N. D. VENKATESH, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision, filed under 115 C. P. C. is by the tenant. Susheelamma, respondent herein, had filed an application under Clauses (a), (i) and (h) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 21 of the Karnataka rent Control Act, 1961 (the Act) in the court of the Prl. Munsiff, Shimoga, in H. R. C. No. 66 of 1975 against her tenant Gulam Rasul Manrulwala the pettitioner here in, claiming possession of the premises bearing No. 5211, kalidas St. . , Shimoga City. On the tenant raising objections to the claim made by the landlady the Court below received evidence, heard the parties concerned, and allowed the application only under Clause (a) of S. 21 (1) of the Act. The tenant preferred a revision in H. R. C. R. P. No. 45 of 1978 in the Court of the District Judge, shimoga. The learned Judge has confirmed the order of the Munsiff. That order is under challenga in this revision. ( 2 ) IT was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant that the courts below had failed to properly construe sub-section (2) of S 21 of the Act, in particular, clause (ii) thereof. It was his submission that this provision (S. 21 (2) (ii) ) conferring as it does, a discretion on Court to give relief to tenants in the matter of their eviction for non-payment of rent requires to he liberally construed. In this connection, drawing an analogy between S. 114 of the Transfer of property Act, 1182, and this provision, he requested me to keep in mind decisions rendered thereunder while examining the scope of this provision ( 3 ) ON the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent, while supporting the impugned order, pleaded that the concurrent findings of the courts below that the tenant had, failed to show sufficient cause for not depositing or tendering the rent within the period referred to in S. 21 (1) (a) being one based purely on appreciation of facts, was not Fable to be disturbed by this Court. ( 4 ) THE Act, while placing restrictions on the powers of landlords in the matter of eviction of tenants, lays down conditions which alone provide cause of action for them to recover possession of the premises leased. Those conditions, some of them further hedged in, are enumerated in S. 21 of the act. ( 4 ) THE Act, while placing restrictions on the powers of landlords in the matter of eviction of tenants, lays down conditions which alone provide cause of action for them to recover possession of the premises leased. Those conditions, some of them further hedged in, are enumerated in S. 21 of the act. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of s. 21 read with sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 21 is one such. As provided therein a cause of action arises in favour of a landlord to apply for eviction of his tenant on the tenant not paying the rent due within two months of the date on which he had received the statutory notice sent bv the landlord. But, further restrictions are placed on the power of the Court in awarding possession of the premises terminating the tenancy. Sub-sec (2) which places such restrictions may be noted:"21 (2) No order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made on the ground specified, in clause (a) of the proviso to subsection (1), if the tenant - (i) complies with the provisions of section 29; (ii) satisfies the court that he, had sumcient cause for the default to pay or tender the rent within the period, referred to in the said clause (a); and (iii) pays to the land lord or deposits in the court such further amount, as may be determined by the Court to be due, along with a sum not exceeding ten per cent of the rent thereof as may be fixed by the court, within one month from the date of the order of the court. " ( 5 ) AS is clear from the opening words used in sub-section (2) the same are prohibitive as well as negative. There negative prohibitory and exclusive words spell out the mandatory na- true of the provision and its legislative intent. But, what is it ? " ( 5 ) AS is clear from the opening words used in sub-section (2) the same are prohibitive as well as negative. There negative prohibitory and exclusive words spell out the mandatory na- true of the provision and its legislative intent. But, what is it ? It says, please do not evict him if he satisfies these further conditions, the conditions being (i) that during the, pendency of that proceeding he pays all the arrears in compliance with the mandate of section 29 pi the Act: (ii) that the reasons assigned by him for not pay-ing the arrears within two months of the date on which he had received the statutory notice satisfy you (the judge); and (iii) that he pays to his landlord or deposits in court such further amount within such time as the court may direct in its final order. Here itself it may be noted that during the pendency of