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1982 DIGILAW 222 (KAR)

THIMMABHOVI v. STATE OF KARNATAKA

1982-10-04

K.S.PUTTASWAMY

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PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) SOME time in the year 1962-63 respondent No. 3, a member of a Scheduled caste was granted 5 acres of land in Sy. No 1 of Savamardi Kaval, Tarikere Taluk, chickmagalur District under the Land grant rules with a condition that the said land should not be alienated for a period of 15 years from the date of issue of the grant certificate in his favour. On 18-1-1969 respondent No. 3 sold the said land to the petitioner for valuable consideration in contravention of the non-alienation clause. ( 2 ) UNDER the provisions of the Karnataka scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) act of 1978 (Karnataka Act 2 of 1979) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and the rules framed thereunder the Assistant commissioner, Tankere (hereinafter referred to as 'the AC ') after due notice to the petitioner and considering his objections by his order dated 12-10-1979 (Annexure A) declared the sale effected in favour of the petitioner as null and void and directed the restoration of the land to respondent No. 3. In his petition under art. 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has challenged the constitutional validity of the Act and the order dated 12 10 1979 made by the AC. ( 3 ) IN Krishnappa v. Munichannappa (1) a Division Bench of this Court rejecting the very contentions urged for the petitioner, has upheld the validity of the Act. In this view, the challenge of the petitioner to the Act is rejected. ( 4 ) IN the course of his order, the AC has found that respondent No. 3 had sold the land within the specified period in contravention of the non alienation clause. Sri D. S. Lingappa, learned counsel for the petitioner, in my opinion, very rightly did not dispute this finding of the ac. But, still he urged that the nature of the enquiry held by the AC was not in conformity with the Act and the principles of natural justice and he had also not determined various other objections urged by his client. ( 5 ) WHEN the petitioner does not dispute that he had purchased the land within the specified period in contravention of the non alienation clause, no other question really survives for consideration. In this view, the impugned order cannot be upset on any other unsubstantial ground. ( 5 ) WHEN the petitioner does not dispute that he had purchased the land within the specified period in contravention of the non alienation clause, no other question really survives for consideration. In this view, the impugned order cannot be upset on any other unsubstantial ground. Hence, the challenge of the petitioner to the impugned order is liable to be rejected. ( 6 ) ASSUMING that the petitioner has effected improvements, it is undoubtedly open to him to work out his remedies for recovery of the value of improvements in the ordinary Civil Court or before the authority as and when a provision is made for the same under the Act. But, that cannot be a ground for this Court to interfere with the impugned order of the AC. ( 7 ) IN the light of my above discussion, i hold that this writ petition is liable to be dismissed. I, therefore, dismiss this writ petition and discharge the rule issued in this case. But, in the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. After I dictated the order dismissing the writ petition Sri Lingappa seeks for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme court under Arts. 132 and 133 of the Constitution. An order made by a single Judge of this Court is appealable before a Division bench and is therefore, not final. Hence, it is not open to a single Judge of this court to grant a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court under Arts. 132 and 133 of the Constitution. I, therefore reject the prayer of the petitioner for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the supreme Court. While issuing rule nisi on 14-12-1979 this Court had stayed the operation of the impugned order which has been in force ever since then. In Krishnappa's (1) case the Division Bench of this Court while granting a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court has granted stay for a period of 3 months. In these circumstances, it is just and proper to stay the operation of my order for a period of 3 months to enable the petitioner to move the Supreme Court in Special Leave to appeal and seek for stay. I, therefore, stay the operation of my order for a period of 3 months from this day. --- *** --- .