SABHAHTT, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal under S. 72 (4) of the bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, (hereinafter referred to as the 'act') is by trustees and is directed against the judgment and order, dated 10-4-1978, passed by the Prl. District Judge, Belgaum, in Misc. Appln. No. 222 [1977, on his file, made before him under S. 72 (2) of the Act. ( 2 ) THE brief and relevant facts necessary for the appreciation of the facts and questions in this appeal are: adishayya Kadayya Kadadevaru, by an application, dated 27-6-1968, before the Assistant Charity Commissioner, belgaum, under S. 22 of the Act, prayed for inclusion of 20 items of properties shown in the application as the properties belonging to the Trust, namely, Sri kadasiddeshwar Temple of Konnur village. . . The same was resisted by dundayya, the applicant before the District judge. The Assistant Charity Coumissioner, Belgaum, held that the properties are trust property. That was confirmed by the Charity Commissioner. Aggrieved by the said order, an application was made by the applicant, under S. 72 of the Act, before the District Judge. ( 3 ) THE learned District Judge raised the following points as arising for his consideration. 1, Whether the opponent No. 1 proves that the properties TPC Nos. 124 and 127)4 of Konnur, are the trust properties of Sri Kadasiddeshwar Dev Muth at Konnur? 2, What order? the learned District Judge, re-assessing the evidence, held that the Assistant charity Commissioner and Charity commissioner had no jurisdiction to decide the question of title and in that view, according to him, the application was not maintainable. He has also held further, that in the application under S. 22 of the Act, the question whether they were Trust properties or not could not be gone into by the Assistant Charity commissioner; and further he held that the applicant failed to establish that they were trust properties. In that view, he allowed the application on setting aside the order passed by the assistant Charity Commissioner, confirmed by the Charity Commissioner. Aggrieved by the said Order, the Trustees have come up before this Court, under S. 72 (4) of the Act, with the above appeal. In that view, he allowed the application on setting aside the order passed by the assistant Charity Commissioner, confirmed by the Charity Commissioner. Aggrieved by the said Order, the Trustees have come up before this Court, under S. 72 (4) of the Act, with the above appeal. ( 4 ) DURING hearing, the learned counsel, sri B. V, Jigjinni, appearing for the appellants, gave an application praying for amendment of the original application for converting it into an application under S. 22-A of the Act, as the, application was given originally only under s. 22 of the Act. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the, appellants further submitted that in the interest of justice the amendment application should be allowed and the appeal allowed and the case remitted back to the Assistant Charity Commissioner to hold fresh enquiry giving opportunity to the parties while holding enquiry under S. 22-A of the Act. ( 6 ) AS against that, the learned counsel, sri Mandagi, appearing for the respondent in this appeal, strenuously urged before us that the learned District judge was perfectly justified in observing 'that the question of title could not be gone into even in a proceeding under s. 19 or 22-A of the Act and as such the prayer for amendment could not be considered and accepted. He further submitted that the scope of enquiry under s. 72 (4) of the Act was limited and this court sitting in appeal could not exercise powers which could not be exercised by the District Judge, under S. 72 (2) of the Act. ( 7 ) THE points, therefore, that arise for our consideration in this appeal are:1. Whether the District Judge was justified in observing that the Assistant Charity Commissioner, or Charity commissioner, under the Act, could not decide the question whether a property is Public Trust property? 2. Whether this Court has no powers of allowing the appeal and remanding the case in appeal under S. 72 (4) of the Act? , in order to appreciate the contentions raised before us, it would be necessary to read the power and functions of Assistant Charity Commissioner and charity Commissioner, conferred in the act. 2. Whether this Court has no powers of allowing the appeal and remanding the case in appeal under S. 72 (4) of the Act? , in order to appreciate the contentions raised before us, it would be necessary to read the power and functions of Assistant Charity Commissioner and charity Commissioner, conferred in the act. Among other things, S. 79 (1) of the Act reads:"any question, whether or not a trust exists and, such trust is a public trust or particular property is the property of such trust, shall be decided by the Deputy or Assistant Charity commissioner or the Charity Commissioner in appeal as provided by this Act. "section 79 (2) of the Act reads:"the decision of the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or the charity Commissioner in appeal, as the case may be, shall, unless set aside by the decision of the Court on application or of the High Court in appeal, be final and conclusive. "sec. 80 of the Act further ousts the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in these matters; it reads:"save as expressly provided in this act, no civil Court shall have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act to be decided or dealt with by any officer or authority under this Act, or in respect of which the decision or order of such officer or authority has been made final and conclusive. " ( 8 ) THUS, reading Ss. 79 and 80 of the Act together, it becomes manifest that it is the exclusive jurisdiction of the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner to decide whether a trust exists and such trust is a public trust or a particular property is a property of such trust. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide upon these questions. ( 9 ) UNDER S. 19 of the Act, inquiry for registration by the Deputy or Assistant charity Commissioner is contemplated. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide upon these questions. ( 9 ) UNDER S. 19 of the Act, inquiry for registration by the Deputy or Assistant charity Commissioner is contemplated. It reads:"on the receipt of an application under Section 18, or upon an application made by any person having interest in a public trust or on his own motion, the Deputy or Assistant charity Commissioner shall make an inquiry in the prescribed manner for the purpose of ascertaining: (i) Whether a trust exists and whether such trust is a public trust, (ii) Whether any property is the property of such trust, (iii) Whether the whole or any substantial portion of the subject-matter of the trust is situate within his jurisdiction, (iv) The names and addresses of the trustees and manager of such trust, (v) the mode of succession'to the office of the trustee of such trust, (vi) the origin, nature and object of such trust, (vii) the amount of gross average annual income and expenditure of such trust, and (viii) any other particulars as may be prescribed under sub-section (5) of section 18. " ( 10 ) THUS, it becomes clear that whenever an application is made by any person having interest in a public trust or on his own motion, it is one of the duties of the deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner to find out whether any property is the property of such public trust. Thus, reading Ss. 79 and 80; in conjunction with S. 19 of the Act, we have no hesitation to hold that one of the powers specifically- conferred under the Act, upon the Deputy or Assistant Charity commissioner is to find out whether any property is the property of the public trust in question and the, jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted to that extent expressly under S. 80 of the Act. Now, S. 22-A is a section which is incorporated by Amending Act XIV of 1954, before States Re-organisation which reads:"if at any time, after the enteries are made in the register under S. 21 or 22 it appears to the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner that any particular relating to any public trust, which was not the subject matter of the inquiry under Section 19, or subsection (3) of Section 22, as the case may be, has remained to be; enquired into, the Deputy or Assistant Charity commissioner, as the case may be may make further inquiry in the prescribed manner, record his findings and make entries in the register in accordance with the decision arrived at or if appeals or applications are made as provided by this Act, in accordance with the decision of the competent authority provided by this Act. ( 11 ) THE provisions of Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 shall, so far as may be, apply to the inquiry, the recording of findings and the making of entries in the register under this section. " ( 12 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent as stated above strenuously urged before us that the question of title in dispute or question of hostile title cannot be gone into at all by the Deputy or assistant Charity Commissioner under s. 19 of the Act or under S. 22a of the, act. He very much relied on a Full bench decision of Bombay High Court in Keki Pestonji Jamadar v. Khodadad merwan Irani (1), for the above proposition advanced by him before us. ( 13 ) AS against that the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that in view of the specific provisions in Ss. 19, 22a, 79 and 80 of the Act specific power to decide whether a property is a property of public trust or not is conferred on the, deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner and to hold otherwise would be to render otiose an express provision of law. He further submitted that the ratio decidendi of the decision of the bombay High Court does not support the proposition of law as advanced by the learned counsel for respondent. ( 14 ) IN order to appreciate the rival contentions advanced before us we were taken through the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court. He further submitted that the ratio decidendi of the decision of the bombay High Court does not support the proposition of law as advanced by the learned counsel for respondent. ( 14 ) IN order to appreciate the rival contentions advanced before us we were taken through the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court. The specific questions referred to the Full Bench in that decision are these:"1) Is the question whether the author of the trust was the lawful owner of the property of which he has created the trust or had otherwise authority to create the, particular trust, covered by Section 79 read with Section 80 of the Bombay Public trusts Act, 1950? 2) Can a person who has once appeared in the proceedings under the bombay Public Trusts Act and has made his contentions therein on the above question, bring a suit in a Civil court in respect of such a question ? or , 3) Has the Civil Court no jurisdiction to deal with or decide such a question by reason of Section 80 of the Act?' thus, it is clear, that the question referred to the Full Bench of the Bombay high Court was not whether the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner has no jurisdiction to decide whether tht property is a public trust property or not, but specifically otherwise as stated above in question No. 1, and the Full bench considering the various aspects of the provision of law and Rules under that Act answered the questions as follows : "for these reasons, our answer to the first question is in the negative. ( 15 ) AS regards questions 2 and 3, we ere of the opinion that for determining whether the bar under Section 80 of the Act arises, it is irrelevant whether the person who wants to raise the particular question was or was not a party to the proceedings under Section 19. The fact that such a person was a party to those proceedings may, perhaps, raise a bar analogous to that of res judicata but we are not concerned with that question and would prefer not to express any opinion thereon. The Civil Court would, however, have the jurisdiction to decide the