the proceeding before the Munsiff the tenant did deposit the arrears of rent as required under S. 29 of the Act. ( 6 ) NOW, though the tenant may satisry, without much difficulty, the 1st and the 3rd conditions by complying with the orders of the court first made under S. 29 and the other finally, he will lace some difficulty in satisfying the court as to the 2nd condition in view of the fact that that satisfaction depends on several factors, factors, the significance of which can only be comprehended if understood in their native background. It is this 2nd condition stipulated by clause (ii) of sub-sec. (2) (extracted above) that confers a, discrtion on court in the matter of condoning the lapse on the part of the tenant in paying or tendering all the arrears of rent legally recoverable from him within the time stipulated in s. 21 (1) (a) of the Act. ( 7 ) I am of the view that while consiruing clause (ii) of sub-sec. (2) we should keep in mind the beneficial nature of the law and the language of the provisions, to which reference has already been made. ( 8 ) WHAT do these words in clause (ii) of sub-section (2) "satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for the default to pay. . . " mean? (2) we should keep in mind the beneficial nature of the law and the language of the provisions, to which reference has already been made. ( 8 ) WHAT do these words in clause (ii) of sub-section (2) "satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for the default to pay. . . " mean? The tenant' should explain as, to why he did not pay the arrears within two months of the date on which he had received the notice. We will assume that he gives some reasons, Then, it is for the court to see whether, in the circumstances of the case, the tenant shoud be relieved from the extreme penalty of dispossession from the premises. The satisfaction is of the Court but, it cannot be subjective. Nor can it be whimsical or arbitrary in its contents. In being satisfied as to the cause shown or reasons given the court has to take into consideration many factors and must take a total view of the matter. As Venkataramiah, J (as he then was) has put it, though in a somewhat different context, in T. N. Shankar Rao and Bros. V. S. A. W. Azid (1) the Court "must approach the problem in a broad common sense way as a man of the world and come to a conclusion giving such weight as it thinks right to the various factors. " The thing appears to be apparently simple to a narrow technical eye. But, it is not so, if one reflects over it or understands the consequences ensuing the decison of the court. ( 9 ) WHILE examinring the ambit and scope of clause (ii) of sub-sec. (2) of 21 of the Act reliance cannot be placed on S. 114 of the Transfer of Property act. This is a statutory lease. The eviction sought for is under the provisions of the Act. The discretion to be exercised is a discretion conferred by the Act itself. As observed by the privy Council in Maqbul Ahmad vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh (2) while exercising statutory discretion we should not go outside the limits of the Act. I am also aware of the observations of the Supreme Court in v. Dhanapal Chettiar Vs. Yesodai Ammal (3) and, in particular. the observations made thereunder at para-16. As observed by the privy Council in Maqbul Ahmad vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh (2) while exercising statutory discretion we should not go outside the limits of the Act. I am also aware of the observations of the Supreme Court in v. Dhanapal Chettiar Vs. Yesodai Ammal (3) and, in particular. the observations made thereunder at para-16. And also the observations of the Supreme Court in Pradesh Kumar Baypaie vs. Benod Behari Sarkar (4) at para ( 10 ) THIS is not to say that in examining a question like this, decisions rendered by Courst under s. 114 of the Transfer of Proper v act or other similar provisions will not be of any use. They do help us to know as to how courts have viewed the conduct of a tenant reeking equity at the hands of the courts for his lapse in the matter of payment of rents to the landlord. From this limited angle i propose to examine one or two decisions presently. First T would like to refer to one of the oldes, decisions of the Indian background. In the middle of the last century the East India Company, then administering in its own whimsical way several parts of this country, having been severely Jolted by the Sepoy Mutiny, had handed- over its administration to the Crown in England. The new administration appears to have taken several measures for the amelioration of the lot of the people. The then Government, in order to relieve the Mukkarari leaseholders against forfeiture of their leases for non-payment of rent, had incorporated a provision - section 78 in act X of 1859. That Act was in force in parts of the present day States of bihar and Bengal. In Duli Chand vs. Meher Chand Sahu (5), a decision rendered by the Judges of the Privy Council more than, a century ago (on 20. 