ORDER U.C. Srivastava, J. - The order passed by the Prescribed Authority allowing the landlord's application under section 21(l) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act, as well as the appellate order passed by the VII Additional District Judge dismissing the tenant's appeal and affirming the order passed by the Prescribed Authority is subject matter of challenge in this writ petition. 2. The landlord-opposite party filed an application under section 21(1) of the Act for eviction of the petitioner on the ground that he has got a big family consisting of four sons, two daughters and a wife. Out of four sons two were married and living with him, while the other two sons were of marriageable age and they are suffering hardship because of paucity of accommodation. The tenant of the premises in dispute contested the application and pleaded that the landlord owns number of houses in city. He has transferred a house in Mohalla Misrana few months ago before moving of the application and he had transferred a house in Mohalla Jatavpura which was in the name of his eldest son and so far his sons are concerned, one of his eldest sons was in service at Aligarh. 3. Before the Prescribed Authority affidavits were filed on behalf of both the parties. On behalf of the landlord it was stated that the petitioner himself has got a house in the city of Earth where he can easily shift. The Prescribed Authority accepted the contention raised on behalf of the landlord and allowed the release application of the landlord. The petitioner challenged the same by filing an appeal. The appellate court but for one affirmed the other findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority after talking into consideration the report of the Commissioner appointed by the Prescribed Authority and recorded a finding that apart from owning a very small house the landlord does not own any house in the city and the said house was in possession of the tenant which was wholly insufficient for catering the need of the landlord. The finding recorded by the appellate court without any in specification recorded a finding that properties are owned by the landlord, but they are in possession of other tenants meaning thereby that the landlord was owning more than one house. The finding recorded by the appellate court without any in specification recorded a finding that properties are owned by the landlord, but they are in possession of other tenants meaning thereby that the landlord was owning more than one house. So far as house which was transferred before moving the application under section 21 of the 'Act' on the basis of the sale-deed is concerned, it was observed that it was as a Khandhar situate in Mohalla Jatavpura which was a locality of Jatavs and the same was not suitable for residential purposes for the person like the landlord. So far as the house said to be owned by the tenant is concerned, the appellate court did not agree with the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority who held that the tenant has only got a share in the said house. The appellate court held that it was not proved that he has got any alternative accommodation. The appellate court recorded a tinting that the landlord bona fide requires the accommodation and he would suffer greater hardship than the tenant in case the application is rejected. 4. The admitted position appears to be that the premises in dispute were owned by the nephew of the landlord and years ago he filed an application under section 3 of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act against the tenant who contested the case and the application was ultimately rejected. It seems that after rejection of' the application mutual exchange of house between the uncle and nephew took place, though it is not known whether the exchange was evidenced by any registered document or not. A notice was also given to the tenant that opposite party was the owner of the premises in dispute and the petitioners-tenants started paying rent to the landlord. Few years thereafter the landlord-opposite party moved an application under section 21 of the 'Act'. 5. The order passed by the Additional District Judge who decided the appeal has been assailed on number of grounds. On behalf of the petitioner it was contended that before the appellate court it was brought to its notice that the eldest son of the landlord for whom the accommodation was enquired was posted at Aligarh. He came to Etah and again went to Aligarh and his second son was at Aligarh. On behalf of the petitioner it was contended that before the appellate court it was brought to its notice that the eldest son of the landlord for whom the accommodation was enquired was posted at Aligarh. He came to Etah and again went to Aligarh and his second son was at Aligarh. A ration card has been alleged to have been shown to prove the strength of his family, but there is nothing in the judgment which may indicate the same. It appears from the pleadings that none of the parties pleaded that Mohalla Jatavpura is inhabited by Jatavs and a person like the landlord for certain reasons would not like to reside in the said Mohalla though in the said Mohalla a house was purchased by him, in the name of his son . Even though it was not pleaded by the parties, but the Additional District Judge went out of his way in laying emphasis on Mohalla Jatavpura stating that it was inhabited by Jatavs and a person like landlord for certain reasons would not like to stay in that Mohalla. Suffice will be to say that the appellate court went astray and entered into such a question which is not expected from an appellate court and cannot be appreciated. The appellate court recorded a finding that the landlord owns number of properties, but they are in possession of tenants. While recording this finding the appellate court was to record a finding as to the numbers of houses owned by the landlord as only then it could have been known as to the accommodation in possession of other tenants and the proximity of the house in which the landlord as residing and exchange of house or availability of alternative accommodation for the landlord or the tenant whose ejectment was being sought. On behalf of the opposite party it has been contended that by recording such a finding the appellate court only meant one house for which a finding was recorded by the Prescribed Authority. In the absence of any specification and serious contest on behalf of i the petitioner who was agitating at every stage that the landlord was owning more houses, the contention raised on behalf of the landlord even if same may be ultimately found to be correct cannot be accepted in these circumstances. 6. In the absence of any specification and serious contest on behalf of i the petitioner who was agitating at every stage that the landlord was owning more houses, the contention raised on behalf of the landlord even if same may be ultimately found to be correct cannot be accepted in these circumstances. 6. Much stress has been laid on the comparative hardship to be suffered by the tenant-petitioner. The Prescribed Authority while recording I finding that alternative accommodation was available to the tenant did not deal with the question as to the comparative hardship to be suffered by the tenant in case the landlord's application was allowed. The appellate court it seems did not attach any importance to the conduct of the landlord in transferring the house which was in the name of his son in Mohalla Jatavpura and confined itself on the strength of the family of the landlord in the absence of any detail on behalf of the tenant. That was not the only ground for deciding the comparative hardships between the tenant and the landlord also in view of other findings recorded by the appellate court itself. 7. Thus it is clear that the appellate court did not proceed with the case in a satisfactory manner and did not take into consideration the guidelines laid down in rule 16 of the Rules framed under U P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for residential accommodation which was obligatory on him and without considering the comparative needs and the hardships to be suffered by the parties in the light of facts established and the guidelines provided is the relevant Rule decided the matter. As such the order passed by the appellate court affirming the order passed by the Prescribed Authority deserve to be quashed. 8. This writ petition is allowed and the order passed by the VII Additional District Judge dated 27.1.1979 (Annexure-3) is quashed and the District Judge is directed to restore the appeal to its original number and hear and decide the same again in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above. The appeal may be decided by the District Judge himself or by soy other Judge other from one who decided the appeal earlier. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.