points mentioned in question No. 1 in the sense that S. 80 cannot operate as a bar to that jurisdiction. The Civil Court would, however, have the jurisdiction to decide the points mentioned in question No. 1 in the sense that S. 80 cannot operate as a bar to that jurisdiction. " ( 16 ) THIS is all that the Full Bench has decided in that decision, namely that the civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the question whether the author of the trust was the lawful owner of the property of which he has created the trust or had otherwise authority to create the particular trust. We respectfully accept the answer given by the full Bench on full discussion. ( 17 ) IN order to appreciate the denotation of the answer it is necessary to read a few sentences from para-20 of the judgment:"the third question relegated to the decision of the Deputy or Assistant charity Commissioner is whether the "particular property is the property of such trust. , ' This clause is couched in words of doubtful import leading to the expression of divergent views as regards its scope. Learned counsel for the appellant contends for the view that as the question whe;- ther the particular property is the property of the trust'. cannot be answered without deciding whether the author of the trust had the right or title to the property conveyed to the trust, the authorities must decide this latter question and, indeed, it is urged that questions of title to the particular property are thus required to be decided in inquiries under section 19 and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide those quegtiots is barred under Section 80. The contesting respondents contend for the rival view that the question whether the author of the trust had title to the property conveyed to the trust is outside the scope of the inquiry under Section 19 and therefore, the jurisdiction of the Civil courts to decide or deal with that question is not barred. The learned government pleader has pointed out the merits and demerits of both the views. But he has given good reasons why the contention of the respondents should be accepted in preference to that of the appellant. Having considered the matter in all the aspects presented before us we are of the opinion that the respondents are right in their contention. But he has given good reasons why the contention of the respondents should be accepted in preference to that of the appellant. Having considered the matter in all the aspects presented before us we are of the opinion that the respondents are right in their contention. " ( 18 ) THUS it becomes amply clear that what their Lordships have answered is that the scope of S. 19 of the Act does not include the consideration of the title of the person who created the trust or the validity of such trust. The Full Bench decision never suggests or states anything contrary to the express provision of law that it is the function of the Deputy or Asst. Charity Commissioner to decide whether a property is a property of a public trust or not. Hence we are unable to accept the sweeping proposition made before us by the learned counsel for the respondent that the Deputy or assistant Charity Commissioner, according to the Full Bench decision of the bombay High Court referred to above, has no jurisdiction at all to decide the title of the public trust with regard to a, particular property when the same is disputed. ( 19 ) IN this context, it is relevant to refer to the Full Bench decision of our High court in the case of Sri Gurupadayya charantayya Adavimath v. Chikkayya (2 ). His Lordship Jagannatha Shetty, who spoke for the Full Bench, in para-11 of the judgment has specifically observed thus:"in the language of S. 80, two categories of matters are excepted from the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. The matter which the authorities under the Act have jurisdiction to decide or deal with, and the questions in respect of which the Act imparts finality to the decision of the statutory authorities, are both excluded from the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. There is no difficulty to isolate the questions falling under the second category. The matter which the authorities under the Act have jurisdiction to decide or deal with, and the questions in respect of which the Act imparts finality to the decision of the statutory authorities, are both excluded from the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. There is no difficulty to isolate the questions falling under the second category. They have been specifically provided under sub-section (1) of S. 79, namely, tbe question as to whether or not a trust exists, whether such trust is a public trust and whether a particular property is the property of such trust, these questions shall be decided by the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner and the decision thereon unless set aside by the court on application or in appeal under the Act has been made final and "conclusive under sub-section (2) of Section 79. " ( 20 ) THIS proposition of law as laid down by the Full Bench of this Court binds us. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that it is the exclusive function of the deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner, under S, 79 (1) of the Act, to decide, inter alia, whether a property is the property of the public trust and his decision, "subject to conditions mentioned, becomes final and conclusive and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide that question. ( 21 ) THAT leads us to the consideration of the question involved on the facts of the present case: Whether the two properties are the properties of the public trust in question or not. There cannot be any dispute on this fact. The trust asserts that these two properties are its properties whereas the respondent in the appeal asserts that they are his ancestral properties. Alternatively he also claimed ownership of those properties by adverse possession. ( 22 ) FOR reasons discussed above whether these two properties are the properties of the public trust can certainly be gone into and has to be gone into exclusively by the Deputy or Assistant Charity commissioner, as contemplated undeir s. 79 (1) of the Act. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide that question. Hence, we are constrained to hold that there is no substance in the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent, ( 23 ) THAT takes us to the question whether the amendment sought for by the learned counsel for appellants should be allowed. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide that question. Hence, we are constrained to hold that there is no substance in the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent, ( 23 ) THAT takes us to the question whether the amendment sought for by the learned counsel for appellants should be allowed. It is in this context that we have to consider the preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for respondent, that this Court sitting under s. 72 (4) of the Act has no power to remand the case. S. 72 (4) of the Act reads: an appeal shall lie to the High court against the decision of the Court under sub-section (2) as if such decision was a decree from which, an appeal ordinarily lies. " thus, it becomes amply clear that the normal procedure before this Court in matters of appeals would be applicable to appeals contemplated under S. 72 (4) of the Act. Thus in such appeals, this Court has to exercise jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure. That being so, this Court has among other things, the power to reverse and remand the case. ( 24 ) IT may, no doubt, be otherwise in the case of inquiry by the District Judge under S. 72 (1) of the Act, for it is spefically stated as to what powers he should exercise in such a case under Section 72 (1) of the Act. Hence, there is no substance in the submission made before us by the learned counsel for the respondent that this court cannot exercise powers of reversing the decree and remanding the case on allowing the amendment. ( 25 ) THE next point that arises for our consideration is: Whether the amendment application should be allowed. It is a settled principle of law that an application for amendment should be allowed liberally with a view to do substantial justice between the parties, unless it is shown that prejudice would be caused to one of the parties who had by lapse of time acquired some legal right as in the case of an action barred by limitation. It is a settled principle of law that an application for amendment should be allowed liberally with a view to do substantial justice between the parties, unless it is shown that prejudice would be caused to one of the parties who had by lapse of time acquired some legal right as in the case of an action barred by limitation. No such contention can be advanced on the facts of the present case, because it is a matter pertaining to the public trust and under S. 22-A of the act, it is specifically provided that such an application may be made later, without prescribing any period of limitation. ( 26 ) THE original application was made by in-advertance under S. 22 of the Act. in schedule III prescribed form. But the charity Commissioner, in his order, dated 10-4-71, in para-15, pointed out thus:"the matter involved in the change report is the matter of omission at the time of the registration, and it required the enquiry only under Section 22-A of the Bombay Public Trusts act. On this ground among others stated above, the enquiry held by the learned Assistant Charity Commissioner is improper and illegal, and therefore the finding recorded by him is unsustainable. . . . . ""the said proceeding is remanded to the Assistant Charity Commissioner for further enquiry on treating it as a proceeding under Section 22-A of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, with direction to give notice to the parties concerned and to the public also. . . "the Charity Commissioner was no doubt right in observing that the case is governed under S, 22-A of the Act. But in our considered view, he was not justified in ordering that an application given under S. 22 of the Act should itself be treated as one under S. 22-A, as the reliefs claimed in the two applications and the questions involved for decision are entirely different. A Court can give relief only on the basis of the prayer made for which there is a foundation laid in the petition. Hence, it is necessary that the application should if at all be amended as an application under s. 22-A of the Act. It is for that purpose that the learned counsel for the appellant has given the present application for amendment. Hence, it is necessary that the application should if at all be amended as an application under s. 22-A of the Act. It is for that purpose that the learned counsel for the appellant has given the present application for amendment. We are inclined to allow the same to do substantial justice between the parties and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Accordingly we allow the amendment application. ( 27 ) THAT necessarily requires that the order passed by the learned District judge should be set aside. So also the order passed by the Assistant Charity commissioner and the Charity Commissioner, earlier. We may also mention that we are constrained to set aside the order passed by the learned District Judge, for reasons discussed above since he has held that the Assistant Charity Commissioner has no jurisdiction to decide the question of title, namely, whether a property belongs to a public trust or not. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the order passed by the Assistant Charity Commissioner confirmed by the charity Commissioner and the order passed by ther District Judge are hereby set aside and the case is remitted back to the, Assistant Charity Commissioner with a direction that the Trustees shall be allowed to amend the petition in accordance with the application made before this Court within 15 days from the receipt of the records and thereafter following the procedure contemplated under the Rules and the Act, the Assistant Charity Commissioner shall dispose of the case in accordance with law. No costs. --- *** --- .