JUDGMENT Kaushal Kishore, Member - On this reference dated July 11, 1980 being made by Sri B.N. Tandon, Member, Board of Revenue, this Larger Bench was constituted by the Senior most Member/Chairman for giving the answer to the question 'whether the rules for allotment, cancellation etc. in respect of Gaon Sabha land allotted for the purpose of Abadi will apply as they stood on the dale of allotment or as on the date the authority concerned takes cognizance of the matter'. There is no dispute about the rules applicable for allotment being those applicable on the date of allotment for judging whether the allotment is legal or not. So the question that remains to be answered is 'whether the rules for cancellation of allotment of Abadi sites will apply as they stood on the date of allotment or as on the date the authority concerned takes cognizance of the matter'. 2. We have heard the learned counsel for both the sides and have also perused the record. For a better appreciation of the question, it is desirable to have the facts of the case in brief. Plot number 147 which was recorded as Banjar was allotted to the revisionist Amrit Lal on June 25, 1965 under clause III to the first proviso of rule 115-L of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Rules. The revisionist claims to have constructed a house within two years of the allotment. The opposite party started interference in 1974 and filed a suit for injunction which was withdrawn on December 4, 1975. There after the opposite party moved an application under Section 122-C(6) and Rule 115-P. The revisionist challenged the jurisdiction of the court in these proceedings but the Collector by his order dated April 15, 1977 decided that the proceedings were maintainable and were not barred by limitation. The revision was filed against this order in which the question has arisen. 3. The learned counsel for the applicant Sri S.C. Varma, has argued that at the time of allotment, there was no provision for cancellation of the allotment and the only condition for extinction of rights of the allottee was contained in the then Rule 115-P which requires the allottee to build a house either Kuchcha or Pucca and begin to reside in it or use it for the purpose for which it was built within two years from the date of allotment. He argued that since a house had been constructed within the stipulated period, no provision for cancellation of allotment was left and any subsequent objection to the allotment was barred by time. He further argued that the provisions under Rule 115-N for cancellation of allotments applied to irregularities in auction of the Abadi sites and the limitation was three months from the date of auction. Since in the instant case, no auction was held, he argued, there was no question of the application of the provision under Rule 115-N. The learned counsel argued that valuable rights accrued to the applicant after construction of the house and these could not be taken away by the subsequent amendments. In support, he cited a ruling reported in 1961 R.D. 380. This is a High Court's Division Bench decision, and considering Section 202-B, it was held that if as a result of the expiry of the period of limitation, a vested right is acquired by any party, a subsequent amendment in law of limitation will not affect that vested right and the amended provision relating to limitation will not apply so as to govern rights in respect of which finality had come into existence before the amendment, except where the amendment in law of limitation is by the legislature, expressly made applicable retrospectively. 4. The learned counsel further argued that the application for cancellation of the allotment under Section 122-C(6) was not maintainable because this Section 122-C itself came into existence on May 24, 1971 and the provision for cancellation applies only to allotments of land under this section. 5. The learned counsel further argued that the rule relating to cancellation of allotment in 1965 was very different than its amended form, in 1975. The former Rule 115-N (replaced by the present amended form in Rule 115-P) runs as below: "115-N. (1) The Assistant Collector in-charge of the sub-division shall, on the application of any person interested, filed within three months of the date of auction, and may, at any time on his own motion, cancel for reasons to be recorded in writing the allotment order on one or more of the following grounds; (i) the bid accepted was inadequate; (ii) the auction was collusive or unfair; (iii) the auction proceedings were not followed in accordance with the rules; (iv) any other ground. (2) No order under sub-rule (1) shall be pasted unless the allottee has been given an opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. (2) The decision of the Assistant Collector in-charge of the sub-division shall be final." This rule underwent drastic changes by the notification No. 256/Rajaswa-l-3(l)-71 dated March 16/17, 1972 and it became as reproduced below: - "115-P. (1) The Collector, may, of his own motion or on the application of any person aggrieved by any order of allotment of land under rule 115-L or 115-N, proceed to make an inquiry in the manner given hereunder. (2) The allottee and Land Management Committee shall be necessary parties to all such cases. (3) The Collector on the application of any party or otherwise may pass suitable interim orders at any time before the final disposal of the case. (4) The Collector shall call upon all persons interested in the order of allotment to appear and present their case before him. It shall not be necessary to record evidence but the memo of the day to day inquiry shall be kept on record by the Collector. On making enquiries, if he is satisfied that the allotment is irregular, he may cancel the allotment and thereupon the light, title and interest of the allottee and of every other person claiming through him in the land shall cease. (5) The order of the Collector under the preceding sub-rule shall be final." 6. The learned counsel argued in respect of the rule of interpretation that in case two interpretations are possible, ore prospective and the other retrospective, then the interpretation in favour of prospective should he chosen. In support, he cited a ruling reported in A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 936, in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as below: - "The principles that have to be applied for interpretation of statutory amendments taking away substantive rights are well established. The first of these is that statutory provisions creating substantive rights or taking away substantive rights are ordinarily prospective; they are retrospective only if by express words or by necessary implication the Legislature has made them retrospective; and the retrospective operation will be limited only to the extent to which it has been so made by express words, or necessary implication. The second rule is that the intention of the Legislature has always to be gathered from the words used by it giving to the words their plain, normal, grammatical meaning. The third rule is that if in any legislation, the general object of which is to benefit a particular class of persons, any provision is ambiguous so that it is capable of two meanings, one which would preserve the benefit and another which would take it away, the meaning which preserves it should be adopted. The fourth rule is that if the strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to an absurdity or inconsistency such interpretation should be discarded and an interpretation which will give effect to the purpose the Legislature may reasonably be considered to have had, will be put on the words, if necessary, even by modification of the language used." Their Lordships further warranted that - "In their anxiety to advance the beneficent purpose of legislation courts must not, however, yield to the temptation of seeking ambiguity when there is none." This, no doubt, relates to substantive law but the difficulty with the rules under consideration is that they are not purely procedural law, they also include conveyance of statutory rights as well as limitation and creation of rights by passage of limitation period. In the ruling reported in 1970 R.D. 249, the Hon'ble High Court dealing with the Sirdari rights acquired by an Asami under Section 204 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, held that rights acquired before amendment cannot be taken away by the amendment in limitation. It is observed that where the intention of the Legislature is otherwise, it is expressly provided in the section as in the present Section 210 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act which now prohibits the Gaon Sabha Asamis from becoming Sirdars. 7. The learned counsel for the opposite-party. Sri N.B. Nigam and Sri D.N. Srivastava, D.G.C (R) argued that the procedural law is always retrospective and alterations in procedure should take effect retrospectively. They further argued that change in jurisdiction or in limitation are matters of procedure and do not affect the rights of the party concerned. 7. The learned counsel for the opposite-party. Sri N.B. Nigam and Sri D.N. Srivastava, D.G.C (R) argued that the procedural law is always retrospective and alterations in procedure should take effect retrospectively. They further argued that change in jurisdiction or in limitation are matters of procedure and do not affect the rights of the party concerned. A case may be triable by the S.D.O. and by some amendment, it may become triable by the Collector, but the parties cannot claim on the ground of institution of the proceedings before the amendment that they must be heard according to the former provision. In support of their argument that limitation is a matter of procedure, the learned counsel cited rulings reported in A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 655 and A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 241. In the former ruling, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the finality of the appellate decision under Section 15(4) of the East Punjab Urban Land Restrictions Act before its amendment by the Act XXIX of 1926 could not be invoked by the appellant before the appellate decision was actually recorded. It was further observed that it is well settled that where an amendment affects the vested rights, the amendment would operate prospectively unless it is expressly made retrospective or its retrospective effects follow as a matter of necessary implication. This amounts to retrospective extension of limitation in cases where it has not already expired, being valid. In the latter ruling, it was held that the law of limitation is a procedural law and the provision existing on the date of the suit applies to it. However, we do not find any clash between these principles and the arguments of the applicant's counsel that it is not a question of change in the limitation but an entirely new provision coming into force by the amendment effective from March 16/17, 1972. His point precisely is that in 1965. there was no provision for cancellation of the allotment and the present rule 115-P coming into force from March 16/17, 1972 cannot be termed as amendment in limitation or procedure. 8. The learned counsel for the opposite party further cited rulings reported in A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 577 and A.I.R. 1941 Federal Court 5, in support of their contention that any change in procedure during the pendency of the appeal can also be considered. 8. The learned counsel for the opposite party further cited rulings reported in A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 577 and A.I.R. 1941 Federal Court 5, in support of their contention that any change in procedure during the pendency of the appeal can also be considered. The principle is sound but its application in this case appears to be misconceived, in counting even substantive law under the procedural law. The principle that procedural law is retrospective finds confirmation in the ruling reported in 1981 U.P. R.J. 136 SC wherein it was held that no person has a vested right in any course of procedure and alterations in procedure are always retrospective unless there be some good reasons against it. 9. The above consideration covers the principles which must be applied to the instant reference with respect to rules which give the procedure. The relevant rules are not purely procedural law or purely substantive law but in some places cover both. One notable example in Rule 26, read with Rule 115-R as it existed in 1965, which is important too, but the learned counsel on either side somehow chose not to mention it. It should be useful to reproduce the relevant rules as they were in 1965 or rather before the amendment of March 16/17, 1972 and as they were after the aforesaid amendment of March 16/17, 1972. As in 1965: "115-L. Abadi sites situate in the Abadi or in the waste land of the area vested in the Gaon Samaj shall be allotted for the purpose of construction of buildings in the following order of preference - (a) a landless agricultural labourer or a landless servant of the village community such as Barhai, Dhobi, Lohar, Sweeper etc.; (b) a Bhumidhar, Sirdar or Adhivasi, who is holding less than 5 standard bighas; (c) others. Allotment shall be made on the result of public auction held for this purpose. The exact location of the site to be auctioned, the time, the date and venue of the auction shall be announced by beat of drum in the circle of the Gaon Samaj: Provided that - (i) no auction shall be held where any of the applicants requires a site for the construction of a building for a charitable purpose. In case of such an applicant, the site shall be allotted to him without payment of premium. In case of such an applicant, the site shall be allotted to him without payment of premium. If there are more than one such applicants, the Land Management Committee shall decide as to whom the site may be allotted. The decision of the Land Management Committee in this respect shall be final subject to confirmation by the Assistant Collector in-charge of the sub-division. (ii) The provision of clause (i) shall also apply in cases where an applicant requires a site for setting up cottage industry, provided that a certificate to this effect is obtained from the Assistant Collector in-charge of the sub-division. In case where there are two applicants for a site, one requiring it for charitable purpose and the other for setting up cottage industry, the Land Management Committee shall decide as to whom the site may be allotted. The decision of the Land Management Committee in this respect shall be final subject to confirmation by the Assistant Collector in-charge of the sub-division. (iii) Abadi sites in the area earmarked for Abadi in the waste land shall not be put to auction unless there are more applicants than the sites available: Provided further that if there is only one applicant requiring a site for the construction of a house it shall be allotted to him on payment of such premium as may be fixed by the Land Management Committee in this behalf: Provided also that the provisions oil this rule shall not apply in case where the Abadi site is required for settling those who have lost their houses on account oft floods. In such cases the land will be earmarked and allotted by the Land Management Committee according to directions of the Collector. 115-M - Subject to the provisions of Rule 115-L, the auction for Abadi sites for construction of houses shall be open to all persons residing in the circle of the Gaon Samaj. The first bidding shall be confined among the persons of categories (b) and (c) mentioned in Rule 115-L, and the highest bid shall be recorded. 115-M - Subject to the provisions of Rule 115-L, the auction for Abadi sites for construction of houses shall be open to all persons residing in the circle of the Gaon Samaj. The first bidding shall be confined among the persons of categories (b) and (c) mentioned in Rule 115-L, and the highest bid shall be recorded. Immediately thereafter, there shall be a second bidding among the persons of category (a) mentioned in Rule 115-L. The highest bid in the second bidding, provided it is not less than 25 per cent of the highest bid recorded in the first bidding, shall be taken as the final bid and accepted, if the bidder belongs to category (b) mentioned in rule 115-L. If the highest bid recorded in the first bidding is of the person belonging to category (c) the highest bidder among the persons of category (b) shall be given an option to pay the amount of the highest bid recorded in the first bidding. If agrees to pay the amount, his offer shall be accepted, and if not, the highest bid recorded in the first bidding shall be taken as final and accepted. The person whose bid is accepted, shall be required to pay one-fourth of the bid money immediately and the balance within a time to be fixed by the Land Management Committee. If the balance is not paid within the time so fixed, the advance money shall be liable to forfeiture in the discretion of the land Management Committee. Explanation - The definition of landless agricultural labourer shall be the same as given in tile explanation to rule 175. 115-N. - (1) The Assistant Collector in-charge of the sub-division shall, on the application of any person interested, filed within three months of the date of auction, and may, at any time on his own motion, cancel for reasons to be recorded in writing the allotment order on one or more of the following grounds: (i) the bid accepted was inadequate, (ii) the auction was collusive or unfair; (iii) the auction proceedings were not followed in accordance with the rules; (iv) any other ground. (2) No order under sub-rule (1) shall be passed unless the allottee has been given an opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. (2) The decision of the Assistant Collector in-charge of the sub-division shall be final. (2) No order under sub-rule (1) shall be passed unless the allottee has been given an opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. (2) The decision of the Assistant Collector in-charge of the sub-division shall be final. 115-P. - The person to whom an Abadi site is allotted shall be required to build a house, either Kachcha or Pucca, and begin to reside in it or use it for the purpose for which it was built within two years from the date of allotment. If he fails to do so, his rights shall be extinguished and the site may be re-auctioned. 115-R. - Subject to the provisions in rules 115-L to 115-Q the rights of the allottee of the Abadi sites shall be governed by rule 26. 26. - Private wells and buildings - (a) Subject to sub-rule (b) the site of a well or building along with the area appurtenant thereto, situate within the limits of an estate shall be deemed to be settled with the owner of the said well or building, on the following terms and conditions: - (i) He shall have a heritable and transferable interests in the site. (ii) He shall not be liable to ejectment on any ground whatsoever. (iii) He shall have the right to use the site for any purpose whatsoever subject to the existing rights of easement. (iv) Succession shall be governed by personal layv. (v) If the building is abandoned or if the well goes out of use, or if the owner dies without any heir entitled to succeed, the site shall escheat to the State. (vi) (1) He shall pay to the Gaon Samaj rent for the site equal to the amount of rent payable therefor on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting. He shall, however, not be liable to pay any rent for the site if no such rent was payable on the said date. (2) (i) In case the site is assigned for any public purpose, such as roads, hospitals, dispensaries, schools and the like, which will not yield any income either in the present or in the near future to the individual or body assigning it, the Gaon Samaj shall report the fact to the Collector, giving the details of the land and the amount of rent involved. The Collector may exempt the site from the payment of rent for so long as it is utilized for any purpose of the nature indicated above. (ii) When such exemption has once been sanctioned by the Collector, the Gaon Samaj may sanction the continuance of the exemption from year to year so long as the land is being put to the same use. (iii) In the beginning of every revenue year the Gaon Samaj shall enquire whether all land in respect of which exemption has been allowed is still used for the purpose which made it eligible for exemption. If it is found that the land or any portion thereof has ceased to be so used, or though used for i.he same purpose as before, has started to yield and income to the body or the individual concerned, the Gaon Samaj shall report the fact to the Collector with necessary details. The