JUDGMENT - Bharucha S.P. J.:-The short point involved relates to the jurisdiction of the tribunal of appeal constituted under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. 2. On 14th September, 1959 the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, the petitioner herein, declared its intention to vary the Town Planning Scheme, Santacruz II (1st Variation) (final), to provide for recreation grounds and widening of roads. On 24th September 1959 the draft variation was published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette. On 3rd February 1962 the Town Planning Officer was appointed. Ultimately, after changes, the 4th respondent was appointed Town Planning Officer on 13th September, 1972. On 8th January 1975 the Town Planning Officer finalised the scheme and declared the award. On 16th September 1975 appeals were filed by 38 original plot-holders to the tribunal of appeal constituted under the Act and comprised of respondents 1 to 3. The appeals were beard on 7th and 8th January 1976. The tribunal inspected the plots on 14th January 1976. On 23rd February 1976 the tribunal published its award. 3. The tribunal held that, in view of the fact that the 7 plots described by it were wholly acquired, and as no part of the original plots were to remain with the respective original plot holders, it was open to these plot holders to ask the tribunal to fix the reasonable value of these original plots in view of the provisions of section 73 (2) (iv) of the Act. However, where the original plot-holders were not wholly deprived of their respective original plots the submission made to re-assess the original value of these original plots was rejected as being against the provisions of the Act. In this writ petition, the Municipal Corporation challenges that part of the award which enhances the value of the original plots which were wholly acquired and no part thereof remained with the respective plot-holders. 4. It was submitted by Mr. Dalai, learned counsel for the Municipal Corporation, that no appeal Jay where the original plot-holder was allotted a final plot. It lay only where the original plot-holder was not awarded a final plot but was awarded only monetary compensation. It was contended on the other hand by counsel on behalf of the respondent plot-holders that where the final plot allotted, contained no part of the original plot, sections 72 (3) (iv) applied and an appeal lay. It lay only where the original plot-holder was not awarded a final plot but was awarded only monetary compensation. It was contended on the other hand by counsel on behalf of the respondent plot-holders that where the final plot allotted, contained no part of the original plot, sections 72 (3) (iv) applied and an appeal lay. Where, however, the final plot allotted contained a part of the, original plot, section 72 (3) (iii) applied and no appeal lay. 5. The relevant provisions of the Act need to be looked at. Under “ section 2(13) “final Plot” is defined to be a plot allotted in a final town planning scheme. Section 2(22) defines “reconstituted plot” to mean a plot which is altered in ownership or in any other way by the making of a town planning scheme. Under section 72(1) the State Government is obliged to appoint an arbitrator. The powers of the arbitrator are mentioned in section 72 (3). Under clause(iii) of sub-section (3) of section 72 the arbitrator shall “estimate the value of and fix the difference between the value of the original plots and the value of the final plots included in the final scheme, in accordance with the provisions contained in clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 97.” Under clause (iv) the arbitrator shall “estimate the compensation payable for the loss of the area of the original plots in accordance with the provisions contained in clause (f) of sub-sec-tion (1) of section 97 in respect of any original plot which is wholly acquired under the Scheme.” Section 97 refers to the cost of a town planning scheme. Under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 97 such cost includes “the amount by which the total of the values of the original plots exceeds the total of the values of the plots included in the final scheme, each of such plot being estimated at its market value at the date of declaration of intention to make a scheme”. Under section 73, except in matters arising out of clauses (iv) to (xi) both inclusive and clauses (xiv), (xv) and (xvi) of sub-section (3) of section 72, every decision of the arbitrator shall be final and conclusive and binding on all parties including the Planning Authority. Under section 74 any decision of the arbitrator under clauses (iv) to (xi) may be referred to the Tribunal of Appeal for decision. Under section 74 any decision of the arbitrator under clauses (iv) to (xi) may be referred to the Tribunal of Appeal for decision. Under section 75 the constitution of the tribunal of appeal is provided for. Under section 78 all questions of law and procedure shall be decided by the President of the tribunal and all other questions shall be decided by the President and the two assessors or by a majority. The decision of the tribunal of appeal shall be final, conclusive and binding on all persons. Under section 88 (b) “all rights in the original plots