out from the judgment in the International Airport Authority's case ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ). These tests are not conclusive or clinching, but they are merely indicative indicia which have to be used with care and caution, because while stressing the necessity of a wide meaning to be placed on the expression ' other authorities', it must be realised that it should not be stretched so far as to bring in every autonomous body which has some nexus with the Government with the sweep of the expression. A wide enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation." Therefore the facts of this case have to be considered and the question arising therefrom decided with this guideline in view. 22. In Ajay Hasia's case ( AIR 1981 SC 487 ) the Supreme Court had to consider a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the Regional Engineering College, Srinagar, which is a college run by a society registered under the Jammu and Kashmir Societies Registration Act, 1898 and not a corporation created by a statute, is not an authority within the meaning of Art.12 of the Constitution. Before considering the special features of the said College, Bhagawati, J. summarised the relevant tests gathered from the decision in the International Airport Authority's case ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ) as follows: "(1) 'One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government.' (2) 'Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character.' (3)' It may also be a relevant factor........ whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is the State conferred or State protected.' (4) ' Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the Corporation is a State agency or instrumentality.' (5) 'If the functions of the corporation of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government.' (6) ' Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government. If on a consideration of these relevant factors it is found that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of government, it would, as pointed out in the International Airport Authority's case, be an 'authority' and, therefore, ' State' within the meaning of the expression in Art.12'." Our task in this case would be to apply the above tests to the Centre to see whether it satisfies the said tests. Before attempting that also, it would be useful to focus our attention to the discussion of the Supreme Court in the above case, for coming to the conclusion that the College in that case was an authority under Art.12, so that the status of the Centre in this case could be tested juxtaposed with the status of the College. The relevant discussion is in paragraph 15 of the judgment which we extract in full: "15. It is in the light of this discussion that we must now proceed to examine whether the Society in the present case is an 'authority' falling within the definition of ' State' in Art.12. Is it aa instrumentality or agency of the Government? The relevant discussion is in paragraph 15 of the judgment which we extract in full: "15. It is in the light of this discussion that we must now proceed to examine whether the Society in the present case is an 'authority' falling within the definition of ' State' in Art.12. Is it aa instrumentality or agency of the Government? The answer must obviously be in the affirmative if we have regard to the Memorandum of Association and the Rules of the Society. The composition of the Society is dominated by the representatives appointed by the Central Government and the Governments of Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh with the approval of the Central Government. The monies required for running the college are provided entirely by the Central Government and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and even if any other monies are to be received by the Society, it can be done only with the approval of the State and the Central Governments. The Rules to be made by the Society are also required to have the prior approval of the State and the Central Governments and the accounts of the Society have also to be submitted to both the Governments for their scrutiny and satisfaction. The Society is also to comply with all Such directions as may be issued by the State Government with the approval of the Central Government in respect of any matters dealt with in the report of the Reviewing Committee. The control of the State and the Central Governments is indeed so deep and pervasive that no immovable property of the Society can be disposed of in any manner without the approval of both the Governments. The State and the Central Governments have even the power to appoint any other person or persons to be members of the Society and any member of the Society other than a member representing the State or Central Government can be removed from the membership of the Society by the State Government with the approval of the Central Government. The Board of Governors, which is in charge of general superintendence, direction and control of the affairs of Society and of its income and property is also largely controlled by nominees of the State and the Central Governments. The Board of Governors, which is in charge of general superintendence, direction and control of the affairs of Society and of its income and property is also largely controlled by nominees of the State and the Central Governments. It will thus be seen that the State Government and by reason of the provision for approval, the Central Government also, have full control of the working of the Society and it would not be incorrect to say that the Society is merely a projection of the State and the Central Governments and to use the words of Ray, C. J. in Sukhdev Singh's case ( AIR 1975 SC 1331 )(supra) the voice is that of the State and the Central Governments and the hands are also of the State and the Central Governments. We must, therefore, hold that the Society is an instrumentality or the agency of the State and the Central Governments and it is an 'authority' within the meaning of Art.12." 23. We will now analyse the above features and compare them with the Centre. The college is run by a Society which is dominated by representatives of the Central Government and the various States. The monies come entirely from the Central Government and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. If other monies come that can be received by the Society only with the concurrence of the State and Central Governments. The Rules to be made by the Society must also be approved by the State and Central Governments. All directions from the Central Government and the State Government have to be complied with by the Society. According to the Supreme Court, the control of the State and the Central Governments in that case was deep and pervasive. But in our case the Governing Body of the Centre consists of governmental and non governmental personnel. The funds of the Centre are not solely from the Government. At a given time perhaps the funds may be from the Government alone. It can well be that at another given time the fund of the Centre is solely from other sources. Public sector undertakings or even private sector undertakings may find the Centre doing exceptionally good work or yeoman service, and may make munificent grants and contributions to the society and at a given time it can be that the Centre is financed solely by such grants and contributions. Public sector undertakings or even private sector undertakings may find the Centre doing exceptionally good work or yeoman service, and may make munificent grants and contributions to the society and at a given time it can be that the Centre is financed solely by such grants and contributions. Under clause 7 of the Rules and Regulations the funds of the society can by grants from the Government either State or Centre, grants and contributions from other corporate bodies, agencies, institutions and persons and also loans from governmental and other financial institutions. Therefore it will not be proper to say that the funds of the Society are solely from governmental loan or aid. Though the Government have some supervisory powers over the Centre that will not by itself render the centre an instrumentality of the State. On a consideration of the features of the Regional Engineering College and the Centre it can be safely stated that the features are dissimilar and the Centre cannot fit in with the features of the Regional Engineering College concerned in Ajay Hasia's case ( AIR 1981 SC 487 ). 24. Now we will consider whether the centre satisfies the six tests which we have extracted from the same judgment. Test number one relates to funds. The centre does not satisfy it. Test number two also relates to the preponderance of the financial assistance by the State to render it an instrument or agency of the Government. This again, the Centre does not satisfy. The third test is the monopoly character which again is absent in the Centre. The existence of a deep and pervasive State control which is the fourth test is also absent. The fifth test is the nature of the function, namely, functions of public importance, which is present in the functions of the Centre. If the coming into being of the authority is by the transfer of a government department which is the sixth test, it would be a supportive factor. It cannot be said that the Centre answers to this description either. 25. What remains now is a comparison of the features of the Centre with the C. S. I. R. While the Centre is registered under the relevant Travancore - Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, the C. S. I. R. is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act. 25. What remains now is a comparison of the features of the Centre with the C. S. I. R. While the Centre is registered under the relevant Travancore - Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, the C. S. I. R. is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act. The Chairman of the Centre is to be the Minister for Irrigation; the Prime Minister of India is the ex officio President of the Society. The governing body of the Centre consists of, among others, the Minister other governmental representatives and non governmental agencies; of the Council it consists of, inter alia, some persons appointed by the Government of India representing the Ministry under which the Council is entrusted and the Ministry of Finance. In both cases the Government have the power to remove the governing body of the Executive Committee. In both, the governing body has the power of management of all the affairs and things. The governing body of the Centre has the power to make bye laws in specified matters as seen in clause 5(xvii) and R.46 of the Council gives the governing body powers to frame, amend or repeal bye laws not inconsistent with the sanction of the Government. While there is provision that all matters relating to the council are under the Department of Science and Technology a similar provision is not seen made for the Centre. A comparison of these features persuades us to hold that the Centre and the council are more or less similar regarding the features, though the Additional Advocate General would say that the governmental control over the C. S. I. R. is more pronounced than the Centre. On a careful scrutiny of the various aspects of the C. S. I. R. and keeping in view the caution indicated in Ajay Hasia's case ( AIR 1981 SC 487 ), we hold that the Centre in this case cannot be brought within the purview of 'other authority' contemplated under Art.12 of the Constitution. 26. This discussion became necessary only because of an attack by the petitioner of the action taken against him as being arbitrary and of the R.16 and 17, if found to govern his service conditions, bad under Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution. 26. This discussion became necessary only because of an attack by the petitioner of the action taken against him as being arbitrary and of the R.16 and 17, if found to govern his service conditions, bad under Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has laid down that merely because a juristic entity is found to be an 'authority' and therefore 'State' within the meaning of Art.12, it cannot be elevated to the position of a 'State' for all purposes. It is limited in its application only to Part III and by virtue of Art.36 to Part IV. It does not extend to other provisions of the Constitution. In other words, even if the Centre is found to be 'State' it would not be so for any purpose other than for the purpose of Part III of the Constitution. The attack against the validity of the Rules and the action taken against the respondent on the basis of Art.14 and 16 does not assume importance or relevance in view of our finding. Arrived at in the above paragraph. Even so, since considerable time was taken by both sides, we would briefly summarise the submissions made and give our opinion on them. 27. The respondent's counsel faintly argued that the respondent was a civil servant entitled to the benefits of Art.311. According to him the respondent is not governed by the service rules of the Centre. He was appointed by the Government and there existed between him and the Government a relationship of master and servant. This plea was put forward before the learned Judge also. It did not find favour with him and the said plea was rejected thus by him: "But, I do not think that merely because in an institution which might be a governmental agency, but which is not really a governmental department, an office bearer of the institution is appointed by the State on the basis of the memorandum of association, it could be said that the office bearer is a civil servant entitled to invoke the benefit of Art.311." We agree, What is more, the respondent himself has agreed to be bound by the Rules and Regulations of the Centre and as such his claim to be a civil servant was rightly negatived. 28. 28. What then remains to be considered is the attack against the order of termination on the ground that it is arbitrary, opposed to natural justice and violative of Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Original Petition was amended by including an additional ground challenging R.17 as violative of Art.14 and 16in so far as it did not afford any guideline for its application. An additional prayer was made to declare R.17 as ultra vires Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The learned Judge has not granted this relief. The attack against R.17 is that it gives an unguided power to the authority to terminate the services of an employee under the Centre. We are not satisfied that this attack can be sustained. R.17 deals with the termination of service of a temporary employee and that of a permanent employee; in the case of a temporary employee without assigning any reason and in the case of a permanent employee by a notice of three months or on payment of three months salary. Since the employees under the Centre are not civil servants and the relationship between them and the Centre is contractual, there is nothing wrong in providing for termination of service of a temporary employee and a permanent employee in the manner in which R.17 is worded. We are not impressed with the submission that it is ultra vires Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution. The prayer to declare R.17 as ultra vires has therefore to be rejected and we do so. 29. From paragraphs 21 to 27 the learned Judge narrated the rival contentions put forward before him by the petitioner and the respondents; before so doing expressed himself thus regarding the validity of Ext. P-6 considering the attack of mala fides: "And in any case as for the reasons which I will give below, I am of the positive view that Ext. P-6 is invalid and void in law apart from the question of mala fides in the action and I am leaving the question of mala fides open." The respondent's case is that Ext. P-6 order terminating his services is arbitrary and illegal. He could have continued in the Madras service for seven years more. Ext. P-6 proceeds on a wrong assumption that he was appointed temporarily. There was nothing in the appointment orders indicating that he was a temporary employee. P-6 order terminating his services is arbitrary and illegal. He could have continued in the Madras service for seven years more. Ext. P-6 proceeds on a wrong assumption that he was appointed temporarily. There was nothing in the appointment orders indicating that he was a temporary employee. The said order violates all principles of fair play, natural justice and offends Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution. The case of the appellants is put forward thus: The respondent was originally appointed as Head of the Academic Division, specifically making it clear that he would rank second in the Centre. Subsequently, he was appointed Executive Director. On 24th May 1980 he sent a proposal to the Government for fixation of the terms and conditions of the respondent wherein he specifically stated that for all matters other than his pay and allowances he would be governed by the Rules of the Centre. In G. O. (Ms.) No. 55/80/Plg., dated 6th December 1980 the Government agreed to the proposals and made it clear that in all matters other than pay he will be governed by the Rules of the Centre, which came into force on 1st March 1978.Clause 2 of the preamble of the Rules makes the Rules applicable to all categories of the staff of the Centre. The said categories of staff were specified in Annexure I to the Rules. The Executive Director who was originally included in the Annexure, under the administrative staff was later included under the academic staff by an amendment. The termination order against the respondent was passed in exercise of R.17 of the Rules. Though he was not entitled to three months pay it was offered to him in lieu of notice by way of abundant caution and on compassionate grounds. He is a temporary employee of the Centre according to the Rules because he has not been confirmed by any decision of the Government at any time. He was aware of the Rules and Regulations of the Centre and he should be deemed to know that unless and until an employee was confirmed he would be treated as temporary. The termination order was not passed as a penalty. It was not based on any misconduct. Its foundation was not also on any misconduct. An anonymous petition was received by the Chief Minister against him. The termination order was not passed as a penalty. It was not based on any misconduct. Its foundation was not also on any misconduct. An anonymous petition was received by the Chief Minister against him. A preliminary enquiry was conducted by Sri Gopalakrishna Pillai and he submitted a report to the Government. No action was initiated pursuant to that report and no decision taken at any time to take any action against him on the basis of the said report. The termination was a simple termination and is neither arbitrary nor unconstitutional. His employment is under a body registered under a statute and his conditions of service are governed by certain domestic rules having no statutory character. No relief, as asked for, can be given since to do so would tantamount to specific enforcement of personal contract of service on an unwilling employer and that offends the provisions of the Specific Relief Act. 30. The above is a short narration of the rival contentions. The learned Judge proceeded to consider the question of validity of Ext. P-6 from paragraph 34 onwards, on the basis of his finding that the Centre was a "State". Various authorities were noted by the learned Judge and the principle settled in them referred with this finding in the background. The case of the State that there was no arbitrariness in the order and that the order was strictly in conformity with rules 16 and 17 was repelled by the learned Judge finding that the Executive Director under the Rules and Regulations was an office bearer of the Centre and he cannot be bound by the said Rules. The learned Judge states that the respondent is the Chief Executive member of the governing body and of the Executive Committee. Rules 16 and 17 of the Service Rules of the Centre occur in Chapter II of the said Rules. From rules 1 and 2 therein it is clear that it applies only to categories and posts under the Centre which are grouped from time to time by governing body of the Executive Committee by virtue of the powers vested in them under rules 5 and 8 of the Rules and Regulations of the Centre. In addition to this, the Executive Director is to be appointed by the State. Under these circumstances, the learned Judge held that the Rules would not apply to the Executive Director. 31. In addition to this, the Executive Director is to be appointed by the State. Under these circumstances, the learned Judge held that the Rules would not apply to the Executive Director. 31. With great respect, we hold that this approach is not correct. It is true that the Executive Director is appointed by the State. But it is not correct to say that he is not governed by the Rules and Regulations of the Centre. We have already mentioned that the respondent had as per his letter dated 24th May 1980 agreed to abide by the Rules and Regulations of the Centre in all matters other than his salary and allowances. It was pursuant to this letter that the Government issued a G. O. on 6th December 1980 agreeing to such proposal with slight modification. It has to be further noted that the post of Executive Director was brought within the Annexure under the head "Academic Staff" by a resolution to which the respondent himself was a party. Therefore, it will not be correct to say that he is not governed by the Rules and Regulations of the Centre regarding the conditions of his service. The approach of the learned Judge, with respect, was to a large extent influenced by this erroneous assumption that respondent was not governed by the Rules and Regulations. A catena of decisions was cited before us by the counsel on both sides in support of and against the action taken against the respondent covering the jurisdiction of the employer to terminate a temporary employee and a permanent employee and the insistence by the Supreme Court on the need of notice even in cases where a temporary employee's services are terminated. Some of the cases cited by the learned Additional Advocate General related to the defence personnel and are not strictly applicable. The cases that were cited by the respondent's counsel mostly related to action taken on the ground of misconduct in which case the imperative need to conform to the requirements of Art.311(2) and of the principles of natural justice was emphasised. The learned Judge quoted the following passage from Moti Ram v. H. E. Frontier Railway ( AIR 1964 SC 600 ). "In regard to temporary servants or servants on probation every case of termination of service may not amount to removal. The learned Judge quoted the following passage from Moti Ram v. H. E. Frontier Railway ( AIR 1964 SC 600 ). "In regard to temporary servants or servants on probation every case of termination of service may not amount to removal. In cases falling under these categories, the terms of contract or service rules may provide for termination of service on notice for a specified period or payment of salary for the said period; and if in exercise of the power thus conferred on the employer, the service of a temporary or probationary servant are terminated, it may not necessarily amount to removal. In every such case, courts examine the substance of the matter and if it is shown that the termination of service is no more than the discharge simpliciter effected by virtue of the contract or the relevant rules, Art.311(2) may not be applicable to such a case. If, however, the termination of a temporary servant's service in substance represents a penalty imposed on him or positive action taken against him, then such termination would amount to removal and Art.311(2) would be attracted." 32. We have considered the above passage and also the various other authorities cited before us, viz. Ram Gopal v. State of M.P. ( AIR 1970 SC 158 ); State of U.P. v. Sughar Singh ( AIR 1974 SC 423 ); S. P. Vasudeva v. State of Haryana ( 1976 (1) SCC 236 ); State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra (AIR 1978 SC 2347); Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar ( AIR 1976 SC 1766 ); I. N. Subba Reddy v. Andhra University ( AIR 1976 SC 2049 ) and Sate of U.P. v. Bhoop Singh ( AIR 1979 SC 684 ).The ultimate principle that is deducible from these authorities headed by AIR1964 SC 600 is this. In the case of temporary service or service on probation, if the employer specifies the terms of the contract of service while terminating the service of such temporary servant, such termination will not amount to removal which is bad in the eye of law. The courts will examine the order and if it finds that it is a termination simpliciter it will stay its hands from such orders. The courts will examine the order and if it finds that it is a termination simpliciter it will stay its hands from such orders. If, however, on a closer scrutiny it is found that the order in substance represents a penalty imposed on him, then such termination would amount to removal to attract Art.311(2).This principle cannot apply to the case on hand both on the ground that the respondent is not a civil servant and on the ground that his termination is a termination simpliciter which in substance does not amount to penalty. The order of termination does not on its face show that it was as a penalty. The counter affidavit filed has clearly stated that the order of termination is not based on the enquiry report against the respondent. It is true that the Government found two warring factions in the Centre and felt that for the smooth working of the Centre the respondent's service will have to be terminated. This cannot be characterised as either a misconduct or a penalty. 33. Now we will consider the contention as to whether the respondent is a temporary employee or a permanent employee and whether Ext. P-6 is bad for non compliance with the relevant rules and incidentally as being arbitrary otherwise. 34. We had extracted in full the termination order Ext. P6. On a reading of that order it is seen to be an order of termination simpliciter. The appellant's stand as seen reflected in that order is that the respondent's appointment is not a permanent one and that therefore he is not entitled to notice or pay in lieu thereof. However, it was ordered that he would be paid three months pay on termination of the service. The general conditions of service are seen in Chap.2 to the Service Rules of the Centre. S.3, Chap.2 relates to tenure. Clause 14 deals with probation and confirmation. The probation prescribed is a period of 12 months from the date of joining within a continuous period of 24 months which period can be extended by the appointing authority. Clause 14(3) states that every person appointed to a permanent post under the Centre either by promotion or by direct recruitment shall be eligible for confirmation in that post on satisfactorily completing the period of his probation. Clause 16 deals with temporary and permanent servants and R.17 with termination of service. Clause 14(3) states that every person appointed to a permanent post under the Centre either by promotion or by direct recruitment shall be eligible for confirmation in that post on satisfactorily completing the period of his probation. Clause 16 deals with temporary and permanent servants and R.17 with termination of service. 16(1) states that an employee shall be a temporary employee until he is confirmed in a permanent post and 16(2) states that an employee confirmed in a permanent post would be a permanent employee of the Centre. R.17 reads as follows: "17 Termination of service.- (i) The service of a temporary employee may be terminated by the appointing authority without assigning reasons. (ii) The service of a permanent employee may be terminated by a notice of three months or on payment of pay for such period as the notice falls short of three months, or without notice, on payment of three months pay, if the post in which he confirmed is abolished. (iii) An employee who is given notice of termination of service under clause (ii) may be granted, during the period of notice, such earned leave, as may be admissible to him and where the leave so admissible and granted is more than three months, his services shall be terminated on the expiry of such leave." The case put forward by the learned Additional Advocate General is that the learned Judge was in error in holding that the respondent was not governed by the Rules and Regulations since they applied "only to categories and posts under the Centre which are grouped from time to time by the Governing Body and the Executive Committee by virtue of the powers vested in them under rules 5 and 8 of the Rules and Regulations of the Centre". We have already indicated our view that the respondent is governed by the Rules and Regulations of the Centre which include rules 16 and 17 for the reason that he himself had agreed to this course. In view of this, the fact that the respondent was appointed by the Government assumes little importance. The learned Judge has held that the appointment of the respondent cannot be characterised as a temporary appointment. This case has to be examined in the light of R.16. Exts. P1 to P-4 do not indicate that the appointment is a temporary appointment. In view of this, the fact that the respondent was appointed by the Government assumes little importance. The learned Judge has held that the appointment of the respondent cannot be characterised as a temporary appointment. This case has to be examined in the light of R.16. Exts. P1 to P-4 do not indicate that the appointment is a temporary appointment. The respondent was appointed on 25th April 1980 and made an Executive Director by the correction in Ext. P-5, on 15th May 1980. Ext. P-6 is on September 23, 1981. In any case, therefore, when Ext. P-6 order was passed, he had completed the period of probation and was thus eligible for confirmation. The appellants' case is that the respondent would continue to be a temporary employee until confirmed by a specific order. He may have completed the period of probation. That would not give him the status of a permanent employee unless by a specific order he is confirmed. When such an order is passed it could take effect retrospectively from the date of satisfactory completion of the probation. Still, in the absence of an order of confirmation he continues to be a temporary employee. This, according to the learned Additional Advocate General, is the normal rule in service law. He pressed into service this contention to plead that the respondent's service can be terminated by the appointing authority without assigning any reason because he is a temporary employee. This submission was met by the respondent's counsel with the plea that the respondent became a confirmed hand the moment he completed the period of probation. According to him, there was no need for a separate order of confirmation after completing the period of probation. We have considered these rival contentions. We do not feel persuaded to hold that even after the completion of the period of probation the respondent continued to be a temporary employee. It is true that an argument is possible that an appointing authority has a right to decide whether a particular employee has satisfactorily completed his probation and that if found unsatisfactory not to declare his probation. Such an argument postulates an order of confirmation. It is true that an argument is possible that an appointing authority has a right to decide whether a particular employee has satisfactorily completed his probation and that if found unsatisfactory not to declare his probation. Such an argument postulates an order of confirmation. But in the peculiar circumstances of this case, we hold that on the completion of the period of probation the respondent became a confirmed hand and therefore a permanent employee, and therefore he cannot be terminated under R.17(1) of the rules. If he is a permanent employee his termination has to be under R.17(2).The respondent's counsel attempted a feeble argument that R.17(2) does not apply to the respondent since the condition laid down there is not satisfied. He was perhaps relying upon the second part of the rule which enables termination without notice on payment of three months pay only if the post in which the employee was confirmed is abolished. According to him, the post in which he was confirmed had not been abolished and therefore the rule does not come into play. We have no hesitation to reject this submission because that part of the rule deals with an entirely different set of circumstances. The second part deals with a case of termination without notice when the post is abolished, with the obligation to pay three months pay. The case of the respondent does not fall in this group. His case falls in the first part.R.17(2) gives an option to the employer to terminate the service of a permanent employee either by giving three months notice or on payment of pay for such period as the notice falls short of three months. In this case, the order states that the respondent will be paid three months pay on termination of his service. Thus, R.17(2) is satisfied. If R.17 governs the service conditions of the respondent the power of the appointing authority to act under R.17 cannot be questioned. Therefore, we hold that Ext. P-6 is in strict compliance with R.17 and the order Ext. P-6 is a validly passed order. 35. We will also examine the case put forward before us which had found favour with the learned Judge that Ext. P-6 is void, non est and inoperative, it being an order passed arbitrarily and in violation of Art.14 of the Constitution. P-6 is in strict compliance with R.17 and the order Ext. P-6 is a validly passed order. 