Collector may, after making such inquiry as he considers necessary, direct that the exemption from the payment of rent should cease wholly or in part, as the case may demand. (3) The person or body assigning the site has no right to claim exemption from the payment of rent as a matter of course. Such exemption can only be granted by the Collector who has full discretion to reject any case which does not completely fulfil the requirements of sub-clause (2)(i) above. (b) The site of a private well or a building in a holding or grove shall be deemed to be settled with the tenure-holder on the same tenure as the holding or the grove in which it is situate." After amendment of March 16/17, 1972: "115-L. - Abadi sites for preferential categories - (1) The Assistant Collector in-charge of the sub-division may, wherever land earmarked for the extension of Abadi for Harijans under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 and any other land of Abadi site vested in Gaon Sabha is insufficient to meet the housing requirements of persons referred to in sub-section (3) of Section 122-C, proceed to earmark land for Abadi sites in accordance with sub-section (1) of the said section. (2) ............. (2) ............. (3) Before allotting housing sites to persons referred to in sub-section (3) of Section 122-C, the Assistant Collector incharge of the sub-division shall, in respect of each village, cause to be prepared the following lists and extracts - (i) a list in Z.A. Form 49-D showing separately particulars of persons of the three categories mentioned in sub-section (3) of Section 122-C; (ii) a list in Z.A. Form 49-E of lands enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 122-C; and (iii) an extract of village map showing the plots given in the above list. (4) In making allotment of housing sites under this rule, the order of preference mentioned in sub-section (3) of Section 122-C shall be observed. (5) No premium shall be charged for allotment of housing sites under this rule. 115-M. - Other Abadi sites - (1) Abadi sites other than those referred to in rule 115-L and vested in a Gaon Sabha may be allotted for construction of buildings for residential or charitable purposes on the purposes of cottage industry in the following order of preference: (a) a landless agricultural labourer or village artisan residing in the village; (b) a Bhumidhar, Sirdar or Asami residing in the village and holding land less than 1.26 hectares (3.125 acres); (c) any other person residing in the village. (2) Every allottee under this rule shall be required to deposit amount equal to 40 times of the rent of the land calculated at hereditary rates which shall be credited to the Gaon Fund: Provided that no premium shall be charged in respect of site allotted for charitable purpose. 115-P. - (Amended form of old rule 115-N). - (1) The Collector may, of his own motion or on the application of any person aggrieved by any order of allotment of land under rule 115-L or 115-M, proceed to make an inquiry in the manner given hereunder. (2) The allottee and Land Management Committee shall be necessary parties to all such cases. (3) The Collector on the application of any party or otherwise may pass suitable interim orders at any time before the final disposal of the case. (4) The Collector shall call upon all persons interested in the order of allotment to appear and present their case before him. (3) The Collector on the application of any party or otherwise may pass suitable interim orders at any time before the final disposal of the case. (4) The Collector shall call upon all persons interested in the order of allotment to appear and present their case before him. It shall not be necessary to record evidence but the memo of the day to day inquiry shall he kept on record by the Collector. On making inquiries, if he is satisfied that the allotment is irregular, he may cancel the allotment and thereupon the right, title and interest of the allottee and of every other person claiming through him in the land shall cease. (5) The order of the Collector under the preceding sub-rule shall be final." Under Rule 115-0, a limit of 250 sq. yds. for allotment of house sites was prescribed which was later amended to 250 sq. mts. The old rule 115-P provided that the person to whom an Abadi site was allotted would be required to build a house either Kuchcha or Pucca and begin to reside in it or use it for the purpose for which it was built within two years from the date of allotment, and failing to do so his rights would be extinguished and the site can be re-auctioned. This became rule 115-Q after the amendment of March 16/17, 1972. The former rule 115-Q imposing a restriction on transfer within 5 years from the date of allotment unless the transfer was by the heirs of the deceased allottee, was included in the amended rule 115-R, and the restriction period was raised to ten years after March 16/17, 1972. This became rule 115-Q after the amendment of March 16/17, 1972. The former rule 115-Q imposing a restriction on transfer within 5 years from the date of allotment unless the transfer was by the heirs of the deceased allottee, was included in the amended rule 115-R, and the restriction period was raised