JUDGMENT A.R. Navkar, J. This is an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 5-3-1981, passed by the Second Additional District Judge, Bhind in Civil Appeal No. 13-A of 1980 confirming the judgment and decree dated 18-3-1976, passed by the Civil Judge Class 11, Bhind, in Civil Suit No. 109 of 1969. The suit of the plaintiff against the defendant was on the following allegations. The plaintiff owns a shop at Paret Bazar, Bhind and the defendant is occupying the same on the basis of a rent-note executed by him on 3-10-1962. The rent-note is for a period of eleven months. The purpose for which the shop was given on rent was for doing business of cloth and the rent to be paid was Rs.87.50. After taking the shop on rent, it is alleged that the defendant started residing in the said shop. Net only this, but in one portion of the said shop, defendant No. 1 kept one Lakhmidland son of Gulzarilal, the owner of the firm Lakhmichand Nareshchand at Rs.33 per month as Shikami tenant. The alleged sub-tenant is doing business in ropes. This giving of the portion of the shop on rent was against the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act.). On both the grounds, the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of eviction. The grounds are that the defendant has kept a sub-tenant and the defendant has changed the purpose for which the shop was taken on rent. A notice was served on the defendant on 2-9-1969 by which the tenancy of the defendants was terminated from 2-10-1969. For the period for which the rent was not paid, the plaintiff demanded also the arrears by the said notice. But, under section 12(1)(a) of the Act the claim was not pressed before me as no decree was granted by the Courts below on that ground as the defendants have complied with the provisions of sections 12 and 13 of the Act and as such, no decree can be passed under section 12(1)(a) of the Act. This finding was not disputed by the learned counsel appearing for both sides. The suit was filed on 28-10-1969. This finding was not disputed by the learned counsel appearing for both sides. The suit was filed on 28-10-1969. The defendants have filed their written statement, saying that defendant No. 1 has not executed any rent-note on 3-10-1962 and on the contrary, they are in possession of the suit shop for the last thirty years. As to the rent of the shop, there was no dispute. Further, it was submitted by the defendant that in the beginning, the accommodation was taken for doing business and also for residential purposes. The front portion of the accommodation was used as a shop and the remaining portion was used for residence. Defendant No. 2 is not the sub-tenant and defendant No. 1 is in possession of the whole accommodation. Defendant No. 2 Lakhmichand is not in possession of any portion of the accommodation and the business which is alleged to be run by Lakhmichand is the business of defendant No. 1 only. Lakhmichand, defendant No. 2 is the servant of defendant No. 1. There was a dispute regarding the validity of the notice by which the plaintiff is alleged to have terminated the tenancy. But, regarding the validity of the notice which terminated the tenancy, nothing was canvassed before me. Therefore, I need not decide the same. When the period of tenancy is over, there is no need of serving a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, as held by the Supreme Court in a number of cases. The real intention of the plaintiff is to increase the rent to Rs.150 and when this demand was not acceded to by the defendants, the plaintiff has filed the present suit. In additional pleas, the defendants have stated as to how the landlord has enhanced the rent from time to time and what was the rent in the beginning. But, in my opinion, these facts will not be material to decide the case. On these aliegations and counter allegations, the learned trial Court framed the following issues : - 1(a) Whether the suit premises were let out by the plaintiff to the defendant for non-residential purpose only? ...Yes. (b) If so, whether the plaintiff is entitled to terminate the tenancy of the defendant from the suit premises because the defendant is using some portion of the premises for residence? ......Yes. ...Yes. (b) If so, whether the plaintiff is entitled to terminate the tenancy of the defendant from the suit premises because the defendant is using some portion of the premises for residence? ......Yes. 2(a) Whether the defendant has sub-let some portion of the suit premises on rent to Lakhmichand? ...Yes. (b) Whether Lakhmichand is a servant of the defendant? ...No. Whether the plaintiff has terminated the tenancy of the defendant after giving him a valid notice? ...Yes. Relief and Costs ...Suit decreed with costs. Additional issues: Whether the defendant has not paid the arrears of rent? The amount? ...Not paid in time. (b) Whether the defendant has not paid or tendered the amount of arrears of rent within two months of the date of receipt of notice? ..Not in time. The trial Court, after taking into consideration the evidence of the parties, decreed the suit. Aggrieved by this, an appeal was preferred before the Second Additional District Judge, Bhind. The Second Additional District Judge, Bhind, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the finding of the trial Court. Aggrieved by the said order, the present second appeal is filed. Before me, the learned counsel for both sides submitted that the ground under sections 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(c) of the Act will not be available to the plaintiff. The only ground on which both the counsel addressed me is on section 12(1)(b) of the Act. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted before me that section 12(1)(b) of the Act can be divided into three different parts and those parts will be (i) whether the tenant has kept a sub-tenant, (ii) whether the tenant has parted with possession let out to him and (iii) whether the sub-letting or parting with the possession was for consideration or not. He further submitted that the plaintiff has filed a suit on the basis of letting out a portion of the premises at Rs.33 per month to defendant No. 2 and both the courts below have found that he has failed to prove this fact. As the plaintiff has failed to prove this fact about which he has made allegations in the plaint, the suit of the plaintiff should fail. As the plaintiff has failed to prove this fact about which he has made allegations in the plaint, the suit of the plaintiff should fail. Further, he submitted that the plaintiff has not taken the ground that defendant No. 1 has parted with possession of a portion of accommodation for consideration or otherwise and, therefore, the counsel for the appellant has submitted an application for seeking the amendment in the written statement saying that defendant No. 1 has not parted with possession of a portion of the accommodation, and that the whole accommodation is under the possession and control of the defendant. This amendment is opposed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff and he has submitted that both the Courts have found that the plaintiff has created a sub-tenancy and, therefore, the plaintiff is entitled for a decree under section 12(1)(b) of the Act. He has submitted that as it is a finding of fact which is concurrent by both the Courts below and, therefore, in second appeal, T should not disturb it. To this, the reply of the learned counsel for the appellant is that if there are no specific pleadings regarding parting with possession, the evidence led for supporting that allegation cannot be taken into consideration and the question of finding of fact concurrently against the defendant will not come in his way in second appeal and just to avoid this he has filed the amendment application. I will consider the amendment application itself. In my opinion, the amendment application is mala fide and the purpose of filing this application is to get a remand from this Court and to delay the matter by asking the trial Court that the defendant wants to produce further evidence. Alomr with the plaint, the plaintiff has filed a map showing exclusive possession of defendant No. 2 of a portion which is let out to defendant No. 1. Further, in the evidence of Ram Prasad (P. W. 2) and Kailash Narayan, it has come that the two portions are separated by a partition and after partitioning the tenanted premises, one shop is in possession of defendant No. 1 in which he is carrying the business of cloth, while the other portion is in possession of defendant No. 2 in which he is running the business of ropes. Ram Prashad (P. \V. 2) has further stated that the sub-tenant is the owner of the business carried on in the portion which is separated by the partition. Ram Prashad (P. W. 2) himself is an agent of a transport Company and he also works for Lakhmi Chand. Ram Prashad has never worked as an agent for delivering goods containing rassi for defendant No. 1 Naresh Chandra and he is seeing the business of Lakhmi Chand in the disputed shop since last 6-7 years. Kailash Narayan (P. W. 3) also has stated to the same effect that there is a partition dividing the two shops and Lakhmi Chand has exclusive possession of the shop in which rassi business is done. Further, he has stated that Naresh Chandra, defendant is not related to Lakhmi Chand. This is the evidence produced by the plaintiff and the said witnesses have not been cross-examined as to why there is a separate shop of Lakhmi Chand which is separated from the main shop by a partition. This goes to show that the accommodation is divided into two parts by a partition-one portion is in possession of defendant No. 1 and the other is in possession of defendant No. 2. There is one more aspect of the case, namely, that Lakhmi Chand is running the business in the name and style of Lakhmi Chand Naresh Chand. When defendant No. 2 is doing the business in the name of Lakhmi Chand Naresh Chand it was for the defendant No. 1 to prove that the said business exclusively belonged to him or that Lakhmi Chand was working as his servant. It has come in evidence of Kailash Narayan (P. W. 3) that Naresh Chand and Lakhmi Chand are not related to each other, but Lakhmi Chand is a stranger. When Lakhmi Chand has admitted that he was carrying his business, heavy burden lies on defendant No. 1 to prove that he is not a stranger, but he is his servant, because sub-tenancy cannot be proved by direct evidence. Defendant No. 2 himself has admitted in his statement (para 5) that Lakhmi Chand who is son of Naresh Chandra is about 3 to 4 years old and that he was born after the business of rope was started in the shop by defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 2 himself has admitted in his statement (para 5) that Lakhmi Chand who is son of Naresh Chandra is about 3 to 4 years old and that he was born after the business of rope was started in the shop by defendant No. 2. If these facts are taken into consideration, it will be strange to hold that even prior to the birth of Lakhmi Chand, his name was given to the firm. This fact, the appellate Court has considered in its judgment in para 32. I agree with the reasoning given by the appellate Court and I see no reason to repeat the same again. The other evidence which defendant No. 1 could have produced to show that the rope business was his business and it is run under his guidance through his servant. It has come in evidence of the defendants that account books are kept in both the shops and the account books are written by one Rajmal and who is still alive. Rajmal has not been produced before the Court who would have been the best person to state the facts regarding the possession of defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 inter se as far as rassi shop is concerned. It has also come in evidence that Naresh Chandra has invested about Rs.5,000 in the rassi shop. The registration for the two shops, (one in the name of Naresh Chandra Lakhmi Chand and the other in the name of Ratan Sen Naresh Chandra) is separate. Naresh Chandra, as defendant, has stated that the rope shop is run by Lakhmi Chand. The octori duty is also paid by Lakhmi Chand, but in the capacity of his servant. But, these documents are not produced by either Naresh Chandra or Lakhmi Chand. Lakhmi Chand also has stated that he gets salary for working on the shop of Naresh Chandra and he signs the receipt for whatever amount he gets, on a simple paper. These documents are also not produced before the Court. Learned counsel for the appellant then took me through the evidence of Mannilal (D. W. 3) and Chhakkilal (D. W. 4). But, in my opinion, their evidence is a tainted one because they are on inimical terms with the plaintiff because a civil litigation is going on between the plaintiff and these witnesses. Learned counsel for the appellant then took me through the evidence of Mannilal (D. W. 3) and Chhakkilal (D. W. 4). But, in my opinion, their evidence is a tainted one because they are on inimical terms with the plaintiff because a civil litigation is going on between the plaintiff and these witnesses. Therefore, they somehow want to support the case of the defendant and to see that the plaintiff is harmed. It was submitted before me by learned counsel for the appellant that the defendant will not say anything against his own interest by admitting Lakhmi Chand to be the owner of the rope shop, it will be a big loss to the defendant. But, I am not impressed with this submission of the learned counsel. Using business shop which is run by the defendant for the lasr thirty years, as mentioned in the evidence, has many advantages in favour of the defendant No. 1. Further, doing the business for last thirty years must have created goodwill in favour of defendant No. 2 and further, to get a good shop in the locality now-a-days is a big problem. Therefore, taking all these facts into consideration, the admission by defendant No. 1 against his own intetest is not such as to hold that whatever defendant No. 1 has stated should be taken lo be true. Now, I take the point that it is not pleaded by the plaintiff that the defendant No. 1 has parted with possession and it was submitted by defendant No. 1 that unless there is exclusive possession by defendant No. 2, there cannot be parting of possession and the case will not be covered under section 12(1)(b) of the Act. Merely alleging that defendant No. 2 is the sub-tenant of defendant No. 1 is not sufticient to bring the case in the ken of section 12(I)(b) of the Act, but as I have already discussed above, both the parties have led evidence well knowing as to what case they have to meet. The plaintiff has produced evidence to show that defendant No. 2 has exclusive possession and he is running rassi shop in a portion which is tenanted to defendant No. 1. The plaintiff has produced evidence to show that defendant No. 2 has exclusive possession and he is running rassi shop in a portion which is tenanted to defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 1 has also tried to show that rassi business is his business and that Lakhmi Chand is his servant, but, in my opinion, the stand taken by defendant No. 1 that Lakhmi Chand is his servant, the defendant has miserably failed to prove. Therefore, the only inference can be drawn is that the original tenant has parted with possession of a portion of accommodation by allowing Lakhmi Chand to run his shop in a portion which is separated by a partition. It dearly indicates that Lakhmi Chand, the alleged servant, is in exclusive possession of the said portion. Therefore, the case is fully covered under section 12(1)(b) of the Act. As such, I see no reason to disturb the finding of the courts below and also to disturb the decree passed against the defendant. Lastly, it was submitted that if this Court is going to grant a decree of eviction against the defendants, then taking into consideration that they are occupying the shop for the last thirty years and they will suffer in their business and goodwill of the shop, sufficient time be given to the defendants to vacate the disputed portion. This submission has force and in my opinion, the defendants should be given time to vacate the disputed portion upto 31st August, 1982. The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails and is dismissed, but the defendants are given time upto 31st August, 1982 to vacate the shop. The plaintiff will be entitled to get mesne profits up to the date till the shop is vacated at the rate of Rs.87-50 per month. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed