JUDGMENT 1. - This is a writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India by Ram Rattan son of Shri Kalyan challenging the validity of the orders dated February 17, 1981 and August 1, 1981 passed by the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer (hereinafter referred to as 'the Board'), whereby learned Member of the Board unheld the finding of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bundi to the effect that the petitioner had 16.12 standard acres of and as surplus under the Ceiling laws and the same was resumable. 2. The history of the land reforms in general and of the ceiling laws in particular, in Rajasthan need not be chronicled here, as the same had been dealt with at length by a Division Bench of this Court to which I was a party: vide Rajeshwar Singh v. S.D,O., Amber and others, 1981 RLW 561. 3. The facts giving rise to this writ petition are that proceedings under chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Act No. 3 of 1955) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') were initiated against the petitioner, but the same were dropped: vide order dated January 6, 1971 by holding that he does not have any surplus land. The State Government in exercise of the powers under Section 15(2) of the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1973'), as amended by Act No. 8 of 1976, reopened the case of the petitioner and learned Sub-Divisional Officer after hearing the parties held that on the notified date i.e., April 1, 1966 the petitioner had 56.12 standard acres of land. He had seven members in his family. As such the family was entitled to retain only 40 standard acres of land. As the petitioner possessed 16.12 standard acres of land in surplus. the same was resumable. 4. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the above order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, dated March 15, 1979, in the Board, but the same was dismissed: vide judgement, dated February 17, 1981. The review petition filed by the petitioner was also dismissed on August 1, 1981. Hence this writ petition. 5. Though a number of points were raised in the writ petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner, keeping in view various decisions of this Court and other Courts, confined their arguments on the following points: 1. The review petition filed by the petitioner was also dismissed on August 1, 1981. Hence this writ petition. 5. Though a number of points were raised in the writ petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner, keeping in view various decisions of this Court and other Courts, confined their arguments on the following points: 1. The ceiling proceedings out of which the impugned judgement arises were instituted after the coming into force of the Act of 1973, as such the case ought to have been decided under the Act of 1973, and not under Chapter III - B of the Act. 2. Out of 113 Bighas of land 100 Bighas of land was ancestral property in the hands of the petitioner. His children have interest in it. A coparcener acquires an interest in the ancestral property by birth and as such he cannot be termed to be dependent upon his father within the meaning of Section 30-B(a) of the Act. 3. That the petitioner's son Mahavir, who became major at the time of the decision of this case by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bundi could not be considered as a member of the family headed by Ram Ratan. He ought to have been considered as a separate unit. 4. That vide decree dated November 19, 1970 a partition decree of the joint Hindu family property was passed by a competent Court. Under the decree each member of the joint family was awarded separate partion of land. Each of them became a separate unit and the land coming to their share could not have been clubbed along with the land of the petitioner. Learned Sub-Divisional Officer and the Board while deciding the case in hand committed an error of law in not considering the effect of that decree. A reference for cancellation of the decree, dated November 19, 1970, was made by the Collector to the Board, but the same was rejected and as such it is not open to the State Government to urge that the petitioner, his children and other members dependent upon him formed a family within the meaning of Section 30-B(a) of the Act. 5. That the possession of the petitioner on 13 Big has of land was that of a mortgagee and the land could not have been treated as land belonging to the petitioner. 5. That the possession of the petitioner on 13 Big has of land was that of a mortgagee and the land could not have been treated as land belonging to the petitioner. It ought to have been clubbed with 100 Bighas of joint family land. 6. Before dealing with the aforesaid contentions, it would be profitable to read Section 15(2) of the Act of 1973, which is as under: "15. Power to re-open cases.-(1) .......(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 40, it the State Government, at any time within three years of the commencement of this Act, is satisfied that the ceiling area in relation to a person as fixed under the law repealed by the said section has been determined in contravention of the provisions of such repealed law, it my direct any officer subordinate to it, to re-open a decided case and enquire into it and to determine the ceiling area and the surplus area afresh in accordance with the provisions of such repealed law." A bare perusal of the above noted section makes it crystal clear that cases re-opened under sub-section 2 of Section 15 of the Act of 1973 are required to be decided afresh in accordance with the provisions of the repealed law," i. e., the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. 7. Section 40 (1) of the Act of 1973 reads as under: "40. Repeal and savings - (1) Except as provided in second proviso to sub-section (1) of section 4 and in sub-section (2) of section 15 of this Act, the provisions of clause (6A) of section 5 and Chapter III B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act 3 of 1955) are hereby repealed except in the Rajasthan Canal Project area wherein such provisions shall stand repealed on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area. (2) & (3) ............" Thus the repeal is subject to certain exceptions as specified in section 4 (1) of the Rajasthan Act No. 11 of 1973. The relevant portion of Section 4 (l) of the Act of 1973, reads as under: "4. Ceiling areas (1).......... (a) to (h)................... Explanation............... Proviso................. (2) & (3) ............" Thus the repeal is subject to certain exceptions as specified in section 4 (1) of the Rajasthan Act No. 11 of 1973. The relevant portion of Section 4 (l) of the Act of 1973, reads as under: "4. Ceiling areas (1).......... (a) to (h)................... Explanation............... Proviso................. Provided further that if the ceiling area applicable to any person or family in accordance with this section exceeds the ceiling area applicable to such person or family according to the provisions of law repealed by section 40, in that case the ceiling area applicable to such person or family will be the same as was under the provisions of the said repealed law. ............." I may point out that even under the second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act of 1973 the ceiling area applicable to a person or family has to be determined just in accordance with the provisions of the old law, namely, the provisions of Chapter III B of the Act. Thereafter the ceiling area applicable to such person or family has to be determined under the new law, namely, the Act of 1973 and in case the ceiling area determined according to the provisions of the new Act exceeds the ceiling area applicable to such parson or family as determined under the old law, then the ceiling area applicable to such person or the family under the Act of 1973 shall be the same as determined under the old law i. e., under Chapter III-B of the Act. In view of such a provision, the ceiling area applicable to the family was to he determined of under the old law. As it is not in dispute that the family so far as the petitioner is concerned could constitute the same constituents both under the old law as well as under the new law. I am of the view that the petitioner cannot he said to have suffered any loss at all on account of the determination of the ceiling area in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III-B of the Act. 8. The second and third contentions also are devoid of any merit. 9. The State Government vide Notification No. F. 6 (9) Rev, B,64 dated February 11, 1966, fixed the notified date under Section 30-E of the Act, as April 1, 1966. 8. The second and third contentions also are devoid of any merit. 9. The State Government vide Notification No. F. 6 (9) Rev, B,64 dated February 11, 1966, fixed the notified date under Section 30-E of the Act, as April 1, 1966. The Act fixed 30 standard acres of land as the ceiling area, which could be held by a person or family consisting of live or less then five members. Directions were issued the it every person, who possesses land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him, should make a declaration of such possession of land in excess of the ceiling land and should surrender the same and place it at the disposal of the State Government. Such a declaration and surrender of excess land was required to be made within six months from the notified date. The requirement of sub-section (2), (34 and (4) of Section 30-E of the Act is that any person having excess land must make a declaration and surrender the excess land, failing which the person concerned would expose himself to penalty provided in the Act. Sub-Section (4) reads that in addition to such penalty the person retaining possession of any land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him shall be deemed to be trespasser liable to ejectment as provided under Section 183 of the Act. Under the fiction of law such a person is deemed to be the trespasser over the excess land from the notified date. The ceiling area of a 'family' or a person' as defined in Section 30-B of the Act is required to be determined with reference to the notified date and i of with reference to the date of decision of the case. This point is no more res integra. as it stands concluded by a number of decisions of this Court. Reference in this connection may be made with advantage to Kesari Lal v. S.D.O. Ramganj Mandi, A.I.R. 1977 Rajasthan 229, and Mst. Bhanwari Bai v. Board of Revenue & Ors. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1686 of 1981, decided on April 14, 1982). 10. The Rajasthan State Legislature. vide Act No. 4 of 1960, published in the Rajasthan Gazette Extraordinary, dated March 21, 1960, introduced Chapter III-B in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. Section 30-B and Section 30-C read as under:- "30-B. Definitions. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1686 of 1981, decided on April 14, 1982). 10. The Rajasthan State Legislature. vide Act No. 4 of 1960, published in the Rajasthan Gazette Extraordinary, dated March 21, 1960, introduced Chapter III-B in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. Section 30-B and Section 30-C read as under:- "30-B. Definitions. For the purposes of this Chapter:- (a) 'family' shall mean a family consisting of a husband and wife, their children and grand-children being dependent on them and the widowed mother of the husband so dependent; and (b) 'person' in the case of an individual, shall include the family of such individual " "30-C. Extent of ceiling area. The ceiling area for a family consisting of five or less than five members shall be thirty standard acres of land: Provided that. where the members of a family exceed five, the ceiling area in relation thereto shall be increased for each additional member by five standard acres, so however that it does not exceed sixty standard acres of land. Explanation-A 'Standard acre' shall mean the area of land which, with reference to its productive capacity, situation, soil classification and other prescribed particulars, is found in the prescribed manner to be likely to yield ten maunds of wheat yearly; and in case of land not capable of producing wheat, the other likely produce thereof shall, for the purpose of calculating a standard acre, be determined according to the prescribed scale so as to be equivalent in terms of money value to ten maunds of wheat: Provided that, in determining, a ceiling area in terms of standard acres, the money value of the produce of well - irrigated (chahi) land shall be taken as being equivalent to the money value of the produce of an equal area of unirrigated (barani) land." The above provisions show that the Legislature, in its wisdom, has created an artificial 'family unit' and fixed a ceiling on the holding of land of such family unit. The Act created an artificial 'family unit', whereby a person (husband) and his wife, their children and grand-children being dependent on them and the widowed mother of the husband so dependent were made as one unit. I have described the 'family unit' as contemplated in the Act as an artificial legal conception, because in quite a few cases it would be different from the family as known in ordinary parlance. I have described the 'family unit' as contemplated in the Act as an artificial legal conception, because in quite a few cases it would be different from the family as known in ordinary parlance. The latter would include even independent sons and unmarried daughters and other heirs, which the former by its definition does not. It is clear from the scheme of the Act that for the purpose of determining whether land is held in excess of the ceiling area, 'family' is taken as an unit and the limitation of ceiling area is applied in relation to land deemed to he held by such family unit on the notified date and in such a case each individual member of the family is not treated as a separate unit for the purpose of applicability of limitation of ceiling. The land held by each member of the 'family' is fictionally treated as land held by the family unit and to the aggregate of such land. which is deemed to be held by family unit, the limitation of ceiling area is applied. This feature of clubbing together the land held by the members of the 'family' for the purpose of applying the limitation of ceiling area, was introduced by Act No. 4 of 1960, (which came into force with effect from December 15, 1963), almost after three years of the coming into force of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The notified date was fixed after the dismissal of the writ petitions challenging the validity of the amending Act No. 4 of 1960. It was fixed as April 1, 1966: vide Notification No. F. 6 (9) Rev. B 64, dated February 11, 1966 (reference may be made with advantage to (4) D B. Civil Writ Petition No. 24 of 1977. Ram Niwas v. State of Rajasthan) AIR 1977 P & H 221. Under the scheme of the Act the ceiling area is required to be determined with reference to the notified date and not with reference to the date when the case is decided. The scheme of Chapter III-B of the Act is to determine the ceiling area of 'family' or person including the family) with reference to the notified date. The policy of law is that no person, including the 'family' should be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area as determined under Chapter III.B of the Act. The scheme of Chapter III-B of the Act is to determine the ceiling area of 'family' or person including the family) with reference to the notified date. The policy of law is that no person, including the 'family' should be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area as determined under Chapter III.B of the Act. As soon as the exact amount of surplus land is determined, the right created in favour of the State stands vested from April 1, 1966. The obligation not to retain land in excess of the ceiling area arises from the time prescribed under sub-section (2) of Section 30-E of Chapter III-B of the Act. A transfer inter vivos, which is not bona fide, has to be ignored for determining the surplus area. Similarly a decree obtained for partition after the notified date cannot be taken into consideration for determining the surplus area of a person or 'family'. 11. It is true that but for the provisions contained in Chapter III-B of the Act the term 'person', which includes individual and natural person, as well as group or bodies of persons, an artificial person, such as family, each individual member of the family would have been entitled to hold land coming to his share upto the ceiling limit. This follows from the obvious meaning of the term 'person'. The definition of the word 'person' is inclusive and is of wider connotations. 12. The learned Member of the Board of Revenue held that the petitioner claimed non-dependent status only for his son Mahavir and not for other sons. As such I would first deal the case of Mahavir regarding his age on April 1, 1966. The petitioner Ram Rattan in his affidavit dated May 21, 1976 affirmed that Mahavir was born in 2006, which corresponds to 1949 A.D. Thus according to the petitioner's own affidavit Mahavir was 17 years of age on April 1, 1966. Letter No. 757 dated July 27, 1976 issued by the Head Master, Government Secondary School, Sawasa, Bundi reveals that according to the school record Mahavir's date of birth is July 1, 1953. Thus from the above noted two documents it can be safely said that the Board was not at mistake in holding that Mahavir was minor on April 1, 1966 This finding of fact has not been challenged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Thus from the above noted two documents it can be safely said that the Board was not at mistake in holding that Mahavir was minor on April 1, 1966 This finding of fact has not been challenged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. His main contention is that irrespective of the age all the sons of the petitioner formed the coparcenary with him and as such none of them could be held to be dependent upon the father within the meaning of Section 30-B (a) of the Act. It is a fact that the word 'dependent' appearing in Section 30-B (a) of the Act has not been defined anywhere in the Act. 13. The petitioners are Hindus. Hindu Law as administered in India today is a part of the Samrities or Hindu Dharmashastras as modified by customs and statutes Ownership of the coparcenary property vests in the whole body of coparcenary. No individual member of the family can assert, while he remains joint, that he has a definite share. The fraction which is at any time employed to describe the quant, in of the interest of a male member does not represent his right while the family is joint. 14. The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (Act No. 78 of 1956), hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1956', has an overriding effect over the customary law Section 4 of the Act of 1956 gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the Act of 1956 as against any text, rule, or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of the Act. Similarly Section 5 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (Act No. 32 of 1956). has overriding effect. 15. The word 'dependent', appearing in the definition of 'family', provided under Chapter III-B of the Act, also appears in Section 21 of the Act of 1956, which reads as under: "21. Dependent defined: ................ (i) to (iii)............... (iv) his or her son or the son of his pre-deceased son or the son or a pre-deceased son of his pre-deceased son, so long as be is a minor: Provided and to the extent that he is unable to obtain maintenance, in the case of a grand-son from his father's or mother's estate. Dependent defined: ................ (i) to (iii)............... (iv) his or her son or the son of his pre-deceased son or the son or a pre-deceased son of his pre-deceased son, so long as be is a minor: Provided and to the extent that he is unable to obtain maintenance, in the case of a grand-son from his father's or mother's estate. and in the case of a great-grandson, from the estate of his father or mother or father's father or father's mother;" Thus, a minor child has an enforceable right of maintenance against his own father irrespective of his property. In this context reference may also be made to Manu Samriti, wherein the great Sage has observed as under:- HINDI MATTER 373356 "The aged parents, a virtuous wife and an infant child must be maintained even by doing a hundred misdeeds."- Manu cited in the Mitakshara. 16. Every Hindu, irrespective of his possessing any property, is personally bound to maintain (1) his aged parents, (2) his wife, (3) his minor sons, whether legitimate or illegitimate, and (4) unmarried daughters. The right of this class to maintenance lies in personal relationship, and the corresponding obligation. which is independent of there being ancestral or joint family property, is one attaching to the individual. The liability of the father to maintenance and support his son exists independently of the existence of any ancestral property in the hands of his father. 17. A combined reading of Section 21 of the Act of 1956, provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act and the definition of 'family unit', appearing in Chapter III-B of the Act, leaves no room for doubt that the Legislature, while creating an artificial unit, mean that the family unit shall consist of the husband, wife and their minor children and widowed mother of the husband, dependent upon them. 18. 'Dependent' means a person, who derives support from another. When a statutory obligation is created on a person to maintain his or her minor children, it will be too much to say that such a child is not dependent on the person who is obliged to maintain him, simply because he is a member of a coparcenary. 19. The words 'children' and 'dependent' appearing in Section 30-B of the Act have not been defined therein. 19. The words 'children' and 'dependent' appearing in Section 30-B of the Act have not been defined therein. In the absence of a definition or anything contrary in the Act a person who is not competent to enter into a contract or enforce his claim, having not attained the age of majority i.e., 18 years, cannot be said to be not dependent on his father or mother with whom he forms his coparcenary. The word 'dependent' appearing in Section 30-B of the Act is of wider connotation. A child below 18 years of age by very reason of his or her age and relationship seeks support and maintenance from his or her parents. When the word 'child' is used with reference to parentage, it necessarily includes minor children. It not only includes minor children, but also major children. The Legislature by using the word 'dependent' ALSO MEANT TO INCLUDE A MAJOR CHILD WHO IS UNABLE TO look after himself or support himself because of his imbecility or deformity or other handicap or any other reason. The word 'dependence,' has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary as under: " 'Dependence'. A state of looking to another for support, maintenance, food, clothing, comfort and protection of a home and care." In Mozley & Whiteley's Law Dictionary the word 'dependent' has been defined as under: " 'Dependant'. A person who to some extent depends on others for the provision of the ordinary necessities of life; a parson to some extent maintained by another." The word 'dependent' has been defined in Corpus Juris Secondum Volume 26A at page 190 as under: "Generally 'dependent' is one who is in fact dependent; one who is sustained by another or relies for support on the aid of another; one who looks to another for support and maintenance; one who relies on another for reasonable necessities of life and a person who is not self sufficient." 20. Section 20 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, creates a personal obligation on a person to maintain his or her children, legitimate or illegitimate, irrespective of the fact whether the child is the member of a coparcenary or not. It is the settled rule of interpretation that in arriving at the true meaning of any particular phrase in a statute the phrase is not to be viewed isolated from its context. It is the settled rule of interpretation that in arriving at the true meaning of any particular phrase in a statute the phrase is not to be viewed isolated from its context. It must be viewed in its whole context, the title, the preamble and all other enacting parts of the statute. The enactment regarding ceiling takes notice of the necessity for wide ranging radical land reforms in order to improve rural economy. With that end in view, Chapter III-B has been introduced in the Act. The imposition of ceiling on agricultural holdings was found necessary to remove undue balance in society, resulting from landless class on the ore hand and concentration of land on the few on the other. The growth of monopolistic tendencies in the land ownership had to be arrested, if the optimum area was to be made available to the largest number of people. The panel of the land reforms set up by the Planning Commission in 1955, unanimously accepted the principle that there should be absolute limit to the area of land, which any person or a 'family unit' should hold With this end in view, the legislature by giving an artificial definition to the word 'family' in Section 30-B of the Act, intended that the dependent children, who are infants and major who cannot contract or maintain independently should be clubbed together with their parents and should be considered as one family unit. 21. As regards the fourth contention it would suffice to say that the requirement of the law is that the ceiling limit of the area of a person including the family as defined in Section 30-B of the Act is required to be determined with reference to the notified date. The provisions of Chapter III-B of the Act do not purport to set aside or reverse any decision of a Court. It does not declare a decision to be null and void. A decree obtained after the notified date cannot be taken into consideration in determining the surplus area of a person. The rights are to be determined as existed on the notified date. the ceiling are to which a person is entitled is not liable to fluctuation with the subsequent decrease or increase in the number of the members of the family. Reference may he made with advantage to a Supreme Court decision in (5) Raghunath Laxman Wani & Ors. The rights are to be determined as existed on the notified date. the ceiling are to which a person is entitled is not liable to fluctuation with the subsequent decrease or increase in the number of the members of the family. Reference may he made with advantage to a Supreme Court decision in (5) Raghunath Laxman Wani & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1971 SC 2137 . 22. Section 30-E of the Act says that no person shall, as on April 1, 1966, the date notified, continue to hold or retain any land in excess of the ceiling limit. It is a mandate of the legislature that the determination of surplus area has to be determined with reference to a fixed date and cannot continue to vary. A fiction has been created and, therefore, the date cannot be advanced beyond the notified date by fortuitous circumstance of the death of a person or birth of a person. It must be appreciated that the legislature intends that areas in excess of ceiling has to be treated as surplus. To accept any argument of variation and constant changing of this date, will defeat the very purpose of the legislation, which has its purpose. the social emileration of the landless and is in fulfilment of the Constitutional mandate to give social and economic justice to the under-privileged. A subsequent decree, obtained by the parties after the notified date cannot be taken into consideration for determining the surplus area held by a person or family'. It affects the rights of the parties who are party to the decision, bit the rights so determined inter se apply to the quantum of land which a family is entitled to retain on April 1, 1966. In this observa,ion of mine I stand fortified by a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Smt. Jaswant Kaur and another v. State of Haryana and another, AIR 1977 P. & H. 221 . 23. As regards the fifth contention the Board rightly held that the mortgaged land with the petitioner could not have been redeemed, as the right to redeem was lost by the mortgagee much prior to the coming into force of the Act. 23. As regards the fifth contention the Board rightly held that the mortgaged land with the petitioner could not have been redeemed, as the right to redeem was lost by the mortgagee much prior to the coming into force of the Act. The claim had already become barred by limitation by efflux of time and the petitioner became a tenant of the land within the meaning of sub-clause (h) of sub-section (43) of Section 5 of the Act. 24. In the result I find no merit in this writ petition. It is dismissed summarily. 25. Dr. K.S. Sidhu J. - This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the appellate order (Annexure 4), dated, February 17, 1981, by the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, thereby affirming the order (Annexure 2), dated, March 15, 1979, by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bundi, holding that the petitioner held 16.12 standard acres of land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him. 26. The ceiling law of Rajasthan, as it stood prior to the commencement of the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973, was enacted by Rajasthan Act No. 4 of 1960, which was inserted as an integral part of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. Section 30-E of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, thus amended (hereinafter called the old ceiling law) lays down inter alia that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no person shall continue to hold or retain in his possession in any capacity land in excess of the ceiling area, applicable to him, as from a date notified by the State Government in this behalf. The State Government issued the requisite notification under section 30-E of the old Ceiling law notifying April 1, 1966, as the date for the aforementioned purpose. In other words the crucial date with reference to which the surplus land of the petitioner is required to be determined is April 1, 1966. By his order, dated March 15, 1979, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bundi, held that the petitioner held 16.12 standard acres of land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him on April 1, 1966. In other words the crucial date with reference to which the surplus land of the petitioner is required to be determined is April 1, 1966. By his order, dated March 15, 1979, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bundi, held that the petitioner held 16.12 standard acres of land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him on April 1, 1966. The petitioner challenged that order in appeal before the Board of Revenue on three grounds as under: (i) The Sub-Divisional Officer ignored a decree of partition, dated, November 19, 1970, passed in respect of the petitioner's land in accordance with the provisions of section 53, Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 whereby some land out of the land held by the petitioner fell to the share of his son Mahavir. If that land is taken into consideration the petitioner is not left with any land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him. (ii) The entire land in the petitioner's holding on April 1, 1966, including the land held to be surplus land by the Sub-Divisional Officer was ancestral with the result that Mahavir had acquired an interest as a coparcener by birth. Mahavir's share of land should therefore be excluded from the land held by the petitioner for determining the surplus land on April 1, 1966. (iii) Land measuring 13 bigha 24 biswa was held by the petitioner as a mortgagee and the same could not be legally included in his holding for determining the surplus land. 27. The Revenue Board repelled all the three grounds. It held that Mahavir was below 18 years of age on April 1, 1966, and that being, a member of the petitioner's family. Mahavir's share in the holding in dispute must be clubbed with the share of other members for calculating the surplus land of the petitioner or his family. It also referred to section 30 DD of the old Ceiling law and pointed out that since the partition relied upon by the petitioner took place on November 19, 1970, i.e. on the date of the passing of the partition decree, the transfer by partition could not he recognised under that section which provides for recognition of such transfers upto and not beyond December 31, 1969. The fact that the entire holding in the hands of the petitioner was ancestral qua his minor sons made no difference for even then the entire holding has to be taken into consideration for, determining the area in excess of the ceiling area applicable to the petitioner. As for the land held by the petitioner as a mortgagee. the Revenue Board held that according to section 30-E of the old Ceiling law, such land must be treated as part and parcel of, the petitioner's holding for determining the surplus land with him on April 1, 1966. It pointed out in this context that the petitioner had failed to prove that the mortgagor's right to redeem this land was still subsisting on the notified date. 28. It was on the basis of the above findings that the Board of Revenue dismissed the petitioner's appeal and affirmed the order of Sub Divisional Officer to the effect that the petitioner held 16.12 standard acres of land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him on April 1, 1966. Aggrieved by the dismissal of his appeal, the petitioner filed this writ petition on December 7, 1981. 29. After hearing Mr. C. K. Garg learned counsel for the petitioner and perusing the record. I am of opinion that this writ petition is wholly devoid of force and should therefore be dismissed in limine. Mr. Garg has not been able to point out any jurisdictional error of the Board of Revenue warranting interference by this court in the impugned order in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The order made by the Board of Revenue is absolutely correct and perfectly in accord with the old ceiling law. I may briefly state my reasons for this opinion. 30. As for the decree of partition made by the Sub Divisional Officer on November 19, 1970, the same cannot possibly be of any avail to the petitioner either under section 30D or 30DD of the old Ceiling law, for the simple reason that the crucial date with reference to which the ceiling area applicable to the petitioner or his family has to be determined is April 1, 1966. Section 30D which is expressed in negative terms lays down that no voluntary transfer effected by a person on or after February 25, 1958, shall be recognised for the purpose of determining the ceiling area of a person under section 30C. Two exceptions engrafted to the negative rule enacted in section 30D are: (i) voluntary transfer by way of partition and (ii) voluntary transfer in favour of a landless person subject to certain qualifications. It is obvious that these exceptions could be of some use, but only to a person who had made a voluntary transfer of either category on or before April 1, 1966 and not afterwards. The ceiling area of a person under section 30C read with section 30E as already explained, has to be determined with reference to April 1, 1966. That being so, a voluntary transfer effected by a person after April 1, 1966, cannot possibly be recognised for the purpose of determining the ceiling area applicable to such person as on April 1, 1966, unless the legislature either expressly or by necessary implication makes provision for recognition of a transfer, effected subsequent to hat date for the purpose of determining the ceiling area on that date. A reference to section 30DD would show that the legislature has made such provision in respect of only two types of transfers, effected after April 1, 1966, being recognised for the purpose of determining the ceiling area on April 1, 1966. Section 30DD would show that the legislature has made such provision in respect of only two types of transfers, effected after April 1, 1966, being recognised for the purpose of determining the ceiling area on April 1, 1966. Section 30DD may be reproduced here for convenience of reference:- 30DD. Certain transfers to be recognised --Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in section 30D, for the purpose of determining the ceiling area in relation to a person under section 30C- (i) Every transfer of land not exceeding thirty standard acres made by a person upto the thirty first day of December. Certain transfers to be recognised --Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in section 30D, for the purpose of determining the ceiling area in relation to a person under section 30C- (i) Every transfer of land not exceeding thirty standard acres made by a person upto the thirty first day of December. 1969 in favour of an agriculturist domiciled in Rajasthan or in favour of his son or brother intending to take to the profession of agriculture and capable of cultivating land personally and who had attained the age of majority on or before the said date; and (ii) every transfer to the extent as aforesaid made by a person before the first day of June, 1970, of land comprised in grove or farms of the nature referred to in clauses (a), (b), (d) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 30, as it stood prior to the commencement of the Rajasthan Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act, 1970, and acquired before the first day of May, 1959, in favour of his son or brother fulfilling the conditions mentioned in clause (i) and who attains the age of majority on or before the first day of the aforementioned dates; shall also he recognised. It will be seen that the transfer with which we are concerned in the instant case is said to have been effected by way of a decree of petition passed on November 19, 1970. The crucial cut-off dates given in clause (i) and clause (ii) are December 31, 1969 and June 1, 1970, respectively. So the transfer by way of partition relied upon in this case which admittedly took place on November 19, 1970, cannot possibly be recognised under section 30DD either. 31. Mr. Garg next contended that Mahavir had already attained majority on April 1, 1966, and that, in any case, being a coparcener who acquired an interest in the ancestral land by birth, he was entitled to he treated as forming an independent unit, separate from the petitioner, for the purpose of determining the ceiling area of himself and the petitioner. He argued ed that Mahavir even if he is assumed to have been a minor on April 1, 1966, cannot be said to have been dependent on his father i.e the petitioner, but he was dependent on land in which he had acquired an interest by birth. That being the position, so the argument of Mr. He argued ed that Mahavir even if he is assumed to have been a minor on April 1, 1966, cannot be said to have been dependent on his father i.e the petitioner, but he was dependent on land in which he had acquired an interest by birth. That being the position, so the argument of Mr. Garg further proceeds. Mahavir could not be legally treated as a member of the "family" of the petitioner within the purview of the definition of this expression as given in the old ceiling law. Let us read here the relevant provisions of the old ceiling law, including the definition of "family" Section 5 Sub-section 6A:-"Ceiling area" in relation to land held anywhere throughout the State by a person in any capacity whatsoever shall mean the maximum area of land that may be fixed as ceiling area under section 30C in relation to such person. Section 30B-Definitions. - For the purpose of this Chapter- (a) "family" shall mean a family consisting of a husband and a wife, their children and grand-children being dependent on them and the widowed mother of the husband so dependent, and (b) "person" in the case of an individual shall include the family of such individual. Section 30 C. - Extent of ceiling area-- The ceiling area for a family consisting of five or less than five members shall be thirty standard acres of land : Provided that, where the members of a family exceed five, the ceiling area in relation thereto shall be increased for each additional member by five standard acres, so however that it does not exceed sixty standard acres of land. 30-E. - Maximum land that can be held and restriction on future acquisitions,-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall, as from a date notified by the State Government in this behalf- (a) continue to hold or retain in his possession in any capacity and under any tenure whatsoever land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him, or (b) ................ Provided that different dates may be so notified for different areas of the State. 32. Provided that different dates may be so notified for different areas of the State. 32. A plain reading of the relevant provisions of the Act, specifically sections 5 (6A) and 30-E, as reproduced above, would at once show that "ceiling area" is to be determined in relation to land held any where throughout the State by a person "in any capacity whatsoever" (emphasis supplied). Both section 5 (6A) and section 30-E lay emphasis on the fact that ceiling area must be determined in relation to the entire land held or retained in possession by a person in any capacity whatsoever. This means that, even if Ram Rattan held the land in question as karta of the joint Hindu Family consisting of himself and his sons as coparceners, he could not have, if the members of his family had been five or less than five, legally held or retained in possession, even in the capacity of a karta, land in excess of the ceiling area of 30 standard acres as prescribed by section 30-C read with section 30-E. The legal proposition, as propounded by shastric Hindu Law, to the effect that sons acquire an interest by birth in co-parcenety properry held or possessed by a karta of a joint Hindu Family, does not, in any manner, improve the position of the karta of the family in relation to the ceiling area required to be fixed under the Act for the "family". 33. Now so far as the definition of "family" as given in section 30-B (a) is concerned, it must be construed, according to the well recognised rule of interpretation, without adding in the language of the definition any word which is not there or omitting from the language any word which is there. In other words, if the meaning of the words used by the legislature is clear, we must not try to draw different meaning by adding a word here or substracting a word there. The language in which the definition of "family" is couched is quite clear and unambiguous. "Family" means a family consisting of a husband and wife, their children and grand-children being dependent on them and the widowed mother of the husband so dependent. The language in which the definition of "family" is couched is quite clear and unambiguous. "Family" means a family consisting of a husband and wife, their children and grand-children being dependent on them and the widowed mother of the husband so dependent. To find out whether a child or a grand-child is a member of such a "family" or not, one need not be concerned with the question whether the child or grand-child is minor or major, for in either case according to the definition, he would be a member of the family if he is dependent on his parents or grand parents. For example. a child or a grand child in a joint Hindu family who was well placed in some service or profession and was thus not dependent on his parents or grand parents who held the joint family land on the notified date (i.e. April 1, 1966) and, instead, was dependant on his own earning from service or profession etc., though he may be a member of the joint Hindu family, strictly so called, will not be treated as a member of the "family" within the purview of the definition as given in section 30B (a) of the old Ceiling law. The significance of this definition can be better appreciated if we read it in conjunction with the proviso to section 30C. The proviso lays down that if the members of a family (which consists, inter alia of dependant children and grand-children) exceed five, the ceiling area in relation there to shall be increased for each additional member by five standard acres, so however that it does not exceed sixty standard acres of land. 34. I have therefore no hesitation in holding that Mahavir like other sons of the petitioner was a member of the petitioner's family on April 1, 1966 and that since the total number of the members of this family exceeded five, the petitioner was entitled to retain in his possession in addition to 30 standard acres for five members, further area increased for each additional member by five standard acres. It was on this reckoning that the Sine-Divisional Officer determined the petitioners ceiling area to be 40 standard acres and declared the remaining 16.12 standard acres to be surplus land. It was on this reckoning that the Sine-Divisional Officer determined the petitioners ceiling area to be 40 standard acres and declared the remaining 16.12 standard acres to be surplus land. The inclusion of Mahavir and other sons of the petitioner among the members of his family thus proved to he an asset rather than a liability for the purpose of determination of the ceiling area applicable to the petitioner. The argument of Mr. Garg to the contrary proceeded on the erroneous assumption to the effect that the sons were entitled to be treated as independant units or families for the purpose of determination of ceiling area applicable to the petitioner. There is no warrant in the old ceiling law for treating the sons of the petitioner as constituting independant units or families. 35. Turning now to the argument that the land held by the petitioner as mortgagee was not includible in his land for the purpose of determination of ceiling area applicable to him, I am afraid this argument is also without any basis and must be summarily rejected. I am in agreement with the Board of Revenue that such land is also includible as per the plain provisions of Section 30E of the old ceiling law. 36. In conclusion, this writ petition must fail and is therefore dismissed in limine.Petition dismissed. *******