35. We will also examine the case put forward before us which had found favour with the learned Judge that Ext. P-6 is void, non est and inoperative, it being an order passed arbitrarily and in violation of Art.14 of the Constitution. While considering this aspect of the case we cannot forget that a challenge on the basis of Art.14 is impermissible on our finding that the Centre is not an authority. The contractual relationship between the parties has given power to the employer to take the recourse for termination under R.17. But since the horizons of Art.14 have by now been expanded from the original concept based on the doctrine of classification to the new concept of arbitrariness, we will consider briefly this aspect of the case also. Bhagawati, J. outlined this expanse of the horizon thus in Ajay Hasia's case ( AIR 1981 SC 487 ): "It is sufficient to state that the content and reach of Art.14 must not be confused with the doctrine of classification. Unfortunately, in the early stages of the evolution of our constitutional law Art.14 came to be identified with the doctrine of classification because the view taken was that that Article forbids discrimination and there would be no discrimination where the classification making the differentia fulfils two conditions, namely, (i) that the classification is founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group; and (ii) that that differentia has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the impugned legislative or executive action. It was for the first time in E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu [ (1974) 2 SCR 348 ; ( AIR 1974 SC 555 )], that this court laid bare a new dimension of Art.14 and pointed out that that Article has highly activist magnitude and it embodies a guarantee against arbitrariness. This Court speaking through one of us (Bhagwati, J.) said: 'The basic principle which therefore informs both Art.14 and 16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination. Now what is the content and reach of this great equalising principle ? This Court speaking through one of us (Bhagwati, J.) said: 'The basic principle which therefore informs both Art.14 and 16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination. Now what is the content and reach of this great equalising principle ? It is a founding faith, to use the words of Bose, J., "a way of life", and it must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic or lexicographic approach. We cannot countenance any attempt to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be "cribbed, cabined and confined" within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact, equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Art.14, and if it affects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Art.16. Art.14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment'." The learned Judge quoted his own Judgment in the Maneka Gandhi's case ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ) thus : "No attempt should be made to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning for, to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned within traditional and doctrinaire limits...... ..........Art.14 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non arbitrariness pervades Art.14 like a brooding omnipresence." The submission on Art.14 is linked also to the case of violation of natural justice. We do not think it necessary to go in greater detail into this part of the lengthy argument made at the bar not only for the reason that we have held the Centre to be not an authority but also for the reason that the foundation of Ext. P-6 order, according to us, is not any misconduct on the part of the respondent. P-6 order, according to us, is not any misconduct on the part of the respondent. The question of arbitrariness, necessity for a notice etc. become relevant only when action is taken pursuant to an allegation of misconduct and the order of termination is passed as a consequence thereof. The learned counsel for the respondent had placed in our hands two representations made by the respondent to the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Centre, in which he had presented his case about the emergence of a rival faction against him, to impress upon us the background of the order of termination. We decline to go into these matters. We have noted already the existence of two rival factions in the Centre. We have also adverted to the fact that the Government felt, in the circumstances of the case, in the interest of the Centre and for peace, that the better course was to terminate the service of the respondent. Since this termination is not by way of punishment, we do not think it necessary to delve deep into the anatomy of the decision taken by the Government of tear the veil of innocuousness that is apparent in Ext. P-6. In our view, to unsettle Ext. P-6wouldbetogive a direction to the Government to reinstate the respondent in service which in the context of the contractual relationship between the parties would not be permissible under the general law. Though we are not very happy with what had happened in the Centre nor with the manner in which the termination order was served on the respondent, we feel that in law we will not be justified in upsetting Ext. P-6 order. We have given our anxious consideration to the facts of the case. Sympathetic consideration towards the respondent or indignation at the manner in which the order of retirement was served on the respondent, cannot be allowed to influence us when questions of law are to be decided. 36. We say with respect that the learned Judge was in error in invalidating Ext. P-6 order. We set aside the Judgment of the learned Judge and hold that Ext. P-6 order is valid. We allow the appeal with a direction that the parties will bear their respective costs.