which have been reconstituted shall deter-mine and the reconstituted plots shall become subject to the rights settled by the arbitrator” Under section 100 “the amount by which the total value of final plots included in a final scheme with all the buildings and works thereon allotted to the persons falls short of or exceeds the total value of the original plots with all the buildings and works thereon of such per-sons shall be deducted from or added to, as the case may be, the contribution leviable from such person, each of such plots being estimated at its market value at the date of the declaration of intention to make a scheme.” Under section 104 “if the owner of an original plot is not provided with a final plot in the final scheme or if the contribution to be levied from him is less than the total amount to be deducted there from under any of the provisions of the Act, the net amount of his loss shall be payable to him by the Planning Authority in cash or in such other way as may be agreed upon by the parties.” 6. It was the contention of Mr. Dalai, learned counsel for the Municipal Corporation, that where a final plot had been allotted to an original plot-holder, the provisions of Section 72(3) (iii) applied and not the provisions of Section 72(3) (iv) and that, therefore, no appeal lay. It was the contention of Mr. Dalai, learned counsel for the Municipal Corporation, that where a final plot had been allotted to an original plot-holder, the provisions of Section 72(3) (iii) applied and not the provisions of Section 72(3) (iv) and that, therefore, no appeal lay. It was the contention of counsel for the respondent plot holders on the other hand that the case fell within the provisions of Section 72 (3) (iv) because the final plot allotted contained no part of the original plot, in other words, that the original plot having been wholly acquired it was patent from the phraseology of clause (iv) that to such a case that clause applied. It was also contended that if there were an ambiguity as to which of the two clauses would apply, then the benefit of the ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the respondents plot-holders. 7. The point of importance is that if section 72(3) (iv) applied, the appeal was competent; if section 72(3) (iii) applied, it was not. 8. As I read section 72(3) (iii) its provisions must be applied when-ever a final plot is allotted to an original plot-holder, whether or not the final plot maintains any part of the original plot; the arbitrator must then estimate the value of and fix the difference between the value of the original plot and the value of the final plot. On the other hand, Section 72 (3) (iv) must be applied only when the original plot is wholly acquired and. compensation has to be estimated therefor; that is to say, when no final plot is allotted in lieu of the original plot. 9. It is true that clause (iv) uses the words “any original plot which is wholly acquired.” But they have to be read in the context of clause (iii). I do not see any ambiguity the benefit of which may be accorded to the respondents. 10. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent plot-holders that the tribunal had not interpreted the provisions of the two clauses but had come to a conclusion on a question of fact. It was also submitted that it had not been argued before the tribunal that the appeals were incompetent. 10. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent plot-holders that the tribunal had not interpreted the provisions of the two clauses but had come to a conclusion on a question of fact. It was also submitted that it had not been argued before the tribunal that the appeals were incompetent. In para 19(vi) of its decision, the tribunal states that, in view of the fact that the plots therein mentioned were wholly acquired and as no part of the original plots were to remain with the respective plot-holders, it was open to the plot-holders to urge before the tribunal the issue about the original value of these plots in view of the provisions of Section 72(3) (iv) of the Act. Whether or not, then it was argued before the tribunal that section 72(3) (iv) had no application, it is patent that the tribunal has interpreted the provisions thereof. 11. It was contended that the writ jurisdiction was discretionary and it should not here be exercised in favour of the Municipal Corporation in view of the fact that the Municipal Corporation had delayed the finalisation of the scheme for 16 years. It was added on behalf of some of the respondents plot-holders that by its letter dated 16th October, 1982 the Municipal Corporation had arrived at a settlement with them which was now not being honoured. It is a matter of regret that the Municipal Corporation should delay finalisation of a town planning scheme for 16 long years. But these arc not circumstances which can persuade the court to exercise discretion against the Municipal Corporation. The question involved is one of principle and it should be finally resolved. The amount enhanced by the Tribunal is not so substantial that the Municipal Corporation should not, having regard to the fact of 16 years delay, pay it to the respondent plot-holders exgratia. 12. Petition absolute in terms of prayer (a). No order as to cost. Rule absolute.