to ten years after March 16/17, 1972. In the old rule 115-R, the provision was that the rights of the allottee of the Abadi sites would be governed by rule 26 subject to the provision under rule 115-L to 115-Q. After the amendment of March 16/17, 1972, this rule did not contain any reference to rule 26 and was made self-sufficient as reproduced below: - "115-R. (2) Subject to the provisions of rules 115-L to 115-Q, all allotments of land or site shall be subject to the following conditions, namely - (a) the allottee as well as his heirs shall have a heritable interest in the land or site so allotted; (b) the allottee and his heirs shall not be liable to ejectment; (c) the succession shall be governed by the personal law to which the allottee was subject to; and (d) if the building is abandoned or if the owner thereof dies without any heir entitled to succeed the land or site and the building shall vest in the Gaon Sabha." It may be noted that in the old rule 115-L, the allotment of Abadi sites to preferential categories and others is provided and it is further provided in which cases no auction for allotment would be held. In the old rule 115-M, the procedure for auction and payment of bid amount was given. In that context, the old rule 115-N was framed, giving grounds on which the allotment could be cancelled. The learned counsel for the opposite party have relied upon ground No. 4 any other ground' to include any irregularity in the allotment as a possible ground for cancellation of the allotment, but this is not logical inference as would be clear on reading the full rule 115-N (1). The limitation in this rule is three months from the date of auction and no limitation for suo moto action which from the context in earlier rule 115-M, makes it clear that the ground must relate to the auction and would not relate to any allotment without auction. The limitation in this rule is three months from the date of auction and no limitation for suo moto action which from the context in earlier rule 115-M, makes it clear that the ground must relate to the auction and would not relate to any allotment without auction. The grounds (i), (ii) and (iii) indicate specific defects or irregularities or inadequacies in the auction and the clause 'any other ground' was, no doubt, added to make the provision more comprehensive to include any defect, irregularity or inadequacy in the auction not specifically mentioned in the rule. We are, therefore, definite about the interpretation of this rule that the ground could not have covered any aspect other than that related to the auction for the Abadi sites. 10. It is necessary to examine the effects of rule 26(a)(2), made applicable by rule 115-R before amendment on March 16/17, 1972. This rule gives definitely valuable rights to an allottee who constructs a building on the allotted site for he immediately acquired a heritable and transferable interest in the site, was not liable to ejectment 'on any ground whatsoever', his succession would be governed by personal law, etc. He did no longer remain just an allottee but became a person having rights contained in Rule 26. It is further observed that when these various provisions were included in rule 115-R itself by the amendment of March 16/17, 1972, right to transfer was made applicable after ten years from the date of allotment except in the case of heirs of a deceased allottee, in place of the provision of five years in the old rule. But the most important change was that the bar to ejectment 'on any ground whatsoever' was reduced to a mere bar to ejectment. In our considered view, the implications of this change cover a wider scope. The former provision amounted to an absolute bar, in view of the fact that once the allotment was without auction, and the allottee constructed a building within limitation period, there was no provision left for cancellation of the allotment and so, was consistent with the old rule 115-N. The ejectment was possible only when an allottee through auction could no longer be called an allottee, the allotment being cancelled under rule 115-N and rule 115-K/Rule 26 remaining no longer applicable to the ex-allottees. After the amendment of March 16117, 1972, the allotment became liable to cancellation on various grounds covering the irregularities in the allotment. We thus find a marked change in the rights of the allottees with the amendment of March 16/17, 1972. 11. In view of this discussion, the precise distinction between the old rules and the new rules may be stated as below: (1) The old rule 115-N contained provisions for cancellation of allotments based on auctions only, while in the new rule 115-P, the allotment could be cancelled on finding any irregularity in the allotment. (2) An allottee who constructed a house or building on the allotted site within the stipulated period was entitled to protection under rule 26 under old rule 115-R, while no such unqualified protection was available under the new rule 115-R. The only other provision for extinction of rights of allottees in general, in old rule 115-P, continued in the new rule 115-Q. 12. It would be useful to repeat the well-known principles of interpretation in regard to retrospective operation of the statutes as observed in the ruling 1981 U.P. R.J. 136 SC. "A statute which takes away or impairs substantive rights acquired under the existing law is construed to have a prospective operation unless the language of that statute expressly or by inevitable intendment compels a contrary construction." It may be plainly seen that before the amendment of March 16/17, 1972, an allottee without auction who had constructed a house on the allotted Abadi site within two years from the dale of the allotment, had acquired valuable rights on the site of the building along with the area appurtenant thereto, the total area not exceeding 250 sq. yds., and these rights could not be challenged or taken away by any proceeding under the amended provision of law after March 16/17, 1972. To all other cases, there would be no bar to the application of the amended rules. yds., and these rights could not be challenged or taken away by any proceeding under the amended provision of law after March 16/17, 1972. To all other cases, there would be no bar to the application of the amended rules. We do not think it necessary for us to define as to what should be deemed the area appurtenant to a building, for public housing coming up now in a big way and the building regulations providing definite set backs in the front, rear and sides of a house, it should not be difficult for the court to decide the limits of the precise area appurtenant to a building with reference to the area of construction itself, when another limit of 250 sq. yds. total area was already there. We may observe that irrespective of the area allotted, the protection of rule 26 applies only to the above defined area subject to a maximum of 250 sq. yds. imposed by the rule 115-O. 13. It may further be observed that the above discussion is not covered by the present Section 123 which provides protection to certain specified categories (weaker Sections of the society), while special rights conferred under Section 9, rule 26 were applicable to the former allottees in general on certain conditions, and there was no reservation for any specified category of the society. Therefore, this consideration irrespective of the provisions contained under Section 123 has become necessary. 14. It is necessary to make distinction between rules and procedure. There may be rules prescribing procedure and also rules conveying substantive rights in various mariner. Rules cannot always be taken to mean procedure and amendment in rules might affect procedure as well as substantive rights. The reference is about the applicability of rules, while the various pronouncements in the rulings discussed only lead to the conclusion that amendments in procedure are retrospective. Whenever amendments in procedure directly or by necessary implication transgress into consideration of substantive rights already acquired, the need of caution cannot be overemphasized. 15. In consequence, the reference is I answered as below: - (1) In case of allottees of Abadi sites, where date of allotment was prior to the amendment of March 16/17, 1972. Whenever amendments in procedure directly or by necessary implication transgress into consideration of substantive rights already acquired, the need of caution cannot be overemphasized. 15. In consequence, the reference is I answered as below: - (1) In case of allottees of Abadi sites, where date of allotment was prior to the amendment of March 16/17, 1972. the rules including the old rules 115-N, 115-O and 115-P with amendments to provide for enquiry by the Collector in place of the S.D.O., if any as they stood on the date of allotment, shall be applicable, only in respect of the site of the building constructed within two years, along with the area appurtenant thereto, subject to a maximum area of 250 sq. yds. The Collector, of course, will have jurisdiction to enquire for ascertaining whether the land, or what part of it, if any, is covered by this clause. (2) Rules applicable on the date of allotment will govern the legality of an allotment. Subsequent amendment will not make a legal allotment an illegal one, unless the subsequent amendment is made specifically retrospective. (3) An illegal allotment can never give a vested right to the allottee. (4) In case of allottee of Abadi sites where date of allotment was prior to the amendment of March 16/17, 1972, in respect of the area not covered by (1) above, the rules as on the date the authority concerned takes cognizance of the matter, shall be applicable. (5) In case of allottees of Abadi sites, where date of allotment was after the amendment of March 16/17, 1972, in respect of the whole allotted area, the rules as on the date the authority concerned takes cognizance of the matter, shall be applicable. (6) In case of Abadi sites allotted after May 24, 1971 under Section 122-C, the procedure for cancellation contained in Section 122-C(6) shall be applicable. (7) The Collector will follow the procedure prescribed for dealing with the application for cancellation of the allotment according to the rules applicable on the date of application, subject to, the above. 16. The file may now be returned, with the above answer to the reference, for further action by the Member having jurisdiction.