11. 1872), S. 78 referred to above came up for consideration. The landlords had brought a suit in 18666 for arrears of rent and for cancellation of the Mukkarari lease. The condition stiputated in the lease was that, failure on the part of the lessees to pay six instalments, the lease would become void. 11. 1872), S. 78 referred to above came up for consideration. The landlords had brought a suit in 18666 for arrears of rent and for cancellation of the Mukkarari lease. The condition stiputated in the lease was that, failure on the part of the lessees to pay six instalments, the lease would become void. The defendants - lessees though pleaded that they were not in arrears of the amount claimed, had admitted that they were in arrears of a small sum and pleaded further the circumstances under which /that arrears had fallen due. The matter reched the high Court of Judicature in Bengal. The learned Judges, thoueh granted a decree in favour of the landlords, gave relief to the tenants under S. 78 stating that the tenants were "entitled, to continue in possession of the Mukkarari tenure, the subject of this suit, upon their paving into court within 15 days from this date the amount decreed. . . " the landlords look this matter to the privy Council. It was argued before their ordiships that S. 78 did not apply to a case where the lease was liable for cancellation under the terms or covenants of the lease for non-payment of rent, but only apply to cases where leases were liable to be cancelled as provided in the statute itself (Act No x of 1859 ). Repelling this contention and upholding the decision of the High court the learned, Judges of the Privy council observed as folloms:"but, their Lordships are of opinion that that would be placing too narrow at construction, upon an act which may be termed, upon the whole, a remedial one, and they see no sufficient reason for limiting what is the prima facie and natural meaning of its terms to the extent contended for. "the Supreme Court, while examining as to how Courts shuld exercise their discretion under S. 114 of the t. P. Act, observe as follows in namdeo Lokman Lodhi Vs. Narmadabai (6 ). "in our opinion, in exercising the discretion, each case must be judged by itself, the delay, the conduct of the parties and the difficulties the landlord has been put to should be weighed against the tenant. This was the view taken by the Madras High Court in Appayya Shetty Vs. Mohammad Beari, A. I. R. 1916 Ma. 680, and the matter was discussed at some length. This was the view taken by the Madras High Court in Appayya Shetty Vs. Mohammad Beari, A. I. R. 1916 Ma. 680, and the matter was discussed at some length. We agree with the ratio of that decision. It is a maxim of equity that a person who comes in equity must do equity and must come with clan hands and if the conduct of the tenant is such that it disentitles him to relief in equity, then the Court's hands are not tied to exercise it in his favour. Reference in this connection may also be made air 1914 Mad. , 706 and AIR 1928 Mad. 250 "in that decision their Lordships have, with approval, referred to the decision of the Madras High Court in Appayya shetty v. Mahommad Bean (7 ). One of the learned Judges, who was a party to that decis on (Madras decision) Seshagiri Aiyar, J. , has observed as follows:"a proviso for re-entry on nonpayment of rent is merely a security for the payment of rent and relief should be given if arrears and expenses are paid and if the parties can be placed in status quo ante and the insertion of such a clause should not be held to disentitle the tenant from equitable relief. "another learned Judge, Napier J. , referring to English decisions in this connection, has observed as follows:"the principle which guides English courts of equity in relieving against forfeiture of tenancy for non-payment of rent viz. , that the tenant, if not relieved against, should suffer enormous less whorly disproportionate 16 the injury, apples to India, and the provison in the lease for days of grace coes not take the case out of the principle. "in a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court also this view has been upheld. In R. S. Lala Praduman kumar v. Virendra Goyal (8) (at para-7) the Supreme Court observes as follows:"the Covenant of for ferture of tenancy for non-payment of rent is regarded by the courts as merely a clause for securing payment of rent, and unless the tenant has, by his conduct, disentitled himself to suitable relief the Courts grant relief against forfeiture of tenancy on the tenant paying the rent due. interest thereon, and costs of the suit. interest thereon, and costs of the suit. Juisdiction to relieve against forfeiture for non-payment of rent may be execised by the Court if the tenant in a suit in ejectment at the hearing of the suit pays the arrears of rent together with interest thereon and full costs of the suit. In terms Section 114 makes payment of rent at the hearing of the suit in ejectment a condition of the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction but an appeal being a re hearing of the suit in appropriate cases it is open to the appellate court at the hearing of the appeal to relieve the tenant in default against forfeiture. Passing of a decree in ejectment against the tenant by the court of first instance does not take away the jurisdiction of the appellate court to grant equitable relief. "it is true, as already stated, we are not, in, the instant case, dealing with any forfeiture clause of a lease, but with a statutory lease, a lease, created or continued by the provisions of the rent Act. The ratio of the authorities referred to above, however, will, to an extent, be useful in understanding as to how courts have acted in using their discretion while confronted with a situation like this. ( 11 ) MANY things are brought into play while examining the conduct of the tenant in this context. As observed in Praduman Kumar's case (8) (supra ). unless his conduct disentitled him, "the courts hands are not tied to exercise it in his favour. As already stated, the discretionary power range of a Judge is a difficult area to operate. Of the many factors to be taken note of, the first and the foremost is the conduct of the tenant, the man who seeks equity. In assessing his conduct court has to see as to whether he is a, chronic defaulter. It has also to see whether he had any genuine, genuine from his point of view, grounds to withhold rent. Was he prevented from any real difficulty in remitting the rent, in spite of his desire to fulfil his obligation would be a factor for consideration. In examining this, his economic condition also may have relevance. It is not possible to envisage all situations. Human nature reacts to situations in myriad ways. Times are when it is righteously indignant, defiant, fo dish, crooked, selfish etc. In examining this, his economic condition also may have relevance. It is not possible to envisage all situations. Human nature reacts to situations in myriad ways. Times are when it is righteously indignant, defiant, fo dish, crooked, selfish etc. Calculated cunning or selfish attitudes will have to be differentiated from reactions borne out by frustrations. ( 12 ) LET us examine the conduct of the tenant in the instant care. After notice to the landlady, the Municipality in implementing its scheme of underground drainage system, had pulled down the latrine attached to this house. The landlady, whose duty it was to provide an alternate arrangement had not done so inspite of repeated requests by the tenant. Thus, he and the inmates of his house, perhaps, had been put to the humiliation of using some one else's lavatory or making their own temporary arrangements. She, the landlady, who, it appears, under the agreement was liable to pay water charge, had not paid the same. With these provccations in the background the tenant withheld a few months' rents and when notice was issued, forgetting the mandate of law, got issued a reply denying her claim and in effect telling he bringing to her notice her lapses and his consequent sufferings, with what face was she claiming rents from him. What was his intention? Was it to deprive her of her legitimate due or indignation at her failure to discharge her obligations? If it is the latter, as it appears to be, is this a case in which he should be saddled with the extreme penalty of eviction? I do not think so. Tha Courts below have not correctly approached the questions involved. Their orders, in mv view, are required to be quashed ( 13 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent drew my attention to a division Bench ruling of this Court in Shiva v. Devanna, (9) and submitted that a tenant who commits default in a case like this will not be entitled to any relief at all under sub-sec. (2) of Section 21 of the Act. I do not find anything in that decision contrary to what has been stated above. ( 14 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, this revision is allowed, the orders of both the courts below are hereby set aside; and the application filed by the land-lady under Clause (a) of sub-sec (1) of sec. (2) of Section 21 of the Act. I do not find anything in that decision contrary to what has been stated above. ( 14 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, this revision is allowed, the orders of both the courts below are hereby set aside; and the application filed by the land-lady under Clause (a) of sub-sec (1) of sec. 21 of the Act for possession of the premises is hereby dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .