JUDGMENT Gangadhara Rao, J.- This petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed to release (1) Katapagarri Peda Narayana Reddy, (2) Suram Nagireddy, (3) Suram Narasaiah and (4) Katapagarri Chinna Musalappa, who are now lodged in the Central Prison, Chenchalguda, Hyderabad. In Sessions Case No. 97 of 1974 they were convicted under section 302, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to imprisonment for life on 17th November, 1975, by the Additional Sessions Judge, Ananthapur. The Criminal Appeal filed by them was dismissed by the High Court. They were also accused in Sessions Case No. 38 of 1972 on the file of the Sessions Judge, Ananthapur They were charged for an offence under section 302, Indian Penal Code. They were acquitted by the Sessions Judge on 2nd November, 1974. The State preferred an appeal against their acquittal in the High Court. On 31st December, 1976, the High Court set a side the order of acquittal, convicted them under section 302, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced them to life imprisonment. By its order, dated 29th March, 1979, the High Court directed that the sentences of the imprisonment awarded to them in the Criminal Appeal should run concurrently with the sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon them in Sessions Case No. 97 of 1974 as provided under section 427 (2), Criminal Procedure Code. 2. The Government of Andhra Pradesh in order to commemorate the 25th Anniversary of the formation of the State of Andhra Pradesh and in exercise of its powers under section 432, Criminal Procedure Code, issued G.O. Ms. No. 557, dated 30th October, 1980. Home (Prisons. C) Department, remitting and reducing the sentence of various categories of prisoners in the State. Paragraph 2 of that Orders reads as follows: “(a) Except the prisoners sentenced for life who are governed by section 433-A, Criminal Procedure Code, all other convicts who have undergone a total sentence of 5 years as on 31st October, 1980, shall be released. (b) All prisoners with a sentence of one year and above shall be granted a special remission of one month for each year of sentence awarded. (c) All prisoners with a sentence below one year shall be granted a special remission of fifteen days. (d) All prisoners other than life convicts over sixty years of age as on 13th October, 1980, shall be released.” 3. (c) All prisoners with a sentence below one year shall be granted a special remission of fifteen days. (d) All prisoners other than life convicts over sixty years of age as on 13th October, 1980, shall be released.” 3. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Maru Ram v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 2147 section 433-A, Criminal Procedure Code, is not applicable to them, as they were convicted before 18th December, 1978. 4. The order of the Government was also the subject-matter of Criminal Appeal No. 247 of 1981 before the Supreme Court. While reversing the judgment of our High Court the Supreme Court interpreted clause 2 (a) of the G. O. in the following manner: “Under clause (a) all convicts who have undergone a total sentence of five years as on 31st October, 1980, except prisoners sentenced for life and who are governed by section 433-A have to be released. This means that ‘life convicts’ who are governed by section 433-A, Criminal Procedure Code, are not to be released even if they have undergone a total sentence of five years as on 31st October, 1980. A-1 others are to be released. Therefore, life convicts who are not governed by section 433-A, Criminal Procedure Code and who have undergone a total sentence of five years are entitled to be released”. 5. Basing on this judgment of the Supreme Court, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that after taking into account the remand period and the remissions earned by them, the four prisoners have completed five years of imprisonment by 31st October, 1980, and since the sentences were made to run concurrently by the order of this Court it should be held that there is only one sentence of life imprisonment and, consequently, they should be released from jail forthwith. 6. It is not disputed that in the first Sessions Case in which the four persons were convicted for life imprisonment on 17th November, 1975, they have undergone a total sentence of five years as on 31st October, 1980. It is not also disputed that in the second Sessions Case they Were sentenced to life imprisonment on 31st December, 1976, and they have not undergone a total sentence of five years by 31st October, 1980. It is not also disputed that in the second Sessions Case they Were sentenced to life imprisonment on 31st December, 1976, and they have not undergone a total sentence of five years by 31st October, 1980. It is true that, this Court has directed that the sentence in the second Sessions Case should run concurrently with sentence in the first Sessions Case. It means that it could run concurrently only from 31st December, 1976. It could not run concurrently from 17th November, 1975. From 17th November, 1975, there was only one sentence which the petitioners were undergoing till 31st December, 1976, when they started undergoing concurrent sentence. It is not correct to state that when the Court directs that two sentences should run concurrently they merge into one sentence. The word “concurrent” means, meeting in the same point: running, coming, acting, or existing together, coinciding; accompanying “concurrently” means, agreeing (See Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, New Edition, 1972, page 270). When two sentences ane directed to run concurrently, it means: they run to gether. A prisoner that is directed to undergo two sentence concurrently has to undergo both the sentence only once for the duration of that period of concurrence. 7. The point could be illustrated from another angle also. Suppose a prisoner is convicted sentenced to five years rigoroue imprisonment on 1st January, 1980. Supposs the same prisoner is convicted in another case for five years on 1st January, 1982, and it is directed in that case that sentence should run concurrently with the sentence in the first case. In the first case, he will complete first years by 30th December, 1984. In the second case he will complete five years by 3oth December, 1986. It does not mean that he would be released on 30th December, 1984. He would be released only on 30th December, 1986. He has the benefit of undergoing the concurrent sentence only from 1st January, 1982, till 30th December, 1984, that is, for a period of three years. The reason is obvious. Till 1st January, 1982, there is only one sentence. From 1st January, 1985, also there is only one sentence. It is only one from 1st January, 1982 till 30th December, 1984, there are two sentences running concurrently. 8. The reason is obvious. Till 1st January, 1982, there is only one sentence. From 1st January, 1985, also there is only one sentence. It is only one from 1st January, 1982 till 30th December, 1984, there are two sentences running concurrently. 8. In Juvansingh Jadeja v. State, (1973) 14 G.L.R. 104 a Division Bench of Gujarat High Court held: “A concurrent sentence carries the inbuilt conception of the prisoner undergoing the sentences in connection with the two different punishments imposed in two different cases simultaneously or concurrently at the same time. The law has resorted to a fiction and has treated the. sentence being undergone by the prisoner as being undergone for both the offences simultaneously or concurrently. This is for the benefit of the prisoner because otherwise he would have to under-go the two sentences consecutively. Merely because the sentence for the offence under section 302 was imposed earlier in point of time, it cannot be said that what is being undergone at present is the sentence imposed under that section and not the sentence imposed on him one year later in December, 1969”. 9. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has invited our attention to section 427 (2), Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, which says that when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term of imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. He argued that in view of this section when the two sentences have to run concurrently, there is really one sentence. For the reasons already given by us, we find it difficult to agree with him. In this connection we may refer to section 429 (1) , Criminal Procedure Code, which provides that nothing in section 426 or section 427 shall be held to excuse any person from any part of the punishment to which he is liable upon his former or subsequent conviction. 10. In the present case it has to be held that the prisoners were undergoing the two sentences concurrently only from 31st December, 1976. By 31st October, 1980, they have undergone a total sentences of five in the first case. In the second case they did not complete five five years by 31st October, 1980. Therefore, they cannot be released under clause (a) of Paragraph 2 of G.O. Ms. By 31st October, 1980, they have undergone a total sentences of five in the first case. In the second case they did not complete five five years by 31st October, 1980. Therefore, they cannot be released under clause (a) of Paragraph 2 of G.O. Ms. No 557, dated 30th October, 1980. 11. Consequently the writ petition is dismissed. No. costs, Advocates fee Rs. 150. 12. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has made on oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We do not consider that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance that needs to be decided by the Supreme Court nor do we consider that this is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court. Hence the oral application is rejected. R.S.R. ----- Writ petition dismissed.